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2016 DIGILAW 1034 (HP)

Avnish Kant Tiwari v. Hon’ble High Court of H. P.

2016-06-03

AJAY MOHAN GOEL, SANJAY KAROL

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JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, Judge In this petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ten petitioners, who fall in the category of Translators/Revisors, have laid challenge to the amendment carried out, vide Notification dated 2.6.2014 (Annexure P-7), in Column No.4, Serial No.9, Schedule-B of the Himachal Pradesh High Court Officers and the Members of the Staff (Recruitment, Conditions of Service, Conduct & Appeal) Rules, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as ‘2003 Rules’). Challenge is also laid to the decision dated 30.3.2015 (Annexure P-12) of the Grievance Committee of this Court. 2. In short, without alleging any malafides, it is the petitioners’ grievance that revised ratio, in fixing the quota, for promotion to the post of Section Officer, from 5:1 to 7:1, from the categories of Superintendent Grade-II and Revisor, while adversely affecting them, would confer undue benefit upon private respondents No.2 to 53. 3. The moot point for consideration is the scope of interference by a Writ Court, in striking down the rules framed by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in exercise of his legislative power and the extent of power of judicial review of the decision taken by the Full Court of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. Also, what is the nature of recommendation made by a Committee of Judges of the High Court? 4. First, we proceed to discuss the legislative history of the Rules, subject matter of challenge before this Court. 5. In exercise of his powers, under Article 229 of the Constitution of India, the Chief Justice of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as the Chief Justice) was pleased to notify the High Court of Himachal Pradesh (Recruitment, Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as ‘1975 Rules’). Rule-4 prescribed the ‘Method of Recruitment’, both for promotional and selection posts. For the post of Superintendent, Schedule-II prescribed the promotions to be in the following manner: “5. Superintendents -do- Rs.450- 800 (a) By selection from amongst the graduate Court servants serving in a grade not less than Rs.225-500 with a minimum service of 5 years in the grade. (b) By recruitment from amongst the officials of the Courts subordinate to the High Court in a grade not less than Rs.160- 400 with a minimum service of 5 years in the grade.” 6. (b) By recruitment from amongst the officials of the Courts subordinate to the High Court in a grade not less than Rs.160- 400 with a minimum service of 5 years in the grade.” 6. 1975 Rules came to be amended vide Notification dated 6.1.1976 (Page-442 of Volume-1) and in the aforesaid Schedule, the following words came to be inserted: “(b) By selection from amongst non-graduate but atleast matriculate Court servants serving in a grade not less than Rs.225-500 with a minimum service of 8 years in the grade. (c) By direct recruitment from amongst the graduate Court servants and graduate officials of the Courts subordinate to the High Court serving in a grade not less than Rs.160-400 with a minimum service of 5 years in the grade. (d) By direct recruitment of Law Graduates conversant with office working.” Noticeably, even non-graduates, who were matriculate with a minimum grade, having qualifying service of eight years, were made eligible for promotion to the post of a Superintendent. 7. It is a matter of record that Association of Non-Graduate Officers of the employees of this Court made representations, which came up for consideration before various Committees set up by the Chief Justice. Perhaps what was required to be examined was the sufficiency of representation of the feeder categories. 8. Based on the recommendations of the Committee and other contemporaneous material, including the representations made by various employees/ associations, vide Notification dated 25.11.1992, new Rules came to be notified. Subsequently, the High Court in its wisdom also thought of deleting the provision of pay-scale, which is not a permanent feature and is always subject to alteration. With the enactment of the Himachal Pradesh (Recruitment, Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1992 (hereinafter referred to ‘'31992 Rules’), the 1975 Rules came to be repealed. In terms of these Rules, promotion to the post of Superintendent, as prescribed in Schedule-II, was to take place in the following manner: “Superintendents Gaz. Class-II Rs.2200-4000 +Rs.200/- S.P. By promotion from amongst graduate Deputy Superintendents/Revisors with minimum 3 years of service as such in the ratio of 4:1, failing which by promotion from amongst Sr. Assistants/ Translators with minimum 6 years service as such in the same ratio. Explanation :- After promoting 4 Deputy Superintendents/Sr. Assistants as Superintendents from general category…., one Revisor/Translator shall be promoted as Superintendent from amongst Revisors’/Translators’ category.” 9. Assistants/ Translators with minimum 6 years service as such in the same ratio. Explanation :- After promoting 4 Deputy Superintendents/Sr. Assistants as Superintendents from general category…., one Revisor/Translator shall be promoted as Superintendent from amongst Revisors’/Translators’ category.” 9. Significantly, it was for the first time that the concept of a ‘feeder category’ and ‘quota’ came to be introduced. Also, the post was to be filled up by way of promotion and not selection. 10. The introduction of minimum qualifying service of three years, in these Rules, as reproduced supra, came to be assailed by one Mrs. Shakuntala Sharma and the apex Court in Shakuntala Sharma v. High Court of Himachal Pradesh, (1994) 2 SCC 411 , quashed such action. What essentially weighed with the Apex Court was the introduction of minimum period of service. 11. Pursuant thereto, and in compliance of the directions issued by the apex court, for framing equitable rule of promotion to the post of Superintendent, vide Notification dated 28.9.1994, the following criteria for promotion to the post of Superintendent came to be introduced: Sr.No.10 By promotion from amongst graduate Deputy Superintendents/Revisors in the ratio of 4:1, failing which by promotion from amongst Sr. Assistants/ Translators with minimum 6 years service, as such in the same ratio. Explanation :- After promoting 4 Deputy Superintendents/Sr. Assistants as Superintendents from category…., one Revisor/Translator shall be promoted as Superintendent from amongst Revisors’/Translators’ category.” 12. Noticeably, except for the period of length of qualifying service for graduate Deputy Superintendents/ Revisors, qualifying service continued to remain the same. 13. Even the 1992 Rules came to be repealed by virtue of the Himachal Pradesh (Recruitment, Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as ‘1997 Rules’). For promotion to the post of Superintendent, no change at all was made in these Rules, save and except that vide subsequent amendment dated 12.3.1998, the post of Superintendent was made as a Selection Post and the period of qualifying service, so prescribed for promotion from the category of Senior Assistants/Translators came to be changed from 6 to 5 years. Hence, with these amendments, Rules for promotion to the post of Superintendent came to be read as under: “Superintendents Gazetted Class-II Rs.2200-4000 +Rs.200/-S.P. By selection from amongst graduate Deputy Superintendents/Revisors with minimum 3 years of service as such in the ratio of 4:1, failing which by promotion from amongst Sr. Hence, with these amendments, Rules for promotion to the post of Superintendent came to be read as under: “Superintendents Gazetted Class-II Rs.2200-4000 +Rs.200/-S.P. By selection from amongst graduate Deputy Superintendents/Revisors with minimum 3 years of service as such in the ratio of 4:1, failing which by promotion from amongst Sr. Assistants/ Translators with minimum 5 years service as such in the same ratio. Explanation:- (1) In case a graduate Dy. Superintendent is not available for promotion, a graduate Senior Assistant shall be considered for promotion. (2) In case a graduate Revisor is not available for promotion, a graduate Translator shall be considered for promotion. (3) After promoting 4 Deputy Superintendents/ Sr. Assistants as Superintendents from general category…., one Revisor/Translator shall be promoted as Superintendent from amongst Revisors’/ Translators’ category.” Note:- The promotions made under the repealed rules will be taken into account for the purpose of above ratio.” 14. Still further, in its wisdom, the Chief Justice repealed the 1997 Rules and w.e.f. 25.11.2003, 2003 Rules came to be notified. As per these Rules, Schedule-B, dealing with Class-1 Gazetted Officers, prescribed the post of Superintendent to be filled up as under: 9. Superintendents. (including one leave reserve Reader) 13 By Selection from amongst Deputy Superintendents/Revisors in the ratio of 4:1 on the basis of merit- cumseniority. Note.-Roster of ratio maintained under the repealed Rules will continue. Explanation.- After promotion of four Dy. Supdts. One Revisor will be appointed. This cycle will repeat. Graduation Three years Rs.7220-220-8100-275-10300-340-11660 +S.A.Rs.400/- 15. Noticeably, here three significant changes came to be incorporated – (i) Selection to the post of Superintendent was restricted only to the category of Deputy Superintendent/Revisor, in the ratio of 4:1, (ii) Senior Assistants and Translators were excluded for promotion to this post, and (iii) Experience/length of qualifying service in the feeder cadre was introduced. Of course, selection was to be on the basis of merit-cum-seniority. 16. It is the common case of the parties that with effect from 3.6.2010, post of Superintendent came to be re-designated as Section Officer, and the Deputy Superintendent as Superintendent Grade-II. Hence, for the post of Section Officer, selection in the ratio of 4:1 was to be carried out from amongst the Superintendents Grade-II and Revisors. 17. 16. It is the common case of the parties that with effect from 3.6.2010, post of Superintendent came to be re-designated as Section Officer, and the Deputy Superintendent as Superintendent Grade-II. Hence, for the post of Section Officer, selection in the ratio of 4:1 was to be carried out from amongst the Superintendents Grade-II and Revisors. 17. It is a matter of record that when representations/counter representations, filed by both the feeder categories, came to be placed before the Chief Justice, a Committee of Judges of this court was constituted to examine the question of inadequate representation of Superintendents Grade-II. Pursuant thereto, on 17.5.2011, such Committee made the following recommendation: “The Committee considered the representations received from various categories of the employees on the subject. After having gone through the record and position of Rules, the committee noticed that earlier the cadre strength of Senior Assistants and Translators was 32 and 8, respectively. Therefore, the ratio of 4:1 was logically fixed between these two cadres for promotion to the post of Section Officer. Now with the cadre strength of Senior Assistants having increased to 40 and such strength of Translators having remained the same, the committee is of the unanimous view that the existing ratio of 4:1 needs to be revised to 5:1 between the aforesaid categories. Necessary steps to make suitable amendment in the R&P Rules be taken.” Let follow up action be taken.” 18. Finding favour with such recommendation, the 2003 Rules came to be amended with effect from 14.6.2011 and the figure “4:1” was substituted with that of “5:1”. 19. Aggrieved thereof, petitioners made representations, which came to be rejected by the Committee in its meeting held on 26.8.2011. The Committee felt that the recommendation, enhancing the ratio was made only after considering cases of all the affected officials. Noticeably, the Committee noticed stagnation in both the feeder categories, yet it took into account the cadre strength of Senior Assistants and Translators, while enhancing the ratio. 20. It is also a matter of record that still further these Rules came to be amended with effect from 2.6.2014 and the ratio of “5:1” substituted as “7:1”. Noticeably, the Committee noticed stagnation in both the feeder categories, yet it took into account the cadre strength of Senior Assistants and Translators, while enhancing the ratio. 20. It is also a matter of record that still further these Rules came to be amended with effect from 2.6.2014 and the ratio of “5:1” substituted as “7:1”. The relevant amendment, so carried out vide Notification dated 2.6.2014, reads as under: “The figure “5:1” in column No.4 “Mode of Appointment” of item No.9 of Schedule “B” of Class-I (Gazetted), annexed to “The Himachal Pradesh High Court Officers and the Members of Staff (Recruitment, Conditions of Service, Conduct & Appeal) Rules, 2003” shall be substituted by figure “7:1”. Consequently, “Explanation” of the item No.9 under Column No.4 “Mode of Appointment” of Schedule “B” of Class-I (Gazetted) annexed to the Rules supra shall be read as under:- “After promotion of seven Superintendents Gr.II one Revisor will be appointed. This cycle will repeat.” ” 21. Petitioners, through proper channel, made representations and also approached the Court on judicial side. This Court vide judgment dated 5.12.2014, passed in CWP No.6501 of 2014, titled as Panne Lal and others v. High Court of H.P. and others, directed the High Court to have the matter examined, in the light of the representations submitted by the petitioners. 22. On the Administrative side, the matter came up for consideration before a Committee of Judges constituted by the Chief Justice and the petitioners’ representations came to be considered and rejected on 30.3.2015. 23. It is also a matter of record that 2003 Rules now stand repealed with the notification of Himachal Pradesh High Court Officers and the Members of the Staff (Recruitment, Conditions of Service, Conduct & Appeal) Rules, 2015, notified on 3.12.2015. However, insofar as the relevant rule of promotion is concerned, there is no change and it remains the same. 24. With these facts, we are called upon to examine the correctness of the decisions taken by the Committees and the Full Court over a period of time, as also the legality of the legislative action in carrying out the amendment dated 2.6.2014, in the 2003 Rules. 25. Rules so framed in the year 2003 are framed by the Chief Justice, in exercise of his power, under Article 229 of the Constitution of India, which reads as under: “229. 25. Rules so framed in the year 2003 are framed by the Chief Justice, in exercise of his power, under Article 229 of the Constitution of India, which reads as under: “229. Officers and servants and the expenses of High Courts :- (1) Appointments of officers and servants of a High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice of the Court or such other Judge or officer of the Court as he may direct : Provided that the Governor of the State may by rule require that in such cases as may be specified in the rule no person not already attached to the Court shall be appointed to any office connected with the Court save after consultation with the State Public Service Commission. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of the State, the conditions of service of officers and servants of High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the Chief Justice of the Court or by some other Judge or officer of the Court authorised by the Chief Justice to make rules for the purpose : Provided that the rules made under this clause shall, so far as they relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, require the approval of the Governor of the State. (3) The administrative expenses of High Court, including all salaries, allowances and pensions payable to or in respect of the officers and servants of the Court shall be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of the State, and any fees or other moneys taken by the Court shall form part of that Fund.” 26. Undisputedly, the State has not framed any other Rules, governing the service conditions of the employees of the High Court. Therefore, the question, which arises for consideration, is as to what is the nature of power, so exercised by the Chief Justice, in framing these Rules. 27. We notice that provisions of Articles 146(2) and 229 (2) of the Constitution of India are similar. 28. In Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association v. Union of India and another, (1989) 4 SCC 187 , the apex Court has held the powers exercised by the Chief Justice of India, under Article 146(2) of the Constitution of India, to be legislative in nature. The Court observed that: “97. 28. In Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association v. Union of India and another, (1989) 4 SCC 187 , the apex Court has held the powers exercised by the Chief Justice of India, under Article 146(2) of the Constitution of India, to be legislative in nature. The Court observed that: “97. The fact that the power exercised by the Chief Justice of India or the President under Art. 146 (2) is derived directly from the Constitution, and not from a statute, makes no difference to the power of judicial review by a competent court. Any action taken.(or. refusal to act) on the strength of' power derived directly by constitutional delegation is as much justiciable or reviewable upon the same grounds and to the same extent as in the case of any statutory instrument. The fundamental question in determining whether the exercise of power by an authority is subject to judicial review is not whether the source of his power is the Constitution or a statute, but whether the subject matter under challenge is susceptible to judicial review. Pure questions of facts or questions which cannot be decided without recourse to elaborate evidence or matters which are generally regarded as not justiciable such as, for example, those relating to the conduct of the external affairs or the defence of the nation - are not amenable to judicial review.” “105. Any arbitrary exercise of power by a public authority, whether or not it is in the nature of subordinate legislation, is liable to be condemned as violative of Article 14. As stated in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 : ".......... equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch ......." “107. The true position thus appears to be that, just as in the case of an administrative action, so also in the case of subordinate legislation (whether made directly under the Constitution or a Statute), its validity is open to question if it is ultra vires the Constitution or the governing Act or repugnant to the general principles of the laws of the land or it is so arbitrary or unreasonable that no fair minded authority could ever have made it.” 29. We notice that the scope of proviso to Article 309, Part III of the Constitution of India is also similar. 30. A Five-Judge Bench of the apex Court in B.S. Yadav and others v. State of Haryana and others, 1980 (Supp) SCC 524, has held the power exercised by the Government, under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, to be legislative in nature. 31. While taking a similar view, a Two-Judge Bench of the apex Court in R.L. Bansal and others v. Union of India and others, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 318, has further held that the exercise of such power being legislative in character cannot be struck down merely because the Court thinks that they are unreasonable and that they can be struck down only on the ground on which a legislative measure can be struck down. 32. A Five-Judge Bench of the apex Court in B.S. Vadera v. Union of India and others, AIR 1969 SC 118 , has held that: “24. It is also significant to note that the proviso to Article 309, clearly lays down that 'any rules so made shall have effect, subject to the provisions of any such Act'. The clear and unambiguous expressions, used in the Constitution, must be given their full and unrestricted meaning unless hedged-in, by any limitations. The rules, which have to be 'subject to the provisions of the Constitution shall have effect, 'subject to the provisions of any such Act'. That is, if the appropriate Legislature has passed an Act, under Article 309, the rules, framed under the Proviso, will have effect, subject to that Act; but, in the absence of any Act, of the appropriate Legislature, on the matter, in our opinion, the rules, made by the President or by such person as he may direct, are to have effect, both prospectively and retrospectively. Apart from the limitations, pointed out above, there is none other imposed by the proviso to Article 309, regarding the ambit of the, operations of such rules. In other words the rules, unless they can be impeached on grounds such as breach of Part III, or any other Constitutional provision, must be enforced, if made by the appropriate authority.” 33. Apart from the limitations, pointed out above, there is none other imposed by the proviso to Article 309, regarding the ambit of the, operations of such rules. In other words the rules, unless they can be impeached on grounds such as breach of Part III, or any other Constitutional provision, must be enforced, if made by the appropriate authority.” 33. In Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited and another v. Union of India and others, (1990) 3 SCC 223 , the apex Court drew the distinction between the power exercised by the authority being legislative, administrative or quasi-judicial in nature. Court further observed that: “37. If a particular function is termed legislative rather than judicial, practical results may follow as far as the parties are concerned. When the function is treated as legislative, a party affected by the order has no right to notice and hearing, unless, of course, the statute so requires. It being of general application engulfing a wide sweep of powers, applicable to all persons and situations of a broadly identifiable class, the legislative order may not be vulnerable to challenge merely by reason of its omission to take into account individual peculiarities and differences amongst those falling within the class.” 34. A Two-Judge Bench in Union of India and another v. Cynamide India Ltd. and another, (1987) 2 SCC 720 , has held the legislative action, plenary or subordinate, not to be subject to the Rules of natural justice unless, of course, law itself specifically provides for the same. 35. A Five-Judge Bench of the apex Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, (1974) 4 SCC 3 , has held that:- “85. The last two grounds of challenge may be taken up together for consideration. Though we have formulated the third ground of challenge as a distinct and separate ground it is really in substance and effect merely an aspect of the second ground based on violation of Arts. 14 and 16. Article 16 embodies the fundamental guarantee that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. 14 and 16. Article 16 embodies the fundamental guarantee that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Though enacted as a distinct and independent fundamental right because of its great importance as a principle ensuring equality of opportunity in public employment which is so vital to the building up of the new classless egalitarian society envisaged in the Constitution, Art. 16 is only an instance of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Article 14. In other words, Art 14 is the genus while Art. 16 is a species. Article 16 gives effect to the doctrine of equality in all matters relating to public employment. The basic principle which, therefore, informs both Arts. 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. Now, what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle ? It is a founding faith, to use the words of Bose, J., "a way of life", and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to truncate its all embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be "cribbed, cabined and confined" within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14 and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Art. 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality. Where the operative reasons for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous and outside the area of permissible considerations, it would amount to mala fide exercise of power and that is hit by Arts. 14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of power and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations emanating from the same vice : in fact the latter comprehends the former. Both are inhibited by Arts. 14 and 16.” 36. Most recently in Cellular Operators Association of India and others v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India and others, AIR 2016 SC 2336 , while reiterating the principles of law laid down in its earlier decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. P. Krishnamoorthy, (2006) 4 SCC 517 , has laid down the following parameters for judicial review of the subordinate legislation: "There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is invalid. It is also well recognised that a subordinate legislation can be challenged under any of the following grounds: (a) Lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate legislation. (b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. (c) Violation of any provision of the Constitution of India. (d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act. (e) Repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment. (f) Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an extent where the court might well say that the legislature never intended to give authority to make such rules). The court considering the validity of a subordinate legislation, will have to consider the nature, object and scheme of the enabling Act, and also the area over which power has been delegated under the Act and then decide whether the subordinate legislation conforms to the parent statute. The court considering the validity of a subordinate legislation, will have to consider the nature, object and scheme of the enabling Act, and also the area over which power has been delegated under the Act and then decide whether the subordinate legislation conforms to the parent statute. Where a rule is directly inconsistent with a mandatory provision of the statute, then, of course, the task of the court is simple and easy. But where the contention is that the inconsistency or non-conformity of the rule is not with reference to any specific provision of the enabling Act, but with the object and scheme of the parent Act, the court should proceed with caution before declaring invalidity." 37. Hence, the scope of judicial review of the legislative action by the Chief Justice of this Court is in a very limited compass. The legislative competence is not an issue. Hence, the petitioners would have to demonstrate as to how the exercise of such power is violative of Part-III of the Constitution of India. 38. There is yet another legal issue which arises for consideration and that being as to what extent can a Court exercise its powers in reviewing the decision taken by the Judges of the High Court in its Full Court meeting. 39. A three-Judge Bench of the apex Court in High Court of Judicature of Patna, Through Registrar General v. Shyam Deo Singh and others, (2014) 4 SCC 773 , while dealing with the question of finalization of the Annual Confidential Reports of the Judicial Officers, in the Full Court meetings, relying upon its earlier decision in Syed T.A. Naqshbandi v. State of J&K, (2003) 9 SCC 592 , has held that:- “…………In the very nature of things it would be difficult, nearing almost an impossibility to subject such exercise undertaken by the Full Court, to judicial review except in an extraordinary case when the Court is convinced that some monstrous thing which ought not to have taken place has really happened and not merely because there could be another possible view or someone has some grievance about the exercise undertaken by the Committee/Full Court." 40. While addressing similar question, the apex Court in High Court of Judicature, Patna v. Shiveshwar Narayan and another, (2011) 15 SCC 317, has observed that:- “13. While addressing similar question, the apex Court in High Court of Judicature, Patna v. Shiveshwar Narayan and another, (2011) 15 SCC 317, has observed that:- “13. Lord Hailsham in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police vs. Evans, 1982 3 AllER 141 (HL) made the following statement: "The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised or enjoined by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court." 14. In State of U.P. and others vs. Maharaja Dharamander Prasad Singh and others, 1989 2 SCC 505 it was held by this Court that judicial review is directed, not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decisionmaking process. 15. Recently, Centre for PIL vs Union of India, 2011 4 SCC 1 a three Judge Bench of this Court stated that a difference between judicial review and merit review has to be kept in mind.” “20. On a careful reading of the judgment of the High Court, we are of the view that the Division Bench failed to keep in mind the distinction between judicial review and merit review and, thereby committed a serious error in examining the merits of the decision of the Full Court.” 41. Another legal issue which arises for consideration is the extent to which this Court can exercise its powers of judicial review in the case of amendments, variations, additions, subtractions carried out by an employer with regard to qualifications, eligibility criteria and other conditions of service including avenues of promotion in the relevant Rules from time to time as per administrative exigencies. 42. A five-Judge Bench of the apex Court in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and others v. The State of Maharashtra and others, (1974) 1 SCC 317 , has reiterated its earlier principle that chances of promotion are not conditions of service. The principle stands reiterated also in another five-Judge Bench decision of the apex Court in Mohammad Shujat Ali and others v. Union of India and others, (1975) 3 SCC 76 . (See also: Dhole Govind Sahebrao and others v. Union of India and others, (2015) 6 SCC 727 ). 43. The principle stands reiterated also in another five-Judge Bench decision of the apex Court in Mohammad Shujat Ali and others v. Union of India and others, (1975) 3 SCC 76 . (See also: Dhole Govind Sahebrao and others v. Union of India and others, (2015) 6 SCC 727 ). 43. A five-Judge Bench of apex Court in Ajit Singh and others (II) v. State of Punjab and others, (1999) 7 SCC 209 , has further held right of an employee to be considered for promotion as a fundamental right, which would not mean that promotion itself is a fundamental right. 44. It is a settled proposition of law that fixing limitations and restrictions to the criteria of promotion exclusively falls within the domain of the State. The apex Court in P.U. Joshi and others v. Accountant General, Ahmedabad and others, (2003) 2 SCC 632, has further observed as under: “10. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of both parties. Questions relating to the constitution, pattern, nomenclature of posts, cadres, categories, their creation/abolition, prescription of qualifications and other conditions of service including avenues of promotions and criteria to be fulfilled for such promotions pertain to the field of policy is within the exclusive discretion and jurisdiction of the State, subject, of course, to the limitations or restrictions envisaged in the Constitution of India and it is not for the statutory Tribunals, at any rate, to direct the Government to have a particular method of recruitment or eligibility criteria or avenues of promotion or impose itself by substituting its views for that of the State. Similarly, it is well open and within the competency of the State to change the rules relating to a service and alter or amend and vary by addition/subtraction the qualifications, eligibility criteria and other conditions of service including avenues of promotion, from time to time, as the administrative exigencies may need or necessitate. Likewise, the State by appropriate rules is entitled to amalgamate departments or bifurcate departments into more and constitute different categories of posts or cadres by undertaking further classification, bifurcation or amalgamation as well as reconstitute and restructure the pattern and cadres/categories of service, as may be required from time to time by abolishing the existing cadres/posts and creating new cadres/ posts. There is no right in any employee of the State to claim that rules governing conditions of his service should be forever the same as the one when he entered service for all purposes and except for ensuring or safeguarding rights or benefits already earned, acquired or accrued at a particular point of time, a Government servant has no right to challenge the authority of the State to amend, alter and bring into force new rules relating to even an existing service.” 45. In Joginder Nath and others v. Union of India and others, (1975) 3 SCC 459 , the apex Court observed that it would not be possible or practical to measure the respective merits for the purpose of seniority with mathematical precision by a barometer and some formula doing largest good to the largest number had to be evolved. 46. In Kerala Magistrate (Judicial) Assn. and others v. State of Kerala and others, (2001) 3 SCC 521 , the apex Court reiterated the principles laid down in V.T. Khanzode and others v. Reserve Bank of India and another, (1982) 2 SCC 7 , by observing that no scheme governing service matters can be foolproof and some section or the other of employees is bound to feel aggrieved on the score of its expectations being falsified or remaining to be fulfilled. Arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity and mala fides will of course render any scheme unconstitutional but the fact that the scheme does not satisfy the expectations of every employee is not evidence of these. 47. The question as to whether for determining the quota, the strength of the immediate feeder cadre alone is to be considered for promotion to the next higher post or not, is no longer res-integra. In Dwaraka Prasad and others v. Union of India and others, (2003) 6 SCC 535 , held as under: “16. Fixation of quotas or different avenues and ladders for promotion in favour of various categories of posts in feeder cadres based upon the structure and pattern of the Department is a prerogative of the employer, mainly pertaining to policy making field. Fixation of quotas or different avenues and ladders for promotion in favour of various categories of posts in feeder cadres based upon the structure and pattern of the Department is a prerogative of the employer, mainly pertaining to policy making field. The relevant considerations in fixing a particular quota for a particular post are various such as the cadre strength in the feeder quota, suitability more or less of the holders in the feeder post, their nature of duties, experience and the channels of promotion available to the holders of posts in the feeder cadres. Most important of them all is the requirement of the promoting authority for manning the post on promotion with suitable candidates. Thus, fixation of quota for various categories of posts in the feeder cadres requires consideration of various relevant factors, a few amongst them have been mentioned for illustration. Mere cadre strength of a particular post in feeder cadre cannot be a sole criteria or basis to claim parity in the chances of promotion by various holders of posts in feeder categories. 17. Normally, where officers are to be drawn for promotion from different posts in the feeder cadre, quota for each post in the feeder cadre is maintained proportionately to the sanctioned strength in that post. This, however, cannot be an inviolable rule of strict application in every case, with an absolute equality of arithmetical exactitude but may vary from case to case depending upon the pattern, structure and hierarchies in the Departmental set up as well as exigencies and balancing needs of Administration. There are other relevant considerations, some of which have been mentioned above, which may require departure from the practice of fixation of quota for each post in the feeder cadre, solely proportionate to its strength.” (Emphasis supplied) 48. Significantly, a five-Judge Bench of the apex Court, in Govind Dattatray Kelkar and others v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and others, AIR 1967 SC 839 , has also observed that: “16. But, it is said that if the system of rotation was necessary, the Government should have applied the ratio of 50: 50 and not 75: 25. When the recruitment to certain posts is from different sources, what ratio would be adequate and equitable would depend upon the circumstances of each case and the requirements and needs of a particular post. But, it is said that if the system of rotation was necessary, the Government should have applied the ratio of 50: 50 and not 75: 25. When the recruitment to certain posts is from different sources, what ratio would be adequate and equitable would depend upon the circumstances of each case and the requirements and needs of a particular post. Unless the ratio is so unreasonable as to amount to discrimination, it is not possible for this Court to strike it down or suggest a different ratio. Nothing has been placed before us to show that the ratio of 3: 1 is so flagrant and unreasonable as to compel us to interfere with the order of the Government.” 49. On this issue, a two-Judge Bench of the apex Court in Tamil Nadu Rural Development Engineers Association v. Secretary to Government Rural Development Department and others, (2013) 15 SCC 380 , has observed that: “48. Even otherwise, the fixation of the quota/ratio is the prerogative of the executive. It is not disputed that the ratio of 6:2:1 has been fixed in the service rules in exercise of the powers of the Governor under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. In the absence of the Appellants placing on the record material to establish that fixation of such a ratio is patently arbitrary, the action of the Government cannot be nullified. Fixation of rota/quota on the basis of qualification is well accepted in service jurisprudence. We, therefore, see no merit in the submissions of the Appellants that the ratio of 6:2:1 ought to be replaced with the ratio by 1:1.” 50. In this legal backdrop, now we examine the merits of the present case. 51. We notice that while enhancing the ratio from 5:1 to 7:1, all relevant material came to be considered by the Committee constituted by the Chief Justice. In fact, petitioners’ apprehension of non-consideration of their representations came to be met with the Grievance Committee, having examined the matter, even though not required in law, after affording opportunity of hearing to all concerned. Crucially, the Committee wanted to balance the equity between different feeder categories. The Committee not only took into account the hierarchy of the posts, leading to the appointment of a Section Officer, but also the entire cadre strength and the promotional avenues of various sections of employees in the High Court. Crucially, the Committee wanted to balance the equity between different feeder categories. The Committee not only took into account the hierarchy of the posts, leading to the appointment of a Section Officer, but also the entire cadre strength and the promotional avenues of various sections of employees in the High Court. This was in the line of Dwaraka Prasad (supra). 52. To examine the numerical strength, we have culled out an empirical data. A Chart, depicting the number of posts and the promotional avenues, is as under: SECTION OFFICER 18 POSTS SUPERINTENDENTS GRADE.II 13 POSTS REVISORS 3 POSTS By promotion from Sr.Asstt. 5 years. By promotion after 5 years. Sr. Assistants 40+19 = 59 posts Translator 8 posts (i)90% by promotion from Jr. Asstt/Clerks with 6 years service. (ii) 10% by limited competitive exam from Jr. Asstts/clerks of the sub. Courts. Jr Assistants 40 posts (i)80% by direct Recruitment (ii)20% by transfer from amongst Restores/Book Binder. Clerks 40 posts + 16 Junior Assistants = 56 posts Restorers 15 posts Total cadre strength in Ist line = 13+59+40+56+15 = 183 53. Can it be said that while fixing the ratio, on the basis of the material objectively considered and assessed by the Committee, the present petitioners have been put to a disadvantageous or inequitable position. In our considered view, no. For demonstrating the same, comparative Chart, so prepared, by the High Court is on record. We also, in tabulated form, highlight the date on which some of the petitioners would be promoted, considering the respective ratios: Sr. No. Name of the petitioner Date of appointment as Translator Date of promotion as Revisor Anticipated date of promotion as Section Officer in the ratio of 5:1 Anticipated date of promotion as Section Officer in the ratio of 7:1 1. Sh. Avnish Kant Tiwari 14.3.2005 19.3.2011 6.4.2016 1.10.2016 2. Sh. Rajiv Kumar 20.3.2007 2.1.2013 1.11.2016 1.3.2018 3. Sh. Sanjeev Kumar Sethi 8.7.2008 5.5.2015 1.3.2018 1.8.2019 4. Sh. Yugal Kishore 2.9.2009 18.5.2016 1.2.2019 1.2.2021 5. Sh. Ramesh Chand 20.8.2011 1.11.2016 (Anticipated) 1.5.2020 1.8.2022 6. Ms Ramninder Kaur 20.8.2011 1.3.2018(Anticipated) 1.6.2021 1.2.2024 7. Sh. Yash Paul 20.8.2011 1.2.2019(Anticipated) 1.8.2022 1.4.2026 54. Keeping in view the overall length of service of the petitioners in the Institution, it cannot be said that any promotional avenues of the petitioners stand marred. 55. Yugal Kishore 2.9.2009 18.5.2016 1.2.2019 1.2.2021 5. Sh. Ramesh Chand 20.8.2011 1.11.2016 (Anticipated) 1.5.2020 1.8.2022 6. Ms Ramninder Kaur 20.8.2011 1.3.2018(Anticipated) 1.6.2021 1.2.2024 7. Sh. Yash Paul 20.8.2011 1.2.2019(Anticipated) 1.8.2022 1.4.2026 54. Keeping in view the overall length of service of the petitioners in the Institution, it cannot be said that any promotional avenues of the petitioners stand marred. 55. Also, what weighed with the Committee, and the Chief Justice, was the nature of work and the duties, which the petitioners and the respondents are either required or called upon to discharge. The petitioners, by the very nature of their duties, are only required to either translate or revise such work. Neither are they called upon to discharge administrative work nor do they have any such experience. 56. Comparatively, Superintendent(s) Grade-II, who are equivalent to the Revisor(s), are being filled up from the Senior Assistants having more than six years of experience and all employees in that stream are called upon to discharge and perform various administrative work and duties. 57. Noticeably, there is no prescribed criteria of experience/length of service for appointment to the post of Translator. Also, the cadre of Translators is much smaller. They do not face stagnation, as compared to other categories, for their strength being large. 58. It is a settled principle of law that quota is fixed in order to equi-balance each category so that each one of them gets equal opportunity of promotion. It is also settled principle of law that in larger interest of administration, decision of the employer, who is best suited to fix the ratio and decide the percentage of posts in the promotional cadre should not be trifled with. 59. As a model employer and a mother institution, the High Court is duty bound to provide promotional avenues to all of its employees. This is more so to increase efficiency in public service. The impugned action, may only curtail, but not mar, the petitioners’ right of promotion, which action is only in public interest and cannot be said to be grossly unreasonable or arbitrary, hence, violative of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India. This we say so in view of the limited scope of judicial review of the legislative action. “Judicial Review” and not “Merit Review” as laid down in the High Court of Judicature Patna (supra) is what is required to be done. 60. This we say so in view of the limited scope of judicial review of the legislative action. “Judicial Review” and not “Merit Review” as laid down in the High Court of Judicature Patna (supra) is what is required to be done. 60. With the change in the ratio, it cannot be said that for all times to come, right of the petitioners for promotion to the post in question stands obliterated or grossly affected. This can clearly be inferred from the Chart reproduced (supra). With the vacancy being available, their cases would be considered in accordance with law. Action is in the line of view taken in Ramachandra Shankar Deodhar (supra) and Mohammad Shujat Ali (Supra). 61. Noticeably, petitioners never laid any challenge to the amendment carried out in the year 2011, when the ratio came to be changed from 4:1 to 5:1. 62. In the instant case, doctrine of reasonable/ legitimate expectation of the petitioners to be always governed by the Rules, prevalent at the time of their induction in service, merits rejection, in view of the law laid down in P.U. Joshi (supra). 63. Petitioners have laid much reliance on the following observations, made by the apex Court in Shakuntala Sharma (supra):- “12. ……….If Senior Assistants and Translators are to be provided with promotional avenue, more posts of Deputy Superintendents and Revisors which are above the posts of Senior Assistants and Translators respectively, should be created, and first the Senior Assistants and Translators have to be promoted to the said posts……….” 64. Noticeably, such observation came to be made in the backdrop of the explanation to the main Rule, as it existed in the Rules, which now stands repealed. We are dealing with the Rules, whereby categories of Translators are no longer in the feeder cadre for the post, in question, i.e. Section Officer. Also, amendment to the Rules was not carried out for the purpose of providing opportunities of promotion to Superintendent Grade-II. Also, subsequent decisions of the apex Court have specifically dealt with the issue otherwise. We are dealing with the Rules, whereby categories of Translators are no longer in the feeder cadre for the post, in question, i.e. Section Officer. Also, amendment to the Rules was not carried out for the purpose of providing opportunities of promotion to Superintendent Grade-II. Also, subsequent decisions of the apex Court have specifically dealt with the issue otherwise. Since much vehemence is laid on the said decision, we are of the considered view that, it would be only fallacious to contend that the decision of the Committee is contrary to the principle of law laid down by the apex Court, wherein the Court was dealing with the issue of promotion amongst the Revisors and Senior Assistants, and not the Revisors and Superintendents Grade-II. Also, in the said decision question of ratio/quota was never in issue, which came to be introduced only with the enactment of 2000 Rules, and the Rules under consideration by the apex Court came to be repealed. 65. We notice that the recommendation made by the Grievance Committee came to be accepted by the Chief Justice, who, in exercise of his powers under Article 229 of the Constitution of India, on 2.6.2014 got notified the amendment carried out in the Rules. The role of the committee is only recommendatory in nature. It is not that every recommendation made by the Committee is to be always accepted by the Chief Justice or for that matter the High Court. Constitution mandates the Chief Justice to deliberate on such recommendations and independently take action. In the instant case, we find that before taking such decision, the matter came to be placed before the Full Court and only after due deliberation and consultation by the Judges of this Court, the Chief Justice was pleased to carry out the necessary amendment in the rules, which was actually in the interest of the Institution and its employees. 66. The scope of judicial review, with regard to the decisions so taken by the Full Court and the Chief Justice in exercise of his legislative functions is limited in nature, which we have already discussed. [(Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association (supra); High Court of Judicature of Patna (supra); and Syed T.A. Naqshbandi (supra)]. 67. While fixing the ratio of promotion to the next post, it is not necessary for the employer to only consider the immediate strength of the feeder cadre. [(Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association (supra); High Court of Judicature of Patna (supra); and Syed T.A. Naqshbandi (supra)]. 67. While fixing the ratio of promotion to the next post, it is not necessary for the employer to only consider the immediate strength of the feeder cadre. This alone can never be the criteria for fixing the quota. Personal interest of an employee has to make way for the larger good of the institution. Decision taken by the Committee, the Full Court and the Chief Justice, is not based on the myopic view, which the petitioners want the Court to take. It is not that the cadre strength of the immediate feeder category alone is required to be considered for fixing the ratio for promotion to the next higher post, when there is more than one feeder category. The mandate of law laid down by the apex Court in Dwaraka Prasad (supra) is unambiguously clear to such effect. Keeping in view the entire attending circumstances, in our considered view, the Chief Justice, by taking a holistic view, decided to change the ratio from “5:1” to “7:1”. Objectivity in taking such decision is demonstratively evident. 68. Yet another grievance made out by the petitioners that decision for carrying out amendment never came to be communicated, is legally untenable, in view of the law laid down in Sitaram Sugar Company Limited (supra). 69. We notice that challenge is not laid on the ground of malafides – legal or factual. It is also not the petitioners’ established case that the legislative power is exercised only to accord undue favour to a particular individual. Hence, there cannot be any question of bias against the petitioners. The exercise of such power is neither ultra vires nor in bad faith. 70. It is also contended that the decision of the Committee is self-contradictory. For highlighting such fact our attention is invited to the minutes of the meeting dated 30.4.2014, wherein on one hand, the representation of the private respondents came to be rejected, yet the ratio came to be altered from 5:1 to 7:1. We do not find such fact to be true. Private respondents were seeking redetermination of the ratio on a much higher scale. 71. We do not find such fact to be true. Private respondents were seeking redetermination of the ratio on a much higher scale. 71. Petitioners have failed to even prima facie show, muchless establish or demonstrate that in fixing the quota/ ratio of 7:1, the action of the respondent is unreasonably perverse or an act of malafide, manipulation and is indefensively arbitrary. 72. In a passing reference, we may only observe that the petitioners always stand accommodated by the High Court. Their condition of qualifying test, in terms of the Recruitment and Promotion Rules, came to be repeatedly relaxed. 73. Our attention is invited to the minutes of the meeting of the Committee of Registrars dated 25.10.1990. This is to contend that the High Court itself had desired that for promotion to the post of Superintendent/ Reader, feeder categories be so provided and that all equally placed persons should get equal opportunity. Noticeably, even then the ratio between the two immediate feeder categories came to be determined as 4:1. 74. Reliance upon the decision rendered by a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi, in CWP No.W.P.(C) 8026/2011, titled as J.P. Gupta and others v. High Court of Delhi and others, is also misconceived. In fact, it does not lay down the proposition that for the purposes of fixing quota, only the cadre strength of the immediate feeder category alone is to be taken into account. In fact, in the very same decision, the Court refused to interfere with the decision taken by the Full Court, which demonstrably was found not to shock the conscience of the Court. In any case, Dwaraka Prasad (supra) is the law on the issue. 75. Reliance on V.B. Badami and others v. State of Mysore and others, (1976) 2 SCC 901 , is totally misconceived, it does not deal with any of the propositions urged before us. The issue before the Court was only with regard to rota-quota, inter se the two groups of the feeder category. Hence, for all the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in the present petition, which is accordingly dismissed. All interim orders stand vacated. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.