JUDGMENT Dr. Dhanjaya Yaswant Chandrachud, C.J. and Yaswant Varma, J. – Both the Special Appeals question the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge on 17 March 2015 in terms of which two writ petitions preferred seeking quashing of an order dated 27/29 November 1992 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Jaunpur came to be allowed. The order of the District Inspector of Schools upheld the appointment of the appellant as an Assistant Teacher in the Gangadin Ram Kumar Inter College. Since the two writ petitions and the challenge to the appointment of the appellant have a history it would be apposite to briefly note the same. Appointment of the Appellant 2. The appellant is stated to have been appointed as an Assistant Clerk in the institution consequent to a vacancy having come into existence on 18 September 1972. The appellant came to be appointed against this vacancy on 30 December 1986. At the relevant time when the appointment was effected in favour of the appellant his father was working as the Officiating/Adhoc Principal in the institution. This appointment was approved by the District Inspector of Schools by an order dated 3 June 1987. Acting upon a complaint dated 2 July 1987, the DIOS instituted an enquiry. The challenge to the appointment of the appellant was on the ground that the same had come to be made in violation of the provision of Regulation 4 falling under Chapter III of the Regulations framed under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Regulation 4 prohibits the appointment of any teacher who may be related to a member of the Committee of Management, Head Master or teacher. In order to avoid any adverse comment, the management terminated the services of the appellant by an order dated 12 December 1988. This order was challenged by the appellant by means of a writ petition [Writ Petition No. 3135 of 1988 decided on 25.2.1992] which came to be allowed on the ground that the termination had come to be made in breach of the principles of natural justice. The Court accorded liberty to the DIOS to complete the enquiry afresh after affording opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties. It was pursuant to this direction that the DIOS proceeded in the matter and ultimately passed the order dated 27/29 November 1992. Writ Petition No. 8265 of 1993 [First Writ Petition] 3. The Court accorded liberty to the DIOS to complete the enquiry afresh after affording opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties. It was pursuant to this direction that the DIOS proceeded in the matter and ultimately passed the order dated 27/29 November 1992. Writ Petition No. 8265 of 1993 [First Writ Petition] 3. Assailing the order of the DIOS the first writ petition came to be filed by the Committee of Management through Sri Virendra Kumar Pandey asserting himself to be the manager of the institution. This petition initially came to be allowed on 5 February 2004 on the ground of the appointment having come to be made in the absence of a vacancy in the institution as also on account of infraction of Regulation 4 of Chapter III of the Regulations. Two separate applications for recall came to be filed in these proceedings- one by the appellant and the other by Sri Virendra Kumar Pandey. The appellant sought recall of the order dated 5 February 2004 on the ground that the name of his counsel was not correctly printed in the cause list as a result of which he could not attend the proceedings. Pandey filed an application alleging that he had not authorised the filing of the writ petition through counsel. The application of the appellant came to be allowed on 8 November 2004 and the judgment dated 5 February 2004 came to be recalled. No orders were passed on the application made by Pandey. Writ Petition No. 55339 of 2004 [Second Writ Petition] 4. Being unsure of the conduct and motives of Pandey and as the learned Single Judge records, as a matter of abundant caution, the Committee of Management filed this petition also assailing the order of the DIOS dated 27/29 November 1992. 5. We may note that the learned Single Judge has by the judgment impugned dismissed the application of Pandey moved in the first writ petition and has also commented upon his conduct. For the purposes of these appeals, however, we have heard learned counsel for the contesting parties on the merits of the challenge laid to the appointment of the appellant and accordingly do not propose to deal with the conduct of Sri Virendra Kumar Pandey or the background in which the application came to be made in Writ Petition No. 8265 of 1993. 6. 6. As noted above, the challenge to the appointment of the appellant was on the ground that the same had come to be made in violation of the provision of Regulation 4 falling under Chapter-III of the Regulations framed under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Regulation 4 prohibits the appointment of any teacher who may be related to a member of the Committee of Management, Head Master or teacher. Since, the appellant came to be appointed at a time when his father was the Officiating Principal of the institution his appointment was clearly in violation of Regulation 4. Such an appointment would admittedly be a nullity and being per se illegal is not liable to be legalised. This issue need not detain us too long in light of the binding precedents which have been noticed by the learned Single and which hold that such appointments in violation of Regulation 4 and pari material provisions would be null and void. We may in this connection only refer to the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in District Basic Education Officer And Another v. Dhananjai Kumar Shukla And Another, 2008 (5) ESC 760 and a recent judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Azizullah Khan v. State of U.P. And Others, 2015 (1) ADJ 733 (DB). 7. Learned senior counsel for the appellant has advanced the following submissions for our consideration: (a) The long continuance of the appellant on the post in question is a circumstance which the learned Single Judge should have taken into consideration and therefore desisted from issuing the writs as prayed for; (b) learned Single Judge clearly erred in dismissing the application filed by Sri Virendra Kumar Pandey seeking dismissal of Writ Petition No. 8265 of 1993 (c) the challenge to the order of the District Inspector of Schools by means of a petition instituted in 2004 being highly belated should not have been entertained. These submissions fall for our consideration. 8. While urging the learned Single Judge to refrain from issuing the writ setting aside the appointment of the appellant on the ground of his long continuance on the post, much reliance was placed upon a judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Rajendra Prasad Srivastava v. District Inspector of Schools And Others, 1994 (3) ESC 117 (All). While urging the learned Single Judge to refrain from issuing the writ setting aside the appointment of the appellant on the ground of his long continuance on the post, much reliance was placed upon a judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Rajendra Prasad Srivastava v. District Inspector of Schools And Others, 1994 (3) ESC 117 (All). The learned Single Judge has in this connection while negativing the submission made before him dealt with the entire body of precedent which has evolved subsequent to the judgment rendered by a Constitution Bench in Secretary, State of Karnataka And Others v. Uma Devi And Others, 2006 (4) SCC 1 to hold that an illegal appointment is a nullity and that equity and other sympathetic considerations have no role to play while dealing with the legality of such appointments. The learned Single Judge has further rested his judgment upon the principle as laid down by Supreme Court that illegal appointments and appointments made in violation of the statutory rules cannot be saved merely on account of the incumbent having continued on the post for a long period of time. The underlying principle which can be deduced from the various judgments of the Supreme Court is that mere continuance on the post for a long period cannot justify the condoning of gross illegalities in the initial appointment. For the aforesaid reasons, we find ourselves unable to sustain the appointment of the appellant or to condone the illegality merely on account of his long continuance on the said post. Such a course would clearly be subversive to the rule of law which must predominate and outweigh all other considerations. Equity and other considerations would have a role to play where a person is able to establish a legal right. In absence thereof we fail to find any merit in the submissions advanced on these lines. 9. We are further of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge correctly distinguished Rajendra Prasad Srivastava by holding that soon after the approval of the appointment of the appellant on 3 June 1987, the Committee of Management acting on a complaint made to the District Inspector of Schools had terminated the services of the appellant on 12 February 1988. We are further of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge correctly distinguished Rajendra Prasad Srivastava by holding that soon after the approval of the appointment of the appellant on 3 June 1987, the Committee of Management acting on a complaint made to the District Inspector of Schools had terminated the services of the appellant on 12 February 1988. The learned Single Judge has found that while the order of 12 February 1988 came to be set aside on a writ petition preferred by the appellant on the ground that the same had come to be made in breach of the principles of natural justice, there was no delay on the part of the Committee of Management in dispensing with his services. Rajendra Prasad Srivastava was a case where the incumbent had been appointed in 1971 and had continued to work till his services came to be terminated on 8 August 1978. As the judgment of the Division Bench would indicate the order of termination made in 1978 came to be challenged in a writ petition upon which an interim order was granted on the strength of which he continued in service till his petition came to be dismissed. These distinguishing features clearly establish that the aforesaid judgment rendered by the Division Bench did not apply to the facts of the present case. 10. Insofar as the last two submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant are concerned, we may only note that the second writ petition appears to have been instituted only upon the committee of management becoming aware of the conduct and motives of Pandey in taking steps to have the first writ petition dismissed. It was the vacillating conduct of Pandey that prompted the committee of management to institute the second writ petition. We may also note that the committee of management had laid a challenge to the order of the DIOS in 1993 itself. Since it was suing through Pandey, the then manager, it out of abundant caution preferred the second writ petition. This was therefore not a case where the management had acquiesced in the appointment of the appellant or belatedly woke up to challenge the same. Moreover since a closure to the challenge to the appointment of the appellant, would have only perpetuated an illegality, we find are ourselves unable to accept the submissions advanced on this score also. 11. This was therefore not a case where the management had acquiesced in the appointment of the appellant or belatedly woke up to challenge the same. Moreover since a closure to the challenge to the appointment of the appellant, would have only perpetuated an illegality, we find are ourselves unable to accept the submissions advanced on this score also. 11. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in the challenge laid to the judgment of the learned Single Judge in these two Special Appeals which shall consequently stand dismissed.