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2016 DIGILAW 1031 (ORI)

Basanta Kumar Barik v. State of Odisha

2016-11-03

D.DASH

body2016
JUDGMENT : In OJC no. 399 of 2002 (A) the petitioner seeks issuance of writ of mandamus quashing the order dated 18.12.2001 passed by the Director, Higher Education, Orissa, Bhubaneswar the opposite party no. 2 under Annexure -15 declaring the opposite party no. 4 (Lokanath Barik) as senior to the petitioner as holding the second post of Peon of the College of PBM Mahavidyalaya, M.V. Road, in the District of Dhenkanal. 2. In the F.A.O. 183 of 2011 (B), the very same petitioner of the above writ application as the appellant has challenged the order passed by the learned State Educational Tribunal on 01.03.2011 in Grant-In-Aid Case No. 83 of 2008 under Annexure -9 of the said F.A.O. in accordance with the provision of section 24(B) of the Orissa Education Act, 1969 (hereinafter in short called the Education Act) The learned Tribunal in that judgment has rejected the claim of the petitioner as against the second post of Peon of the said College in view of the aforesaid order dated 18.12.2001 passed by the Director, Higher Education. 3. Thus, both the writ application and the appeal under section 24(C) of the Education Act, when concern with the competing claim of the petitioner and opposite party no. 4 as against the second post of Peon of the said College and other consequential benefits flowing therefrom, those have been heard together for their disposal by this common judgment. 4. For the sake of convenience and in order to avoid confusion and bring in clarity, the parties hereinafter have been referred to as they have been arraigned and as per their position in the writ application. 5. (a). Petitioner’s case is that pursuant to the advertisement dated 15.07.1985 (Annexure-8 to -B) for filling of three posts of peon in the said College, he and others including opposite party no. 4 and one Kulamani Roul appeared as the applicants. In an interview held for the purpose, one Kulamani Roul stood first being placed in serial no. 1; whereas the petitioner and opposite party no. 4 came under serial no. 2 and 3 respectively in the merit list. The above three candidates secured 43, 41 and 37 marks respectively (Annexure -1 to -A). (b). In accordance with the above selection, all the three as above joined as Peon in first, second and third post on the same day i.e., on 05.08.1985. 4 came under serial no. 2 and 3 respectively in the merit list. The above three candidates secured 43, 41 and 37 marks respectively (Annexure -1 to -A). (b). In accordance with the above selection, all the three as above joined as Peon in first, second and third post on the same day i.e., on 05.08.1985. Pursuant to the same, the Governing Body of the College passed a resolution approving the appointments of those three in order of their seniority as above and thus it is stated that the petitioner’s appointment was approved as against the second post of Peon, whereas opposite party no. 4 as against the third post (Annexure-5 to -A). The College came to be notified for receiving Grant-In-Aid w.e.f. 01.01.2004. In accordance with the said notification, the Secretary, of the Governing Body presented the staff position of the College and in so far as the Peons are concerned, one Kulamani whose appointment is against the first post of Peon which is not under challenge; the present petitioner and opposite party no. 4 were recommended as against first, second and third post of Peon respectively. The Director, Higher Education made necessary verification and accordingly recommended the case of Kulamani Roul in the first post of Peon and the petitioner for the second post to receive Grant-In-Aid w.e.f. 01.06.1996 (Annexure-4 to -B). (c) The opposite party no. 4 filed writ application numbered as OJC No. 14919 of 1999 making allegations in particular against the Governing Body of the College in question that he was prevented from discharging his duty. This Court disposed of the writ application with a direction to the Director, Higher Education to treat the representation of opposite party no. 4 as appeal and dispose of the same in accordance with the Government circular as the appellate authority for hearing the said appeal as against the order of termination of the employee of the private educational institution in force. (d) It is stated that the Director, Higher Education without hearing the Governing Body, the petitioner and over looking direction given by this Court straight way proceeded to declare the opposite party no. 4 as senior to the petitioner applying the principle that the opposite party no. 4’s date of birth being prior to the date of birth of the petitioner, since both have joined same day, the seniority of opposite party no. 4 as senior to the petitioner applying the principle that the opposite party no. 4’s date of birth being prior to the date of birth of the petitioner, since both have joined same day, the seniority of opposite party no. 4 has to be taken over the petitioner. This is attacked to be without taking note of the select list. This order is now the subject matter of challenge in the writ application-(A). Earlier, the Director, had approved the appointment of the petitioner against second post and since no step was taken pursuant to it by releasing the monthly salary component, the petitioner had carried a writ application numbered as W.P.(C) No. 1223 of 2004, when the cancellation of the approval order by subsequent order dated 15.07.2004 by the Director, Higher Education come to his knowledge. So, in the said writ application, he having been granted with the liberty, the matter was the moved at his behest before the learned State Educational Tribunal in Grant-In-Aid Case No. 83 of 2008 calling in question the order dated 15.07.2004 passed by the Director, negating the claim of the petitioner as against the second post of Peon of the College not only on the ground that it having earlier been decided by the Director, the same ought not to have been recalled at that belated stage but also on the ground that it was beyond the bounds of the authority of the Director assuming jurisdiction in the matter by virtue of Government circular wherein the Director’s authority only remains to hear the appeals against the termination of the employees of the private educational institutions and redress their grievance, as also being so directed by this Court in the writ application to act as said appellate authority in the matter when he was having no such authority to decide the seniority of the petitioner vis-à-vis opposite party no. 4 in that appeal. 6. (a) The opposite party no. 4 in support of his claim as against the second post of Peon of the College as also denying the claim of the petitioner for the very same post has projected the case that there was no such interview for selection of three Peons in the said College and accordingly the question of assignment of required marks to the candidates appearing therein had never arisen. It is his case that the Peons were simply selected on the basis of the suggestion of the Members of the Governing Body on fulfillment of certain parameters which they had then decided. Thus, he claims that since his date of birth is 17.01.1964, when the date of birth of the petitioner is 05.05.1964 and as both joined on the same day i.e. on 05.08.1985 as Peons in the said College as per the normal rule, the petitioner stands as junior to the opposite party no. 4 and that has been so done by the Director, Higher Education. This is according to the opposite party no. 4 is justified in law and needs no interference. (b) It is stated that as per resolutions of the College dated 20.07.1985 and 30.07.1985, there being no remark to the effect that a process of selection had to be undergone by the candidates applying for the post of Peons of the College followed by conduct of interview, they were simply selected as such and appointed by the Governing Body. However, it is admitted that when Governing Body prevented opposite party no. 4 from discharging his duty in the second post of Peon of the College, he had approached this Court in OJC No. 14919 of 1999 seeking his entitlement to the post of second Peon and a direction to the Governing Body for allowing him to discharge his duty as such. This Court having directed the Director to take up the matter as an appeal being the authority as per Government circular, the petitioner did not appear in the said appeal although noticed. So according to him, the Director at the ultimatum has rightly passed the order dated 18.12.2001. Basing upon the same, the Governing Body passed a resolution dated 03.12.2002 which is said to have never been challenged by the petitioner. It is further stated that pursuant to the resolution dated 31.12.2002, the Director Higher Education issued letter to the Principal of the College approving of the service of opposite party no. 4 in the second post of Peon on 15.07.2004 and consequentially, the Director has rightly cancelled the approval order of the service of petitioner in the second of Peon by recalling the earlier order which cannot be found fault with. 4 in the second post of Peon on 15.07.2004 and consequentially, the Director has rightly cancelled the approval order of the service of petitioner in the second of Peon by recalling the earlier order which cannot be found fault with. (c) It is further stated that when the Government did not sanction the salary component as per the Grant-In-Aid Order to the eligible employees of the College, the petitioner, opposite party no. 4 and 5 and other employees of the said College had jointly filed writ petition bearing W.P.(C) No. 2478 of 2011 wherein this petitioner had asserted himself to be working in the 3rd post of Peon in the said College. That writ application was disposed of with a direction to the State Government to accord sanction of Grant-In-Aid as well as arrear salary accordingly. So, when the matter moved further, it is only at that point of time, there took turn that the petitioner began claiming approval of his service against the second post of Peon of the College when the College authority by then had submitted the case of the petitioner as against 3rd post of Peon in alteration of the earlier proposal. It is stated that the petitioner had never objected before the State Government in this regard. So accordingly, the Director in office memorandum dated 07.02.2013 under (Annexure – R/17) of the counter affidavit reflected, the name of opposite party no. 4 as against second post of Peon and the petitioner as against the 3rd post indicating further that as per 1994 yard stick, the petitioner is not eligible to receive 1/3rd Grant-In-Aid with effect from 01.06.1994. It is further stated that pursuant to the same, the opposite party no. 4 received the Grant-In-Aid to the tune of Rs. 1,82,000/-which was not objected to by the petitioner and now by virtue of the interim order, the same has remained undisbursed. (d). The records relating to the selection process for the position of Peon in the College holding the interview and assignment marks therein are all alleged to be forged and outcome of manipulation. 1,82,000/-which was not objected to by the petitioner and now by virtue of the interim order, the same has remained undisbursed. (d). The records relating to the selection process for the position of Peon in the College holding the interview and assignment marks therein are all alleged to be forged and outcome of manipulation. It is further stated that as per the acquaintance roll from the year 1985 onwards under Annexure –R/13 to the counter affidavit, the O.P. No. 4 has been shown as against the second post of Peon, whereas the petitioner as against the 3rd post and accordingly they have been receiving their salary without any demur. 7. Next coming to the appeal-B, it be stated that learned State Educational Tribunal has refused to quash the order dated 15.07.2004 passed by the Director holding the opposite party no. 4 as senior to the petitioner being so appointed and worked such as against the second post of Peon of the College. In that view of the matter, the claim of entitlement of the petitioner for his appointment as against said second post of Peon and other consequential entitlement have been declined. 8. Mr. K.K. Swain, learned counsel for the petitioner advances the following contentions:- “(i) that the Director, Higher Education had no jurisdiction to decide the question of inter se seniority between the petitioner and opposite party no. 4. In order to buttress the submission, he has placed reliance in case of Kanika Dey Vr. Trupti Rani Panda & Others; 2008 (Supp-1) OLR 810. Further he derives support in this connection from the decision of this Court in case of Shri Sarat Kumar Mishra Vrs. Managing Committee of Teisipur High School and Others; 55 (1983) 446 as also Ajit Kumar Ray Vrs. State of Orissa & Others; 1996(1) OLR 2009.” According to him, the Director within the bounds of his authority ought to have proceeded only to decide the question of prevention of the opposite party no. 4 in discharging his duty which tantamounts to termination of this service strictly in terms of Government circular dated 27.03.1983, and was merely obliged to look into the legality of the action of the Governing Body in preventing him from discharging his duty as such in the College but not view and reopen the matter of inter-se seniority between the petitioner and opposite party no. 4; (ii) even assuming for a moment that the Director, had the jurisdiction as above, he was not right in deciding opposite party no. 4 to be senior to the petitioner being in second post of Peon and the order is unsustainable since the factum of due process of selection, the merit list prepared for the purpose, have not been taken note of which under no circumstance can be overlooked. And on the face of the same, there was no justification to decide the question of seniority of the opposite party no. 4 just banking upon the date of birth of the two as they had joined on the same day. In support of the same, reliance is placed upon the case of Bighnesh Tanwar Vrs. State of Haryana and Others; AIR 2003 SC 2000 and Suresh Chandra Jha Vrs. State of Bihar & Others; 2007 (3) SLR 227 . 9. Mr. B. Senapati, learned Addl. Government Advocate submits all in favour of the order of the Director, Higher Education contending it to have been duly passed after consideration of facts and circumstances of this case and upon verification of records as also within the bounds of his authority. Placing the counter affidavit, he contends that opposite party no. 4 has been rightly accepted by State as being appointed against the second post of Peon of the College and accordingly his service as such has been rightly approved. 10. Learned counsel for the opposite party no. 4 banking upon the facts and circumstance as stated in the counter affidavit, further contends that the claim of the opposite party no. 4 for of second post of Peon of the College has been rightly so found by the Director and accordingly, the learned State Educational Tribunal has committed no error either on fact or law in refusing to interfere with the same. He further relies on the decision of this Court in case of Josobanta Narayan Mohanty Vrs. State of Orissa and Others; 82 (1996) CLT 305 that once the Managing Committee had appointed the opposite party no. 4 and the State authority having accorded the approval, the approved appointee has to be protected under law. He has also cited the case of Sudam Singh Vrs. Nath Saran Singh & Others; AIR 1988 SC 84 in support of his contention. 11. 4 and the State authority having accorded the approval, the approved appointee has to be protected under law. He has also cited the case of Sudam Singh Vrs. Nath Saran Singh & Others; AIR 1988 SC 84 in support of his contention. 11. Admittedly, in the instant case, the dispute as regards the appointment of the petitioner and opposite party no. 4 to the second post of Peon arose for the first time when the opposite party no. 4 was prevented from discharging his duty as such which led him to approach this Court in OJC No. 14919 of 1999 which was disposed of on 08.05.2001. Be that as it may, fact remains that after the said College became eligible to receive the Grant-In-Aid under section 7(c) of the Education Act read with clause 3 of the Grant-In-Aid Order, 1994 from the State Government, the Governing Body of the College had sent the proposal as required in Form-A to the opposite party no. 2 (Director) and there the petitioner’s appointment had been shown as against the second post of Peon (Annexure-3). The opposite party no. 2 (Director) on receipt of the aforesaid staff position, after having made necessary verification of the records had recommended the case of the petitioner to the State Government for approval of his service as against that second post of Peon in the said College. This was on 21.02.1998 (Annexure-4). Accordingly, on 23.06.2004, the State Government approved the appointment of this petitioner as against second post of Peon in the said College. As no further step was taken in releasing the salary component as per the Grant-In-Aid Order, 1994 in so far as the petitioner is concerned, then he filed W.P.(C) No. 1223 of 2004, it came to be apprised by learned counsel for the State that said approval order dated 23.06.2004 stood cancelled by another order dated 15.07.2004 which was consequent upon the order of opposite party no. 2 (Director) on 18.12.2001 after disposal of the appeal under the Government circular dated 27.03.1983 as per the direction given in the order in OJC No. 14919 of 1999. 2 (Director) on 18.12.2001 after disposal of the appeal under the Government circular dated 27.03.1983 as per the direction given in the order in OJC No. 14919 of 1999. This was then challenged by the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 5890 of 2005 which was disposed of granting liberty to the petitioner to move State Education Tribunal under section 24-B of the Orissa Education Act and in the said forum, the order in GIA Case No. 83 of 2008 having gone against him, now it is called in question before this Court in the appeal as provided in section 24(C) of the Education Act in F.A.O. No. 183 of 2011(B). The order of the opposite party no. 2 (Director) in declaring the opposite party no. 4 as senior to the petitioner being in second post of Peon of the College has also been called in question in W.P.(C) No. 3999 of 2002. 12. It may not be out of place to mention here that the first ground of challenge to this order of opposite party no. 2 (Director) is that while deciding the appeal he had no jurisdiction to decide the inter-se seniority which does not come within the purview and scope of the power so vested in him under that Circular. 13. The letter dated 27.03.1983 as circulated runs as under:- “Letter No. 13585(2) EYS Dt. 27.03.1983 from Govt. of Orissa Education and Y.S. Department addressed to the D.P.I.(S) H, Orissa. Sub:-Service Protection to the employees of unaided recognized education institutions. I am directed to say that it has been brought to the notice of Government that in some private unaided educational institutions the service of the employees are being terminated arbitrarily without assigning sufficient reasons and following the principles of natural justice. Such employees are not entitled to get protection under the Orissa Education Act, 1969. Though the employees of unaided recognized private educational institutions do not have any statutory right of appeal before any authority. Government feel that illegal termination of service in unaided recognized private educational institution should be stopped. It has, therefore been decided by Govt. Such employees are not entitled to get protection under the Orissa Education Act, 1969. Though the employees of unaided recognized private educational institutions do not have any statutory right of appeal before any authority. Government feel that illegal termination of service in unaided recognized private educational institution should be stopped. It has, therefore been decided by Govt. that if an employee of any unaided recognized private educational institution feels that this services have been terminated arbitrarily, he may file an appeal before the Director of Public Instruction, ()HE” Orissa in the case of employees of unaided recognized Private Colleges, Director of Public Instruction (s), Orissa in case of unaided recognized private high schools and concerned Circle Inspector of Schools in case unaided recognized private M.E. Schools within a period of one month from the date of termination who will dispose of it finally. This matter may be brought to the notice of all concerned.” The very reason for the Govt. in coming out with the above Circular is to prevent arbitrary termination of service or any such action which tantamounts to termination of the service of the employees in the unaided educational institutions so as to mitigate the hardship of the employees thereof in the absence of any such statutory provision by conferring the right of appeal to those employees, creating an appellate forum vesting the power with the Director for examining the such termination of service of those employees of unaided educational institutions if as arbitrary and not adherence to the principle of natural justice etc in finally interfering with the same so as to set at naught if so found. This circular has absolutely nothing to do with the seniority of an employee nor it so confers any power upon the Director to do so. Even this cannot be so dealt as ancillary or incidental to the subject matter which remains confined only to the extent of examination of the arbitrariness or illegality of said order of termination if any. In case the decision of the appeal is dependant upon the seniority, the matter has to be directed by the authority having the power to so decide so as to be taken note of in the appeal for its decision by an appropriate independent exercise in accordance with law and more particularly when it concerns with recall of a final order already passed earlier. Of course in any considered view, if the authority finds that while passing the earlier order, fraud has been practised, the same is only open to the ignored but there has to be categorical finding in that score and mere suspicion won’t serve the purpose. 14. The decision relating to seniority taken by the Director is here the bone of challenge. There is no statutory rule or administrative instruction for fixation of inter-se seniority amongst the staffs of the unaided education institutions and the authority remains with the appointing authority to do so by such general consideration of all the relevant factors. The Director cannot be said to have been so conferred with the jurisdiction to decide the question of inter-se seniority in deciding the appeal as per the order of this Court in OJC No. 14919 of 1999 except in rare cases as stated in the forgoing para. In fact the Director’s bounds of authority is strictly within the orbit as provided in the circular. This Court in case of Kanika Dey Vrs. Truptirani Panda; 2008 (Supp-I) OLR 810 has held. “This Court further finds that the Governing Body of the College being the appointing authority was competent to decide the inter se seniority of its staff. The Director and absolutely no role to play in the matter. Therefore after taking a decision and passing a Resolution on 28th July, 1997, there was absolutely no reason for the Governing Body to refer the matter to the Director to decide the dispute of inter se seniority. Even otherwise the Director having no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute the decision taken by him was a nullity in the eye of law.” 15. In case of Sarat Ku. Mishra Vrs. M.C. Teisipur High School; (55) 1983 CLT 446, the Division Bench of this Court as regards the decision of Director in a revision under rule 26 of Orissa Education (Recruitment and Condition of Service etc.) Rules, 1974 have held that:- “This Court by order dated 16.07.1980 simply directed the D.P.I. (Schools) to dispose of the revisional application within two months, while disposing of the revisional application, the D.P.I. (Schools) in the purported exercise of his powers under Rule 26 of the Rules determined the inter se seniority and declared O.P. No. 3 as senior to the petitioner. The order of this Court did not confer jurisdiction on the D.P.I. (Schools) to determine the inter se seniority. There is no statutory rule or administ4rative instruction for fixation of inter se seniority among the teachers. It is, therefore within the discretion of the appointing authority to determine the inter se seniority by general consideration of merit, educational qualifications, age, past experience and several other factors. In the present case, there was no determination of inter se seniority by the Managing Committee. The Director of Public Instruction (Schools) had no jurisdiction to determine the inter se seniority. The order in Annexure-3 is, therefore, liable to be quashed.” 16. Again in case of Ajay Ku. Ray and Others Vrs. State of Orissa and Others; 1996(1) OLR 209, the Division Bench has relied upon the ratio of the decision in case of Sri Sarat Kumar Mishra (Supra) and has taken the view :- “In our considered opinion, the Director should not have put reliance on it for taking a decision on the question of inter se seniority between the parties. The Governing Body of the college being the employer and observation having been made by it that the petitioner is senior to opposite party no. 4 in all respect, the Director should have given weight to the said decision and held the petitioner to be senior.” 17. In view of aforesaid, the irresistible conclusion stands that in deciding the appeal, the opposite party no. 2 (Director) had no jurisdiction to decide the inter se seniority of the petitioner and the opposite party no. 4. When he has not found the earlier order of approval to have been so passed being practised with fraud and as such nonest and is avoidable at that stage. This being not the case here, the order on that score thus cannot stand to judicial scrutiny being without jurisdiction. In my considered view, even that aspect is not within the domain of the opposite party no. 2 (Director) to decide as ancillary or incidental in rendering the decision on the sustainability of the action of the Managing Committee in not allowing the opposite party no. 4 to discharge his duty save and except when it falls within the rare category as staged above. In that view of the matter, all actions subsequent to the said order of the opposite party no. 4 to discharge his duty save and except when it falls within the rare category as staged above. In that view of the matter, all actions subsequent to the said order of the opposite party no. 2 (Director) in cancelling the earlier recommendation and moving for approval of the service of the petitioner by cancellation of the earlier approval of the service of the petitioner in the second post of Peon are nonest in the eye of law. 18. Now let us assume for a moment that the Director had the power even otherwise as the recommending authority in the matter of approval of the service of the petitioner and opposite party no. 4 in respect of their service in particular post, the same on also on merit cannot sustain. The opposite party no. 2 (Director) in the case has applied the general rule that when both have joined on the same day, the seniority has to be reckoned viewing their respective date of birth. The same clearly appears to be illegal in the instant case. As in this case, the petitioner had been placed in second post of Peon being so found in second position in an interview held and that had been earlier very much taken into account by the opposite party no. 2 (Director) while recommending the case of the petitioner in the second post of Peon. These documents are now not found by the Director to be the outcome of manipulations and fraudulent. Rather the documents find full support from the admitted fact that one Kulamani Roul’s service has been approved against the first post of Peon though he also joined on the same day with this petitioner and opposite party no. 4 when his date of birth is much later to these of the petitioner and opposite party no. 4 and that is not questioned which also the Director finds to be in order. Moreover, this opposite party no. 2 (Director) while initially recommending the case of the petitioner for approval of his service as against the second post of Peon had been satisfied as regards the interview finding this petitioner being placed above the opposite party no. 4 in the merit list and it is not said that during that time, the authority was swayed away on account of practice of fraud in any way. 19. 4 in the merit list and it is not said that during that time, the authority was swayed away on account of practice of fraud in any way. 19. It is further seen from Annexure-2 that after joining of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the college on 05.08.1985, there was a resolution of the governing body and in the second proposal, the governing body was appraised of the said joining. In the list, this petitioner was placed above the opposite party no.4. More important in this connection is Annexure-5. This is the proposal for approval of the Grant-In-Aid of the said college in respect of the teaching and non-teaching staff by the Directorate. The verification report enclosed thereto further reflect the verification of the records in relation to the appointments of the peons. It has been specifically indicated therein that the seniority of the peons have been determined as per the interview conducted on 27.07.1985. The authority can now going to ignore all these in this fashion is not permissible. So when opposite party no.4 says the records of the college to be manipulated and the above is the position of the verification report made at the earliest, the objection does not appear to hold the water which has not been touched by the Director. This proposal was accepted by the Government. This rather finds support, as already stated from the fact of approval of services of Kulamani Roul in the first post of Peon. Had it been the fact that without passing any sort of selection process, they had been so appointed then this opposite party no.4 in accordance with his date of birth would have been against the first post of Peon. He is not claiming that. Now he goads only against the petitioner. When the opposite party no. 2 (Director) subsequently has found the opposite party no.4 to be senior, he has made no reference to the earlier report nor he has specifically held those records to have been the creation by way of manipulation to accommodate the petitioner in the second post of peon. His view is simply based on fact that both having joined in the same day and the opposite party no.4 being elder to the petitioner, he is to be placed in the second post of peon. His view is simply based on fact that both having joined in the same day and the opposite party no.4 being elder to the petitioner, he is to be placed in the second post of peon. But at the same time he has not taken into account as regards the placement of Kulamani Roul in the first post of peon and approval of his service accordingly. So this order declaring the opposite party no.4 to be senior to the petitioner and consequently the recommendation for cancellation of earlier approval of the service of the petitioner as such and also the conferment of the said benefit upon the opposite party no.4 rather are wholly in conflict with one another and as such irreconcilable. For the aforesaid, the order on the merit cannot sustain in the eye of law. Learned Education Tribunal, therefore, is found to have fallen in grave error both in fact and law in accepting the order of the Director (opposite party no.2) to be having the finally say over the matter without any such adjudication. He appears to have adopted the slipshod method without even taking note of the position that the Director had no jurisdiction in the matter of dispute the inter-se-seniority between the petitioner and the opposite party no.4 as per that circular referred to above. It therefore, appears that the learned Tribunal has not even perused the relevant documents and that can clearly be seen if one carefully reads paragraph-5 of the judgment. It simply does not occur to me as to how the Tribunal has gone to say that there remains no scope for the petitioner to re-agitate the matter since the same has been set at rest by the Director in compliance to the order of this Court. The decision cited by the learned counsel for the opposite party no.4 in the case of Jagobanta Narayan Mohanty (supra) rather supports the case of the petitioner when we look at the earlier recommendation of the governing body for the purpose of release of Grant-In-Aid after the college came into the fold of Grant-in-Aid as per G.I.A. Order 1994 and the recommendations being made after due verification as already discussed followed by final approval. Viewing the matter from all the above angles, this Court finds that the order of the Director (opposite party no. Viewing the matter from all the above angles, this Court finds that the order of the Director (opposite party no. 2) is liable to be quashed, as prayed for in the writ application (A). The order passed by the learned State Education Tribunal called in question in F.A.O. (B) is also unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. 20. Accordingly, I allow the writ application (A) by quashing the order of the Director under Annexure-15 and also allow the above appeal (B) by setting aside the order of the learned Education Tribunal. Consequently, petitioner is hereby declared senior to the opposite party no.4 and it is directed that he is as such entitled to all the service benefit attached to the second post of peon of P.B.M. Mahavidyalaya, MV Road in the district of Dhenkanal. In the circumstance, there shall however be no order as to cost.