JUDGMENT : Sahidullah Munshi, J. 1. In view of order dated 24th August, 2010, passed in C.O. No.2542 of 2009, this revisional application was heard analogously with C.O. No.2542 of 2009. For the sake of convenience C.O. No.2542 of 2009 (Parul Projects Ltd. – Vs. – Mrinal Kanti Basu & Ors.) has been decided first and in deciding this case I intend to rely upon the findings arrived at in C.O. No.2542 of 2009 because identical issues of fact and law are involved in both the matters. 2. This revisional application is directed against an order being no.21 dated 20th August, 2007, passed by the learned 3rd Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Alipore in Title Suit No.76 of 2006. In the revisional application the petitioners have stated that – opposite party nos. 1 to 4 as plaintiffs filed a suit being Title Suit No.76 of 2006 for a declaration and permanent injunction in the Court of the learned 3rd Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Alipore. In the said suit it was, inter alia, prayed by the plaintiffs that they have right, title and interest over 20% super built-up area of the premises being no.115B/1, Netaji Subhas Bose Road, under Regent Park Police Station, Kolkata – 700040, this is mentioned in Schedule A to the plaint and further that they were entitled to have delivery of possession of separated and demarcated portion of the said 20% super built-up area in the suit premises. The plaintiffs also prayed for permanent injunction restraining the defendant nos.1 to 4 from obstructing the possession of 20% super built-up area in the suit premises mentioned in Schedule A to the plaint. 3. The defendants, after entering appearance in the suit, filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and prayed for rejection of the plaint, inter alia, on the grounds that – (1) The plaintiffs have got no cause of action for filing the suit and there has been no cause of action in the plaint for filing the suit against the defendant nos.1 to 4. (2) The suit is hopelessly barred by law of limitation. (3) The suit is hopelessly barred by provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act as also Section 14 (1) (c) and (3) (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. (2) The suit is hopelessly barred by law of limitation. (3) The suit is hopelessly barred by provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act as also Section 14 (1) (c) and (3) (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. (4) There has been no privity of contract between the parties and (5) The plaint does not disclose the cause of action. 4. After a contested hearing, the learned Court below, by the order impugned, rejected the application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the defendant nos.1 to 4. While rejecting the said application under Order VII, Rule 11, the learned Court below arrived at a finding that cause of action is a mixed question of facts and law and the same requires to be decided on evidence. Learned Judge has mentioned that paragraph 23 of the plaint discloses that the cause of action for the suit arose on 18th August, 2006 when the defendants refused to separate, demarcate and delivery of possession of 20% super built-up area in the suit property. According to the learned Court below, provisions of Order VII, Rule 11(d), Code of Civil Procedure provides that the plaint may be rejected if on perusal of the plaint it appears that the same is barred by any provision of law. Learned Judge has held that as per averment made in paragraph 23 of the plaint the plaintiffs approached the defendant on 18th August, 2006 to separate and/or demarcate and/or deliver 20% super built-up area in the suit premises but the defendant refused to separate and/or demarcate and/or deliver possession of the said 20% super built-up area and that gave rise to the cause of action for this suit. The suit was filed on 26th September, 2006. Therefore, according to the learned Judge, the suit was filed within one and half month from the date of accrual of the cause of action. The learned Court below has also held that the plaintiffs have prayed for declaration and also for possession of the suit property after demarcation. According to the learned Court below, the suit is not a suit simplicitor for declaration but coupled with a prayer for possession. Therefore, it cannot be said that the suit was filed without praying for consequential relief. According to the learned Court below, the suit is not a suit simplicitor for declaration but coupled with a prayer for possession. Therefore, it cannot be said that the suit was filed without praying for consequential relief. Learned Court below held that without going for evidence it cannot be concluded that the suit is barred under the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act or Section 14 (1) (c) and (3) (c) of the Specific Relief Act. So far the statement that there was no privity of contract between the parties as raised by the defendants, the plaintiffs denied the same. Therefore, according to the learned Judge, such issue has to be decided in trial on evidence. The learned Court below, on the aforesaid finding, rejected the plaintiff/petitioner’s application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the defendant nos.1 to 4. 5. Mr. Haradhan Banerjee, learned Counsel appearing in respect of the petitioners, has submitted that the petitioners/defendant nos.1 to 4, by a registered Deed of Sale, purchased the entire premises no.115B/1, Netaji Subhas Bose Road, P.S. – Regent Park, Kolkata – 700040, containing an area of 27 cottahs within which the suit premises lies and got possession of the entire premises as owners thereof. He submitted that on 6th April, 2001 and 9th April 2001 two agreements were executed by and between the petitioners and the opposite party nos.1 to 4 being the erstwhile owners of the property thereby agreed that 20% super built-up area of the constructed building would be demarcated and separated and was to be handed over to the erstwhile owners being the opposite party nos.1 to 4, in the event, this demarcated portion is not needed to be allotted to Shri Kush N. Segal, the defendant no.5 in Title Suit No.76 of 2006. Mr. Banerjee has placed reliance on the agreements and supplied copies thereof. He has drawn the attention of the Court to the plaint averments which are annexed to the revisional application. According to Mr. Banerjee, the defendant nos.1 to 4 failed to separate and demarcate 20% super built-up area. According to Mr. Banerjee, suit is barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and hence, plaint is liable to be rejected. He has drawn the attention of the Court to the plaint averments which are annexed to the revisional application. According to Mr. Banerjee, the defendant nos.1 to 4 failed to separate and demarcate 20% super built-up area. According to Mr. Banerjee, suit is barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and hence, plaint is liable to be rejected. He submitted that on a meaningful reading of the averments of the entire plaint it would appear that the plaintiffs claimed in paragraph 9 of the plaint that the defendant being the proforma defendant in the suit, vacated the suit premises upon undertaking given by the plaintiffs. According to him, in terms of paragraph 11 of the plaint, 20% demarcated area would go to the defendant no.5 subject to fulfilment of agreement dated 17th December, 1996 and 6th April, 2001 and in default, 20% super built-up area would go back to the plaintiffs. He further submitted that paragraph 12 of the plaint says that plaintiffs delivered possession of the entire premises to the petitioners/defendant nos.1 to 4 by execution of Sale Deed. According to Mr. Banerjee, in paragraph 15 of the plaint although, the plaintiffs demanded possession of the demarcated building from the defendant nos.1 to 4 but refused to deliver possession and for which the plaintiffs were unable to sort out the demand of the proforma defendant. He submitted that paragraph 18 of the plaint says that plaintiffs are in joint possession and paragraph 19 of the plaint says that defendant nos.1 to 4, present revisionists, failed to make separate and/or demarcate and/or deliver possession of 20% super built-up area. Mr. Banerjee submitted that on a meaningful reading of the plaint it would appear that further consequential relief is available to the plaintiffs but they have not prayed for such consequential relief and, accordingly, the suit is barred under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act by not making a prayer for recovery of possession of demarcated and separated 20% super built-up area of the building. Therefore, according to him, declaration simplicitor and permanent injunction is not a complete relief. According to Mr. Banerjee, the learned Court below has erred in law by not rejecting the plaint. Therefore, according to him, declaration simplicitor and permanent injunction is not a complete relief. According to Mr. Banerjee, the learned Court below has erred in law by not rejecting the plaint. In support of his submission he has relied on the following judgments – An unreported judgment passed on 16th March, 2010 in Civil Order No.402 of 2010 in the case of Smt. Anjana Gupta – Vs. – Sri Hemant Kumar Pathak. A decision in the case of Imraj Ali Molla – Vs. – Madan Mohan Saha & Ors., reported in 2010(4) CHN (CAL) 679. A decision in the case of Venkataraja – Vs. – Vidyane, reported in Judgment Today 2013(4) SC 505 and A decision in the case of Ram Saran & Anr. – Vs. – Smt. Ganga Devi, reported in AIR 1972 SC 2685 . 6. The unreported decision relied on is not applicable in the present case. In the said case the plaintiff claimed that the parties entered into an Agreement for Sale for purchase of suit property for a consideration mentioned therein. Subsequently, another agreement was entered into between the parties which might have certain terms of the earlier agreement. In the said case plaintiffs requested for completion of the said transaction by giving delivery of possession of the suit property was not fulfilled by the defendant in terms of the agreement and even then the plaintiff did not make a prayer without seeking further reliefs by way of specific performance of contract. In the present case, the contract has been fulfilled. Nothing remains for the plaintiff to pray for specific performance of the contract which was essentially a contract for development of property in question. According to the plaint case, it was the grievance of the plaintiff that portion of 20% share was not demarcated and separated from the joint possession. Therefore, the referred case has nothing to do with the present one. 7. The referred decision in the case of Imraj Ali Molla (supra) is also identical with that of the case of Smt. Anjana Gupta (supra). Mr. Banerjee relied on paragraph 23 of the said reported decision which says that since the plaintiff did not pray for a decree for specific performance of contract in the suit, is barred under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Mr. Banerjee relied on paragraph 23 of the said reported decision which says that since the plaintiff did not pray for a decree for specific performance of contract in the suit, is barred under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. In the present case, there was no scope for praying for any specific performance of contract because that was not required at all in the facts and circumstances of the case. 8. The decision in the case of Venkataraja (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that when the defendants were admittedly in possession of the suit property and the plaintiffs omitted to make a prayer for consequential relief for possession thereof, the suit would be bad. The facts of the case are distinguishable firstly, this is not a case where the defendants were in possession of the suit property and the plaintiffs have failed to make a prayer for consequential relief. The fact of the referred decision is somewhat different. In the said case the suit property belonged to the deceased appellant who donated the suit property in favour of his minor grandson. The donee died issueless and, therefore, the other donee became the full usufructuary owner of the suit property. The suit filed by the appellant was decided by judgment and decree and, thereafter, ultimately, parties went to Supreme Court challenging the decisions from the appellate decree. Therefore, this is not a case for rejection of plaint and consequentially, the principles laid down there are not applicable to the present case. 9. The decision in the case of Ram Saran (supra) is also not applicable in the present case. In the said case it is the admitted position that the defendant was in possession of a portion of the suit property and the other portion remained in the possession of the plaintiffs but the plaintiff did not pray for recovery of possession and as a result, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that suit was bound to fail within the meaning of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The fact of the said case is not identical with the present one apart from the fact that the issue involved there was not based on a decision under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. Mr. The fact of the said case is not identical with the present one apart from the fact that the issue involved there was not based on a decision under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. Mr. Protik Prakash Banerjee, learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party nos.1 to 4 has submitted that application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not maintainable for the following reasons : firstly, plaintiff need not add a prayer for recovery of possession inasmuch as it would be evident from plaint in Title Suit No.76 of 2006 that the defendant nos.1 to 4, in collusion with the defendant no.5, was trying to dispose of 20% super built-up area along with their 80% area in the suit premises though the plaintiffs were in joint possession thereof. It was further mentioned that if the defendants would succeed to dispose of 20% super built-up area of the suit premises then the plaintiffs would face consequences. According to Mr. Banerjee, it is the categorical case of the plaintiffs that they are in joint possession with the defendant/petitioners and are entitled to 20% super built-up area of the suit premises. They have, therefore, prayed for further relief for permanent injunction to ensure that they are not obstructed in the possession thereof. According to him, the defendant/petitioners filed and used a written statement served on the plaintiffs/opposite party nos.1 to 4 on 27th February, 2007 denying the material averments contained in the plaint including those in paragraphs 12 and 18 thereof and dealt with the plaint on merits. Though several points were taken by the defendant/petitioners before the learned Court below in their application purportedly under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure the said application was rejected by the learned Court below by the order impugned. He submitted that the bar engrafted in the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case particularly the plaint case made out by the plaintiff/opposite party nos. 1 to 4. He submitted that it would be clear from a plain reading of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 that the plaintiff can seek declaration of any of the following, namely, any legal character and/or any right and/or any right as to any property. 1 to 4. He submitted that it would be clear from a plain reading of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 that the plaintiff can seek declaration of any of the following, namely, any legal character and/or any right and/or any right as to any property. He submitted that in case a Court feels that it ought to exercise discretion, it shall make such declaration as prayed for and in such case, the plaintiff need not seek further relief. He submitted that a proviso, which can be restricted scope of operation of the main Section of the Statute, cannot altogether take away the rights and liabilities granted by it. In case of plaintiff seeks not the other types of declaration but a “mere declaration of title” though being able to at that time “to seek further relief” and omits to seek such “further relief” then and only then even the declaration of title will not be made, for the proposition that a proviso can restrict scope of operation of the main Section of the Statute but cannot altogether take away the rights and liabilities granted by it. He has placed reliance upon a judgment in the case of Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India & Ors. – Vs. – Council of Institute of Chartered Accountants of India & Ors., reported in AIR 2007 SC 2091 paragraph 15. 11. The judgment which has been referred to by Mr. Protik Prakash Banerjee, is of no help for the present case inasmuch as, the fact of the referred case does not match with the fact of the present case. The proposition laid down in the referred judgment is also not helpful for resolving the dispute in the present case. In the present case, however, the award is not a declaration simplicitor but it included a recovery of possession and if the parties are in possession and the same is borne out from the pleadings, then it cannot be a ground that the plaintiff has to make a prayer for recovery of possession and, therefore, the same should be hit by the mischief of the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Mr. Banerjee has further submitted that Legislature in its wisdom has not incorporated in the proviso anything about consequential relief but what has been inserted in the proviso is ‘further relief’. Mr. Banerjee has further submitted that Legislature in its wisdom has not incorporated in the proviso anything about consequential relief but what has been inserted in the proviso is ‘further relief’. Now whether such ‘further relief’ is required in the facts and circumstances of the plaint case that can only be decided on the basis of the pleadings made in the plaint and I have already observed that such ‘further relief’ was not required for the plaintiff inasmuch as possession was admitted only demarcation and separation was sought for. Mr. Banerjee has strenuously argued that he has prayed for further relief by way of permanent injunction, therefore, the submission made by the petitioners that the suit should fail for want of incorporation of consequential relief or further relief, is irrelevant. He further submitted that bar to a suit cannot be easily inferred whether under Section 9 or under the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such a bar must be found by rigours and strict interpretation of the Statute and not by interpretation of statutory words where there is no ambiguity. He submitted that bar to the jurisdiction of a Civil Court cannot be readily inferred and in support thereof, he has relied on various judgments passed in the case of – Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (dead) by LRS & Anr. – Vs. – Ramesh Chandra Agarwal & Ors., reported in AIR 2003 SC 2696 at paragraph 22. Dhulabhai & Ors. – Vs. – The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., reported in AIR 1969 SC 78 paragraph 32(7). 12. I have gone through the said judgments. It is undisputed that bar of jurisdiction cannot be readily inferred. Court has to go into the facts of the case and the bar must be express when an application under Order VII, Rule 11, CPC, is made, the applicant has to comply with the provisions of Rule 11. We will discuss hereinafter as to what could be the bar for a suit to be held to be not maintainable. Mr. Banerjee, however, has also relied on a judgment of a Hon’ble Single Bench of this Court which was referred to by Mr. Saptangsu Basu while hearing the other revisional application being C.O. No.2542 of 2009. There, the judgment is common in the submissions of both Mr. Protik Prakash Banerjee and Mr. Saptangsu Basu. Mr. Banerjee, however, has also relied on a judgment of a Hon’ble Single Bench of this Court which was referred to by Mr. Saptangsu Basu while hearing the other revisional application being C.O. No.2542 of 2009. There, the judgment is common in the submissions of both Mr. Protik Prakash Banerjee and Mr. Saptangsu Basu. The said judgment in the case of Krishna Kumar Mundhra – Vs. – Narendra Kumar Anchalia, reported in (2003) ILR 2 Cal 438 has laid down a proposition that Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be attracted despite the provisions contained in Section 36 in respect of an award when the award is sought to be executed thereunder. Although, the nature of the award whether it is simplicitor declaration or coupled with possession, has already been discussed in C.O. No.2542 of 2009. Although, this revisional application restricts the scope whether the suit filed by the opposite parties/plaintiff, is maintainable or not and whether the defendant’s affidavit under Order VII, Rule 11 should have been entertained by the Court and whether the learned Court ought to have rejected the plaint or not. Since the nature of award is very much in issue in between the parties in both the revisional applications the ratio decided in the above-referred case is relevant for the decision of the disputes between the parties. Mr. Basu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff/opposite party no.6 submitted that the petitioners have hopelessly failed to make out a case for rejection of plaint in view of the admitted fact in the plaint itself. Rights and obligation of the parties can only be decided on trial on evidence. He submitted that the application filed under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is misconceived and the same has been rightly rejected by the learned Court below by the order impugned. He submitted that the revisional application should be rejected with exemplary cost. 13. I have heard the parties at length, perused the materials on record and also considered their submissions. The defendants have contended in their application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the plaintiffs have got no cause of action for filing the suit, but such statement has got no basis. The plaintiff has sufficiently shown the reason why the suit has been filed. The defendants have contended in their application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the plaintiffs have got no cause of action for filing the suit, but such statement has got no basis. The plaintiff has sufficiently shown the reason why the suit has been filed. In paragraph 19 the plaintiffs have stated that they approached the defendant nos.1 to 4 to demarcate, separate and deliver the possession of remaining 20% of super built-up area of the suit premises to them, but since the defendant no.5 did not apply the terms and conditions of the agreement and inasmuch as the defendant nos.1 to 4 failed to separate, demarcate and deliver possession of 20% super built-up area of the suit premises, they had reason to file the suit particularly when their request on 18th August, 2006 thereby approaching the defendant no.4 for separation, demarcation and delivery of possession could not be fulfilled by the defendant nos.1 to 4, they had to rush to Court. Though, they clearly mentioned in paragraph 23 that the cause of action arose for the suit on 18th August, 2006 when the defendants refused to separate, demarcate and deliver possession of 20% super built-up area in the suit premises and when without doing so, the defendants were making attempt to dispose of the same to others. Therefore, it cannot be brushed aside that the plaintiffs have no cause of action whether or not such request was made on 18th August, 2006 by the plaintiffs is a subject-matter to be decided on trial and it involves evidence. It cannot be readily inferred that the suit was without cause of action. The petitioners contended in their application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the suit was hopelessly barred by the law of limitation, such a bar must be ex facie. Here, nothing could be spelt out since when the suit has become barred. This is a mixed question of law and fact and which cannot be readily inferred without asking the parties to go for trial. Therefore, this point is also not tenable. The petitioners next contended that the suit is barred by the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as also Section 14 (1) (c) and (3) (c) of the Specific Relief Act. Therefore, this point is also not tenable. The petitioners next contended that the suit is barred by the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as also Section 14 (1) (c) and (3) (c) of the Specific Relief Act. As earlier discussed, in my opinion, these issues need not be reiterated because by virtue of the very nature of the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, it does not hit the present plaint. The contention that there was no privity of contract between the parties is also a mixed question of law and fact which cannot be decided without trial on evidence. Therefore, the finding arrived at by the learned Court below appears to be based on reasoning and sound legal principle. The same does not warrant interference of this Court for the reasons discussed above. 14. In my opinion, where it does not appear on the face of the plaint that there is no cause of action, the Court will not reject the plaint. There is a distinction between a case where the plaint itself does not disclose any cause of action and a case in which the Court, after consideration of the entire material in question, oral and documentary evidence, comes to a conclusion that there was no cause of action. In the latter case, the plaint cannot be rejected and which is similar to the present one. In the present case, cause of action has been stated and it is dependent on certain averments, those averments whether or not correct, are to be justified at the trial not before, and that decision to reject such a plaint will be premature and illegal. It is not competent for the Court to go into the correctness or otherwise of the allegations constituting the cause of action, the correctness or otherwise of the allegations constituting the cause is beyond the purview of Order VII Rule 11 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. What is required to be disclosed by the plaintiff is a clear right to sue and failure to do so must necessarily entail in rejection of the plaint. Such failure is absent in the present case. The words ‘does not disclose the cause of action’ has to be very narrowly construed. The rejection of the plaint at the threshold entails very serious consequences. Such failure is absent in the present case. The words ‘does not disclose the cause of action’ has to be very narrowly construed. The rejection of the plaint at the threshold entails very serious consequences. This power, therefore, has to be used in exceptional circumstances, ought to be used only when the Court is absolutely sure that the plaintiff does not have an arguable case at all. While considering the application under Order VII, Rule 11, CPC, the Court is not required to take into consideration the defence set up by the defendant in his written statement. The question whether the plaint discloses any cause of action is to be decided by looking at the averments contained in the plaint itself and not the defence set up in the written statement. What has to be seen is whether or not a meaningful reading of the plaint discloses a cause of action. In the present case, the question which was raised that suit is barred by limitation to that extent I might add that such a restriction will only apply when it appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred. The statement in the plaint without addition or subtraction must show that it is barred by any law and consequentially it will attract the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code. It will be applicable in those cases only where the statement made by the plaintiff in the plaint without any doubt or dispute shows that the suit is barred by any law in force. When the Court is in doubt or the Court is not sure and certain that the suit is barred by some law, the Court would not reject the plaint under clause (d) of Order VII, Rule 11, CPC. If the question of limitation is connected with the merit of the claim, such point has to be tried along with other issues but not where there is no clear or specific admission in the plaint suggesting that the suit is barred, the Court cannot invoke jurisdiction under clause (d) of Order VII, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code. A plaint cannot be rejected on the ground of limitation especially when it is a mixed question of fact and law. A plaint cannot be rejected on the ground of limitation especially when it is a mixed question of fact and law. On a plain and meaningful reading of the plaint it appears to me that there is no such bar under which the plaint cannot be entertained. In the present case, the contention of the petitioners regarding the bar under the law to be substantiated by evidence. Therefore, plaint cannot be rejected in the present case. The order impugned does not call for any interference. The same is affirmed. 15. Revisional application fails and, accordingly, dismissed. 16. There will be no order as to costs.