JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. 1. This Regular Second Appeal at the instance of the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the ‘plaintiff’) is directed against judgment and decree dated 27.6.2007 passed by learned Additional District Judge (FTC), Una whereby the judgment and decree dated 29.4.2000 passed by the learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Court No.1, Amb has been reversed. 2. The appellant/plaintiff sought the relief of permanent injunction restraining the respondents/defendants from raising any sort of construction, taking forcible possession or interfering in any manner in the suit land, more specifically shown by letters ABCDEFG with red in the site plan being part of land of Khasra No.216. The contention of the plaintiff was that he was owner in exclusive Hissadari possession of the suit land and the defendants who were very clever and head strong persons in connivance with the settlement field staff had got the shape of the suit land disfigured with regard to the location and in consequence thereto Karukans of the suit land were reduced on the eastern side. It is the case of the appellant/plaintiff that during the process of settlement defendants got their land increased thereby causing loss and reduction of the land of the plaintiff. On coming to know about the wrong done by the settlement field staff with regard to the reducing of the area of the plaintiff, he filed an application for correction of Karukans before the Collector Settlement who vide order dated 10.1.1995, ordered the correction to the effect that the area comprised of khasra No.213/3, 214/1 and 215/1 be deleted from the ownership of defendants by adding the same to the ownership of the appellant/plaintiff. The order passed by the Collector was unsuccessfully assailed by the defendants before the Divisional Commissioner. 3. Respondents/Defendants contested the suit by raising preliminary objections of non maintainability of the suit and estoppel. In Para No.1 of the written statement the ownership of the suit land being that of the plaintiff/appellant was not disputed. However, it was submitted that the site plan produced by the plaintiff was wrong as he had wrongly included the land of the defendants in the site plan. In nut shell, the stand of the defendants was that the plaintiff wanted to encroach upon the land of the defendants comprised in khasra No.215. 4. However, it was submitted that the site plan produced by the plaintiff was wrong as he had wrongly included the land of the defendants in the site plan. In nut shell, the stand of the defendants was that the plaintiff wanted to encroach upon the land of the defendants comprised in khasra No.215. 4. Plaintiff filed replication to the written statement wherein he denied the allegations of the defendants and reiterated the claim set out in the plaint. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, learned trial court vide order dated 29.4.2000 framed the following issues:- “(1) Whether plaintiff s entitled to the relief of injunction as alleged? OPP. (2) Whether land shown by letters ABCDEFG in site plan is part of the suit land? OPP. (2B) Whether the defendants during pendency of the suit had raised construction on 10.12.1994? OPP. (3). Whether suit s not maintainable? OPD. (4) Whether plaintiff is estopped from filing suit? OPD. (5). Relief. 6. The learned trial court allowed the suit of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial court, respondents/defendants filed appeal before the learned lower appellate, who allowed the same, constraining the appellants to approach this court by way of instant Regular Second Appeal. 7. On 1st August, 2007, the appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- “1. Whether the order passed by the revenue Officer ordering the correction of the Karukans which were wrongly prepared during the settlement, can be gone into by the civil court, more particularly when such order of correction had attained the finality with the order of the Divisional Commissioner and no further appeal or revision was preferred? 2. What is the effect of non filing the appeal/ revision by the defendants/respondents against the order of confirmation passed by the Divisional Commissioner of correcting the mistake with regard to the Karukans committed by the field staff? 3. Whether the admission of a party to the lis is binding on such party and can be used against such person and non consideration of such admission by the learned lower appellate court has caused a prejudice to the plaintiff/appellant?” I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case. Substantial Question No.1 8. Substantial Question No.1 8. It is not in dispute that during settlement, the karukans prepared were ordered to be rectified by the Collector vide order Ext P-8 and the order so passed was affirmed by the Divisional Commissioner vide order Ext P-9. It is further not in dispute that this order has attained finality, having not been assailed before any authority or even a court of competent jurisdiction. Now, what would be the effect of the order? 9. Section 11 Explanation VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under: “An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.” 10. It cannot be disputed that the Settlement Collector had the jurisdiction to entertain the application for correction. Therefore, in such circumstances, whether the order was right or wrong or in accordance with law or not in accordance with law, would not make the order coram non judice or void and the respondents/defendants, if at all aggrieved, were required to assail the same before the competent authority. 11. To be fair to the learned counsel for the respondents/defendants, he has vehemently argued that once it is proved on record that no proper procedure was followed by the Settlement Collector while ordering the correction of entries and also bearing in mind that these corrections were carried out at the back of the respondents without affording proper and reasonable opportunity of being heard to them, these findings cannot be held to be binding much less operate as res judicata against the respondents/defendants. 12. It is more than settled that where a court or Tribunal is having authority or jurisdiction to decide a particular dispute, but in exercise of such jurisdiction, comes to a wrong conclusion then it is difficult to hold that such an order is void. The correctness of the order has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court. 12. It is more than settled that where a court or Tribunal is having authority or jurisdiction to decide a particular dispute, but in exercise of such jurisdiction, comes to a wrong conclusion then it is difficult to hold that such an order is void. The correctness of the order has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court. It is equally settled that where a quasi judicial authority has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it does not lose its jurisdiction by coming to a wrong conclusion whether it is wrong in law or facts and if decides wrongly, the party wronged can only take the recourse prescribed by law for setting the matters right and if that course is not taken, the decision, however, wrong, cannot be disturbed. 13. Similar issue came up before a Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ujjam Bai Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. AIR 1962 SC 1621 and it was held as under:- “15. Now, I come to the controversial area. What is the position with regard to an order made by a quasi-judicial authority in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction in pursuance of a provision of law which is admittedly intra vires? It is necessary first to clarify the concept of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction means authority to decide. Whenever a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal is empowered or required to enquire into a question of law or fact for the purpose of giving a decision on it, its findings thereon cannot be impeached collaterally or on an application for certiorari but are binding until (1) (1962) 1 S.C.R. 540 reversed on appeal. Where a quasi-judicial authority has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it does not lose its jurisdiction by coming to a wrong conclusion whether it is wrong in law or in fact. The question, whether a tribunal hat; jurisdiction depends not on the truth or falsehood of the facts into which it has to enquire, or upon the correctness of its findings on these facts, but upon their nature, and it is determinable "at the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the enquiry." (Rex v. Bolten, (1841) 1 QB 66 at p.74). The question, whether a tribunal hat; jurisdiction depends not on the truth or falsehood of the facts into which it has to enquire, or upon the correctness of its findings on these facts, but upon their nature, and it is determinable "at the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the enquiry." (Rex v. Bolten, (1841) 1 QB 66 at p.74). Thus, a tribunal empowered to determine claims for compensation for loss of office has jurisdiction to determine all questions of law and fact relating to the measure of compensation and the tenure of the office, and it does not exceed its jurisdiction by determining any of those questions incorrectly but it has no jurisdiction to entertain a claim for reinstatement or damages for wrongful dismissal, and it will exceed its jurisdiction if it makes an order in such terms, for it has no legal power to give any decision whatsoever on those matters. A tribunal may lack jurisdiction if it is improperly constituted, or if it fails to observe certain essential preliminaries to the inquiry. But it does not exceed its jurisdiction by basing its decision upon an incorrect determination of any question that it is empowered or required, (i.e.) has jurisdiction to determine. The strength of this theory of jurisdiction lies in its logical consistency. But there are other oases where Parliament when it empowers an inferior tribunal to enquire into certain facts intend to demarcate two areas of enquiry, the tribunal's findings within one area being conclusive and with in the other area impeachable. "The jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon the existence of some particular fact. Such a, fact is collateral to the actual matter which the tribunal has to try and the determination whether it exists (1) [1841] 1 Q.B. 66, 74. Not is logically prior to the determination of the actual question which the tribunal has to try. The tribunal must itself decide as to the collateral fact when, at the inception of an inquiry by a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, a challenge is made to its jurisdiction, the tribunal has to make up its mind whether it will act or not, and for that purpose to arrive at some decision on whether it has jurisdiction or not. The tribunal must itself decide as to the collateral fact when, at the inception of an inquiry by a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, a challenge is made to its jurisdiction, the tribunal has to make up its mind whether it will act or not, and for that purpose to arrive at some decision on whether it has jurisdiction or not. There may be tribunals which, by virtue of legislation constituting them, have the power to determine finally the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; but, subject to that an inferior tribunal cannot, by a wrong decision with regard to a collateral fact, give itself a jurisdiction which it would not otherwise possess." (Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. II page 59). The characteristic attribute of a judicial act or decision is that it binds, whether it be right or wrong. An error of law or fact committed by a judicial or quasi judicial body cannot, in general, be' impeached otherwise than on appeal unless the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the jurisdiction of that body depends. These principles govern not only the findings of inferior courts strito sensu but also the findings of administrative bodies which are held to be acting in a judicial capacity. Such bodies are deemed to have been invested with power to err within the limits of their jurisdiction; and provided that they keep within those limits, their decisions must be accepted as valid unless set aside on appeal. Even the doctrine of res judicata has been applied to such decisions. (Living Stone v. Westminister Corporation, (1904) 2 K.B. 109; Re Birkenhead Corporation, (1952) Ch. 359; Re 56 Denton Road Twickenham, (1953) Ch. 51; Society of Medical Officers of Health v. Hope, [1959] 2 W.L.R. 377, 391, 396, 397, 402 and In Burn & Co. Calcutta v. Their Employees, [1956] S.C.R. 781 : AIR 1957 SC 38 ) this Court said that although the rule of res judicata as enacted by s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not in terms apply to an award made by an industrial tribunal its underlying principle which is founded on sound public policy and is of universal application must apply. In Daryao v. The State of U.P. this Court applied the doctrine of res judicata in respect of application under Art. 32 of the Constitution. In Daryao v. The State of U.P. this Court applied the doctrine of res judicata in respect of application under Art. 32 of the Constitution. It is perhaps pertinent to observe here that when the Allahabad High Court was moved by the petitioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the order of assessment, passed on an alleged misconstruction of the notification of December 14, 1957, the High Court rejected the petition on two grounds. The first ground given Was that the petitioner had the alternative remedy of getting the error corrected by appeal the second ground given was expressed by the High Court in the following words:- "We have, however, heard the learned counsel for the petitioner on merits also, but we are not satisfied that the interpretation put upon this notification by the Sales Tax Officer contains any obvious error in it. The circumstances make the interpretation advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner unlikely. It is admitted that even handmade biris, have been subject to Sales Tax since long before the dated of the issue of the above notification. The object of passing the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Central Act No. 58 of 1957, was to levy an additional excise duty on certain important articles and with the concurrence of the State Legislature to abolish Sales Tax on those articles. According to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner during the period 14th December, 1957, to (1) [1961] 2 S.C.A. 591. 30th June, 1958, the petitioner was liable neither to payment of excise duty nor to pay- ment of Sales Tax. We do not know why there should have been such an exemption. The language of the notification might well be read as meaning that the notification is to apply only to those goods on which an additional Central excise duty had been levied and paid." If the observations 'quoted above mean that the High Court rejected the petition also on merits, apart from the other ground given, then the principle laid down in Daryao v. The State of U.P. (1) will apply and the petition under Art. 32 will not be maintainable on the ground of res judicata. It is, however, not necessary to pursue the question of res judicata any further, because I am resting my decision on the more fundamental ground that an error of law or fact committed by a judicial body cannot, in general, be impeached otherwise than on appeal unless the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the jurisdiction of that body depends. 16. In Malkarjun Narhari (2) the Privy Council dealt with a case in which a sale took place after notice had been wrongly served upon a person who was not the legal representative of the judgment debtor's estate, and the executing court had erroneously decided that he was to be treated as such representative. The Privy Council said:- "In so doing the Court was exercising its jurisdiction. It made a sad mistake, it is true; but a Court has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right. If it decides wrong, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right:- (1) (1961) 2 S.C.A. 591. (2) [1950] L.R. 279, A, 216 & 225 And if that course is not taken the decision, however wrong, cannot be disturbed". 17. The above view finds support from a number of decisions-of this Court. 1. Aniyoth Kunhamina Umma v. Ministry of Rehabilitation, Petn No. 32 of 1959, D/- 22.3.1961 ( AIR 1962 SC 1616 ). In this case it had been held under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, that a certain person was an evacuee and that certain plots of land which belonged to him were, therefore, evacuee property and vested in the Custodian of Evacuee Property.' A transferee of the land from the evacuee then presented a petition under Art. 32 for restoration of the lands to her and complained of an infringement of her fundamental right, under Art. 19(1) (f) and Art. 31 of the Constitution by the aforesaid order under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. The petitioner had been a party to the proceedings resulting in the declaration under that Act earlier-mentioned. This Court held that as long as the decision under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act which had become final stood, the petitioner could not complain of any infringement of any fundamental right. The petitioner had been a party to the proceedings resulting in the declaration under that Act earlier-mentioned. This Court held that as long as the decision under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act which had become final stood, the petitioner could not complain of any infringement of any fundamental right. This Court dismissed the petition observing:- "We are basing our decision on the ground that the competent authorities under the Act had come to a certain decision, which decision has now become final the petitioner not having moved against that decision in an. appropriate court by an appropriate proceeding. As long as that decision stands, the petitioner cannot complain of the. infringement of a fundamental right, for she has no such right." 2. Gulabdas & CO. v. Assistant Collector, of Customs (S) AIR 1957 SC 733 . In this case certain imported goods had been assessed to customs tariff. The assessee continued in a petition under Art. 32 that the duty (1) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 505. (2) A.LR. [1957] S.C. 733, 736, should have been charged under a different item of that tariff and that its fundamental right was violated by reason of the assessment order charging it to duty under a wrong item in the tariff. This Court held that there was no violation of fundamental right and observed:- "If the provisions of law under which impugned orders have been passed are with jurisdiction, whether they be right or wrong on fact,' there is really no question of the infraction of a fundamental right. If a particular decision is erroneous on facts or merits, the proper remedy is by way of an appeal." 3. Bhatnagar & Co. Ltd. v. The Union of India, 1957 SCR 701 : (S) AIR 1957 SC 478 ). In this case the Government had held that the petitioner had been trafficking in licences and in that view confiscated the goods imported under a licence. A petition had been filed under Art. 32 challenging this action. It was held:- "If the petitioner's grievance is that the view taken by the appropriate authority in this matter is erroneous, that is not a matter which can be legitimately agitated before us in a petition under Art. 32." 4. The Parbhani Transport Co-operative Society. Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, Aurangabad, 1960-3 SCR 177: ( AIR 1960 SC 801 ). It was held:- "If the petitioner's grievance is that the view taken by the appropriate authority in this matter is erroneous, that is not a matter which can be legitimately agitated before us in a petition under Art. 32." 4. The Parbhani Transport Co-operative Society. Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, Aurangabad, 1960-3 SCR 177: ( AIR 1960 SC 801 ). In this case it was contended that the decision of the Transport Authority in granting a permit for a motor carriage service had offended Art. 14 of the Constitution. This Court held that the decision of a quasi-judicial body, right or wrong, could not offend Art. 14.” 14. Once the Settlement Collector had the jurisdiction to make the necessary corrections and such order was affirmed by the Divisional Commissioner who too had the jurisdiction, then even if it is assumed that the order passed was wrong, the same would not make such order a nullity or having been passed without jurisdiction and would, therefore, be binding on the parties. 15. Accordingly, question No.1 is answered in favour of appellant by holding that the order passed by Collector Settlement was required to be assailed by the respondents before a competent authority or court and in absence of any challenge to the same, the learned lower appellate court could not have gone into the validity of the order passed either by the Settlement Collector or the Divisional Commissioner and thereafter reverse the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court. 16. Since question No.1 has been answered in favour of appellant, the appeal succeeds on this sole count alone. Therefore, in such circumstances, there is no requirement or even necessity to answer the remaining two other substantial questions of law framed by this Court on 1.8.2007 which have now only become academic. 17. In view of the aforesaid discussion, appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate court is set aside and that of the learned trial court is affirmed. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms, leaving the parties to bear their own cots.