JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, Boudh (as it was then) in T.A. 7 of 1988 confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif, Boudh in T.S. No. 37 of 1977. The predecessor-in-interest of the present appellants namely Jayadev Sahu had filed the suit for declaration that he is entitled to be in possession of the suit land. During the suit, he died. So these appellants being his legal representatives pursued the suit. The suit having been dismissed, they had carried the first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Having lost in that appeal, the present move is before this Court by filing this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code. 2. For the sake of convenience, in order to bring in clarity and avoid confusion, the parties hereinafter have been referred to as they have been arraigned in the courts below. 3. Plaintiff’s case is that Ananta and Santha are two brothers. Ananta had one son namely Benu and two daughters namely, Gelhi and Beti. Kia is the daughter of Beti. The three sons of Santha are namely Dirju, Meghu and Hari. Dirju and Hari are issueless whereas Meghu’s son is Paramananda. It is stated that the land measuring Ac.15.43 dec. stood recorded jointly in the name of Ananta and Santha and on the death of Ananta, the name of Benu being his son came to be recorded. It is the further case of the plaintiff that both the branches were living in joint mess and estate. In the year 1969, Benu and Dirju entered into an agreement with the plaintiff to transfer Ac.2.03 dec. of land described in Schedule-A of the plaint for a consideration of Rs.1800/-. It is stated that a plain paper hand note had been executed by them and possession of the said land had been delivered to the plaintiff with further assurance of execution of a regular sale deed would follow. It is alleged that after the death of Benu when the plaintiff requested the defendants for execution of said sale deed, they avoided and lastly agreed to sale Ac.1.77 dec. of land better described in Schedule-B of the plaint on receipt of consideration of Rs.2000/-. The plaintiff when agreed to the same, the defendant nos. It is alleged that after the death of Benu when the plaintiff requested the defendants for execution of said sale deed, they avoided and lastly agreed to sale Ac.1.77 dec. of land better described in Schedule-B of the plaint on receipt of consideration of Rs.2000/-. The plaintiff when agreed to the same, the defendant nos. 1 to 3 came forward to execute a sale deed and gave up all their rights over the same in favour of the plaintiff who since then possessed it as owner. It is further stated that the plaintiff thereafter gave up possession of the rest 26 dec. of land to them. The purchased land of the plaintiff as above has been mutated in his name despite the protest of defendant no. 4. It is next alleged that the defendants created a trouble in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff. So finally the property came to be attached in a proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. and learned Executive Magistrate directed the parties to approach the Civil Court in deciding the title and possession, so as to accordingly deliver the possession to the successful party by lifting the attachment. The plaintiff states that even if the possession of the said land since the year 1969 has remained with him, later the same having been purchased, the defendants have no right. Gelhi, the daughter of Ananta and Kia, the granddaughter of Ananta though are co-recorded tenants being not known for a long time, have not been made parties. 4. The suit came to be contested by defendant no. 4 who denied the factum of agreement for sale of schedule-A property said to have been executed by Benu and Dirju and the delivery of possession of the same pursuant to the same. He also denied the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land at any point of time. His specific stand is that the branch of Ananta and Santha had partitioned their lands and the schedule-A property had fallen on the share of Benu who remained in possession till his death. Gelhi being the elder sister of Benu was a widow and was staying with Benu. So she enjoyed the property after the death of Benu. But as the defendant nos. 1 to 3 created trouble in possession of schedule-A land by Gelhi, this defendant no. Gelhi being the elder sister of Benu was a widow and was staying with Benu. So she enjoyed the property after the death of Benu. But as the defendant nos. 1 to 3 created trouble in possession of schedule-A land by Gelhi, this defendant no. 4 had to come out to help Gelhi and accordingly, possession of schedule-A land remained with Gelhi. This defendant no. 4 is said to have separated from defendant nos. 1 and 2. It is further stated that because of rude treatment of defendant nos. 1 and 3towards Gelhi every time, she left the place relinquishing her right over schedule-A property in favour of defendant no.1. Thus, it is stated that taking advantage of the infighting between defendant nos. 1 on one hand and the defendant no. 3 and defendant no. 4 together on the other, the plaintiff began to create trouble over the schedule-A land projecting a fraudulent sale deed. It is stated that the vendor therein has no right of alienation. The defendant no. 4 asserts to have been in possession of the suit land till the date of attachment of the same in the proceeding under section 145 Cr.P.C. It has been pleaded in the written statement that Kia, the daughter of Beti is alive and staying at village Anandapur under Sonpur subdivision. 5. Faced with the above rival pleadings, the trial court framed in total 8 issues. Rightly the trial court has gone to decide issue no. 5 with regard to the strong objection as regards the maintainability of the suit for non-joinder of necessary party. The finding accordingly has been recorded upon examination of evidence both oral and documentary that Gelhi and Kia being alive and the defendant no. 4 having disclosed specifically the whereabouts of Kia in the written statement since the plaintiffs have taken no step to implead her in the suit as one of the defendants by denying her right over the property straightway from the beginning, the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party. As according to the trial court, this issue is not permissible to be decided in her absence or in the absence of legal representative in case of her death on whom her rights have devolved upon. This finding has been concurred by the lower appellate court. So now the concurrent finding remains that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party. This finding has been concurred by the lower appellate court. So now the concurrent finding remains that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party. The dismissal of the suit has been on the 10th day of Feburary, 1988, followed by the dismissal of the first appellate court on the 23rd day of December, 1988. The present second appeal has been filed on 31.3.89. Thus the appeal is also before this Court for more than two and half decades. No move has yet been made to rectify the defect and the plaintiffs have remained firm in their stand that Gelhi and Kia are not necessary parties and as such the suit as laid for the reliefs claimed would not face that as the legal blockade. 6. Though the appeal has been admitted on ground nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9 as described in the memorandum of appeal, the above aspect of non-joinder of necessary party as the ground for dismissal of the suit is under ground no. 7. That in my considered view is required to be answered first as in case the answer to the same goes against the appellants, the other substantial questions of law would no more survive for their consideration for being answered. The said substantial question of law under ground no. 7 is the following:- “For that the courts below are wrong and illegal in dismissing the suit for non-joinder of parties when admittedly Gelhi is unheard of and ‘Kia’ is neither examined nor summoned.” 7. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that it being the specific case of the plaintiff that whereabouts of Gelhi and Kia are not known, the courts below have completely erred in law by recording that finding as aforesaid and dismissing the suit on acceptance of that nonjoinder of parties as an objection. It is further submitted that when the defendant nos. 1 to 3 have sold only Ac.1.77 dec. of land from out of Ac.15.43 dec. which is much less than their half share and the plaintiff has sought for declaration of right of possession of the purchased land, there remains no need to even implead Kia and Gelhi as parties. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents submits in favour of the finding recorded by the courts below. of land from out of Ac.15.43 dec. which is much less than their half share and the plaintiff has sought for declaration of right of possession of the purchased land, there remains no need to even implead Kia and Gelhi as parties. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents submits in favour of the finding recorded by the courts below. According to him, upon due discussion of evidence when specific finding has been given that in the suit as laid for the reliefs claimed, Gelhi and Kia are necessary parties, the same is not liable to be disturbed. 9. It is not in dispute that Benu had the title over the schedule-A land. It is not also denied that Benu had two sisters namely, Gelhi and Beti and Kia, the daughter of Beti then was alive. In the very recital of the sale deed Ext. 3 which is dated 23.11.73, the name of Gelhi and Kia as the recorded tenants in respect of the land covered under the said sale deed has been clearly stated. Here the suit is to declare the right to possess. So the grant of said relief would depend upon the finding of right, title and interest of the plaintiffs over the suit land on the basis of that very sale deed Ext. 3 which is projected as the document of title by holding the title to have been acquired by that. In the written statement from the very beginning, the defendant no. 4 has stated regarding the whereabouts of Kia and this has now continued for such a long length of time covering more than two and half decades. No move is there at any time till now in that regard and in course of hearing, it is also not stated that in view of lapse of time and by change of the factual scenario, the necessity as above has vanished. 10. In the factual settings, this Court finds no such justifiable reason to record any note of dissent over the concurrent finding of the courts below on that issue no. 5. Consequently, the answer to the substantial question of law as aforesaid under ground no. 7 accordingly is rendered against the appellants. 11. In the result, the appeal stands dismissed. No order as to cost.