JUDGMENT : Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J. 1. The judgment dated 26.09.2016 passed in W.P(C) No.21469 of 2016 is called in question by the State in this appeal. 2. Records reveal that the respondents, writ petitioners, were appointed as Additional Government Pleaders and Additional Public Prosecutors in various districts of Kerala State in accordance with the provisions of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) and Conduct of Cases Rules, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as, the 'Rules'). The said appointments were initially for a period of three years from the date of assuming charge. However, their term was further extended for another period of three years from 2014 onwards. While working as Additional Government Pleaders and Additional Public Prosecutors, Exhibit P2 notification dated 05.11.2015 was published in the Official Gazette appointing them as Special Additional Public Prosecutors in all Additional District and Sessions Courts in the State, except Additional District and Sessions Court, Ernakulam where Special Public Prosecutor was already appointed, for conducting the cases under the Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as, the 'POCSO Act'). Another notification Exhibit P3 came to be issued on 13.01.2016 clarifying the names of Additional Government Pleaders and Public Prosecutors, who were also appointed as Special Public Prosecutors, to deal with the cases under POCSO Act. The names of all the respondents find a place in Exhibit P3 notification. From that date onwards, the respondents were not only working as Government Advocates/Additional Public Prosecutors, but also as Special Public Prosecutors under the POCSO Act, which means that the very person, who was appointed as Government Pleader-cum- Public Prosecutor to handle the cases in District and Sessions Court in Kerala, was entrusted with the duties of conducting the case on behalf of the State under the POCSO Act as Special Public Prosecutor. In otherwords, an additional designation is given to the very person, viz. the designation of Special Public Prosecutor under POCSO Act, in addition to the designation of the Government Advocate-cum-Public Prosecutor. 3. In otherwords, an additional designation is given to the very person, viz. the designation of Special Public Prosecutor under POCSO Act, in addition to the designation of the Government Advocate-cum-Public Prosecutor. 3. When the facts stood thus, Exhibit P4 communication was issued by the State Government to the District Collectors of all the districts mentioning therein that the Government have decided to terminate the services of Additional Government Pleaders and Public Prosecutors of thirteen districts, except Kottayam, where the post is vacant, and that the Government intend to make new appointment of Government Pleaders and Public Prosecutors at fourteen district court centres. By the very communication, the State Government had directed the concerned District Collectors to furnish panel of advocates to be appointed as District Government Pleaders in consultation with the District Judges concerned. 4. The communication at Exhibit P4 was questioned by the respondents before the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, which came to be dismissed. The order of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal was confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in Vinod v. State of Kerala [2016 (3) KLT 920]. Thus, it is clear that Exhibit P4 is already confirmed by this Court as back as on 27th July, 2016. Consequently, the respondents, who were working as Additional Government Advocates-cum-Additional Public Prosecutors are now sought to be replaced by another set of advocates. 5. The respondents having felt that State Government may terminate their appointments as Special Public Prosecutors under POCSO Act have approached this Court by filing W.P(C) No.21469 of 2016 seeking to quash Exhibit P4 and declare that the services of the petitioners as Special Public Prosecutors in Special Courts formed under POCSO Act are not liable to be terminated until the Special Courts cease to exist or till the formulation of appropriate rules by the State in that regard. The said writ petition came to be disposed of by the impugned judgment. The said writ petition came to be disposed of by the impugned judgment. The operative portion of the impugned judgment reads thus: "While, I do not find merit in the submission of counsel for the petitioner that, in the absence of any term of appointment prescribed in the appointment orders issued to the petitioners, they must be deemed to have been appointed for a term co-terminus with the court itself or the cases entrusted to them, it is made clear that, the State Government shall terminate the services of the petitioners as Special Government Pleaders under the POCSO Act only for valid reasons that can be justified in the backdrop of the provisions of the POCSO Act and the objects behind the enactment of the said Act, and taking note of the observations of the Supreme Court in the decisions referred above. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed by declaring that the services of the petitioner as Special Public Prosecutors under the POCSO Act cannot be terminated pursuant to Ext.P4 communication, and that the State Government will consider the aspect of necessity of termination of services of the petitioners as Special Public Prosecutors under the POCSO Act, on a case to case basis, and any decision taken by them will only be after complying with a transparent procedure after giving due notice to the petitioners. The writ petition is disposed of as above." 6. Learned Advocate General, drawing the attention of the Court to various records and the law on the point, submits that since the respondents were merely given charge of Special Public Prosecutor under the POCSO Act by issuing Exhibits P2 and P3 notifications, they cannot hold on to the said post forever, in as much as, the main post which they were holding as Additional Government Advocate and Additional Public Prosecutor is withdrawn. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vinod v. State of Kerala (cited supra) has already confirmed Exhibit P4 communication and, therefore, it is not open for the respondents to contend that they got right to continue as Special Public Prosecutors under the POCSO Act even after the termination of their services as Additional Government Pleaders and Additional Public Prosecutors. He further submits that the initial orders of appointment (Exhibits P2 and P3) themselves are illegal, in as much as, the respondents should not have been given additional charge of Special Public Prosecutors under the POCSO Act in as much as, there should have been an order appointing the persons independently to conduct the cases under the POCSO Act only. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents, drawing the attention of the Court to Section 32 of the POCSO Act and Rule 6 of the Rules framed thereunder, contends that since the respondents are appointed as Special Public Prosecutors for every Special Court for conducting the cases only under the provisions of the POCSO Act and as necessary permission of State Commissions for Protection of Child Rights is not taken for removal of the respondents, they are entitled to continue as Special Public Prosecutors under the POCSO Act. Section 32 of the POCSO Act reads thus: "Special Public Prosecutors.- (1) The State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a special Public Prosecutor for every Special Court for conducting cases only under the provisions of this Act. (2) A person shall be eligible to be appointed as a Special Public Prosecutor under sub-section (1) only if he had been in practise for not less than seven years as an advocate. (3) Every person appointed as a Special Public Prosecutor under this section shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor within the meaning of clause (u) of Section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and provision of that Code shall have effect accordingly." 8. Sub-section (1) of Section 32 discloses that the State Government shall by notification in Official Gazette appoint Special Public Prosecutors for every Special Court for conducting cases only under the provisions of POCSO Act, which means that such Special Public Prosecutors should not be assigned any duties, either as Government Advocate or Public Prosecutor. Thus, strictly speaking, the notifications at Exhibits P2 and P3 under which the respondents were appointed/nominated as Special Public Prosecutors for conducting cases under POSCO Act, are illegal. 9. Thus, strictly speaking, the notifications at Exhibits P2 and P3 under which the respondents were appointed/nominated as Special Public Prosecutors for conducting cases under POSCO Act, are illegal. 9. Since the respondents are already working as Government Advocates and Additional Public Prosecutors at the time of issuance of Exhibits P2 and P3 notifications, entrusting them additional duties of Special Public Prosecutor under the POCSO Act runs contrary to sub section (1) of Section 32 and hence, the appointments pursuant to Exhibits P2 and P3 are illegal. Since the appointment of respondents are illegal per se, they cannot hold on to the post in as much as they don't have right to continue in the said post. In all fairness, the State Government ought to have made separate appointments of the persons to work as Special Public Prosecutors under the POCSO Act, as mandated under sub section (1) of Section 32. 10. It is no doubt true that Rule 6 of the POCSO Rules discloses that certain functions are assigned to the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights. One of such functions is to monitor the appointment of Public Prosecutors by the State Government. That does not mean that the Commissions have any say in the matter of appointment or removal. However, they will have to monitor the appointment of Public Prosecutors under the Act. In other words, it is the duty of the Commissions to see that duly qualified prosecutors are appointed without any break, in order to handle the matters in the Special Courts under the POCSO Act. In our considered opinion, it is for the State Government to appoint duly qualified advocates to the post of Special Public Prosecutors to handle the case under the POCSO Act independently. 11. In view of the above, it is open for the State Government to appoint duly qualified advocates as Special Public Prosecutors under the POCSO Act exclusively. However, they should not be assigned any duties of the Government Advocates and Additional Public Prosecutors. 11. In view of the above, it is open for the State Government to appoint duly qualified advocates as Special Public Prosecutors under the POCSO Act exclusively. However, they should not be assigned any duties of the Government Advocates and Additional Public Prosecutors. Though the respondents cannot hold on to the posts of Additional Government Advocate and Public Prosecutor in as much as Exhibit P4 has already been confirmed in respect of those posts by the Division Bench of this Court in Vinod v. State of Kerala (cited supra), they can continue only as Special Public Prosecutors under the POCSO Act only, till fresh appointments are made to the said posts by the State Government. With the above observations, the writ appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge is modified.