JUDGMENT : Mohammad Rafiq, J. 1. These appeals are directed against two separate judgments dated 18.08.2015 passed by learned Single Judge whereby the writ petitions filed by appellants have been dismissed. 2. Since both the appeals involve similar facts, they are being decided together but for the purpose of disposal, we take facts of Appeal No.843/2015 as the basis. 3. Appellants, in writ petitions, prayed for issue of mandamus directing respondents to allot them Plot No.F-84, 85, 86 and 87, Industrial Area, Bapi, Dausa, on the same terms and conditions applicable at the relevant time or to allot any other plot in lieu of the said plots in the same scheme. An alternative prayer was made that respondents be directed to allot area of 10000 square meters in any other nearby industrial zone on the same terms and conditions on which the allotment proposed to be made in favour of petitioners (appellants herein). Further prayer was made that order passed by the State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, Rajasthan, dated 10.02.2015 in the Appeal No.2210/2010 to the extent of its pronouncement on merits, even though matter was adjudged by it as non-consumer matter, be quashed and set aside and consequentially, the order of the District Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, Jaipur, dated 21.10.2010 in Complaint No.769/2007, may also be quashed and set aside. 4. Facts of the case are that appellants applied for allotment of admeasuring 10,000 square meters at Industrial Area Bapi, Dausa, and for that purpose submitted an application to the respondents – Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Limited (hereinafter shall be referred to as 'the RIICO') on 19.03.2005 along-with Demand Draft of Rs.2,34,000/-. The application was registered for consideration as per procedure of allotment and given priority No.38. The respondents then, vide communication dated 23.08.2005, required the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs.3,50,000/- as additional development fee at the rate of Rs.35/- per square meter for supply of water to the area to be allotted. The appellant failed to deposit the said amount. Subsequently, appellants, vide letter dated 31.08.2005, conveyed to respondent RIICO that if and when the water supply was started, the said amount would be deposited within thirty days and in case the water supply was to start late, the amount will be deposited along-with remaining 75% of the development fee. The appellant failed to deposit the said amount. Subsequently, appellants, vide letter dated 31.08.2005, conveyed to respondent RIICO that if and when the water supply was started, the said amount would be deposited within thirty days and in case the water supply was to start late, the amount will be deposited along-with remaining 75% of the development fee. The appellant deposited the water development charges on 02.12.2005 and obtained receipt of deposit of Rs.87,500/-, which was 25% of the development charges. 5. According to the appellants, they requested the respondents on 09.12.2005 to issue necessary directions for deposit of remaining 75% of the amount of development charges by way of installments over a period of two years. The appellants then vide application dated 28.02.2006 requested the respondents to issue allotment letter and further to provide details of the installments of due amount. Respondents, however, vide communication dated 27.02.2006, refused allotment in favour of appellants and informed that the amount of Rs.3,21,500/- was to be refunded, and accordingly a Cheque of the said amount was sent by the respondents, but the appellant did not encash the same. Appellants preferred appeal against letter dated 27.02.2006 and 01.03.2006 stating that other applicants with the lower priority have been given allotment of the plots whereas the plots are still remaining and the Cheque aforesaid was also returned to respondent RIICO and was not accepted by the appellant. The appellate authority, however, did not decide the appeal, and Cheque dated 29.09.2006 for a sum of Rs.3,21,500/- was returned. Appellant then filed a complaint before the District Consumer Forum, Jaipur, on 29.05.2007 for allotment of said plots or any other plots with the same area, in favour of appellants. The District Consumer Forum vide order dated 21.10.2010, directed respondents to refund a sum of Rs.3,21,500/- along-with interest at the rate of 6% per annum and a sum of Rs.1000/- towards expenses. Appellant then preferred appeal before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission on 24.11.2010. The State Commission, vide order dated 10.02.2015, dismissed the appeal holding that the dispute did not come under the category of “consumer dispute”, as defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The State Commission, however, upheld the order dated 21.10.2010 of the District Consumer Forum. The State Commission, vide order dated 10.02.2015, dismissed the appeal holding that the dispute did not come under the category of “consumer dispute”, as defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The State Commission, however, upheld the order dated 21.10.2010 of the District Consumer Forum. It was thereafter that the appellant preferred writ petitions before the Single Bench of this Court, which has been dismissed by learned Single Judge vide orders dated 18.08.2015. Hence these appeals. 6. Learned counsel for appellants has argued that learned Single Judge has erred in law in dismissing the writ petitions on the ground that the appellants have availed the remedy before the District Consumer Forum and thereafter the State Commission, therefore, the remedy of writ petition would not be available to them. It is argued that the District Consumer Forum lacks inherent jurisdiction. The appellant cannot fall within the definition of 'consumer' as given in Section 2 (1) (d). Present matter cannot be considered to be a consumer dispute to be raised before the Consumer Forum. In fact, the State Commission itself has given such finding in its order. Since the appellant was intended to set up an industry in the plot to be allotted to them, which itself indicates that it was meant for industrial purpose, which is a commercial purpose. Even the appellant was given wrong legal advice to go before the Consumer Forum, that would not bar the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the writ petition and debar. 7. Learned counsel, in support of his arguments, has relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. Jagmittar Sain Bhagat and Others Vs. Director, Health Services, Haryana and Others – (2013) 10 SCC 136 and also in Birla Technologies Ltd. Vs. Neutral Glass and Allied Industries Ltd. – (2011) 1 SCC 525 . It is argued that any extent of consent or waiver cannot impart inherent jurisdiction on corum non judice, the jurisdiction exercised such powers is non est. In Seth Hiralal Patni Vs. Sri Kali Nath – AIR 1962 SC 199 and Sarup Singh and Another Vs. Union of India and Another (2011) 11 SCC 198 , the Supreme Court held that the consent cannot waive off the statutory requirement of jurisdiction. For assumption of jurisdiction by a court or a tribunal, existence of jurisdictional fact is a condition precedent. Sri Kali Nath – AIR 1962 SC 199 and Sarup Singh and Another Vs. Union of India and Another (2011) 11 SCC 198 , the Supreme Court held that the consent cannot waive off the statutory requirement of jurisdiction. For assumption of jurisdiction by a court or a tribunal, existence of jurisdictional fact is a condition precedent. The court cannot derive inherent jurisdiction apart from the statute. After finding lack of jurisdiction, the court must not exercise its jurisdiction on its own. In Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka Vs. Jasjit Singh and Others – (1993) 2 SCC 507 , the Supreme Court held that it is settled law that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction on the subject matter or on the grounds on which the decree made which goes to the root of its jurisdiction or lacks inherent jurisdiction is a corum non judice. A decree passed by such a court is a nullity and is non-est. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right, even at the stage or execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the court to pass decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party. 8. It is argued that the Supreme Court even in Laxmi Engineering Works Vs. P.S.G. Industrial Institute – (1995) 3 SCC 583 , a judgment relied on by learned counsel for appellant, held that if the buyer of goods uses them himself, i.e., by self-employment, for earning his livelihood, it would not be treated as a "commercial purpose" and he does not cease to be a consumer for the purposes of the Act. The explanation reduces the question, what is a "commercial purpose", to a question of fact to be decided in the facts of each case. It is not the value of the goods that matters but the purpose to which the goods bought are put to. Learned counsel in this connection in this connection also relied on certain judgments of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Ltd. Vs. M/s. Diksha Particulars (Revision Petition No.3811/2007, decided vide judgment dated 09.07.2010), Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation Ltd. Vs. M/s. Gem Excel (Revision Petition No.4050/2012, decide vide judgment dated 27.09.2013), Boutique International Vs. M/s. Diksha Particulars (Revision Petition No.3811/2007, decided vide judgment dated 09.07.2010), Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation Ltd. Vs. M/s. Gem Excel (Revision Petition No.4050/2012, decide vide judgment dated 27.09.2013), Boutique International Vs. The Haryana Urban Development Authority and Another (First Appeal No.331/2011, decided vide judgment dated 23.07.2012) and U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Vs. Shyama Rani (Revision Petition No.274/2012, decide vide judgment dated 14.01.2013). 9. On merits, learned counsel for appellant submitted that cancellation of application for plot was arbitrary, mala-fide and discriminatory. Application was cancelled without any show cause notice and by merely stating that no land was available whereas applicants with lower priority have been made such allotment. It is argued that appellant was not obliged in law to fulfill demand of respondents for payment of water development charges. Since hundred percent payment was asked at once and therefore both of which terms were against Rule 12(1) of the said Rules. Respondents have accepted payment of 25% of water development charges. The respondents from other applicants, who have been allotted plots surpassing appellants, recovered with water development charges on 25%-75% basis and thus have discriminated against the appellant by demanding full water charges. Allegation of respondents that appellant himself made the application for cancellation of allotment is factually incorrect. No such consent is on the record of the file. Neither appellant remained present in the alleged meeting nor minutes of the meeting have consent or signatures of appellant nor any notice was issued to appellant to remain present in alleged meeting. The appellant never received any notice. It is argued that learned Single Judge erred in law by also rejecting the application on merits while in earlier part of judgment it was held that the writ petition would not be maintainable and the writ petition had to be dismissed on the question of maintainability, it merit should not be gone into. 10. Learned counsel for appellants heavily relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. Jagmittar Sain Bhagat, supra, and argued that the appellant cannot be considered to fall within the definition of “consumer” in view of Section 2(1)(d) of the Act of 1986 as he sought allotment of industrial plot for setting up an industry, which was essentially a commercial purpose. Jagmittar Sain Bhagat, supra, and argued that the appellant cannot be considered to fall within the definition of “consumer” in view of Section 2(1)(d) of the Act of 1986 as he sought allotment of industrial plot for setting up an industry, which was essentially a commercial purpose. He argued that aforesaid Section 2(1)(d) specifically provides that “consumer” would not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose or avails of such services for any commercial purpose. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that once the appellants chose the remedy before the District Consumer Forum by filing complaint and thereafter the appeal against the judgment of the District Consumer Forum before the State Consumer Commission, he ought to have taken that remedy to logical conclusion. The appeal or the revision was maintainable against the judgment of the State Consumer Commission before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and thereafter the appellant could have approached the Supreme Court against the judgment of the National Consumer Protection Commission. It is denied that the appellant did not fall within the purview of 'consumer' and that the District Consumer Forum/State Consumer Protection Commission did not have jurisdiction to entertain the same. Learned counsel for respondents, in support of his arguments, has relied on judgments of the Supreme Court in Punjab University Vs. Unit Trust of India and Others – (2015) 2 SCC 669 and Sanjay Kumar Joshi Vs. Municipal Board, Laxmangarh and Another – (2015) 12 SCC 709. 12. Moreover on merits also, learned counsel for the respondent argued that mere filing of the application by the appellant did not ensure allotment of plot. Such allotment was required to be made on the basis of priority. Respondents have vehemently denied that consent from the appellant was taken for allotment of Plot No.F-84 to 87. The appellant had no right to claim allotment of any particular plot of the area. Amount at the rate of Rs.35/- per square meter was required to be deposited within seven days of the receipt of the letter. The said amount was levied by the Municipal Council and the said decision was conveyed to the appellant. The appellant deposited only 25% of the same, being Rs.87,500/- towards additional development fee and that too after two months of intimation. 13. The said amount was levied by the Municipal Council and the said decision was conveyed to the appellant. The appellant deposited only 25% of the same, being Rs.87,500/- towards additional development fee and that too after two months of intimation. 13. Learned counsel argued that a meeting was convened on 19.12.2005 in which all the applicants were invited. Meeting was also attended by the respondent herein. In the meeting it was apprised by the appellant that out of 16 applicants, thirteen are the members of his family. The appellant requested that as 'godika' family is his business partner, therefore, in order to avoid any difference between the parties the allotment shall be made not on priority but on the basis of consensus. Appellant also requested the respondent to allot plots to twelve applicants and refund money of remaining four applicants. On the request of the appellant, their application was rejected and the money was refunded. 14. I have given my anxious consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. 15. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we do not find any substance in the submission made by the learned counsel. In our view the present writ petition challenging the order of the State Commission is not maintainable. Under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, a complete mechanism has been created for redressal of the grouses of the consumers by filing complaint, first appeal and revision against any order up to National Commission and in some cases up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Therefore, in our considered opinion when the opposite party to a consumer dispute has an adequate opportunity of defending the complaint before the original Forum and then seeking redressal before the appellate as well as revisional Forum, the further petition for judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution ordinarily would not lie. In such situation, the power of judicial review of an order passed by the State Forum under the Act, is restricted. 16. Learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition because the appellant, by virtue of doctrine of election of remedy, has chosen to approach the District Consumer Forum for redressal of grievance and thereafter preferred appeal before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. 16. Learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition because the appellant, by virtue of doctrine of election of remedy, has chosen to approach the District Consumer Forum for redressal of grievance and thereafter preferred appeal before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. The order passed by the State Commission was further revisable before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and thereafter the matter could be taken before the Supreme Court under Section 27A(1)(c) of the Act of 1986 by way of appeal. Thus this court would not entertain the writ petition. 17. Even if the State Commission has observed that the appellant cannot be considered to be a consumer in the meaning of Section 2(d) of he Act of 1986, and could not agitate the matter under the Act of 1986, that finding was open to challenge. In fact, there is contrary law available on the subject according to which dispute with regard to allotment made by statutory board/authority/government corporation etc. could be subject matter of examination by and could be agitated before, the District Consumer Protection Forum under the Act of 1986. The Supreme Court in Lucknow Development Authority Vs. M.K. Gupta - 1994 SCC (1) 243, while considering definition of “service” as given in Section 2(1)(o) of the Act of 1986, held that Lucknow Development Authority, which is a statutory body, is amenable to jurisdiction under the Act of 1986, for any act of lapse in delivery of possession of houses to allottees and process of allotment was held to be a consumer matter within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e) of the Act of 1986. 18. We are not inclined to uphold the argument that the Forum set up under the Act of 1986 did not/would not have jurisdiction to entertain the present nature of matter as the allotment of industrial plot sought by the appellant was a commercial purpose. The Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar Joshi, supra, considered the definition of “consumer” under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act of 1986, wherein appellant had purchased plot in question for earning his livelihood, held that exclusion of sale of plot in public auction for commercial purposes is not attracted to present situation. 19. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Punjab University, supra, also held that the commercial purpose, as waiver in definition of “consumer” must be interpreted in the facts and circumstances of each case. 19. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Punjab University, supra, also held that the commercial purpose, as waiver in definition of “consumer” must be interpreted in the facts and circumstances of each case. The Supreme Court in that case interpreted Section 2(1) (d) of the Act of 1986 and also for arriving at the meaning of “commercial purpose” and held that it would cover an undertaking the object of which is to make a profit out of the undertakings. But the services of UTI in that case were availed by the complainants for the betterment of their employees, that such an investment was made, and it is to be made clear that no benefit by way of profit was to accrue to the complainant, and the intent of the University in the said case was held not profiteering but was for benevolent interest. 20. The judgments relied on behalf of both the sides do raise an inevitable question whether the consumer for a created under the Act of 1986 have jurisdiction. But nevertheless, the District Consumer Forum, in the instant case, has exercised the jurisdiction. If the State Consumer Forum has held to the contrary, the remedy of the appellant lay before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and the appellant, having chosen to avail the remedy under the Act of 1986, could not file the writ petition questioning the correctness of the order passed by the District Consumer Forum and State Consumer Forum. The argument of learned counsel for appellants that the District Consumer Forum lacks inherent jurisdiction to entertain such a dispute and therefore even if the appellant has wrongly availed that remedy, the writ petition should have been entertained, cannot be countenanced. 21. The view taken by learned Single Judge is, therefore, perfectly justified. Even otherwise, writ petition against the order of cancellation passed as far back as on 25th February, 2006, was challenged by the appellant after lapse of nine years in the year 2015. Learned Single Judge therefore in taking that view was perfectly justified in not entertaining the writ petitions. We do not find any error in the order passed by learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petitions. 22. Both the appeals, being devoid of merits, are hereby dismissed. Office to place a copy of this order in connected file.