ORDER 1. The present petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been preferred by the petitioners invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court for the purpose of seeking quashment of the order dated 10.3.2016 passed by the JMFC, Ganjbasoda District Vidisha whereby cognizance under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in short 'the Act') has been taken against the petitioners. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that petitioners are relatives of husband of the respondent; petitioner No.1 is Jeth (brother in law) of the respondent, petitioner No.2 is cousin (sister) of mother-in-law of the respondent and petitioner No.3 is wife of petitioner No.1 (Jethani) and they are residing at Sironj District Vidisha. The first ground of attack of learned counsel for the petitioners is non-compliance of proviso to section 12(1) of the Act, as this proviso mandates that prior to taking cognizance under the Act, the trial Court shall call the domestic incident report from the Protection Officer and thereafter by considering the said report, the order on the question of cognizance can be passed. Here, in the present case, the trial Court has committed grave error in taking cognizance of section 12 of the Act even without calling the domestic incident report from the Protection Officer which is mandatory one. 3. It is further submitted that admittedly after marriage, respondent reside at Ganjbasoda District Vidisha while the petitioners reside at Sironj District Vidisha which is 55 Kms. away from Ganjbasoda. Thus, according to petitioners, no occasion arises for petitioners to harass the respondent for demand of dowry. According to petitioners, they do not fall within the definition of “domestic relationship” as prescribed under section 2 (f) of the Act, therefore, they cannot be grilled under this Act. For the purpose of initiating the proceeding under the Act the accused must come within the ambit of “domestic relationship”. 4. The next thrust of argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that initially the respondent had lodged an FIR against her in-laws for the offence under sections 498A, 323/34 and 506 Part II of IPC and under section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. 4. The next thrust of argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that initially the respondent had lodged an FIR against her in-laws for the offence under sections 498A, 323/34 and 506 Part II of IPC and under section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. In that matter, the respondent has entered into compromise with her in-laws; thereby her in-laws have already been acquitted from those charges by the trial Court, but in order to fetch some illegal gratification, respondent is unnecessarily dragging the petitioners into litigation by levelling the allegations of domestic violence despite the fact that the petitioners being relatives, living separately, had not played any role as alleged by the respondent. Thus, the order of taking cognizance against the petitioners is not sustainable. In order to strengthen his contention, learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ashish Dixit and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another [ (2013)4 SCC 176 ], and this Court in the matter of Kamal Vaswani v. Smt. Jaidevi Vaswani [ 2013(III) MPWN 32 ], and in the matter of Suraj Singh Solanki and others v. Seema Solanki [ 2016(I) MPWN 84 ]. 5. Combating the submissions made on behalf of petitioners, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the petitioners had played active role in causing domestic violence to the respondent and they very well fall within the definition of “domestic relationship”. Further it has been submitted that merely on the ground of separate living; petitioners cannot be exonerated as the distance of residence of both the parties are not so much remote. Thus, prayed for dismissal of this petition. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. Regarding arguments of the petitioner pertaining to non-compliance of the provisions of section 12(1) of the Act is concerned, section 12(1) of the Act reads as under : “12. Application to Magistrate :- (1) An aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under this Act : Provided that before passing any order on such application, the Magistrate shall take into consideration any domestic incident report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider.” 8. Said proviso, makes it clear that it is mandatory upon Magistrate to take into consideration the domestic incident report received by him from the Protection Officer or Service Provider. The legislative intent in this regard is very clear. Even otherwise the domestic incident report given by the Protection Officer indicates true texture of the controversy or disclosing the facts nearer to the actual incident. It is also the duty of the Protection Officer to submit a report which carries actual facts of the incident and indicates intent of the applicant. Therefore, the Magistrate has to consider the said report before passing any order on the application under section 12(1) of the Act. The said view gets support from the judgment of Coordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of Kamal Vaswani (supra). 9. Other aspect in the matter is in respect of effect of definition of domestic relationship vis-a-vis present case. Section 2(f) of the Act defines “domestic relationship” as under : “domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family” 10. Perusal of the said definition reflects that only those persons are in domestic relationship who are living together in a shared household that too when they are related by consanguinity (blood relationship), marriage or through relationship in the nature of marriage or adoption or living as member of joint family. The present petitioners do not qualify to be the members of one of the relationships in a shared household. In absence of any element of domestic relationship, the said persons cannot be inflicted with consequences for allegations; as levelled by the complainant. The said aspect has also been dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.R. Batra v. Smt. Tarun Batra [136 (2007) DLT 1 (SC)], as well as the judgment rendered by this Court Suraj Singh Solanki and others v. Seema Solanki [ 2016(I) MPWN 84 ]. 11. The said aspect has also been dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.R. Batra v. Smt. Tarun Batra [136 (2007) DLT 1 (SC)], as well as the judgment rendered by this Court Suraj Singh Solanki and others v. Seema Solanki [ 2016(I) MPWN 84 ]. 11. The other ground for contest is that the complainant had lodged the FIR against in-laws for the offence under sections 498A, 323,34 and 506 Part II of IPC and under section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act but later on compromised with her in laws. This instance reflects the bend of mind of the complainant. Therefore, once she has reached to a compromise with her in-laws in respect of allegations of dowry demand which is raison detre of all domestic violence then the very nature of the allegations under the proceeding under section 12 of the Act comes under serious doubts. 12. The omnibus allegations are apparent on the face of record thus, on merits also the contention of the complainant suffers and submissions of petitioner gain grounds. 13. The another ground taken by the petitioners carries meritorious consideration regarding the fact of distant living. The Hon'ble apex Court in the matter of Ashish Dixit and others (supra), has laid down the law that in a matter like present one wherein the complainant arrayed all the distant relatives, should not have been allowed to continue and the petition filed by the petitioner be confined to her husband and also her parents-in-law rather than including all and sundry person as accused. 14. Considering submissions and law in this regard, no other inference can be drawn except to quash the proceeding. Resultantly, the proceeding initiated against the petitioner under the provisions of the Act are hereby quashed. 15. Revision stands allowed.