JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. State has appealed against the judgment dated 12.1.2010, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, in Sessions Trial No.23-S/7 of 2009, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ram Singh, challenging the acquittal of respondent Ram Singh (hereinafter referred to as the accused), who stands charged for having committed an Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? offence punishable under the provisions of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Through the testimonies of Jai Dev Sharma (PW-1), Smt. Meena Kumari (PW-2) (mother of the prosecutrix) and prosecutrix (PW-3), prosecution wants the Court to believe that on 28.6.2009, accused Ram Singh sexually assaulted the prosecutrix, aged 5 years. Same day, on the basis of report lodged by Smt. Meena Kumari, FIR No.108 dated 28.6.2009 (Ex.PD), for commission of offence, punishable under the provisions of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, came to be registered at Police Station Shimla West, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh. Investigation conducted by SI Mathura Dass (PW-9) revealed that prosecutrix was residing with her parents in village Patiyud, Post Office, Anandpur, Tehsil and District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh. Accused was sharing accommodation with Jai Dev Sharma (PW-1), brother in law of Smt. Meena Kumari. Prosecutrix used to frequently visit the house of Jai Dev Sharma, who, on 27.6.2009, had gone to his village Niun, Post Office Jai Nagar, Tehsil Nalagarh, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh. In the morning of 28.6.2009, prosecutrix went to the house of Jai Dev Sharma and finding her to be alone, accused sexually assaulted her. Prosecutrix narrated the incident to her mother, who, after contacting Jai Dev Sharma, lodged the report. Prosecutrix was got medially examined from Dr. (Mrs.) Asha Negi (PW-4), who issued MLC (Ex.PF). She found no evidence suggesting penetration. During investigation, police took into possession clothes of the prosecutrix, accused and the Chattai & Baithak. With the completion of investigation, which prima facie revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. With the completion of investigation, which prima facie revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to establish its case, prosecution examined as many as nine witnesses and statement of the accused under the provisions of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also recorded, in which he admitted the following facts to be correct: Q.No.2. It is in evidence against you that you and Sh. Jai Dev Sharma work in the HRTC and are colleagues. What you have to state about it? Ans: It is correct. Q.No.3. It is in evidence against you that Sh. Jai Dev (PW-1) is residing in village Patiyud in the house of Sh. Prem Lal Sharma. You accused were living with Sh. Jai Dev in his house/quarter. What you have to state about it? Ans: It is correct. Q.No.4. It is in evidence against you that the complainant Smt. Meena Kumari is sister in law of Sh. Jai Dev. She, her husband and their children are residing in a house near to your quarter/house in village Patiyud. What you have to state about it? Ans: It is correct. Q.No.5. It is in evidence against you that the children of Smt. Meena Kumari including the prosecutrix used to visit your house/quarter off and on. What you have to state about it? Ans: It is correct. Q.No.6. It is in evidence against you that on 28.06.2009, in the morning, Sh. Jai Dev was away to his native village Niun. You accused were alone in the house/quarter. What you have to state about it? Ans: It is correct. However, while refuting the incident, he took the following defence: “I am innocent. The case is false. Actually, Smt. Meena Kumari and Sh. Jai Dev wanted that I should tie the nuptial knot with the younger sister of Smt. Meena Kumari. I did not agree to the said marriage proposal. Smt. Meena Kumari used to blackmail me for this purpose. She and Sh. Jai Dev even demanded Rs.25,000/- from me. When I refused to pay the money and contact the marriage, Smt. Meena Kumari etc. I did not agree to the said marriage proposal. Smt. Meena Kumari used to blackmail me for this purpose. She and Sh. Jai Dev even demanded Rs.25,000/- from me. When I refused to pay the money and contact the marriage, Smt. Meena Kumari etc. threatened me and roped me in this false case.” 5. Age of prosecutrix (PW-3) is not in dispute. Her age was found to be between 4 and 5 years. However, from the testimony of her mother, as also the birth certificate, so tendered in evidence as Ex.PX, it is apparent that as on the date of the incident, prosecutrix was of 5 years and 3 months. 6. It is a matter of record that Dr. Asha Negi examined the prosecutrix on 28.6.2009 at 9.10 pm. The alleged incident took place in the morning at 8.30. In between, prosecutrix had had a bath and her clothes, stained with discharge of human blood, which smelt badly, were washed. The doctor found no evidence, suggestive of the fact that penetration had taken place. No sign of injury, inflammation, redness, bruises or laceration were found on the private parts or anywhere on the body of the prosecutrix. Significantly, the doctor does not state that no rape had been committed. It does not rule out such possibility. Other scientific evidence is also not suggestive of the sexual assault. 7. But the question, which requires consideration, is as to whether in the absence of any such proof or opinion of the expert, is it open for the court to solely rely upon the substantive ocular version, for bringing home the guilt of the accused or not? The answer is no longer res integra. Fully inspiring testimony of the prosecutrix is sufficient enough. 8. Even in the absence of categorical opinion about rape, opinion of the doctor about such act not being totally ruled out is relevant. Mere absence of spermatozoa would not cast doubt on correctness of the prosecution case. (See: Datta v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 588; and Prithi Chand v. State of H.P., (1989) 1 SCC 432 ). 9. The Apex Court had the occasion to deal with the case where there was a conflict between the medical evidence and ocular evidence of the prosecution. There the Court held as under: “23. (See: Datta v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 588; and Prithi Chand v. State of H.P., (1989) 1 SCC 432 ). 9. The Apex Court had the occasion to deal with the case where there was a conflict between the medical evidence and ocular evidence of the prosecution. There the Court held as under: “23. In any case, to establish a conflict between the medical and the ocular evidence, the law is no more res integra and stands squarely answered by the recent judgment of this Court in the case of Dayal Singh v State of Uttaranchal, (2012) 8 SCC 263 (SCC p.283, paras 35036) "35. This brings us to an ancillary issue as to how the Court would appreciate the evidence in such cases. The possibility of some variations in the exhibits, medical and ocular evidence cannot be ruled out. But it is not that every minor variation or inconsistency would tilt the balance of justice in favour the accused. Of course, where contradictions and variations are of a serious nature, which apparently or impliedly are destructive of the substantive case sought to be proved by the prosecution, they may provide an advantage to the accused. The Courts, normally, look at expert evidence with a greater sense of acceptability, but it is equally true that the courts are not absolutely guided by the report of the experts, especially if such reports are perfunctory, unsustainable and are the result of a deliberate attempt to misdirect the prosecution. In Kamaljit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 12 SCC 155 , the Court, while dealing with discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence, held: (SCC p. 159, para 8) ‘8. It is trite law that minor variations between medical evidence and ocular evidence do not take away the primacy of the latter. Unless medical evidence in its term goes so far as to completely rule out all possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner stated by the eyewitnesses, the testimony of the eyewitnesses cannot be thrown out.’ 36. Where the eyewitness account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities may not be accepted as conclusive.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. The Apex Court in Madan Gopal Makkad v. Naval Dubey and another, (1992) 3 SCC 204 , has held that: 35. Where the eyewitness account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities may not be accepted as conclusive.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. The Apex Court in Madan Gopal Makkad v. Naval Dubey and another, (1992) 3 SCC 204 , has held that: 35. Nariman, J. in Queen v. Ahmed Ally, (1989) 11 Sutherland WR Cr 25, while expressing his view a on medical evidence has observed as follows: "THE evidence of a medical man or other skilled witnesses, however, eminent, as to what he thinks may or may not have taken place under particular combination of circumstances, however, confidently, he may speak, is ordinarily a matter of mere opinion." 36. Fazal Ali, J. in Pratap Misra v. State of Orissa, ( 1977 3 SCC 41 ), has stated thus: "... [l]t is well settled that the medical jurisprudence is not an exact science and it is indeed difficult for any Doctor to say with precision and exactitude as to when a particular injury was caused ... as to the exact time when the appellants may have had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix." 37. We feel that it would be quite appropriate, in this context, to reproduce the opinion expressed by Modi in Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology (Twenty-first Edition) at page 369 which reads thus: "THUS to constitute the offence of rape it is not necessary that there should be complete penetration of penis with emission of semen and rupture of hymen. Partial penetration of the penis within the labia majora or the vulva or pudenda with or without emission of semen or even an attempt at penetration is quite sufficient for the purpose of the law. It is therefore quite possible to commit legally the offence of rape without producing any injury to the genitals or leaving any seminal stains. In such a case the medical officer should mention the negative facts in his report, but should not give his opinion that no rape had been committed. Rape is crime and not a medical condition. Rape is a legal term and not a diagnosis to be made by the medical officer treating the victim. The only statement that can be made by the medical officer is that there is evidence of recent sexual activity. Whether the rape has occurred or not is a legal conclusion, not a medical one. " 38. Rape is a legal term and not a diagnosis to be made by the medical officer treating the victim. The only statement that can be made by the medical officer is that there is evidence of recent sexual activity. Whether the rape has occurred or not is a legal conclusion, not a medical one. " 38. In Parikh's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, the following passage is found: "SEXUAL intercourse. In law, this term is held to mean the slightest degree of penetration of the vulva by the penis with or without emission of semen. It is therefore quite possible to commit legally the offence of rape without producing any injury to the genitals or leaving any seminal stains." 39. In Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice (Vol. 4 at page 1356, it is stated: "... [Even slight penetration is sufficient and emission is unnecessary." 40. In Halsbury's Statutes of England and Wales, (Fourth Edition), Volume 12, it is stated that even the slightest degree of penetration is sufficient to prove sexual intercourse within the meaning of S. 44 of the Sexual Offences Act, 1956. Vide (1) R. v. Hughes, (1841) 9 C&P 752, (2) R. v. Lines and R. v. Nicholls, (1844) 1 Car & Kir 393. 41. See also Harris's Criminal Law, (Twentysecond Edition) at page 465. 42. In American Jurisprudence, it is stated that slight penetration is sufficient to complete the crime of rape. Code 263 of Penal Code of Califomia reads thus: "RAPE; essentials Penetration sufficient. The essential guilt of rape consists in the outrage to the person and feelings of the victim of the rape. Any sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime." 43. The First Explanation to S. 375 of Indian Penal Code which defines 'Rape' reads thus: "EXPLANATION.PENETRATION is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape." 44. In interpreting the above explanation whether complete penetration is necessary to constitute an offence of rape, various High courts have taken a consistent view that even the slightest penetration is sufficient to make out an offence of rape and the depth of penetration is immaterial. Reference may be made to (1) Natha v. Emperor, (1925) 26 CrLJ 1185, (2) Abdul Majid v. Emperor, AIR 1927 Lah 735(2), (3) Mst. Reference may be made to (1) Natha v. Emperor, (1925) 26 CrLJ 1185, (2) Abdul Majid v. Emperor, AIR 1927 Lah 735(2), (3) Mst. Jantan v. Emperor, (1934) 36 Punj LR 35, (4) Ghanashyam Misra v. State, 1957 CriLJ 469 , (5) Das Bernard v. State, 1974 CriLJ 1098. In re Anthony, AIR 1960 Mad 308 it has been held that while there must be penetration in the technical sense, the slightest penetration would be sufficient and a complete act of sexual intercourse is not at all necessary. In Gour's The Penal Law of India, 6th Edn. 1955 (Vol. II), page 1678, it is observed, "Even vulval penetration has been held to be sufficient for a conviction of rape." ” (Emphasis supplied) 11. Either non-rupture of hymen or absence of signs of injury on the body of the prosecutrix, in itself, cannot be a ground to disbelieve the otherwise inspiring testimony of the prosecutrix. In Perminder alias Ladka Pola v. State of Delhi, (2014) 2 SCC 592 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has observed that: “…………..Partial penetration of the penis within the Labia majora or the vulva or pudenda with or without emission of semen or even an attempt at penetration is quite sufficient for the purpose of the law. It is, therefore, quite possible to commit legally the offence of rape without producing any injury to the genital or leaving any seminal stains.” 12. Also, it is a settled principle of law that absence of injuries on the external or internal parts of the victim by itself cannot be a reason to disbelieve the testimony of the prosecutrix. (See: Mukesh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2014) 10 SC 327); State of Haryana v. Basti Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 200 ; O.M. Baby (Dead) by Legal Representative v. State of Keral, (2012) 11 SCC 362 ; and State of U.P. v. Chhotey Lal, (2011) 2 SCC 550 ). 13. The Apex Court in Puran Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2014) 5 SCC 689 , observed that even non-rupture of hymen itself would be of no consequence and rape could be held to be proved even if there is slight penetration. 14. Mere fact that hymen is intact or that there is no actual wound on the private part of the prosecutrix is not conclusive of the fact that prosecutrix was not subjected to rape. 14. Mere fact that hymen is intact or that there is no actual wound on the private part of the prosecutrix is not conclusive of the fact that prosecutrix was not subjected to rape. (Radhakrishna Nagesh v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2013) 11 SCC 688 ). 15. In the instant case, the doctor does not conclusively or clearly rule out the possibility of rape. There is no other opinion of the expert, totally ruling out the possibility of rape. No evidence is there suggestive of such fact. Absence of injury marks is also not fatal. 16. Reiterating its earlier view in Mohd. Iqbal v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 14 SCC 481 ; Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delh), (2012) 7 SCC 171 , the Apex Court in Mukesh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2014) 10 SC 327, has held that sole testimony of prosecutrix is sufficient to establish commission of rape, even in the absence of any corroborative evidence. 17. Out of the three prosecution witnesses, we find the prosecutrix to be a minor. It is now well settled that the testimony of a child witness can be referred to and relied upon for bringing home the guilt of the accused. 18. We may add that the Court itself had recorded its satisfaction and satisfied the test and principles laid down under Section 118 of the Evidence Act. Test laid down by the Apex Court in Rameshwar vs. The State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1952 SC 54 ) stands fully satisfied in the instant case. 19. The Apex Court in Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao & Anr. vs. State of A.P. (1996) 6 SCC 241 has held as under:- “The principle of law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act is usually known as the rule of res gestae recognised in English law. The essence of the doctrine is that a fact which, though not in issue, is so connected with the fact in issue "as to form part of the same transaction" becomes relevant by itself. This rule is, roughly speaking an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The rationale in making certain statement on fact admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act is on account of the spontaneity and immediacy of such statement or fact in relation to the fact in issue. This rule is, roughly speaking an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The rationale in making certain statement on fact admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act is on account of the spontaneity and immediacy of such statement or fact in relation to the fact in issue. But it is necessary that such fact or statement must be part of the same transaction. In other words, such statement must have been made contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the offence or atleast immediately thereafter. But if there was an interval, however slight it may be, which was sufficient enough for fabrication then the statement is not part of res gestae.” 20. In Golla Yelugu Govindu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2008) 16 SCC 769 , the Apex Court, while reiterating its earlier view, held that Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act') does not prescribe any particular age as a determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent one. On the contrary, Section 118 of the Evidence Act envisages that all persons shall be competent to testify, unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from giving rational answers to these questions, because of tender years, extreme old age, disease- whether of mind, or any other cause of the same kind. A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto. It further held that: “….It further held that the evidence of a child witness is not required to be rejected per se; but the Court as a rule of prudence considers such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality thereof and reliability can record conviction, based thereon. (See Surya Narayana v. State of Karnataka ( 2001 (1) Supreme 1 ).” 21. In Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra ( 1997 (5) SCC 341 ) it was held as follows: “5. …..A child witness if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one such evidence could be the basis of conviction. In other words even in the absence of oath the evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the answers thereof. …..A child witness if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one such evidence could be the basis of conviction. In other words even in the absence of oath the evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the answers thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only precaution which the Court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored.” 22. In State of Rajasthan vs. Om Parkash (2002) 5 SCC 745 , the Apex Court held that:- “…….Cases involving sexual molestation and assault require a different approach-a sensitive approach and not an approach which a court may adopt in dealing with a normal offence under penal laws…..” 23. In the very same decision, the Court observed that child rape cases are cases of perverse lust for sex where even innocent children are not spared in pursuit of the sexual pleasure. There cannot be anything more obscene than this. It is a crime against humanity. Many such cases are not even brought to light because of social stigma attached thereto. Children need special care and protection. In such cases, responsibility on the shoulders of the courts is more onerous so as to provide proper legal protection to these children. Their physical and mental immobility call for such protection. Children are the natural resource of our country. They are country's future. Hope of tomorrow rests on them. In our country, a girl child is in a very vulnerable position and one of the modes of her exploitation is rape besides other mode of sexual abuse. These factors point towards a different approach required to be adopted. 24. In State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Suresh Kumar (2009)16 SCC 697 , the Apex Court was dealing with a case where the prosecutrix was ravished by the accused on 15.3.2000 which incident was narrated by the prosecutrix to her sister later during the day. She also narrated the incident to her parents the following day and to the Doctors after the incident. She also narrated the incident to her parents the following day and to the Doctors after the incident. Court accepted the statement of the sister, the parents and the doctors while holding the accused guilty. 25. In Radhakrishna Nagesh v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2013) 11 SCC 688 , the apex Court held that: “33. It will be useful to refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of O.M. Baby v. State of Kerala, (2012) 11 SCC 362 , where the Court held as follows:- "17. ….. ‘16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. 18. We would further like to observe that while appreciating the evidence of the prosecutrix, the court must keep in mind that in the context of the values prevailing in the country, particularly in rural India, it would be unusual for a woman to come up with a false story of being a victim of sexual assault so as to implicate an innocent person. Such a view has been expressed by the judgment of this Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 and has found reiteration in a recent judgment in Rajinder @ Raju v. State of H.P., (2009) 16 SCC 69 , para 19 whereof may be usefully extracted: ‘19. In the context of Indian culture, a woman - victim of sexual aggression - would rather suffer silently than to falsely implicate somebody. Any statement of rape is an extremely humiliating experience for a woman and until she is a victim of sex crime, she would not blame anyone but the real culprit. While appreciating the evidence of the prosecutrix, the courts must always keep in mind that no self-respecting woman would put her honour at stake by falsely alleging commission of rape on her and therefore, ordinarily a look for corroboration of her testimony is unnecessary and uncalled for. But for high improbability in the prosecution case, the conviction in the case of sex crime may be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. It has been rightly said that corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape nor the absence of injuries on the private parts of the victim can be construed as evidence of consent.’ " (Emphasis supplied) 26. It has been rightly said that corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape nor the absence of injuries on the private parts of the victim can be construed as evidence of consent.’ " (Emphasis supplied) 26. In Indian Woman Says Gang-Raped on Orders of Village Court Published in Business and Financial News Dated 230102014, In Re, (2014) 4 SCC 786 , the Apex Court has highlighted the need for having an effective State police machinery for curbing the menace of rape, for such crime is not only in contravention of the domestic laws, but is also in direct breach of obligations under International Law, treaties whereof stand ratified by the State, which is under an obligation to protect its women from any kind of discrimination. 27. The Apex Court has highlighted the need for prompt disposal of cases of crime against women and children. (Rajkumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 5 SCC 353 ). 28. In Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 7 SCC 171 , the apex Court has cautioned the Court to adopt the following approach: “The courts while trying an accused on the charge of rape, must deal with the case with utmost sensitivity, examining the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses which are not of a substantial character.” 29. The Apex Court in Munna v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 10 SCC 254 , has reiterated the principle that testimony of prosecutrix is almost at par with an immediate witness and can be acted upon without corroboration. 30. In the light of the aforesaid analysis of law, we proceed to examine the testimony of the prosecutrix. 31. Now, what is it that she states in Court. It would be beneficial to reproduce her entire testimony, which reads as under: “PW-3 Kumari (name withheld) D/o Sh. Vinod Sharma, aged about 5 years, student, R/O Village Patiyud, Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P. (prosecutrix in camera) I have put certain questions to this child witness. She has replied the same correctly. She appears to be a competent witness. She does not understand the sanctity of oath being of tender age. Let her statement be recorded without oath. Without Oath. 21.12.2009. Sh. Jai Dev Sharma is my papa. She has replied the same correctly. She appears to be a competent witness. She does not understand the sanctity of oath being of tender age. Let her statement be recorded without oath. Without Oath. 21.12.2009. Sh. Jai Dev Sharma is my papa. The accused present in the Court stays with Sh. Jai Dev in his quarter. The quarter of Sh. Jai Dev is near to our quarter. I visit the quarter of Sh. Jai Dev some times. The accused touched his bahu (penis) with my private parts. I felt a lot of pain. The accused even gagged my mouth. I was wearing the clothes Exts. P-3 and P-4 on that day. When I got up in the morning, I went to the quarter of the accused. Sh. Jai Dev was away to his village. The blood stains had come on my clothes. I narrated the incident to my mother. xx. By Sh. M.L. Brakta, Advocate, for the accused.xx I have come to the Court without any reason. I have been brought to the Court today by my parents. It is incorrect to suggest that I was tutored by my parents to make the above statement in the Court. Self stated, my father was away on that day for doing the day’s work. None tutored me outside the Court to make the statement. There are no other kids who play with me. My younger brother did not accompany me to the quarter of Sh. Jai Dev. He was sleeping. The quarter of Sh. Jai Dev has only one room. Sh. Jai Dev sleeps on a cot. The accused too sleeps on the cot. I was raped by the accused on the cot on which Sh. Jai Dev sleeps. I did not tie the string of my pajama after the rape. It had the elastic on the top. I pulled up my pajama of my own after the rape. I informed my mother about the occurrence when she was washing the clothes. It is incorrect to suggest that the accused did nothing with me and I have deposed falsely at the instance of my parents. It is incorrect to suggest that I did not visit the quarter of the accused on the relevant day.” 32. The witness is very categorical and clear in her version. We do not find her testimony to have been impeached in any manner. It is incorrect to suggest that I did not visit the quarter of the accused on the relevant day.” 32. The witness is very categorical and clear in her version. We do not find her testimony to have been impeached in any manner. She is neither tutored nor is she vague in deposing facts. Her version is natural and convincing. She is categorical that when she went to the room of Jai Dev Sharma, whom she calls as Papa, who had gone to his native village, the accused touched his penis with her private parts. She felt lot of pain and the accused had also gagged her mouth. There were blood stains on her clothes. Same day, she narrated the incident to her mother. 33. The Court below found two contradictions in her statement. The first being that no signs of blood were found on the clothes of either the prosecutrix or the accused and second, whereas the prosecutrix narrates the incident to have taken place on the cot, but the spot map so prepared by the Investigating Officer, shows the place of crime to be kitchen and not the cot. 34. In our considered view, while disbelieving this witness, view taken by the trial Court is totally perverse and fallacious. It stands explained by the mother of this witness that the clothes of the prosecutrix stood washed and the prosecutrix was given bath. This explains the absence of blood. 35. Faulty investigation, more so when attention of such fact is not drawn to the witness, cannot come in the way of dispensing justice. Investigating Officer may have faulted in giving correct description of the place where the crime took place, but then it has also come on record through the testimony of the prosecutrix that such crime took place inside the room, which is so depicted in the spot map. One must not forget the testimony of Jai Dev Sharma and Smt. Meena Kumari, where from it is evidently clear that the room, which is described as a quarter, is small and shared by the accused. Hence, absence of cot in the spot map pales into insignificance, as spot maps are only corroborative in nature. We find the substantive evidence to be inspiring in confidence. We need not look into the corroborative evidence, which in any case was neither prepared by the witness nor put to her in Court. Hence, absence of cot in the spot map pales into insignificance, as spot maps are only corroborative in nature. We find the substantive evidence to be inspiring in confidence. We need not look into the corroborative evidence, which in any case was neither prepared by the witness nor put to her in Court. 36. We find the version of this witness to have been corroborated by her mother on all counts, according to whom while she was washing clothes, prosecutrix insisted of going to the house of Jai Dev Sharma. Despite her refusal, she went there, but returned after 15-20 minutes. She filled up the container for giving bath to the prosecutrix. When she tried to open her clothes, prosecutrix resisted. Forcefully, she removed the clothes and saw some blood and dirty stains. When enquired, prosecutrix informed that the accused had opened his pants and her pyjama and thereafter touched his penis with her private part, as a result of which she felt pain. This witness washed the clothes and gave bath to the prosecutrix. Since her husband was not at home, she went to narrate the incident to him in village Anandpur. Telephonically, the incident was also narrated to Jai Dev Sharma. By the evening, they returned from the village and lodged the report at Police Station, Boileauganj. We do not find her version to have been shattered. Suggestion of false implication, so put by the accused, stands categorically denied by her. Thus, on material aspect, the witness has narrated the incident. We do not find her version to be doubtful. 37. Even Jai Dev Sharma has corroborated such version, according to whom, on the fateful day, he was not home, as he had gone to his native village. When the accused was confronted about the incident, he begged for pardon. However, the matter came to be reported to the police. Even from his testimony, it cannot be said that the defence taken by the accused stands probablized. 38. In our considered view, defence taken by the accused does not appear to be true. It is his case that Smt. Meena Kumari wanted to get her sister married to the accused and Jai Dev Sharma was also insisting for the same. It is not his case that such proposal was given for the first time on the date of the occurrence of the incident. It is his case that Smt. Meena Kumari wanted to get her sister married to the accused and Jai Dev Sharma was also insisting for the same. It is not his case that such proposal was given for the first time on the date of the occurrence of the incident. He is categorical that he refused such proposal and Smt. Meena Kumari “used to blackmail” for the same. Now, if that were so, then why is it that this witness continued to stay in the room (quarter) of Jai Dev Sharma. He was gainfully employed and could have afforded to live separately, which he did not do so. 39. Through the clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence, in our considered view, the prosecution has been able to bring home the guilt of the accused. The doctor says that there were no signs of penetration, but then, the prosecutrix is categorical. The accused had touched his penis with her private parts. That is about all which is required to constitute an offence. It is not a case of an attempt, but actual commission of crime. 40. In our considered view, prosecution has been able to establish the guilt of the accused, beyond reasonable doubt, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence. 41. From the material placed on record, it stands established by the prosecution witnesses that the accused is guilty of having committed the offence charged for. There is sufficient, convincing, cogent and reliable evidence on record to this effect. The circumstances stand conclusively proved by unbroken chain of unimpeachable testimony of the prosecution witnesses. The guilt of the accused stands proved beyond reasonable doubt to the hilt. The chain of events stand conclusively established and lead only to one conclusion, i.e. guilt of the accused. It cannot be said that accused is innocent or not guilty or that he has been falsely implicated or that his defence is probable or that the evidence led by the prosecution is inconsistent, unreliable, untrustworthy and unbelievable. It cannot be said that the version narrated by the witnesses in Court is in a parrot-like manner and hence is to be disbelieved. 42. Thus, in our considered view, findings returned by the trial Court cannot be said to be based on correct and complete appreciation of material on record, which are reversed. It cannot be said that the version narrated by the witnesses in Court is in a parrot-like manner and hence is to be disbelieved. 42. Thus, in our considered view, findings returned by the trial Court cannot be said to be based on correct and complete appreciation of material on record, which are reversed. The appeal is allowed and we hold the accused guilty of having committed an offence, punishable under the provisions Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, for committing rape on the prosecutrix, a minor. 43. Bail bonds furnished by the accused-convict stand cancelled. For the purpose of hearing him on the quantum of sentence, the appeal be listed on 20.6.2016. He be produced in the Court on the said date. Copy of the judgment be supplied to the accused, free of cost. 44. Assistance rendered by Mr. Anoop Chitkara, learned Amicus Curiae, is highly appreciable. Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any.