JUDGMENT : 1. The challenge is made to an order no. 126 dated 22nd April, 2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), 4th Court, Sealdah in Title Suit No. 238 of 1990, by which an application for addition of party is rejected. 2. At the very outset this Court must record that the suit for eviction against the tenant has been unreasonably delayed and is pending since more than two decades. 3. Since the point urged before this Court assumes importance, this Court feels that it would be proper to deal with the same without being swayed by the number of years of pendency of the said suit. 4. Admittedly the suit for eviction was filed against the tenant, inter alia, on the ground of default, subletting and reasonable requirement. The original defendant was contesting the said suit. In course of the suit he died. An application for substitution was taken out by the plaintiff/opposite party impleading the widow and the son as heirs, who were ordinarily residing with the tenant at the time of his death. 5. It is also not in dispute that the widow subsequently died so the son and the heirs of the said son have been substituted in the suit. It is also a fact that the heirs of the deceased son are not contesting the said suit and the suit has been posted at the ex parte board. 6. The petitioner took out an application for her addition as defendant in the said suit on the premise that she, being one of the legal representatives and heirs of the original defendant, is a necessary and property party. It is further stated that though she was given in marriage but was residing with her parent and after his death is looking after his business with the help and assistance of a manager. 7. The Trial Court proceeded to dismiss the said application relying on a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in case of Shkuntala Vasant Pahadi & Ors. vs. Purushottam Vasant Pethe & Ors. reported in (2007) 3 SCC 123 wherein it is held that if the estate of the tenant is sufficiently represented, mere absence of one or two heirs would not invalidate the decree for eviction. 8. The doctrine of representation was applied by the Supreme Court in the said decision. 9. vs. Purushottam Vasant Pethe & Ors. reported in (2007) 3 SCC 123 wherein it is held that if the estate of the tenant is sufficiently represented, mere absence of one or two heirs would not invalidate the decree for eviction. 8. The doctrine of representation was applied by the Supreme Court in the said decision. 9. Before the points agitated by the respective parties are taken up, it is necessary to recapitulate the relevant section of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. 10. Section 2 (h) of the said Act defines “tenant” as a person by whom or on whose account or by way of rent of any premises is or but for a special contract would be payable and includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy or in the event of such person’s death, such of his heirs as were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death. 11. The definition of “tenant” is composite one and imbibe within itself two eventualities; firstly when a person dies before termination of his tenancy, meaning thereby on the death of a contractual tenant the heirs and legal representatives, who succeeded to the estate left by him; secondly on the death of a person, whose tenancy has been determined such of his heirs, who were ordinarily residing at the time of his death. 12. It leaves no ambiguity to say that tenancy is a heritable estate and passes on to the heirs and legal representatives on death. The special feature, which can be seen from the definition of “tenant” is that all the heirs and legal representatives may not be joined in a suit for eviction, if such death occurs after termination of a tenancy. The special qualification required in such eventuality is that such heir, who was ordinarily residing at the time of his death, is required to be substituted, as he satisfies the definition clause. 13. There has been a divergent of opinion on a question whether a decree for eviction shall be rendered invalid or ineffective having passed against some of the heirs without impleading the others, if the contractual tenant dies before the termination of tenancy. 14. 13. There has been a divergent of opinion on a question whether a decree for eviction shall be rendered invalid or ineffective having passed against some of the heirs without impleading the others, if the contractual tenant dies before the termination of tenancy. 14. This Court feels that such point need not be gone into, as it is an admitted case that the suit for eviction was instituted against the original tenant, who died during the pendency of the suit. Ordinarily the Court shall not implead such heirs, who were not ordinarily residing with such tenant at the time of his death, as they do not satisfy the definition engrafted under Section 2(h) of the said Act. It is to facilitate the carriage of eviction proceeding and the persons, who were found to be in possession, were bestowed right to such tenancy. 15. The unique feature, which has been brought in the definition of “tenant” is the concept of a statutory tenant distinct from the contractual tenant. Admittedly the present case falls within the ambit of the statutory tenant and there is no difficulty in saying that a person, being one of the heirs, if satisfies the Court that he or she was ordinarily residing with the tenant at the time of his death is a necessary and proper party and mandatorily required to be impleaded in such suit. 16. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that there has been a categorical statement made in the application that his client was residing with the original tenant at the time of his death and, therefore, she is a necessary and proper party. He further submits that there is no contradiction to such specific statements made in the said application and, therefore, the Trial Court has wrongly applied the principles of representation in rejecting the application for addition. 17. According to him the doctrine of representation is well recognised principle but applies in a special circumstances and cannot be brought in all conceivable situation with lock, stock and barrel. 18. On the other hand, Mr. 17. According to him the doctrine of representation is well recognised principle but applies in a special circumstances and cannot be brought in all conceivable situation with lock, stock and barrel. 18. On the other hand, Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/opposite party, submits that it is imperative on the part of a person applying for addition to show that he is in possession of the suit premises and relied upon a judgement of the Coordinate Bench delivered in case of Bimal Kumar Goenka vs. Sri Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal & Ors. reported in 2010 (1) CLJ 763 . He further submits that the definition of “tenant” postulates that on the death of a statutory tenant if a daughter applies for her addition she has to satisfy that she was ordinarily residing with such tenant and mere occasional visit does not satisfy such condition as held in case of Nripati Nath Mitra & Ors. vs. Dilip Kumar Das & Ors. reported in 2008 (2) Indian Civil Cases 628 and in case of Durga Shaw vs. Ramdhani Singh & Anr. reported in 2007 (2) CLJ 373 . 19. He vehemently submits that the petitioner is trying to make out a new case as and by way of defence when the original tenant has not taken such point in the written statement already filed and, therefore, the Trial Court has rightly rejected the application for addition of party. He showed his apprehension that if the petitioner is allowed to be impleaded as a defendant in an eviction suit, it shall invite the other two unmarried daughters to seek their impleadment in the suit and, therefore, the Court should deny such addition. 20. As indicated above what is sine-qua-non for deciding an application for addition is whether the person applying has a direct and substantial interest in the subject matter distinct from commercial interest to satisfy the criterion for necessary and proper party. A necessary party is who without whose presence the adjudication cannot be made effectively. On the other hand, proper party is one whose presence is necessary for complete and effective adjudication of the disputes. 21. It is undisputed that the tenancy is a heritable estate and the heirs inherited the same in accordance with the law of succession applicable to them. 22. On the other hand, proper party is one whose presence is necessary for complete and effective adjudication of the disputes. 21. It is undisputed that the tenancy is a heritable estate and the heirs inherited the same in accordance with the law of succession applicable to them. 22. The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act governs the rights of the landlord and tenant and imbibes within itself various provisions including the provision for eviction of a tenant. In case of a statutory tenant it is imperative on the part of the person, who seeks addition to satisfy that he or she was ordinarily residing with at the time of death of such tenant. 23. There cannot be any doubt on enunciation of law laid down in the aforesaid decisions and it would be an idle exercise if each of such judgements cited by Mr. Ghosh is dealt separately, as this Court concurs with the proposition of law laid down therein. The judgement should be read with the facts involved therein, as a little difference or an additional fact may invite diametrically opposite decision. 24. All the judgements cited by Mr. Ghosh uniformly held that on the death of a statutory tenant it is not obligatory on the part of the landlord to implead all the heirs, who otherwise succeeded to the estate under the law of succession, but such heirs, who were ordinarily residing with such tenant at the time of his death. 25. In the instant case the petitioner had categorically stated in paragraph 6 of the application that though she was given in marriage, but all along resided with the original tenant at the suit premises and upon his death is taking care of his business by engaging a manager. 26. Admittedly the plaintiff/opposite party did not file any written objection to the said application. The statements made on oath goes unchallenged and there is no difficulty in applying the doctrine of non-traverse in such situation. The Court is not supposed to hold mini trial at the time of deciding an application for addition. If the Court finds the statements to be sufficient to satisfy the definition of “tenant” engrafted under Section 2(h) of the said Act, it is enough to implead the said person as necessary and proper party. 27. The contention of Mr. The Court is not supposed to hold mini trial at the time of deciding an application for addition. If the Court finds the statements to be sufficient to satisfy the definition of “tenant” engrafted under Section 2(h) of the said Act, it is enough to implead the said person as necessary and proper party. 27. The contention of Mr. Ghosh that the documents would reveal that the business of the tenant is managed and administered by a third party is premature, inasmuch as the suit has been instituted allegedly on the ground of subletting. It is a matter of evidence whether such person is a subtenant or not and to be decided after full-fledged trial. At the stage of addition the Court should confine its scrutiny whether the person seeking addition is necessary or proper party. 28. In view of the uncontroverted statements made in the application, there is no hesitation in my mind that the petitioner satisfies all the criteria required for addition of a party in a suit for eviction and further satisfies the definition of “tenant’ engrafted in Section 2(h) of the said Act. 29. The Trial Court, in my view, have wrongly proceeded to apply the doctrine of representation and thereby overlooked the material statements made therein. 30. The order impugned is thus set aside. 31. The revisional application is thus allowed. 32. The petitioner is directed to be impleaded as defendant in the said suit. 33. The plaintiff/opposite party is directed to file amended plaint impleading the petitioner as codefendant in the suit and it goes without saying that a copy thereof shall be served upon the petitioner within the time provided under Order VI Rue 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 34. The Trial Court is requested to see that the suit is disposed of within six months from the date of the communication of this order, if necessary shall decline unnecessary adjournments to either of the parties. 35. In view of the decision taken in C.O. 1999 of 2016, the impugned order challenged in C.O. 4405 of 2016, being dependent one cannot independently stand upon and is also set aside. 36. C.O. 4405 of 2016 is accordingly disposed of. 37. There will be no order as to costs.