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2016 DIGILAW 1053 (RAJ)

Bhagwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan

2016-07-25

P.K.LOHRA

body2016
JUDGMENT : P.K. Lohra, J. Accused-petitioners by this criminal misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. have assailed the impugned order dated 07.05.2016 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No.1, Bhilwara (for short, 'learned trial Court') in Criminal Case No. 895/2011 (23/1992). 2. By the order impugned, the learned trial Court has converted the trial of the petitioners under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short, 'the Act of 1954') from summary trial to warrant trial. The learned trial Court, in the impugned order, has precisely assigned the reason of delay in disposal of case which is said to be pending since last 24 years for converting summary trial into warrant trial. The learned trial Court has also referred to Section 16-A of the Act of 1954 for exercising its discretion. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order. 4. There remains no quarrel that the petitioners are facing prosecution under Section 7/16 of the Act of 1954 since 1992 and it has emerged out from the order-sheets that the trial was completed once and thereafter due to transfer of the Presiding Officer, while resorting to procedure envisaged under Chapter XXI of Cr.P.C., a decision was taken for de novo trial. It is in that background the learned trial Court has observed that by resorting to de novo trial final decision in the matter shall be delayed and therefore, it is desirable to convert summary trial into warrant trial. It is clearly apparent that the learned trial Court has not properly construed the provisions of Section 16-A of the Act of 1954 as well as provisions of Chapter XXI of Cr.P.C while passing the impugned order. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Vishnudutt, reported in 2016(1) RCC (Raj.) 464. has dismissed the appeal of State affirming the judgment of the Sessions Court setting aside conviction of accused for offence under Section 7/16 which was recorded after warrant trial. The Court held: "14. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, first of all I have perused the finding given by the appellate court that trial of the case is conducted as warrant case. The Court held: "14. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, first of all I have perused the finding given by the appellate court that trial of the case is conducted as warrant case. In this regard, I have perused the Section 16-A of the Act, which reads as under: "16-A. Power of Court to try cases summarily.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (20 of the 1974), all offences under sub-section (1) of Section 16 shall be tried in a summary way by a judicial Magistrate of the first class specifically empowered in this behalf by the State Government of by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of Sections 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial: Provided that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this Section, it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. Provided further that when at the commencement of, or in the course of a summary trial under this section, it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that a sentence or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is, for any other reason, undesirable to try the case summarily, the Magistrate shall after hearing the parties, record an order to that effect, and thereafter recall any witness who may have been examined and proceed to hear or rehear the case in the manner provided by the said Code." 15. In the aforesaid provision it is abundantly clear that above provision is mandatory in nature, therefore, for all the offences under the Act are required to be tried under the procedure of summary trial by a Judicial Magistrate of First Class specifically empowered in this behalf by the State Government, therefore, obviously the finding of the learned appellate court with regard to non compliance of Section 16-A of the Act does not suffer from any perversity. I have also considered the argument for non-compliance of Section 13(2) of the Act in which there is a provision that on receipt of the report of the result of the analysis under sub ection (1) to the effect that article of food is adulterated, the Local (Health) Authority shall, after the institution of prosecution against the person from whom the sample of the article of food was taken and the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under Section 14-A forward in such manner as may be, to such person or persons, as the case may be, informing such person or persons that if it is so desired, either or both of them may make an application to the court within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the copy of report to get the sample of the article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory." 5. In view of the settled position of law and the law laid down in Vishnudutt (supra), the impugned order, passed by the learned trial Court, cannot be sustained and consequently, the impugned order is quashed and set aside and the learned trial Court is directed to conduct summary trial in the matter strictly in accordance with law. The learned trial Court is also expected to complete the trial as early as possible in view of the fact that the matter in pending since 1992.