JUDGMENT : Aniruddha Bose, J. 1. Chaitali Das, a 19 years old lady committed suicide by hanging at about 11 P.M. on 17th July, 2007 in her matrimonial home. She had got married to the first appellant, Pratap Das eight months prior to the occurrence of the incident. In the earlier part of the day on which she committed suicide, there is evidence to the effect that she went to her parental home to attend puja of “Bipad Tarini” the deity worshipped to ward off danger. Her parents reached the place of occurrence on that very night itself on the basis of information given to them by a local resident whose identity does not appear from evidence. Lakshi Kanta Sardar, father of the victim and Madhabi Sardar, her mother have deposed for the prosecution in the trial as P.W.1 and P.W.2 respectively. P.W.1 has stated in his examination-in-chief that when he had reached the matrimonial home of her daughter on the day of occurrence of the incident, he found only his daughter’s body “in a hanging condition” in her room and none of the members of the family present there. Police had reached the spot later that night itself and removed the body of the victim. 2. Written complaint was made on the next morning, at about 11:20 hrs. on 18th July, 2007. P.W.1, father of the deceased was the complainant and the complaint was scribed by one Hasan Ali Khan, who has deposed as P.W.7. In the complaint, on the basis of which the F.I.R. was registered, all the five appellants were named as offenders. They were (i) Pratap Das (husband of the deceased), (ii) Mana Das (mother-in-law of the deceased), (iii) Tapan Das (father-in-law of the deceased), (iv) Bikash Das and (v) Prosenjit Das (both being brothers-in-law of the deceased). Case was started under the provisions of Sections 498A/304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, registered as Domjur Police Station Case No. 208/07 dated 18th July, 2007. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted by the police arraigning the persons named in the F.I.R. as accused. Charges were framed against them under Sections 498A and 304B/34 of the 1860 Code. 3. The Trial Court found all the charges proved against the accused persons in the judgment delivered on 20th July 2011. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted by the police arraigning the persons named in the F.I.R. as accused. Charges were framed against them under Sections 498A and 304B/34 of the 1860 Code. 3. The Trial Court found all the charges proved against the accused persons in the judgment delivered on 20th July 2011. Punishment awarded to the accused persons was:- “The convict, Pratap Das is, therefore, sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 3 years (Three years) and to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/- (Rupees three thousand) in default to suffer S.I. for 3 months (Three months) more for committing the offence punishable under Section 498A I.P.C. The convict, Pratap Das is further sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years (Ten years) and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) I.D. to suffer S.I. for 5 months (Five months) more for committing the offence punishable under Section 304B/34 I.P.C. The convict, Tapan Das is, therefore, sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 3 years (Three years) and to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/- (Rupees three thousand) in default to suffer S.I. for 3 months (Three months) more for committing the offence punishable under Section 498A I.P.C. The convict Tapan Das is further sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years (Ten years) and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) I.D. to suffer S.I. for 5 months (Five months) more for committing the offence punishable under Section 304B/34 I.P.C. The convict, Prasenjit Das is therefore, sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 3 years (Three years) and to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/- (Rupees three thousand) in default to suffer S.I. for 3 months (Three months) more for committing the offence punishable under Section 498A I.P.C. The convict Prasenjit Das is further sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years (Ten years) and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) I.D. to suffer S.I. for 5 months (Five months) more for committing the offence punishable under Section 304B/34 I.P.C. The convict, Bikash Das is, therefore, sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 3 years (Three years) and to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/- (Rupees three thousand) in default to suffer S.I. for 3 months (Three months) more for committing the offence punishable under Section 498A I.P.C. The convict, Bikash Das is further sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years (Ten years) and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) I.D. to suffer S.I. for 5 months (Five months) more for committing the offence punishable under Section 304B/34 I.P.C. The convict, Smt. Mana Das is therefore, sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 3 years (Three years) and to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/- (Rupees three thousand) in default to suffer S.I. for 3 months (Three months) more for committing the offence punishable under Section 498A I.P.C. The convict, Smt. Mana Das is further sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years (Ten years) and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) I.D. to suffer S.I. for 5 months (Five months) more for committing the offence punishable under Section 304B/34 I.P.C. Both the sentences shall run concurrently. The period of detention, if any, during the investigation, inquiry or trial undergone by the 5 convicts be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on them under Section 428 of the Cr.P.C.” 4. Mr. Jayanta Narayan Chatterjee, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has assailed before us the judgment of conviction and also the sentence awarded by the Trial Court. He has argued that the victim lady had committed suicide not because of being subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused persons, but the apparent reason for her suicide was poverty. Altogether sixteen witnesses were examined by the prosecution seeking to establish the guilt of the accused-appellants whereas there was no witness adduced by the defence. Among these witnesses, P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.4, Saila Sardar (a cousin of the father of the deceased), P.W.8, Santo Sardar, P.W.9, Uttam Sardar (both being paternal uncles of the deceased) and P.W.13, Smt. Parbati Sarder (sister of the deceased) were near relatives of the deceased. Other witnesses of facts were Bapi Das, (P.W.10) – a resident of the locality in which matrimonial home of the deceased was situated, Rajesh Sardar (P.W.11), witness of inquest P.W.7, Hasan Ali Khan being scribe of the complaint. P.W.3 (Gulla Nath) and P.W.12 (Jahar Paramanick) were the priest and barber, who were participants in the performance of the marriage rituals of the victim and the first appellant. There were three police witnesses. P.W.6, Manoranjan Bhattacharya, who had conducted inquest, P.W.14, Braja Gopal Chakraborty, had registered the formal F.I.R. and P.W.16, Bishnupada Biswas was the duty officer before whom the written complaint was initially submitted. He was also the investigating officer. Inquest was also made by the Block Development Officer, Swapan Kumar Mistri who deposed as P.W.5. Dr. Harasit Sarkar, P.W.15 the autopsy surgeon, opined that death of the victim was because of hanging which was ante-mortem and suicidal in nature. The marriage of the victim to the first appellant and her death by suicide are not in dispute. 5. In this appeal thus we shall have to examine as to whether there was cruelty or harassment “soon before” suicide of the victim which could implicate the accused persons in the offence, which was the finding of the Trial Court. The marriage of the victim to the first appellant and her death by suicide are not in dispute. 5. In this appeal thus we shall have to examine as to whether there was cruelty or harassment “soon before” suicide of the victim which could implicate the accused persons in the offence, which was the finding of the Trial Court. We shall also examine as to whether there was cruelty in general against the deceased victim which would justify conviction of the accused persons under Section 498A of the 1860 Code. Evidence on cruelty has primarily come from P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.8 and P.W.9. All of them have also stated in their evidence that there was demand for a gold ring and money made by the accused persons, though it is the first appellant who has been specifically named as the person who had made such demand. Mr. Chatterjee, without giving up the plea for innocence of all the appellants has also sought to segregate the appellants having regard to their alleged involvement in commission of the offence. He has argued that the allegation of demand of money was confined to the first appellant, i.e., husband of the deceased and not against the other accused persons, all being near relatives of the first appellant. The above-referred prosecution witnesses have uniformly referred to demand of money for buying a gold ring, which, as per the prosecution version was main factor justifying the charge of cruelty and harassment of the deceased. Since the fact that the victim had committed suicide is not in dispute before us, it would not be necessary to refer in detail to the inquest or the post-mortem report in this judgment. 6. P.W.1, Lakshmi Kanta Sardar in his examination-in-chief stated:- “After 8 months of marriage Chaitali committed suicide by hanging due to torture upon her by her husband and family inmates of her husband on the ground of demand for said gold finger ring and some cash. They used to inflict physical and mental torture upon Chaitali on the ground of finger ring. Once I visited the matrimonial house of Chaitali and that time I noticed quarrel on said ground. My daughter narrated me the incident of torture upon her by the accused persons. After getting suicidal death news of Chaitali through one para boy myself and my wife at the very night came to the matrimonial house of Chaitali. Once I visited the matrimonial house of Chaitali and that time I noticed quarrel on said ground. My daughter narrated me the incident of torture upon her by the accused persons. After getting suicidal death news of Chaitali through one para boy myself and my wife at the very night came to the matrimonial house of Chaitali. When I reached there I did not find anyone of the family present in the house. I saw Chaitali in hanging condition in her room. Thereafter the matter was informed to police of Domjur P.S. Police came there and removed the dead body from the hanging position. When police came and removed the dead body I came back home.” He stuck by these statements in his cross-examination. 7. P.W.2, Madhabi Sardar (mother of the deceased), in her deposition stated:- “Myself visited the matrimonial house of Chaitali and Chaitali also came to my house off and on. Whenever Chaitali visited my house she used to tell me by weeping that her husband demanded more cash of Rs.5,000/- and said golden ring and that due to said reason she was being subjected to torture and she was not provided with proper food by her husband. After hearing about said torture from Chaitali myself came to her matrimonial house and requested her husband and other family inmates not to torture and assured them to give the said gold ring and further cash. In spite of my said assurance they did not stop torturing upon Chaitali. After 8 months of marriage Chaitali committed suicide by hanging. After getting said information from para people myself came to the matrimonial house of Chaitali and found Chaitali in hanging condition in her room. At that time I did not find her husband and other family inmates present in the house.” She also stuck by her statement in her cross-examination. 8. P.W.8 in his deposition also stated about demand for gold ring made by the first appellant, Pratap which could not be fulfilled by the family of the victim. He has also referred to demand made by the appellant No. 1 for cash. P.W.9, another paternal uncle of the victim has stated that the deceased victim told his wife that she was not being given proper food at her matrimonial house and her mother-in-law used to tease her and used to commit torture upon her. According to Mr. He has also referred to demand made by the appellant No. 1 for cash. P.W.9, another paternal uncle of the victim has stated that the deceased victim told his wife that she was not being given proper food at her matrimonial house and her mother-in-law used to tease her and used to commit torture upon her. According to Mr. Chatterjee however, this part of his evidence is hearsay in nature as the wife of the P.W.9 has not been examined to verify that statement. P.W.9, however also stated about demand for gold ring by the appellant no. 1. From evidence of these witnesses, we find that they have been uniform in stating that the first appellant used to demand cash and gold ring and torture was inflicted on the deceased for that reason. Mr. Chatterjee’s submission on this point is that even if there was demand at some stage followed by torture and cruelty and the dispute stood resolved, then the perpetrators of such acts could not be treated to have committed cruelty soon before death of the victim as contemplated in Section 304B of the 1860 Code. Mr Chatterjee’s, case is that finding of cruelty by the Trial Court is not sustainable as evidence to that effect had only come from near relatives of the deceased victim and the factum of cruelty or torture was not told to anyone else by the deceased during her lifetime or by her near relatives even though the P.W.4, who was a relative of the deceased was a member of the Panchayet. His further submission is that the visit of the deceased to her matrimonial home in the earlier part of the very day of occurrence of the incident for attending puja reflected that relationship between the deceased victim and the appellants was normal at that point of time. He brought to our notice part of the deposition of P.W.2 where she stated that on some occasions the deceased told her that she could not bear the problem arising out of poverty. The fact that both the matrimonial and parental families of the deceased were not well off has come out from the evidence of prosecution witnesses. The occupation of the father of the victim was to collect coconuts from coconut trees whereas the vocation of the first appellant was that of a zari worker. 9. The fact that both the matrimonial and parental families of the deceased were not well off has come out from the evidence of prosecution witnesses. The occupation of the father of the victim was to collect coconuts from coconut trees whereas the vocation of the first appellant was that of a zari worker. 9. It is not possible for us to opine that there was no cruelty or torture of the victim for the sole reason that the said fact was not narrated to any outsider by the deceased victim or by the members of her paternal family. We cannot negate the evidence of P.W. 1, 2, 8 and 9 on that basis. We do not think it would be normal for the members of a family, even with limited means, to publicly share matrimonial problems of a newly wed girl of the family. We also do not accept submission of Mr. Chatterjee that visit of the deceased victim to her parental home on the day of occurrence of the incident should be construed as resolution of the dispute on demand for money or the gold ring. A visit to her parental home by the daughter facing troubled matrimonial life because of such demand per se cannot lead to the conclusion that cruelty and torture had discontinued. Argument of Mr. Chatterjee on this point was based on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kailash vs. State of M.P. (2006) 12 SCC 667 , in which it has been held:- “10. No presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act would be drawn against the accused if it is shown that after the alleged demand, cruelty or harassment the dispute stood resolved and there was no evidence of cruelty or harassment thereafter. Mere lapse of some time by itself would not provide to an accused a defence, if the course of conduct relating to cruelty or harassment in connection with the dowry demand is shown to have existed earlier in time not too late and not too stale before the date of death of the victim. This is so because the expression used in the relevant provision is “soon before”. The expression is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. This is so because the expression used in the relevant provision is “soon before”. The expression is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. The expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. It cannot be said that the term “soon before” is synonymous with the term “immediately before”. This is because of what is stated in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. The determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before” is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression “soon before” would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link [See Hira Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT) Delhi].” 10. On the point as to whether there was cruelty or harassment soon before the death of the victim, Mr. Chatterjee cited several authorities. In the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Girdhari Lal, reported in 2013 (4) Crimes 224 (SC), it has been observed:- “11. Now, the question arises as to whether Babita was subjected to such cruelty and harassment by her husband soon before her death for or in connection with the demand of dowry. The period which can come within the term “soon before” cannot be put within the four corners of time frame. It is left to the Court for its determination depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case….” In the case of Prem Kanwar vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 2009 SC 1242 , it has been held: “12. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B, IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the ‘death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances.’ The expression ‘soon before’ is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B, IPC are pressed into service. Prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the ‘death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances.’ The expression ‘soon before’ is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B, IPC are pressed into service. Prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by prosecution. 'Soon before’ is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression ‘soon before her death’ used in the substantive Section 304-B, IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression ‘soon before’ is not defined. A reference to expression ‘soon before’ used in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods ‘soon after’ the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can come within the term ‘soon before’ is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression ‘soon before’ would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live-link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence.” 11. In the case of Arvind Singh vs. State of Bihar, reported in 2001 SCC (Cri) 1148, it has been laid down: “25. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence.” 11. In the case of Arvind Singh vs. State of Bihar, reported in 2001 SCC (Cri) 1148, it has been laid down: “25. Coming back to Section 498-A the requirement of the statue is acts of cruelty by the husband of a woman or any relative of the husband. The word “cruelty” in common English acceptation denotes a state of conduct which is painful and distressing to another. The legislative intent thus is clear enough to indicate that in the event of there being a state of conduct by the husband to the wife or by any relative of the husband which can be attributed to be painful or distressing, the same would be within the meaning of the section. In the instant case there is no evidence whatsoever. It is on this score Mr. Verma contended that there is no sufficient evidence for even the dowry demand far less the evidence of cruelty available on record. No outside person has been called to give evidence and even the witnesses being in the category of interested witnesses also restricted their version to sufferings of burn injury and the purported dying declarations to the matter as noticed hereinbefore – apart therefrom nothing more is available on record to attribute any act or acts on the part of the husband or on the part of the husband’s relatives – is that evidence sufficient to bring home the charge under Section 498-A? The answer obviously cannot be in the affirmative having regard to the non-availability of any evidence in the matter.” 12. Based on these authorities, Mr. Chatterjee has argued that there was no proper description of the nature of cruelty which prosecution claims was inflicted upon the deceased, and no link could be established by the prosecution between allegations of cruelty and death of the victim. On the same point, Mr. Chatterjee has referred to an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court delivered on 18th November, 2016 in the case of Baijnath & Others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 1097 of 2016 [Arising out of S.L.P. (CRL.) No. 9718 of 2014]. 13. Mr. Bannerjee, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has defended the judgment under appeal. Chatterjee has referred to an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court delivered on 18th November, 2016 in the case of Baijnath & Others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 1097 of 2016 [Arising out of S.L.P. (CRL.) No. 9718 of 2014]. 13. Mr. Bannerjee, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has defended the judgment under appeal. His submission has been that the prosecution witnesses have proved the case of cruelty and harassment, and there is evidence that such cruelty and harassment continued to be inflicted upon her by the appellants-accused persons in connection with demand for dowry. Just because there is no evidence apart from the depositions of near relatives of the victim with regard to cruelty or harassment in connection with demand for dowry he argued, prosecution case ought not to fail. He wanted us not to discard the evidence of P.W. 1, 2, 8 and 9 just because they were near relatives of the deceased victim. 14. From the evidence of the witnesses whom we have referred to, we are satisfied that they have proved cruelty and harassment of the deceased victim in connection with demand for gold finger ring and cash. Now the question remains as to whether there is material to show whether such cruelty was inflicted upon her soon before the death of the deceased. If that question we answer in the affirmative, then the onus would shift on the defence to prove innocence in view of the provisions of Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1862 which provision was dealt with in the case of Kailash (supra). 15. In this case, there is no graphic description in the depositions of the prosecution witnesses as to individual components of cruelty or the manner in which cruelty was inflicted on the deceased. But the expressions “cruelty” and “harassment” themselves are broad terms and we do not think that it would be necessary that it should be expressed in graphic details by the witnesses of the deceased victim to establish the offences with which the appellants have been charged. We also do not find sufficient material to accept Mr. Chatterjee’s argument that the victim had committed suicide because of poverty. The demand for cash and gold ring is interrelated with the question of poverty, in that the parents of the victim did not have sufficient means to meet the demand for cash or gold ring. We also do not find sufficient material to accept Mr. Chatterjee’s argument that the victim had committed suicide because of poverty. The demand for cash and gold ring is interrelated with the question of poverty, in that the parents of the victim did not have sufficient means to meet the demand for cash or gold ring. No material has come before us from which we can conclude that the deceased had committed suicide because of poverty alone. 16. We shall now address the question as to whether cruelty was inflicted upon the deceased victim soon before her death. The different authorities to which we have already referred to do not lay down any precise timeframe within which a victim of cruelty would die unnatural death to attract the provisions of Section 304B of the 1860 Code and the provisions of Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872. In this case the deceased was married only for eight months and there is evidence to the effect that at the time of her marriage, cash of Rs.12,000/- pair of gold earrings, four pieces of gold bangles (churies) and five pieces of brass utensils were given in at the time of marriage. Within a short spell of time, fresh demand for a gold ring and cash of Rs.5,000/- was made. The mother of the deceased in her deposition stated that the deceased was not provided with proper food by her husband. The defence has not come forward with any reason as to why the deceased committed suicide though she was in her matrimonial home all through. Paying a visit to her parental home for a puja ceremony, as we have already held, cannot lead to the inference that the dispute over cash and gold ring had been resolved. P.W.2 has stated that the deceased victim complained that she was not being given proper food. The cruelty being inflicted upon the victim was part of a chain process. There is no evidence from which it can be established that the dispute stood resolved and the process of inflicting cruelty stood discontinued. Ratios of the judgments cited by Mr. Chatterjee do not establish that cruelty and harassment did not occur soon before the death of the victim in this case. 17. Now the question we shall address is as to whether there was evidence to implicate all the five appellants in the offence. Ratios of the judgments cited by Mr. Chatterjee do not establish that cruelty and harassment did not occur soon before the death of the victim in this case. 17. Now the question we shall address is as to whether there was evidence to implicate all the five appellants in the offence. The above-referred four prosecution witnesses have uniformly blamed the appellant as regards the demand for dowry. No role however has been attributed any of the four other accused persons in the process of demand for dowry or inflicting torture. Allegations against them is general in nature. On the other hand, sister of the deceased i.e., P.W.13 in her evidence has stated that in-laws of the deceased used to live in a separate mess. P.W.11, Rajesh Sardar in his cross-examination has stated that Pratap and his wife used to live separately from other family members. In such circumstances, based on such evidence, we do not find any material to sustain the charges against the father-in-law, mother-in-law and two brothers-in-law of the deceased. So far as appellant no. 1 is concerned, there is sufficient material to sustain his conviction and sentence under Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 18. Mr. Chatterjee has prayed for reducing the imprisonment term of the appellant no. 1. We do not find any mitigating circumstances on the basis of which such sentence should be reduced. 19. We accordingly affirm the conviction and sentence of Pratap Das, the appellant no. 1 before us, as awarded by the Trial Court. His appeal shall stand dismissed. 20. So far as conviction of Tapan Das, Prasenjit Das, Bikash Das and Smt. Mana Das being the accused Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 before the Trial Court is concerned, we set aside their conviction because of lack of evidence against them. The judgment of the Trial Court finding them guilty and sentence awarded against them is set aside. These four accused persons are acquitted of all the charges, and their appeal shall stand allowed. 21. We have been informed by Mr. Chatterjee that these four appellants are on bail. The bail bonds of Tapan Das, Prasenjit Das, Bikash Das and Smt. Mana Das shall stand discharged. 22. Let lower Court records with a copy of this judgment be sent down immediately by the department.