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2016 DIGILAW 1063 (JHR)

Nilisha Kumari, W/o Sri A. K. Singh v. State of Jharkhand

2016-07-18

PRAMATH PATNAIK

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JUDGMENT : Pramath Patnaik, J. In the accompanied writ application, the petitioner has inter alia prayed for issuance of writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing notification dated 02.04.2009, whereby respondent no. 3 has been pleased to award punishment as contained in Annexure 4 and further direction upon the respondents to make payment of salary of suspension period and to give annual increment and its consequential benefits. 2. Sans details, the facts as disclosed in the writ application, is that the petitioner while continuing as C.D.P.O, Murhu, Ranchi was placed under suspension vide order dated 09.11.2006 for commission of certain financial irregularities in contemplation of departmental proceeding initiated against her, wherein the Enquiry Officer was appointed, who submitted his report dated 06.03.2009 vide Annexure 3 to the writ application exonerating the petitioner from all the charges. In the said enquiry report, the Enquiry Officer has recommended for revocation of the order of suspension and to allow her to join on the post of Child Development Programme Officer. But to the utter surprise and consternation, the disciplinary authority vide order dated 02.04.2009 has been pleased to impose the punishment of stoppage of two increments for two years and recovery of 10 % interest upon Rs. 22,96,372.00 for the period from 12.05.2006 to 07.06.2006 in five equal installment from the salary and allowances of the petitioner. In this context, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when the fund was allotted to the petitioner's block, the petitioner returned the amount adjusting the expenditure of Posahar in the light of Annexure 5 and 6. 3. Being aggrieved by the impugned order of punishment, the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for redressal of her grievances. 4. Mr. Rishikesh Giri, learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged before this Court that even though the petitioner has been exonerated by the Enquiry Officer vide Annexure 3, the disciplinary authority without issuing any second show-cause notice issued order dated 02.04.2009 imposing the impugned punishment, which is against the settled principles of law. It has further been submitted that on the face of it, the impugned order of punishment appears to be colourable exercise of power and repleted with certain infirmities. It has further been submitted that on the face of it, the impugned order of punishment appears to be colourable exercise of power and repleted with certain infirmities. Learned counsel further submits that during course of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to the judgments rendered in the case of Lav Nigam Vs. Chairman & MD. ITI Ltd. & Another as reported in (2006) 9 SCC 440 . 5. Per contra, counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents controverting the averments made in the writ application. Mr. Ajit Kumar, J.C to S.C. (L& C) reiterating the submissions made in the counter affidavit submitted with vehemence that as per the procedure the entire file of departmental proceeding of the petitioner with enquiry report has been placed before the Advisor of the Hon'ble Governor for taking approval for revocation of suspension of petitioner, who, in turn, disagreed with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and vide order-sheet dated 31.03.2009 has given approval for revocation of suspension by imposing punishment of charges no. 2, 3 and 5, as evident from Annexure C to the counter-affidavit. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that since the impugned punishment is minor punishment, there was no occasion to issue second show-cause notice, therefore, the impugned order of punishment need not be interfered with. 6. After having heard the rivalized submission of learned counsel for the respective parties at length and on perusal of the records, I am of the considered view that the impugned order at Annexure 4 dated 02.04.2009 is not legally sustainable for the following facts, reasons and judicial pronouncement: (i). Admittedly, the petitioner has been proceeded departmentally for the omission/commission for certain financial irregularities and in the said departmental proceeding, the petitioner was exonerated of all the seven charges by the enquiry officer, but, the disciplinary authority disagreeing with the finding of the enquiry officer imposed the impugned punishment. In that eventuality, respondents ought to have issued notice as to why he is in disagreement with the finding of the enquiry officer, but, in the instant case, it appears that such notice was not issued prior to infliction of punishment, rendering the impugned order bad in law. (ii). View of this Court gets fortified by the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Lav Nigam Vs. (ii). View of this Court gets fortified by the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Lav Nigam Vs. Chairman & MD, ITI Ltd & Another as reported in (2006) 9 SCC 440 , in particular 11 and 12, which is quoted herein below: 11. In Punjab National Bank V. Kunj Behari Misraa Bench of this Court considered Regulation 7(2) of the Punjab National Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977. The Regulation itself did not provide for the giving of any notice before the disciplinary authority differed with the view of the enquiry officer. This court held : “The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.” 12. This view has been reiterated in Yoginath D. Bagde V. State of Maharashtra. In this case also Rule 9(2) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and appeal) rules, 1979 did not specifically prove for a disciplinary authority to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer before differing with the view of the enquiry officer. This view has been reiterated in Yoginath D. Bagde V. State of Maharashtra. In this case also Rule 9(2) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and appeal) rules, 1979 did not specifically prove for a disciplinary authority to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer before differing with the view of the enquiry officer. The Court said : “But the requirement of 'hearing' in consonance with the principles of natural justice even at that stage has to be read into Rule 9(2) and it has to be held that before the disciplinary authority finally disagrees with the findings of the enquiry authority, it would give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer so that he may have the opportunity to indicate that the findings recorded by the enquiring authority do not suffer from any error and that there was no occasion to take a different view. The disciplinary authority, at the same time, has to communicate to the delinquent officer the 'TENTATIVE' reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the enquiring authority so that the delinquent officer may further indicate that the reasons on the basis of which the disciplinary authority proposes to disagree with the findings recorded by the enquiring authority are not germane and the finding of 'not guilty' already recorded by the enquiring was not liable to be interfered with”. 7. As a logical sequitur to the aforesaid reasons and in view of the decision cited herein above, the impugned order dated 02.04.2009 at Annexure 4 is hereby quashed. However, the respondents are at liberty to start a proceeding afresh from the stage of issuance of fresh show cause notice by the disciplinary authority to the petitioner indicating the reasons of disagreement with the enquiry report and if such proceeding is initiated, the same must be concluded as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. 8. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the petition stands disposed of. 9. Consequently, I.A. Nos. 124 of 2012 and 2502 of 2016 stands disposed of. Petition disposed of.