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2016 DIGILAW 1030 (GAU)

MARIA MONTESSORI HOUSE OF CHILDREN v. UNION OF INDIA

2016-11-22

ACHINTYA MALLA BUJOR BARUA

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JUDGMENT : A.M. Bujor Barua, J. Heard Sri L.P. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri K.K. Nandi, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and Sri S. Das, learned counsel for respondent No. 2. 2. Although notices had been served upon respondent Nos. 5 and 6, respectively, who are employees of the concerned school, but the said respondents have not entered their appearance. The case of the petitioner is that, the petitioner, namely, Maria Montessori House of Children, situated at Birkuchi Guwahati, is a private Montessori school. The petitioner is aggrieved by the Annexure-II Notification No. GLR.214/2005/94 dated 06.01.2009 issued under the signature of the Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Labour & Employment Department, whereby the provisions of Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (for short, Act 1948) has been extended to the educational institutions, including public, private aided or partially aided run by individuals, trustees, societies or other organisations, in which 20 or more persons are employed or were employed or wages on any day of the preceeding twelve months. 3. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Section 1(4) of the Act 1948, inter alia, provides that the Act shall apply, in the first instance, to all factories including factories belonging to the Government other than seasonal factories. The learned counsel submits that the definition of the expression factory finds place in Section 2(12) of the Act, 1948, which, inter alia, provides the expression factory means any premises including the precincts there-of whereon ten or more persons are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on or is ordinarily so carried on. The learned counsel further refers to Section 2(14AA), wherein, the expression manufacturing process is defined to have the same meaning assigned to it under the Factories act, 1948. He further refers to Section 2(K) wherein the expression factories means any process for making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing etc. 4. The learned counsel further refers to Section 2(14AA), wherein, the expression manufacturing process is defined to have the same meaning assigned to it under the Factories act, 1948. He further refers to Section 2(K) wherein the expression factories means any process for making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing etc. 4. The contention of the learned counsel is that the act of imparting education by a private educational institution does not involve any manufacturing process as defined under Section 2(K) of the Factories Act and, therefore, the present petitioner which is a private school is not involved in any manufacturing process and consequent, thereof, it is not a factory and the petitioner school being not a factory is not within the purview of Act, 1948. 5. On the other hand, Sri K.K. Nandi, learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 and 4 submits that Section 1(5) of the Act, 1948, inter alia, provides that the appropriate Government may, in consultation with the corporation after giving one month's notice of its intention of doing so, by notification in the Official Gazette, extend the provisions of the Act or any of them, to any other establishment or class of establishments, industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise. The learned counsel further submits that the expression 'otherwise' is wide enough to include the private institution imparting education. He further submits that this Court in its judgment and order dated 28.01.2016, in All Assam English Medium Schools Association & Ors. v. State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2016(2) GLT 495, at paragraph 17 had already held that the word 'otherwise' appearing in Sub-Section (5) of Section 1 of the Act 1948 provides for ample scope to cover all variety of establishments beyond the three identified species in the Section and, accordingly, on the above basis the application of ESI Act to cover educational institution would not be faulted. In this view of the aforesaid ratio laid down by this Court, in the said All Assam English Medium Schools Association & Ors. v. State of Assam & Ors. (supra), the issue whether the provision of the Act, 1948 is to be made applicable in respect of the private educational institution also is settled. 6. In this view of the matter, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, putting a challenge to Annexure-II, Notification dated 06.01.2009 is not sustainable. v. State of Assam & Ors. (supra), the issue whether the provision of the Act, 1948 is to be made applicable in respect of the private educational institution also is settled. 6. In this view of the matter, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, putting a challenge to Annexure-II, Notification dated 06.01.2009 is not sustainable. It is made clear that as per the aforesaid judgment of this Court in All Assam English Medium Schools Association & Ors. v. State of Assam & Ors. (supra) the operation of the impugned Notification dated 06.01.2009 which was stayed by this Court, should be applied prospectively to the educational institution including the petitioner institution and no school be forced to subject themselves to the ESI Act of 1948 retrospectively. 7. With the above observation, this writ petition is disposed of. Accordingly, the respondent ESI Corporation is directed to modify the Annexure-III letter dated 17.03.2011 and act accordingly in terms of this order. No costs.