JUDGMENT : S.G. Shah, J. 1. The appellants are original respondents No. 2 and 4 being owner of the vehicle involved in the road accident. Respondents No. 1 to 7 are original claimants; whereas, respondent No. 8 is driver of the vehicle owned by the appellants and respondent No. 9 is insurer of such vehicle. They are hereinafter referred in their original capacity before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ahmedabad (Rural) in their respective Motor Accident Claim Petitions. M.A.C.P. No. 338 of 1989 was filed by legal heirs and dependents of the victim of the road accident, namely, Kantilal Keshabhai, whereas M.A.C.P. No. 331 of 1989 was filed by the parents of the victim of the same accident, namely, Dasrathbhai Mohanbhai. Since both the victims had died in the same vehicular accident, the Tribunal has decided their claim petition by common consolidated impugned judgment and award dated 18.4.1992, whereby, claimant of M.A.C.P. No. 338 of 1989 were awarded Rs. 7,92,000/- as compensation for the death of Kantilal Keshavbhai with 12% interest and cost throughout, whereas claimants of the M.A.C.P. No. 331 of 1989 were awarded an amount of Rs. 97,000/- for the death of Dasrathbhai Mohanbhai with 12% interest and cost throughout. However, Tribunal has exonerated the insurance company from indemnifying the owner of the vehicle being present appellants on the ground that there was clear breach of terms and conditions of the insurance policy and therefore, insurance company cannot be saddled with the liability to indemnify the owners. In view of such situation, the present appeals are preferred by owners of the vehicle being semi-Government Corporation, namely, Gujarat Dairy Development Corporation Ltd. and its subsidiary, namely, Ahmedabad Dairy, who are owning and utilising the vehicle in question for their activities. First Appeal No. 1875 of 1992 was against the award in M.A.C.P. No. 338 of 1989 whereas First Appeal No. 1876 of 1992 is against award in M.A.C.P. No. 331 of 1989. However, since common question of law in involved and when common consolidated judgment is for both the claimants, I am disposing both these appeals by this common and consolidated judgment, wherein issue regarding liability of insurance is common, whereas there would be separate discussion for quantum of compensation in both the appeals. 2. However, since common question of law in involved and when common consolidated judgment is for both the claimants, I am disposing both these appeals by this common and consolidated judgment, wherein issue regarding liability of insurance is common, whereas there would be separate discussion for quantum of compensation in both the appeals. 2. I have heard learned advocates for both the parties and perused the record whereby now, this Court has to decide following three major issues:-- "(1) Whether insurance company can be held responsible for indemnifying the appellants/owners of the vehicle in question, irrespective of breach of policy condition or not. (2) Whether amount of compensation awarded to the claimants are just and reasonable and in accordance with law or it requires any interference by way of modification (3) What is the result." 3. So far as first issue is concerned, it would be appropriate to recollect the details of victims so also nature of accident and status of the victim with vehicle with the conditions of the insurance policy. It is undisputed fact that appellants are owning milk tanker bearing No. GTA-8910 attached with the trailer bearing No. GTD-9970, and on the date of accident i.e. 2.1.1989, such trailer-tanker was driver by opponent No. 1 and it was insured with opponent No. 4 for the period between 1.1.1989 to 31.12.1989. It is also undisputed fact that such vehicle being milk tanker attached to the trailer was used for transportation and distribution of milk for and on behalf of opponents No. 2 and 4, but unfortunately, opponent No. 1 - driver had also allowed the people to travel in such goods vehicle by offering them lift on the way against payment of fare for such transportation during his trip between Ahmedabad and Himmatnagar and thereby, the persons who were travelling in such vehicle were not gratuitous passenger, but passenger for hire and reward, which was received by the driver of the vehicle. It is also undisputed fact that deceased victims Kantilal and Dasrathbhai were travelling in such trailer - tanker when it was empty and therefore, there is no question of travelling in such vehicle either as owner of the goods as a gratuitous passenger when they have taken a lift from Amdupura S.T. Bus Stand for going upto Chiloda or further at Ahmedabad - Himmatnagar Road. It has come in evidence that when the victims had taken sheets in the vehicle, there were already two or three passengers sitting in the cabin of the tanker and after the victims had taken their sheets, the tanker continued its journey towards Himmatnagar. An attempt was made to plead and prove that one of the victim Kantilal was carrying vegetables as goods and he has fixed the hire charges of Rs. 1/- as fare and occupied his seat as one of the passenger in the cabin of the driver. However, in a goods vehicle or even in a passenger vehicle, personal belongings like 1 kg. Vegetables cannot be considered as goods to be carried in a vehicle and there is a need of the owner of the vehicle either to load or unload such goods or to safeguard such goods and therefore, it cannot be said that Kantilal was travelling with his goods, more particularly when he has fixed fare of Rs. 1/, and when vehicle is in fact a milk tanker, there is no scope of transporting any other goods except milk or other liquid and therefore, all other persons travelling in such vehicle can never be gratuitous passengers but passengers for hire and reward. The law is well settled that even in a goods vehicle, permitted persons like police officer on duty or in emergency, persons ordered to be carried by the competent authority or a gratuitous passenger for some local emergency, may be permitted to travel in a goods vehicle, but otherwise, travelling in a goods vehicle against payment of fare as hire and reward would certainly be considered as breach of terms and conditions of policy and thereby, insurance company may not be held responsible to indemnify the owner. 4. So far as the incident is concerned, it is also undisputed fact that opponent No. 1 - driver of the tanker drove his vehicle rashly and negligently and in such an excessive speed that he lost control over the vehicle, which resulted into running over of the vehicle on the wrong side of the road and turning turtle on the road-side ditch and that too on his wrong side. Because of such accident, passengers travelling in the cabin of the trailer attached with the tanker were seriously injured, amongst them Kantilal and Dasrathbhai succumbed to their respective injuries during their treatment in Civil Hospital, Gandhinagar. Because of such accident, passengers travelling in the cabin of the trailer attached with the tanker were seriously injured, amongst them Kantilal and Dasrathbhai succumbed to their respective injuries during their treatment in Civil Hospital, Gandhinagar. Therefore, so far as negligence is concerned, since victims have no role in the accident, and since opponent No. 1 was driving the vehicle during the course of his employment with opponents No. 2 and 4, who are owning the vehicle in question, it is clear and obvious that all opponents are jointly and severally liable to pay compensation to the victims. So far as indemnifying the award of compensation against such driver and owner being tortfeasor and his master by the insurance company i.e. opponent No. 3, it is a contractual liability between the insured and insurer, which would be governed by the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance issued by opponent No. 3 - insurance company against acceptance of premium and its liability would arose based upon statutory provisions applicable to such incident and the contract of insurance. Therefore, as aforesaid, when there is undisputed fact that victims were travelling in a milk tanker-trailer, which has no reason to carry passengers either with the goods or as a gratuitous passenger, since there is no much space in the vehicle for more persons or the goods except storing liquid milk. If driver of the vehicle has allowed few passengers for hire or reward after accepting fare and if he allows those passengers to sit in his cabin, which is generally meant for two or three persons only viz. driver and conductor and at the most a substitute driver or conductor and not for regular passengers, if there are five other passengers on payment of fare for which driver has given them lift from the bus-stop on highway upto next village, they are certainly termed as paid passengers for hire or reward for which insurance company has not accepted any liability and on the contrary the insurance policy categorically confirms that liability of insurance policy would be limited and it may not be responsible to indemnify the owner in case of breach of use of the vehicle. One more difficulty is against the appellants inasmuch as the accident has taken place on 2.1.1989 i.e. before the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force w.e.f. 1.7.1989. One more difficulty is against the appellants inasmuch as the accident has taken place on 2.1.1989 i.e. before the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force w.e.f. 1.7.1989. To that extent, though award is in the year 1992 and we are deciding the appeal in the year 2016, the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 would be applicable, atleast so far as liability of insurance company is concerned because its policy was in accordance with the provisions of such Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and premium charged by them was also in accordance with such terms and conditions, which were prevailing on the date of incident. 5. Learned advocate for the appellants is however relying upon the oral evidence and factual position that now appellant - Company has gone into liquidation and they are not having funds to pay the compensation that may be confirmed in this appeal. However, such second part is not material can never be a criteria to decide any such issue. There are some directions to deposit certain amounts at the admission stage of such appeal. 6. So far as evidence on record is concerned, there is nothing in the deposition of the claimant Shardaben Kantilal Patel in M.A.C.P. No. 338 of 1989 at Exh. 45 to prove or confirm that the victim was gratuitous passenger without hire and reward. On the contrary, it has been confirmed from her evidence that her deceased husband i.e. victim of the accident was travelling as a passenger in the milk tanker. It is reconfirmed in her deposition that she received an information that her deceased husband was seated in a milk tanker at the time of accident. 7. Whereas, eye-witness Prahladbhai Ambalal Patel at Exh. 77 has also confirmed that the vehicle was used to carry milk and that he has not seen that what is there in the luggage with Kantilal, though an attempt was made by him to prove that deceased Kantilal was carrying 15 to 20 Kgs. luggage with him. He also admits that deceased Kantilal has paid fare for both luggage as well as for his seat so also all the passengers have paid the fare and that there are other passengers in addition to him as well as deceased Kantilal, including other victim and that such tankers are regularly carrying passengers on hire or reward on such road. He also admits that deceased Kantilal has paid fare for both luggage as well as for his seat so also all the passengers have paid the fare and that there are other passengers in addition to him as well as deceased Kantilal, including other victim and that such tankers are regularly carrying passengers on hire or reward on such road. He denied the suggestion during cross-examination that victims were not travelling in the vehicle, but were on the road and that because one buffalo had came on the road all of a sudden, the driver had applied brakes, which resulted into tilting of the tanker on wrong side of the road by hitting victims and thereby victims were injured. Therefore, even claimants witness has confirmed that victims were travelling in the goods vehicle - milk tanker on payment of fare and therefore, there is clear and positive evidence to confirm that victims were not gratuitous passengers, but were passengers for hire and reward. This it would be difficult for the Tribunal or any Court to hold that insurance company has to indemnifying the owner even if there is such breach of policy condition. An attempt was made by the appellant - Company, owner of the vehicle to prove that deceased victims were not travelling in the tanker. For the purpose, they have examined one Somabhai Ramjibhai Rabari, claiming to be machine operator, at Exh. 80. Such witness has though deposed that he was travelling with the vehicle on the date of accident and driver had never given lift to anybody, but because of buffalo on road, driver had to apply brakes, which resulted into such incident wherein victims have been injured, who were walking on the road, it is unbelievable story considering the place of incident being highway road between the two villages wherein there is least chance of pedestrian walking from here to there and more particularly, when evidence during investigation confirms that victims were passengers in the vehicle. It cannot be ignored that accident has taken place on 2.1.1989, whereas this witness has deposed for the first time before the Tribunal on 19.8.1991 and it is also clear that though he was claiming to be eye-witness and travelling in the vehicle, he has never disclosed such fact to the investigating agency and therefore, his deposition alone cannot be considered as a gospel truth against several other oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence, in the form of panchnama, are available on record. 8. Whereas, the opponent No. 3 insurance company has also examined one Clerk of R.T.O., Ahmedabad at Exh. 188, who proves the registration of vehicle, which confirms that vehicle in question was registered as a goods vehicle and it was having permit for private carrier and he proves such permit on record at Exh. 114. Such permit specifically discloses that vehicle is to be used to carry milk and milk products and it is subject to the conditions laid down in Section 84 of the Act and in Sub-Rule (6) of Rule 76 of the Gujarat Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989. However, such permit is issued on 23.7.1990 i.e. after the date of accident, whereas the old permit issued under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 categorically discloses that nature of goods permitted to be carried in the vehicle is milk and milk product. Such old permit is issued on 30.8.1980. 9. In addition to oral submission regarding inability of the appellants to satisfy the remaining part of the award because of its financial condition and probably it has gone in liquidation, learned advocate for the appellants have submitted that the quantum of compensation awarded to the claimants are on higher side and therefore, atleast appeals may be allowed by simply modifying the amount of compensation awarded to the claimants limited to the amount which has been deposited by the appellants pursuant to interim orders by this Court. So far as First Appeal No. 1875 of 1992 is concerned, the interim order while admitting the appeal in September, 1992 is to the effect that appellants shall deposit Rs. 6,00,000/- against the award of Rs. 7,92,000/- with 12% interest and costs. Probably, there is no direction to even deposit the interest on such amount of Rs. So far as First Appeal No. 1875 of 1992 is concerned, the interim order while admitting the appeal in September, 1992 is to the effect that appellants shall deposit Rs. 6,00,000/- against the award of Rs. 7,92,000/- with 12% interest and costs. Probably, there is no direction to even deposit the interest on such amount of Rs. 6 Lacs and therefore, practically, it is a lump-sum amount considered by this Court to be deposited by the appellants at the time of filing of the appeal. With due respect, in such cases, considering it as a money decree and amount of compensation to be paid to the victim, generally full awarded amount is directed to be deposited before the Tribunal even if some part of such deposit is to be kept in FDR till disposal of the appeal. Therefore, only because of financial condition of the appellants as aforesaid, the award cannot be modified on such ground. However, the issue regarding quantum of compensation will be determined herein after. But, before answering the first issue regarding liability of the insurance company, if we scrutinize the record, it transpires that though the FIR discloses the name of Prahladbhai Ambalal, who is examined at Exh. 77, the appellants have an audacity to plead that he was got-up witness and not the eye-witness to the cause of accident, and it is further added that he had family relations with the family of the deceased Kantilal and the claimants though there is no iota of evidence to prove such fact in any manner whatsoever. On the contrary, as aforesaid, in fact the complainant Dasrathbhai Girdharbhai Patel, who was passing on his motorcycle from the place of incident and who has lodged the FIR with the Dabhoda police station, has categorically disclosed the name of Prahladbhai Ambalal Patel contending that he has been informed by one of the injured, namely, Ambalal Jesingdas Patel that Ambalal Jesingdas Patel, deceased Kantilal Patel and Prahladbhai Patel etc. were travelling in the tanker, which has met with accident as aforesaid and because of the injuries sustained by all of them they were admitted to the Civil Hospital at Gandhinagar where the complainant had met them. Similarly, appellants have an audacity to say that though there is no reference of Somabhai Rabari, who was examined by appellants at Exh. were travelling in the tanker, which has met with accident as aforesaid and because of the injuries sustained by all of them they were admitted to the Civil Hospital at Gandhinagar where the complainant had met them. Similarly, appellants have an audacity to say that though there is no reference of Somabhai Rabari, who was examined by appellants at Exh. 80, in police papers, to consider him as an eye-witness, though in fact he is interested witness being employee of the appellants themselves. Similarly, appellants have an audacity to claim that no accident has taken place at all and that Tribunal has erred in admitting as evidence and relying upon the public document like FIR, panchnama and postmortem report. The appellants have also contended that evidence adduced on record, cannot be considered for attracting the legal principle of res ipsa loquitur since neither FIR nor panchnama establish that driver had lost control over the vehicle which has caused the accident. It is sufficient to say that when the vehicle in question was dragged off the road with its brake marks and gone into the road-side ditch, such factual detail itself is sufficient to attract the principle of res ipsa locutor. Therefore, it cannot be said that Tribunal has erred in believing the evidence on record and holding that the driver, owner of the vehicle in question are liable to compensate victims and claimants. 10. So far as theory pleaded by the appellant that victims had been dashed by the vehicle and not travelling in the vehicle is concerned, if it is so, nobody has restricted the appellants to prove such fact by cogent and reliable evidence or to rebut the evidence of the claimants, which is supported by documentary evidence and therefore, when this is a crucial issue to confirm liability of either owner or insured, inaction on the part of the appellants except examining one person from their office, would not help the appellants to prove at such appeal stage that victims were not travelling in the vehicle in question. In that case, the appellants should have examined driver also and should have called for the relevant documentary evidence from the police papers, chargesheet and Criminal Case to rebut the evidence of the claimants so as to prove that victims were not travelling in the vehicle, but were outside the vehicle when the incident had taken place. In that case, the appellants should have examined driver also and should have called for the relevant documentary evidence from the police papers, chargesheet and Criminal Case to rebut the evidence of the claimants so as to prove that victims were not travelling in the vehicle, but were outside the vehicle when the incident had taken place. Instead of taking such passive stand, the appellants have taken altogether negative stand during evidence before the Tribunal and tried to establish, without success, that no accident has taken place at all. In view of above discussion, now one thing is crystal clear on record that vehicle of the appellants was involved in the accident, wherein it had dragged itself out of the road on wrong side and gone in the road-side ditch, thereby few passengers carried in the tanker had received serious injuries to which they succumbed. Therefore, as owner of the vehicle, considering the basic principle of the Motor Vehicles Act that claimants are entitled to compensation, if victim receives serious injuries out of the use of the motor vehicle, the appellants are liable to pay compensation to the claimants. 11. So far as liability of insurance company to indemnify the owner is concerned, the insurance policy specifically limits the liability in case of passengers in such goods vehicle when it is endorsed in the policy that insurance policy is issued with condition regarding limitation as to use of the vehicle by endorsement that the vehicle should be used only under a public carrier permit "The policy does not cover: Use of vehicle for carrying passengers...." coming under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. Therefore, the policy in question, which is produced on record before the trial Court categorically confirms restriction of use of the vehicle in question to use for carrying passengers and even thereafter if passengers are carried in such vehicle on accepting fare for a small trip i.e. for hire and reward, it is a clear breach of condition of the policy and it would certainly restrict the insurer to indemnify the insured from payment of compensation, if any awarded against the insurer by the competent authority. 12. 12. The law on such issue is now well settled though Supreme Court has in given cases fixed the liability of the insurance company to indemnify the owners, which is mainly for gratuitous passenger or for owner of the goods, which was carried in such goods vehicle for loading and unloading such goods even if it is for hire and reward. However, as aforesaid, when vehicle in question is milk tanker, where there is no possibility of carrying goods so as to load and unload by its owner, there is no scope of any other interpretation, though claimants have tried to prove that deceased Kantilal was having some goods with him. If we peruse the impugned judgment, the Tribunal has considered the issue regarding liability of insurance company in paragraphs 18, 19 and 24 to 46. Therefore, I do not want to reproduce or re-discuss all such legal issues again when Tribunal has categorically after discussing all relevant issues raised before it and decisions cited before it observed that if the terms and conditions of insurance policy read with provisions of Sections 95 and 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and the conditions of the permit, when it is established on record that there is clear violation of conditions of the policy as well as permit issued by RTO, opponent No. 3 insurance company is to be exempted from its liability, I do not find any fault in such determination. The Tribunal has rightly observed that the defence of the opponents are not only unbelievable, but dishonest and afterthought to avoid its liability as a public corporation to pay the compensation to the victims. When there is a categorical breach of the provisions of the terms and conditions of the policy, which in violation of Section 95, 96(2) and Rule 118 of the Motor Vehicles Act, there is no option, but to confirm that the insurance company is not liable to indemnify the owner. At the cost of repetition, it is to be recollected here that the vehicle in question is a milk tanker and it has been permitted to ply for carrying milk and milk products only. At the cost of repetition, it is to be recollected here that the vehicle in question is a milk tanker and it has been permitted to ply for carrying milk and milk products only. Thereby, it is not a normal truck where the passengers can carry any goods and may travel for loading and unloading goods and therefore, allowing more than five persons to travel in the driver's cabin where there is no space for sitting, would certainly needs to be considered as basic breach of statutory permit, rules and it attracts relevant provision of law, which restricts the insurance company's liability to indemnify the owner for such breach. Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which was in force and applicable to the present case specifically limits the requirement of the insurance policy because of the specific condition under such section that a policy does not require to cover the liability in respect of the death of a passenger, if it be a goods vehicle and if passenger is carried in such vehicle except for the liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, if passenger is employee of the insured, whereas, provision of Section 96 makes it clear that no sum is payable by an insurer in respect of any judgment in case of breach of said condition of the policy regarding excluding the use of the vehicle. Therefore, when there is a condition in the policy, which restricts the insured to carry the passengers and if vehicle carries passengers, then it can certainly be treated as a breach of policy condition and therefore, insurance company cannot be held liable to indemnify the owner. To that extent, there is no substance in the grounds of appeal and the appeals cannot succeed. Since this is now a settled legal position, reference of different decisions pleaded in the appeal memos are not much material, more particularly when most of them are of different High Courts and when there is decision by Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India, confirming such view. Therefore, I answer issue No. 1 against the appellants. However, for such determination, reference of following decisions would be sufficient. "a. AIR 2013 SC 1064 between Manager, National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Saju P. Paul; b. AIR 2008 SC 245 between Smt. Thokchom Ongoi Sangeeta and Anr. v. Oriental Insurance Co. Therefore, I answer issue No. 1 against the appellants. However, for such determination, reference of following decisions would be sufficient. "a. AIR 2013 SC 1064 between Manager, National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Saju P. Paul; b. AIR 2008 SC 245 between Smt. Thokchom Ongoi Sangeeta and Anr. v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors.; c. AIR 2004 SC 4338 (Full Bench) National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. V. Chinnamma and others; and d. AIR 2003 SC 607 between New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani and others." 13. If we scrutinize the evidence on record, it becomes clear that claimants have claimed that victim was earning Rs. 87,000/- p.a. i.e. Rs. 72,000/- from business of transport and Rs. 15,000/- from agricultural work. There is no exaggeration in such disclosure when claimants have disclosed his income for the year ending on 31.3.1988 as Rs. 60,000/- from the business of transport and Rs. 68,000/- for the year ending on 31.3.1989. Therefore, there is nothing against such evidence so as to discard it, more particularly when claimants have not exaggerated income after the death of the victim and when there is no evidence in rebuttal by the opponents. Even thereafter the Tribunal has not considered the prospective earning capacity of the victim and taken Rs. 5,000/- only as dependency of the claimants considering the fact that there is categorical admission by the claimant that deceased was giving her Rs. 5,000/- p.m. for household expenditure. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere in such amount of compensation for loss of dependency. 14. So far as income of the deceased is concerned, it cannot be ignored that there is no evidence in rebuttal to disprove the version of the claimant that deceased was earning Rs. 87,000/- p.a. from business of transport and agricultural work. It is now well-known that amount of compensation needs to be increased by passage of time because of inflation and devaluation of value of rupee from time to time. Therefore also, since the notional income suggested in the Act is before more than two decades, it requires reconsideration by enhancing the same. It is now well-known that amount of compensation needs to be increased by passage of time because of inflation and devaluation of value of rupee from time to time. Therefore also, since the notional income suggested in the Act is before more than two decades, it requires reconsideration by enhancing the same. Similarly, for the same reason, even if it is stated that deceased was not having a permanent job and thereby, there cannot be a consideration of future prospects, the fact remains that future prospects are not to be considered only in case of salaries persons, but in any case every person in his life would certainly earn better by passage of time and otherwise also, inflation and fall in value of rupee is generally continued day after another and therefore, on that count, it would be appropriate to consider some prospective income of the victim of such cases. In this respect, the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India may be referred:-- "a. Smt. Neeta Kallapa Kadolkar & Ors. etc. v. Divisional Manager, M.S.R.T.C., Kolhapur reported in AIR 2015 SC (Supp.) 565; and b. Asha Verman v. Maharaj Singh reported in (2015) SCD 537 : AIR 2015 SC (Supp.) 1841." 15. It cannot be ignored that the Tribunal has not taken care of all relevant evidence and factual details available on record and that the victim was a young man and therefore, they had ample opportunity to earn more and to help their relatives being claimants herein. It is also clear that an unhappy early death certainly results into set-back in the life of parents and widow of the victim and his children therefore, they are also entitled to reasonable amount of compensation on all such counts which otherwise cannot be quantified or compensated in terms of money. 16. The law is now well settled on such issues and therefore, it would not be appropriate and required to recollect and reproduce all the decisions on such count. 16. The law is now well settled on such issues and therefore, it would not be appropriate and required to recollect and reproduce all the decisions on such count. For such determination, I am placing reliance on following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India:-- "(1) Anjani Singh v. Salauddin reported in 2014 (6) SCALE 55 ; (2) Asha Verman v. Maharaj Singh reported in (2015) 42 SCD 537; (3) Kala Devi v. Bhagwan Das Chauhan reported in (2015) 2 SCC 771 ; and (4) Chanderi Devi v. Jaspal Singh reported in 2015 (4) SCALE 390 ; (5) Ashwani Kumar Mishra v. P. Muniam Babu & Ors. reported in,: AIR 1999 SC 2260 " 17. Considering the age and land owned by the victim so also evidence regarding trucks, practically claimants are very reasonable in claiming that deceased was earning Rs. 87,000/- per annum. If we consider the devaluation of money, inflation and consumer price index, practically in case of death, we are supposed to pay just and reasonable amount since we cannot replace a human being. If we consider purchase value of the money, it is found that in the year 1980 when 10 gram gold was available at the cost of Rs. 300/-, the same 10 gram gold is now costing Rs. 30,000/-. Thereby, during last 35 years, the value of money has been reduced by 100 times. Therefore, for the amount which is payable to the claimants in the year 1992, if not paid immediately or if paid after 10 years, then the amount needs to be increased or enhanced by 30%. Therefore, even if we do not consider the rise while awarding compensation because of devaluation of money, it would be inappropriate to reduce the amount of compensation by reducing the earnings, more particularly when the claimants are quite reasonable in claiming that a person having 8 Bigha land and 2 trucks is earning Rs. 87,000/- per annum. Even if we consider Rs. 75,000/- as prospective income at the relevant time, then considering six major and two minor members in the family, the personal expenses of the deceased would be Rs. 10,000/- and therefore, yearly dependency of the claimants would be Rs. 65,000/- considering the age of the deceased though multiplier of 13 can be selected, then the claimants are entitled to same amount towards loss of dependency. 18. 10,000/- and therefore, yearly dependency of the claimants would be Rs. 65,000/- considering the age of the deceased though multiplier of 13 can be selected, then the claimants are entitled to same amount towards loss of dependency. 18. Similarly, when the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has awarded in all more than Rs. 3,00,000/- for loss of consortium, loss of estate in case of minor, the Tribunal has committed an error in awarding Rs. 25,000/- under different heads including compensation for funeral expenses, which should be generally Rs. 25,000/-. Therefore, an award of Rs. 10,000/- on different heads of loss of consortium, loss of estate and funeral expenses by the Tribunal results into non-exercising jurisdiction legally, since it amounts to not awarding any compensation under the head of loss of consortium and loss of estate, which also needs to be awarded separately. 19. Therefore, there is no substance in First Appeal No. 1875 of 1992 so as to interfere in the award either on the issue of liability or quantum. 20. So far as quantum of compensation is concerned, the relevant information can be summarised as under:-- First Appeal No. 1875 of 192 (M.A.C.P. No. 338 of 1989) Name of the victim Kantilal Keshbhai Date of birth 07/03/40 Age of the time of incident 49 Years Claimants Widow and Children, including minor sons Occupation Business of Transport and agriculture, also owing truck bearing Nos. 6392 and 2187 Income Rs. 6,000 p.m. to 7,000/- p.m. Having 8 Bighas of land and Rs. 15,000/- p.a. frome agriculture, Hence, Yearly income is Rs.87,000/- Evidence regarding income Oral evidence of claimants as well as one witness at Exh.69 and income-tax assessment return at Exj,68 disclosing Rs. 59,995/- as income for the A.Y. 1988-89 and Rs. 68,010/- for the A.Y. 1989-90. Therefore income for the financial year 1987-88 is almost Rs.60,000/- and for the financial year 1988-89 is Rs. 68,000/-. Amount of Compensation awarded by the Tribunal Rs. 7,80,000/-, considering Rs. 5,000/- as monthly dependency and applying 13 as suitable multiplier Rs.10,000/- towards loss of expectations of life and 2,000/- towards funeral expenses. Hence, total compensation is Rs. 7,92,000/- First Appeal no. 68,000/-. Amount of Compensation awarded by the Tribunal Rs. 7,80,000/-, considering Rs. 5,000/- as monthly dependency and applying 13 as suitable multiplier Rs.10,000/- towards loss of expectations of life and 2,000/- towards funeral expenses. Hence, total compensation is Rs. 7,92,000/- First Appeal no. 1876 of 1992 (M.A.C.P. No. 331 of 1989) Name of the victim Dasrathbhai Mohanbhai Age of the time of incident 21 Years Claimants Parents Occupation Colouring work i.e. skilled labour work Income Rs.1,200/- p.m. Part time Compounder – Rs.200 Part-time Peon – Rs.600 Total income : 2,000/- Amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal Rs.85,500/- considering Rs.475/- as monthly dependency and applying 15 as suitable multiplier, Rs.10,000/- towards loss of expectation of life and Rs. 1,500/- towards funeral expenses. Hence, total compensation is Rs. 97,000/- 21. Therefore, I do not find any substance in this First Appeal No. 1876 of 1992 also, when the Tribunal has considered only Rs. 475/- as monthly dependency of the parents without considering the prospective income and more particularly, when the Tribunal has not awarded just and reasonable amount even for funeral expenses so also for loss of estate and love and affection. 22. In the result, both the First Appeals fail and stand dismissed.