JUDGMENT : Plaintiff had prayed for a decree for specific performance of the agreement dated January 12, 2009 by directing the defendant No. 1 to execute and register a deed of conveyance in favour of the plaintiff with further direction upon the defendant No.2 and/or the defendant No.4 to act in terms of the agreement dated 24th March, 1988 and to execute a deed of conveyance thereof; and also prayed for a decree for Us. 1,48,89,798.06/- together with interest thereon @ 18% PA till the date of payment as on 31st May, 2009 as against the defendant No.4. 2. Declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to uninterrupted supply of electricity at the said jute mill till such time the plaintiff obtains independent supply from the defendant No.3. 3. Perpetual injunction do issue restraining the defendant No.4 from disconnecting the electric supply to the plaintiffs jute mill; 4. Thus, it appears that the plaintiff sought for a decree for a specific performance of agreement dated January 12, 2009 by directing the defendant No.1 to execute and register the deed of conveyance in favour of the plaintiff or its nominee or nominees and also Direction to issue upon the defendant No.2 and/or the defendant No.4 to act in terms of the agreement dated 24th March, 1988 and execute the conveyance thereof and in alternative plaintiff sought for a decree that on the failure of the defendant No.1 to execute the deed of conveyance in terms of the agreement dated January 12, 2009, the Registrar, Original Side or a Special Officer to be appointed be directed to execute and register such deed of conveyance ill favour of the plaintiff. A decree for Rs.1,48,89,798.06/- as on 31st May, 2009 as against the defendant No.4 and interest thereon calculated @ 18% PA till the date of payment and also sought for a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to uninterrupted supply of electricity at the said jute mill till such time the plaintiff obtains independent supply from the defendant No.3 and for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant No.4 from disconnecting the electric supply to the plaintiffs jute mill. 5. Mr. Dhruba Ghosh, learned 'Advocate for the plaintiff submitted that the suit has been filed against two sets of defendants praying for separate reliefs; firstly, against the defendant Nos. 5. Mr. Dhruba Ghosh, learned 'Advocate for the plaintiff submitted that the suit has been filed against two sets of defendants praying for separate reliefs; firstly, against the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and or defendant No.4 for a specific performance of two several agreements for sale of lands on which Bowreah Jute Mills previously known as "North Mill" is situated and, further a money decree in the sum of Rs.1,48,89,798.06/- paise has been claimed against the defendant No.4 by way of refund of electricity charges wrongfully realised from the plaintiff by the said defendant No.4. A prayer was also made against defendant No.4 for a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to uninterrupted supply of electricity for the said jute mill till such time the plaintiff of plaint obtains supply from the defendant No.3 and for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant no. 4 from disconnecting the electric supply to the plaintiffs jute mill (North Mill) since the supply of electricity was rooted through a meter installed at the nearby jute mill, New Mill, which in terms of a demerger order dated 31st May, 1993 passed on the application of the defendant No.2 and the defendant No.4, came to be owned by the latter. 6. It is submitted that by an order dated 15th July, 2009 the Hon'ble Appeal Court by an interim order restrained the defendant No.4 from disconnecting of electricity to the North Mill of the plaintiff for a limited period of a month without taking into consideration the merits and demerits of the claims put forward by the parties against each other, either in this proceedings or in the civil suit. 7. Plaintiff applied to CESC Ltd. defendant No.3 for a separate connection of electricity to its Mill, namely North Mill, and has now received a separate electricity connection with a new meter. So, decree in terms of prayer (e) and CD are no longer required, ergo, amendment has been sought for to delete the prayers (e) and CD from the plaint. 8. In support of application for amendment Mr. So, decree in terms of prayer (e) and CD are no longer required, ergo, amendment has been sought for to delete the prayers (e) and CD from the plaint. 8. In support of application for amendment Mr. Ghosh has relied on a decision in case of IIaridas Aildas Thadani and others vs. Godrej Rustom Kermani reported in (1984) 1 Supreme Court Cases 668 wherein it has been held that the Court should be extremely liberal in granting prayer of amendment of pleading unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side. 9. Reference is also made to a decision in case of Rameshkumar Agarwal vs. Rajmala Exports Private Limited and others reported in (2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 837 wherein it has been held that amendment seeking to introduce facts/evidence in support of contention already pleaded, is permissible. 10. In the cited decision the suit was filed for specific performance of agreement of sale of immovable property, pleading that entire consideration under the agreement had been paid. Amendment application filed immediately after filing of suit and before commencement of trial seeking to explain the same by giving details of how payment was made. This decision is undoubtedly distinguishable from the instant facts of the case. 11. Now let me see whether injustice would be caused to the defendant No.4 by way of amendment. Admittedly, the plaintiff prayer is for a decree for specific performance of 1, he two agreements dated 24th March, 1988 and 12th January, 2009, the first agreement was made between the defendant No.2 and the defendant No.1, while the agreement dated 12th January, 2009 was made between the defendant No.1 and the plaintiff. True it is, in none of the said agreements, for which specific performance has been 'sought, the defendant No.4 is a party but inadvertently, in prayer (b) of the plaint, a direction has been sought upon the defendant No.4 in the alternative, to act in terms of the agreement dated 24th March, 1988 and to execute the conveyance thereof etc., amendment has been made to delete the defendant No.4 from prayer (b). 12. Mr. Ghosh also submitted that in course of hearing of 1, he application for judgment upon admission being GA No. 2039 of 2013 the defendant Nos. 12. Mr. Ghosh also submitted that in course of hearing of 1, he application for judgment upon admission being GA No. 2039 of 2013 the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have confirmed the admission but the defendant No.4 is wrongfully purporting to deny and dispute that only New Mill was transferred to them before the Hon'ble Justice Soumen Sen. 13. In this context, Mr. Ravi Kapur, learned Advocate for the defendant No.4 Gloster Limited has submitted that an application being GA No. 1451 of 2013 on 10th May, 2018 was filed for framing preliminary issues but by an order dated 21st June, 2013, the issue suggested by defendant No.4 as preliminary issues were directed to be taken up at the trial of the suit and the suit was fixed for settlement of the issues on 8th July, 2013 and for examination of the plaintiffs witness but at the time of hearing on 11th July, 2013, the plaintiff filed GA No. 2039 of 2013 praying for a decree by way of judgment upon admission by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 who are hand in glove with the plaintiff. 14. Mr. Kapur further submitted that legal title in the North Mill is vested in the defendant No.4 whereas the plaintiff is claiming a right over the said North Mill by virtue of a purported agreement dated 12th January, 2009 made between the defendant No.1, the Rooghly Mills Company Limited and the plaintiff, which agreement is not sufficiently stamped and is an unregistered document which is inadmissible in evidence and is liable to be impounded. Now, the plaintiff in an attempt to avoid trial of the suit filed an application for obtaining decree on the basis of alleged admission made by Hooghly Mills and the defendant No.2 Fort Gloster Industries Limited. 1 t is further submitted that neither Rooghly Mills nor FGIL has legal title over the North Mill and that the plaintiff has filed a speculating application to obtain a decree on the alleged admission made by the Hooghly Mills and FGIL. The plaintiff had filed the suit in the year 2009 and the amendment sought for is after five years when the suit is ready for hearing. Accordingly, the defendant No.4 has prayed for rejection of the application for amendment of the plaint at this belated stage. 15. Mr. The plaintiff had filed the suit in the year 2009 and the amendment sought for is after five years when the suit is ready for hearing. Accordingly, the defendant No.4 has prayed for rejection of the application for amendment of the plaint at this belated stage. 15. Mr. Kapur also submitted that by proposed amendment the plaintiff is seeking to change and alter the basic structure of the plaint by now seeking reliefs for specific performance against the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 under both the agreements. nights of the defendant No.2 in its Jute Division including the legal right over the North Mill stood transferred to and vested in the defendant No.4 in pursuance of the Damerger Scheme sanctioned by the Hon'ble Court vide order dated 31st May, 1993 and by reason of refusal of the Urban Land Ceiling authorities to grant any permission for sale and/or transfer of the North Mill to the defendant No.1, the agreement dated 24th March, 1988 between the defendant No.2 and the defendant No.1 stood terminated and the defendant No.1 had no right to assign its alleged rights under the agreement dated 24th March, 1988 to the plaintiff and that under the purported agreement dated 12th January, 2009 the plaintiff was not entitled to get supply of electricity to the North Mill. 16. The plaintiff has claimed a decree for specific performance against the defendant No.4 being fully aware of the Demerger Scheme and not under any mistake as is now being alleged. 17. Mr. Kapur has referred to a decision in case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Union of India and another reported in (2011) 12 Supreme Court Cases 268 wherein it has been observed in paragraph 10 thus- "(10) This Court, while considering Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code, in several judgments has laid down the principles to be applicable in the case of amendment of plaint which are as follows: (i) Surender Kumar Sharma vs. Makhan Singh, (2009) 10 SCC 626 , at para 5: "5. As noted herein earlier, the prayer for amendment was refused by the High Court on two grounds. As noted herein earlier, the prayer for amendment was refused by the High Court on two grounds. So far as the first ground is concerned i.e. the prayer for amendment was a belated one, we are of the view that even fit was belated, then also, the question that needs to be decided is to see whether by allowing the amendment, the real controversy between the parties may be resolved. It is well settled that under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, wide powers and unfettered discretion have been conferred on the court to allow amendment of the pleadings to a party in such a manner and on such terms as it appears to the Court just and proper. Even if, such an application for amendment of the plaint was filed belatedly, such belated amendment cannot be refused if it is found that for deciding the real controversy between the parties, it can be allowed on payment of costs. Therefore, in our view, mere delay and laches in making the application for amendment cannot be a ground to refuse the amendment." (ii) North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur vs. Bhagwan Das (dead) by LRS, (2008) 8 SCC 511 , at para16: "16. Insofar as the principles which govern the question of granting or disallowing amendments under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC (as it stood at the relevant time) are concerned, these are also well settled. Order 6 Hule 17 CPC postulates amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings. In Pirgonda Hongonda Patd vs. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil which still holds the field, it was held that all amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions: (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs." (iii) Usha Devi vs. Rijwan Ahamd and Others, (2008) 3 SCC 717 , at para 13: "13. Mr Bharuka, on the other hand. invited our attention to another decision of this Court in Baldeu Singh vs. Manohar Singh. In para 17 of the decision, it was held and observed as follows: (SCC pp. Mr Bharuka, on the other hand. invited our attention to another decision of this Court in Baldeu Singh vs. Manohar Singh. In para 17 of the decision, it was held and observed as follows: (SCC pp. 504-05) "17. Before we part with this order, we may also notice that proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC provides that amendment of pleadings shall not be allowed when the trial of the suit has already commenced. For this reason, we have examined the records and find that, in fact, the trial has not yet commenced. It appears from the records that the parties have yet to file their documentary evidence in the suit. From the record, it also appears that the suit was not on the verge of conclusion as found by the High Court and the Trial Court. That apart, commencement of trial as used in proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 in the Code of Civil Procedure must be understood in the limited sense as meaning the final hearing of the suit, examination of witnesses, filing of documents and addressing of arguments. As noted hereinbefore, parties are yet to file their documents, we do not find any reason to reject the application for amendment of the written statement in view of proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC which confers wide power and unfettered discretion on the Court to allow an amendment of the written statement at any stage of the proceedings." 18. Mr. Kapur also referred to a decision in case of J. Samuel and others vs. Gattu Mahesh and others reported in (2012) 2 Supreme Court Cases 300, which maintains an authority to this effect that in a suit for specific performance of contract of sale of property, specific averment that plaintiff was and is always ready and willing to perform his part of contract, which is essential under section 16(C) of Specific Relief Act and omission of a specific plea mandatorily required by statute to be stated in plaint amounts to negligence and lack of due diligence. 19. The cited decision in my opinion is not applicable in this case because there is no omission of plea mandatorily required under section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act. 20. 19. The cited decision in my opinion is not applicable in this case because there is no omission of plea mandatorily required under section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act. 20. In the present case, the plaintiff has proceeded with the suit for specific performance of agreement dated 24th March, 1988 directing the defendant No.2 and/or the defendant No.4 but now wants to enforce the said agreement against the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in terms of prayer (b) of the plaint; thereby the plaintiff wants to delete the name of the defendant No.4 by incorporating the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 who are alleged to be in collusion with each other to obtain a judgment on admission. 21. I agree with such submission of Mr. Kapur inasmuch as there is averment made in the plaint as required under section 16(c) of the Act and that there has been denial in the part of the defendant Nos. 2 and 4 to execute a deed of conveyance in terms of the said agreement dated 24th March, 1988, what circumstances compelled the plaintiff to file such amendment. It is obviously, with the object in mind to obtain a decree upon judgment on admission by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 with further intention to compel the Urban Land Department, Government of West Bengal to issue necessary permission for sale of land by use of the Court's seal. 22. In consideration of the letter dated 21st November, 1995 of the Gloster Jute Mill Ltd. addressed to the Secretary, Urban Development Department, Urban Land Ceiling Branch, Government of West Bengal annexed to the plaint at page 230 and bearing in mind the rival contention of the parties to the suit, I am of the view that there are contentious issues between the parties, inasmuch as there is categorical statement on behalf of the defendant No.4 that the said Government Authority has refused to grant any permission for sale of the North Mill to the defendant No.1, the purported agreement dated 24th March, 1988 made between the defendant No.2 and the defendant No.1, thereby stood terminated. Therefore, the defendant No.1 had/has no legal right, title and interest in the suit property to enter upon an agreement dated January 12, 2009, consequently the plaintiff is not entitled to any decree for a specific performance against any of the defendants in the suit. 23. Therefore, the defendant No.1 had/has no legal right, title and interest in the suit property to enter upon an agreement dated January 12, 2009, consequently the plaintiff is not entitled to any decree for a specific performance against any of the defendants in the suit. 23. It is true that a contract can only be bilateral. Since the agreement dated 24th March, 1988 is between defendant No.2 and defendant No.1, it was expedient on the part of the defendant No.1 to have prayed for a decree for specific performance of that agreement. 24. Mr. Kapur also submitted that said agreements are not admissible in evidence and is required to be impounded. It is the law that an instrument not duly stamped is incapable of being used in evidence until it is stamped properly, nevertheless, suit cannot be said to be dismissed on that score as the execution of an instrument not with due stamp is punishable. 25. It is equally a law that in order to convey property, the vendor should have a present right or interest in the property. A bare expectancy of getting such a right in the course of time is not enough. 26. These are the matter in issue which can be decided at the trial on evidence. 27. Mr. Ghosh has submitted that since the defendant No.4 is not a party to any of the agreements, plaintiff does not want any decree against him and has prayed for deletion of defendant No.4 but at the same time, this fact cannot be lost sight of that the plaintiff has entered into agreement for sale dated 12th January, 2009 with the defendant No. 1. Therefore, there is no necessity for a decree of specific performance of contract against the defendant No.2. 28. Therefore, there is no necessity for a decree of specific performance of contract against the defendant No.2. 28. Now, having regard to the settled principle of law on the subject of amendment of pleadings as referred to above and on giving an anxious consideration to the facts of the case in the context above since, in exercising discretion, the Court has to take into account all circumstances, the conduct of the parties and their intention under the agreement; notwithstanding, infirmities creeping in the plaint by way of amendment, it may be allowed, to the extent that the prayer (e) and (f) of the plaint be deleted as the plaintiff has already got new electric connection, but keeping the prayers la), (b), (c) intact by providing an opportunity to the defendants to contest the suit full-fledgedly on all issues by an additional written statement. 29. Thus, the G.A. No. 862 of 2014 is allowed in part on contest against the defendant No.4 but without protest by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2. Necessary amendments be carried out by the Department concerned subject to payment of cost of 3000 GM payable to the defendant No.4. 30. To 17.01.2017 for payment of costs and Additional Written Statement.