JUDGMENT : Sahidullah Munshi, J. 1. This revisional application is directed against order no.55 dated 15th June, 2009, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 6th Court at Alipore, in Title Execution Case No.7 of 2008 issuing writ for delivery of possession with direction to Bailiff to execute writ and deliver vacant possession to the decree-holder/opposite party no.1 as per award dated 10th November, 2007. In this revisional application the petitioners prayed for an order for setting aside the initiation of execution proceeding and impugned order being no.55 dated 15th June, 2009, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 6th Court, Alipore in Title Execution Case No.7 of 2008 by which writ of delivery of possession was issued by the learned Court below with a direction to the Bailiff to execute the writ and deliver the vacant possession to the decree-holder/opposite party no.1 as per award, and all orders passed therein and to restore status quo ante before the order passed by the learned Court below issuing writ of delivery of possession with direction upon the opposite party not to transfer/encumber the property. In support of such prayer in the revisional application the petitioners have made out the following case : (1) The petitioners became owners and persons in possession having acquired right, title and interest over the land measuring 27 cottahs together with structures thereon lying at being premises no.115/B/1, Netaji Subhas Bose Road under Police Station Regent Park, Calcutta – 40, by way of Registered Sale Deed dated 9th April, 2001 and the same was executed and registered by the judgment-debtors/opposite party nos.2 to 5. (2) After purchase, the petitioners made formal application before the concerned authority of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation for mutation of their names in the Assessment Roll of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. Upon considering the right, title and interest and possession of the petitioners the authority of Kolkata Municipal Corporation mutated the names of the petitioners as assessees in respect of the property. The petitioners got building plan duly sanctioned by the authority of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation and thereafter, revised plan has also been submitted by them and in accordance with the sanction plan, as also the revised plan, the petitioners constructed multi-storied building over the said property and the building plan was sanctioned in favour of the petitioners some time in 2005. (3) Judgment-debtors/opposite party nos. (3) Judgment-debtors/opposite party nos. 2 to 5 as plaintiffs filed a suit being no.76 of 2006 in the Court of the learned 3rd Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Alipore sometime in September, 2006 for a declaration and permanent injunction making therein the petitioners as defendant nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4. Opposite party herein was made defendant no.5 in the said suit. The petitioners being defendant nos.1 to 4 in the said suit entered appearance and filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 (a) (d) of the Civil Procedure Code, praying for rejection of the plaint. (4) After a contested hearing, by order no.21 dated 20th August, 2007 the learned 3rd Civil Judge (Senior Division), Alipore, rejected the said application under Order VII, Rule 11 (a) (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the petitioners. The said order being no.21 dated 20th August, 2007, passed in Title Suit No.76 of 2006 is also under challenge before this Court in a civil revisional application being C.O. No.3549 of 2007. (5) When this revisional application was initially taken up for consideration, one of the Hon’ble Judges of this Court passed an order on 15th September, 2009, directing that status quo with regard to the possession as well as nature and character of the suit property including transfer and/or creation of any third party interest in respect of the property covered by the award will be maintained as on that date, till the disposal of revisional application. (6) In the revisional application the petitioner has made out a further case that the opposite party no.1 got an award in terms of arbitration agreement in between opposite party no.1 and the opposite party nos. 2 to 5 which is in the nature of declaration only. According to the petitioner, award does not speak for recovery of possession. The revisionists are not parties to the arbitration agreement and, accordingly, such award is not binding upon the revision petitioners. According to the petitioners, the award was put in execution before the learned District Judge at Alipore for recovery of possession and, accordingly, writ of delivery of possession was issued by the order impugned and possession was delivered by dispossessing the revision petitioners. According to the petitioners, the award was put in execution before the learned District Judge at Alipore for recovery of possession and, accordingly, writ of delivery of possession was issued by the order impugned and possession was delivered by dispossessing the revision petitioners. Being aggrieved by such act of the Executing Court, the revision petitioners filed this revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before this Court on the ground that the order passed in the execution case is without jurisdiction. 2. Learned Counsel, Mr. Haradhan Banerjee, appearing for the petitioners, firstly submitted that award does not speak for recovery of possession, it is only for declaration, therefore, order directing issuance of writ for delivery of possession becomes without jurisdiction; secondly, the Executing Court cannot go behind the award and issuance of writ of delivery of possession, is without jurisdiction and nullity; thirdly, Executing Court lacks inherent jurisdiction in executing the award in terms of Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as the execution was laid before the learned District Judge and transferred it to the learned Additional District Judge for execution and lastly, the revision petitioners are not parties to the arbitration agreement and, therefore, in terms of Section 35 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, award is not binding upon the revision petitioners. According to Mr. Banerjee, revision petitioners cannot be dispossessed from the flats in question by executing the award. 3. Mr. Banerjee, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has referred to the following judgments in support of his case : Rameshwar Dass Gupta – Vs. – State of U.P. & Anr., reported in (1996) 5 SCC 728 . Bhavan Vaja & Ors. – Vs. – Solanki Hanuji Khodaji Mansang & Anr., reported in AIR 1972 SC 1371 . Surya Dev Rai – Vs. – Ram Chander Rai & Ors., reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675 . Kiran Singh & Ors. – Vs. – Chaman Paswan & Ors., reported in AIR 1954 SC 340 . State of West Bengal – Vs. – Bidhu Bhusan Mitra Chowdhury, reported in AIR 1980 Cal 175 . Shakuntla Devi – Vs. – Kamla & Ors., reported in (2005) 5 SCC 390 . An unreported judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court decided on 10th April, 2013 in Civil Appeal Nos.7605-7606 of 2004 in the case of Venkataraja & Ors. – Vs. – Bidhu Bhusan Mitra Chowdhury, reported in AIR 1980 Cal 175 . Shakuntla Devi – Vs. – Kamla & Ors., reported in (2005) 5 SCC 390 . An unreported judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court decided on 10th April, 2013 in Civil Appeal Nos.7605-7606 of 2004 in the case of Venkataraja & Ors. – Vs. – Vidyane Doureradjaperumal (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. Smt. Laxmi Nagappa Hegde – Vs. – The Karnataka Bank Ltd., Sirsi & Ors., reported in AIR 1988 Karnataka 44. Leela Hotels Limited – Vs. – Housing and Urban Development Corporation Limited, reported in (2012) 1 SCC 302 . 4. Appearing for the opposite parties, Mr. Protik Prokash Banerjee submitted that so far illegality of an award is concerned, Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter called as the said Act of 1996), will be the appropriate remedy for the petitioners. He can challenge the propriety of the award only in Section 34 of the said Act of 1996 or he can file a fresh suit. Mr. Banerjee submitted that what the petitioners could not do directly under Section 34 cannot be allowed to do indirectly which is not permissible under the law. He further submitted that jurisdiction before which the execution proceeding is to be filed is the Court within the meaning of Section 2(1) (e) of the Arbitration Act and in the present case, the learned District Judge would be the appropriate Court to entertain the application for execution. Therefore, according to him, the impugned order has been passed by the Court where the execution proceeding ought to have been filed according to the Arbitration Act and it cannot be submitted that the Court which passed the order impugned is without jurisdiction. 5. Mr. Saptangsu Basu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the opposite party no.1, has drawn the attention of this Court at page 109 of the civil revisional application which is the award passed by the learned Arbitrator. The award speaks as follows :- “That proceeding of Award is in favour of the second party. 5. Mr. Saptangsu Basu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the opposite party no.1, has drawn the attention of this Court at page 109 of the civil revisional application which is the award passed by the learned Arbitrator. The award speaks as follows :- “That proceeding of Award is in favour of the second party. The alleged Sale Deed executed by the first parties in favour of others on 06.04.2001 bad in law, hence, non-operative, liable to be cancelled and the second party have the legal right to recover his allotted entire first floor flats measuring more or less 7600 square feet situated and lying at 115B/1, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose Road, P.S. Regent Park, Kolkata – 700040, after expiry of appeal period.” 6. Mr. Basu submitted that the award very much speaks about recovery of possession. It is not a declaration simplicitor. According to Mr. Basu, the learned Court below has committed no illegality in entertaining an application for execution of the said award. According to him, learned Court below has committed no illegality in passing the order impugned. Mr. Basu has placed reliance on a reported decision of this Court in the case of Krishna Kumar Mundhra – Vs. – Narendra Kumar Anchalia reported in (2003) ILR 438. He submitted that in view of the said judgment by which this Hon’ble Court held that in a case where Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be entertained, a civil revision is not maintainable at the instance of the petitioners. 7. I have heard the parties at length, perused the materials on record and considered their submission. So far the judgments cited by Mr. Haradhan Banerjee appearing for the revision petitioners in the case of Rameshwar Dass Gupta (supra) it appears that the Hon’ble Apex Court considered the question whether Executing Court can go behind the decree. In that case, the petitioner before the Hon’ble Apex Court laid execution petition under Order XXI, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. The Executing Court in the impugned order in addition to the salary, gratuity and pension also awarded interest at 12% per annum from the date of execution till the date of the order. The respondents challenged the legality thereof only in respect of the direction to pay the interest. In revision, the High Court in the impugned order held that the Executing Court had no power to enlarge the decree. The respondents challenged the legality thereof only in respect of the direction to pay the interest. In revision, the High Court in the impugned order held that the Executing Court had no power to enlarge the decree. The original decree of the Tribunal did not grant payment of interest and, therefore, the order directing payment of interest was without jurisdiction. Challenging the said decision this special leave petition was filed before the Hon’ble Apex Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that Executing Court exceeded its jurisdiction and the order impugned was without jurisdiction because the same was a void order. But the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the High Court normally exercises its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code and once it is held that the Executing Court has exceeded its jurisdiction, it is the duty of the High Court to correct the same. Therefore, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that there was no illegality in the order passed by the High Court in interfering with the order setting aside the order directing payment of interest. In this special leave petition challenging the High Court’s order passed under civil revision was dismissed. 8. Mr. Banerjee’s submission that revisional application is very much maintainable when there is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Executing Court but the said judgment is not applicable in the present case inasmuch as it cannot be held that Executing Court, in the present case, had inherent lack of jurisdiction. Considering the nature of the award passed, it cannot be held that the award never related to recovery of possession. Therefore, if the award contains recovery of possession the same can be put into execution before the appropriate Court. 9. Next decision relied on by Mr. Banerjee in the case of Bhavan Vaja (supra) and he has placed reliance on paragraph 19 of the said judgment to submit that an order being without jurisdiction is amenable for review by the High Court. The said judgment has no bearing in the present case whatever scrutiny was required to be made, the learned Court below has done so and it is not Mr. Banerjee’s case that he made any application before the Executing Court for taking note of any pleading or any unscrupulous act of the parties so that Court could have a chance to go through those pleadings. Banerjee’s case that he made any application before the Executing Court for taking note of any pleading or any unscrupulous act of the parties so that Court could have a chance to go through those pleadings. Therefore, such allegation against the Executing Court cannot be entertained. 10. Next Judgment submitted by Mr. Banerjee in the case of Surya Dev Rai (supra) to adopt a proposition that by virtue of amendment of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure with effect from 1st July, 2002, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has not been affected. According to the said judgment, interlocutory orders passed by the Courts subordinate to High Court against which remedy of revision has been excluded by Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge and continue to be subject to CERTIORARI and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. Paragraphs 38 and 39 are relevant in the present case and those are reproduced below :- “38. Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder: (1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction – by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction – by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (iii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e., which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case. 39. Though we have tried to lay down broad principles and working rules, the fact remains that the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution cannot be tied down in a straitjacket formula or rigid rules. Not less than often the High Court would be faced with dilemma. If it intervenes in pending proceedings there is bound to be delay in termination of proceedings. If it does not intervene, the error of the moment may earn immunity from correction. Not less than often the High Court would be faced with dilemma. If it intervenes in pending proceedings there is bound to be delay in termination of proceedings. If it does not intervene, the error of the moment may earn immunity from correction. The facts and circumstances of a given case may make it more appropriate for the High Court to exercise self-restraint and not to intervene because the error of jurisdiction though committed is yet capable of being taken care of and corrected at a later stage and the wrong done, if any, would be set right and rights and equities adjusted in appeal or revision preferred at the conclusion of the proceedings. But there may be cases where 'a stitch in time would save nine'. At the end, we may sum up by saying that the power is there but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the dictates of judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and practical wisdom of the Judge.” 11. In the given case before the Hon’ble Apex Court the appellant filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge for issuance of permanent preventive injunction based on his title and possession over the suit property, a piece of agricultural land. The appellant sought for relief by way of ad interim injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and such prayer was rejected by the trial Court as also by the Appellate Court. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the appellant approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which summarily dismissed the petition forming an opinion that the petition was not maintainable as the appellant was seeking interim injunction as against the private respondents. Said appeal raised the question as to whether the impact of the amendment made to Section 115, C.P.C. by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1st July, 2002 on the power and jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain petitions seeking a writ of CERTIORARI under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or invoking the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as against similar orders. The question that arose before the Hon’ble Apex Court is whether an aggrieved person is completely deprived of the remedy of judicial review, if he has lost at the hands of the original Court and the Appellate Court. The facts of the said case are totally different from the present one. The petitioner in the present case, cannot be said to be a person aggrieved by the order impugned and the present petitioner was never a party before the Executing Court. Therefore, question of invoking revisional jurisdiction does not arise at all. 12. Mr. Banerjee has relied on the decision in the case of Kiran Singh & Ors. (supra) which deals with the proposition where a decree passed is without jurisdiction whether is a nullity or not. It is the settled principle of law that a decree passed without jurisdiction is nullity. But that nullity is to be challenged before the appropriate forum. Since the award was never challenged by invoking appropriate provision of law, namely, Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the petitioner waited till execution of the decree that is, till passing of the impugned order on 15th June, 2009. Although, it is evident from record that the plaint was affirmed in the month of September, 2006 by the plaintiff wherein it was a specific averment that the plaintiff was already in possession of the suit property jointly with the other defendants and the said suit was filed only for a decree that the plaintiff had right, title and interest over 20% super-built up area of the suit property on separation and demarcation being made by the said 20% super-built up area and in the said suit, the present petitioners entered appearance and filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 (a) (d) of the Civil Procedure Code sometime in February, 2007. 13. Next decision submitted by Mr. Banerjee in the case of Bidhu Bhusan (supra) relates to the proposition that in exercise of the power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India it can interfere when the Special Judge goes beyond the bounds of his authority. The fact of this case is also different from the present case and proposition laid down therein is not applicable in the present case. 14. The fact of this case is also different from the present case and proposition laid down therein is not applicable in the present case. 14. None of the criteria mentioned under paragraph 16 of the said judgment attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Therefore, the said decision has no bearing in the present revisional application. 15. I have gone through the award. The award very much speaks about the recovery of possession. Therefore, submission of Mr. Banerjee is not correct that the award is simplicitor declaratory award and the Executing Court has no jurisdiction to pass an order of execution. 16. Mr. Banerjee next relied on the decision in the case of Shakuntla Devi (supra) which deals with a proposition that a declaratory decree simplicitor does not attain finality if it has to be used for obtaining any future decree like possession in such cases. If suit for possession passed on an earlier declaratory decree, it is open to the defendant to establish that the declaratory decree on which the suit is passed is not a lawful decree. The cited case is in no way identical with the present case. Therefore, the same has got no application because, undisputedly, the decree is not a decree simplicitor. It is a combined decree for declaration with recovery of possession. 17. Mr. Banerjee next refers to Laxmi Nagappa (supra) to contend that the Court which passed the impugned order in execution of the award, cannot be the Executing Court within the meaning of the Arbitration Act. Ratio decided in this judgment appears to be against Mr. Banerjee’s submission. The Hon’ble Apex Court held “therefore, on account of insertion of the Explanation to Section 37, there would be now two Courts which would come within the meaning of the words ‘the Court which passed the decree.’ One Court would be the Court that actually passed the decree and the second one is a Court which has been established newly having jurisdiction over a part of the territory. New Court thus established having jurisdiction over a portion of the territory will have to be also deemed as a Court that passed the decree. Therefore, such a Court also would have the jurisdiction to execute the decree without that decree being transferred to it by the Court which originally and actually passed the decree.” 18. Last decision referred to by Mr. Therefore, such a Court also would have the jurisdiction to execute the decree without that decree being transferred to it by the Court which originally and actually passed the decree.” 18. Last decision referred to by Mr. Banerjee in the case of Leela Hotels (supra) also does not help him at all. In the said decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held in paragraph 45 “Regarding the question as to whether the award of the learned arbitrator tantamount to a decree or not, the language used in Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, makes it very clear that such an award has to be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure in the same manner as it were a decree of the court. The said language leaves no room for doubt as to the manner in which the award of the learned arbitrator was to be accepted. 19. As held by this Hon’ble Court in the case of Krishna Kumar Mundhra (supra) decided by a Hon’ble Single Judge of this Court, I hold that the invalidity of an award can be found out from Sections 12, 13, 16 and, ultimately, under Section 34 of the 1996 Act and not beyond. Therefore, the petitioner has not moved the right forum to complain about the award within the time-frame mentioned in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and by-passing the said provisions of Section 34 prescribed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the petitioner cannot be allowed to invoke jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution to nullify the order impugned by which the award was executed and writ of possession was issued. In the present case, writ of delivery of possession with a direction to the Bailiff to execute writ and deliver vacant possession to the decree-holder as per award on or before 30th June, 2009, was passed on 15th June, 2009 and the Bailiff was directed to file his report within the date fixed that is, 1st August, 2009. 20. Mr. Basu has submitted before this Court certified copy of the order no.59 dated 1st August, 2009 wherefrom it appears that Process Server filed his execution report and the Court has held that the possession had already been made over to the decree-holder and the decree-holder prayed for disposal of the execution case with full satisfaction. 20. Mr. Basu has submitted before this Court certified copy of the order no.59 dated 1st August, 2009 wherefrom it appears that Process Server filed his execution report and the Court has held that the possession had already been made over to the decree-holder and the decree-holder prayed for disposal of the execution case with full satisfaction. Recording such fact, the learned Court below was pleased to dispose of the execution case holding that the decree has been satisfied. 21. On perusal of the order dated 15th September, 2009, when the revisional application was moved, the petitioner did not bring it to the notice of the Court about the order no.59 passed on 1st August, 2009 although, he has annexed all the orders up to order no.58 with the revisional application. However, order no.58 discloses that the decree-holder filed a petition praying for disposal of the execution case and it was placed for order on 1st August, 2009. The petitioner never tried to bring it to the notice of the Court about the order passed on 1st August, 2009, nor has it been challenged by the petitioner. Therefore, the interim order which was passed on 15th September, 2009, directing for status quo with regard to possession as well as nature and character of the suit property including transfer and/or creation of any third party interest in respect of the property covered by the award would be maintained as on that date would be of no effect and by virtue of such interim order the petitioner cannot be benefitted if anything untoward has been done by the opposite parties before 15th September, 2009. However, such fact is not before this Court and is not borne out from any record placed before this Court. Therefore, even if the petitioner succeeds in this revisional application on the question of jurisdiction, no relief prayed for in the revisional application by passing an order of status quo ante can be granted. 22. As held by this Hon’ble Court in the case of Krisna Kumar Mundhra (supra) I am of the view that the revisional application is not maintainable because the question arose whether the petitioner would have been permitted to file an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure in an execution of an award in terms of Section 36 of the Act. This Court held that provisions contained in Section 34 of the Act of 1996 are somewhat similar to Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 47, C.P.C., renders the scope very wide and includes any and every dispute between the parties to be settled or dissolved in the same proceeding and not by separate proceedings in the execution of the decree itself. This Court, in the above-referred decision, has held that enforcement of the award under Order 21, Civil Procedure Code, would not attract the application of Section 47, Civil Procedure Code, simply by reason of the expression used in Section 36. Section 36 cannot be read independent of the other provisions contained in the Act itself. In the said decision, this Court held further that Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be attracted despite the provisions contained in Section 36 in respect of an award when the award is sought to be executed thereunder. Therefore, if Section 47 cannot be entertained, the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the order impugned before this Revisional Court, jurisdiction of which is of supervisory in nature. 23. Order impugned does not call for any interference in this revisional application. 24. Revisional application fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.