JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. This petition has been filed by the petitioners-original accused Nos. 1 and 2 for the purpose of seeking quashment of the complaint. The prayers made in the petition are reproduced hereinbelow: "B. This Hon'ble Court, may be pleased to quash and set aside the M. Case No. 03/2011 registered with Shahibaug Police Station, Ahmedabad under section427, 447, 392, 395 and 114 of the IPC (Annexure B) and be further pleased to quash and set aside the further proceedings of the said M. case and be further pleased to quash and set aside the proceedings of the Inquiry case No. 13 of 2011; filed and pending in the Court of the learned CJM, Ahmedabad; (Annexure-A); C. Pending hearing and final disposal of this application, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to stay the further proceedings/investigation with respect to M. case No. 03/2011, registered with Shahibaug Police Station, Ahmedabad (Annexure-B) D. Any other and further relief’s, may kindly be granted, in the interest of justice." 2. Brief facts leading to the petition are that complainants, since about more than 25 years, are performing their religious activities in Brahmchari Ashram situated at Asarwa which was originally administered by Guru Dayanadji who died on 4.9.2010. It is the case of the complainants that during the lifetime of the said deceased Guru Dayanandji, had executed a Will in favour of the complainants and despite that fact, on 5.9.2010, with the aid and assistance of a mob of about 25 persons, the petitioners who are original accused Nos. 1 and 2 have trespassed the Ashram and conveyed that since both the complainants have married, as a custom of Ashram, the complainants are not entitled to continue to reside in the Ashram and by conveying that forcibly both the complainants have been drifted out of the Ashram, so much so that the keys of the Ashram have been snatched away from the hands of the complainants and have been threatened with dire consequences and they have been beaten. It has also been alleged in the complaint that cash amount of Rs. 4,23,000/- alongwith other belongings including government papers, bank transaction papers, gold chain etc. have been taken away from the complainants and thereby drifted the complainants from the Ashram and while doing so, the petitioners-original accused have threatened the complainant with dire consequences. It has also been alleged in the complaint that cash amount of Rs. 4,23,000/- alongwith other belongings including government papers, bank transaction papers, gold chain etc. have been taken away from the complainants and thereby drifted the complainants from the Ashram and while doing so, the petitioners-original accused have threatened the complainant with dire consequences. Even threat to life was also administered by the accused persons. It has also been alleged in the complaint that regarding this episode on 5.9.2010, immediately the incident was reported to Shahibaug police station, but it has been mentioned in the complaint that it appears that Shahibaug police has not taken any action. On the contrary, the petitioners are alleged to have been sheltered. It is in this background of facts, the respondent Nos. 2 and 3-original complainants have filed the complaint on 5.9.2011 i.e. almost after a period of one year before learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad which was registered as Inquiry case No. 13 of 2011. The complaint in question is filed for the offences punishable under sections 427, 447, 392, 395 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. Though the date of incident as well as the date of filing of the complaint are very much apparent on record, the learned Magistrate appears to have mechanically ordered an inquiry under section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code ("the Code" for short). It is this process and filing of the complaint has brought the present petition for the purpose of quashing the complaint by invoking inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 of the Code. 3. This Court, while entertaining the aforesaid petition has initially passed the following order on 24.7.2012. "1. Notice to the respondents returnable on 30th August, 2012. 2. Learned APP Mr. H.L. Jani waives service of Notice for respondent No. 1 State of Gujarat. 3. Ad-interim relief in terms of paragraph 20(C) till then. Direct service permitted." 4. Today, the petition came up for final hearing before this Court. Mr. "1. Notice to the respondents returnable on 30th August, 2012. 2. Learned APP Mr. H.L. Jani waives service of Notice for respondent No. 1 State of Gujarat. 3. Ad-interim relief in terms of paragraph 20(C) till then. Direct service permitted." 4. Today, the petition came up for final hearing before this Court. Mr. Sudhanshu Patel, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners-original accused has mainly contended that there is a gross delay in filing the complaint and the complainants have chosen to lodge the complaint before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate after almost a period of one year from the date of incident alleged to have taken place and therefore, on this sole ground, he has requested this Court to quash the complaint. Mr. Patel has further drawn the attention of this Court to the Will in question which is tried to have been pressed into service even by respondent Nos. 2 and 3-original complainants which is at page 22 of the petition compilation and has asserted that the Will on the contrary divested interest in favour of the petitioners and not the complainants. He has further contended that the Will in question is very much signed by two attesting witnesses as well as the same has been signed by complainants themselves. Therefore, Mr. Patel has contended that Will is properly executed, attested and deduced in writing and therefore, the same is a valid piece of material evidence in favour of the petitioners. Learned advocate Mr. Patel has further contended that the validity of the Will is not at all questioned in any proceedings; neither the complainants have challenged the validity of the Will in question nor have raised any grievance about it before Charity Commissioner. He has further drawn the attention of this Court that the Will is signed by the two practising advocates, namely Harshad D. Solanki and Dinesh Gangaram Vaghela and one of the two attesting witnesses has even filed an affidavit in support of the execution of the Will and therefore, based upon this, learned advocate Mr. Patel has specifically contended that filing of the complaint is nothing but futile attempt made by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3-original complainants to ventilate the grievance which otherwise should have been raised before appropriate forum. Therefore, Mr. Patel has specifically contended that filing of the complaint is nothing but futile attempt made by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3-original complainants to ventilate the grievance which otherwise should have been raised before appropriate forum. Therefore, Mr. Patel has contended that the complaint in question is nothing but sheer abuse of process of law, and the learned Magistrate, before issuing the order of inquiry under section 156(3) of the Code, ought to have gone into this material aspect which is evident from the averments made in the complaint itself. Mr. Patel has further drawn the attention of the Court to the story which has been put forward that with the aid and assistance of some 25 persons, the petitioners have rushed to the Ashram, drifted them from Ashram is nothing but concoction and articulate way of diverting the attention of the Court from real grievance. He has contended that criminal machinery is put to motion with an oblique motive and therefore, such an attempt should not be encouraged. It is in this background of facts and contentions that learned advocate Mr. Patel has prayed to allow the petition by granting reliefs as prayed for in the petition. 5. As against this, Mr. Sumit B. Sikarwar, learned advocate for respondent Nos. 2 and 3-original complainants has opposed the stand taken by the learned advocate Mr. Patel for the petitioners and has tried to raise a defence that the Will in question is on the contrary in favour of the complainants and not the petitioners. When a pointed query put forth to him by the Court that why then action is not initiated or any process is not precipitated by Shahibaug police station, then why the complainants have not taken any action to put that complaint in motion. To this pointed query, learned advocate for respondent Nos. 2 and 3-original complainants has pleaded total ignorance and has tried to justify briefly that in para-3 of the complaint, explanation is given for filing the present complaint. Now this explanation which has been given by the complainants as reflected in para-3 of the complaint, does not bear any date nor any particulars of whatsoever nature and just bald assertion to shelter inaction on the part of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3-original complainant. However, learned advocate for the respondent Nos. Now this explanation which has been given by the complainants as reflected in para-3 of the complaint, does not bear any date nor any particulars of whatsoever nature and just bald assertion to shelter inaction on the part of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3-original complainant. However, learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 has submitted that at this stage of the proceedings, in view of the settled position of law, this Court should not interfere with the right of the executive to inquire into the complaint pursuant to the order of inquiry under section 156(3) of the Code and has requested to dismiss the present petition. 6. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor Ms. Jirga Zaveri appearing for the State had no proper instructions and therefore, except supporting the case of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 that no inherent jurisdiction be exercised, no other submission came to be made by her which ultimately led this Court to deal with the issue on the basis of rival submissions of the learned advocates for the petitioners-original accused as well as of the respondents 3 and 4. 7. Before adverting to and deal with the contentions of the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, few propositions are worth considering which are clinching the issue. Whether this Court is to exercise jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the stage of section 156(3) of the Code as ordered by the learned Magistrate. It is settled principle of law that when the Magistrate receives a complaint in writing disclosing cognizable offence, he may take cognizance under section 190(1)(a) of the Code and proceed with the same in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XV of the Code and the other option available to the learned Magistrate in such a case is to send the complaint to appropriate police station under section 156(3) of the Code for investigation. Once such a direction is given under sub-section (3) of section 156 of the Code, the police is required to investigate into with the complaint under sub-section (1) of section 156 of the Code and upon completion of the investigation, to submit the police report. Now, these two options which are available with the learned Magistrate. It pre-supposes an application of mind by the Magistrate once he has received the complaint. Now, these two options which are available with the learned Magistrate. It pre-supposes an application of mind by the Magistrate once he has received the complaint. The learned Magistrate has not to act as a postman that whenever a complaint is received, just send for investigation under section 156(3) of the Code to an appropriate police station. Application of mind and satisfaction on the part of the learned Magistrate whether the complaint is receivable or not are Two pre-requisites options which are indicated above are fortified and supported by one of decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Bala v. Suresh Kumar, reported in AIR 1997 SC 3104 , the relevant para-8 whereof reads as under: "From a combined reading of the above provisions it is abundantly clear that when a written complaint disclosing a cognizable offence is made before a Magistrate, he may take cognizance upon the same under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code and proceed with the same in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XV. The other option available to the Magistrate in such a case is to send the complaint to the appropriate Police station under Section 156(3) for investigation. Once such a direction is given under sub-section (3) of Section156 the police is required to investigate into that complaint under sub-section (1) thereof and on completion of investigation, to submit a "police report" in accordance with Section 173(2) on which a Magistrate may take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) but not under 190(1)(a). Since a complaint filed before a Magistrate cannot be a police report in view of definition of the complaint referred to earlier and since the investigation of a "cognizable case" by the police under Section 156(1) has to culminate in a police report the complainant as soon as an order under Section 156(3) is passed thereon-transforms itself to a report given in writing within the meaning of Section 154of the Code which is known as the First Information Report (FIR). As under Section 156(1) the police can only investigate a cognizable "case, it has to formally register a case on that report." 8. As under Section 156(1) the police can only investigate a cognizable "case, it has to formally register a case on that report." 8. This Court is of the firm view that sending the complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code is a serious step which is to be initiated by the learned Magistrate and at times, it may have a serious impact and such action of casual exercise of power by the Magistrate who is sending the complaint under section 156(3) of the Code in a routine manner is nothing but a clear dereliction of duty on the part of the learned Magistrate. The Supreme Court, over a passage of time has taken a judicial note of the situation in a large number of cases that Section 156(3) of the Code is being utilised in a routine and casual manner and therefore, recently, taking note of such a situation, has propounded that Section 156(3) of the Code, a remedy which is available is not of a routine nature and exercise of such power requires application of judicial mind. The Magistrate, exercising said power, must remain vigilant with regard to nature of allegations made in the application and not to issue directions without proper application of mind. In a recent decision in the case of Priyanka Srivastava and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2015) 6 SCC 287 has propounded proposition of law about exercising power under Section 156(3) of the Code by the concerned Magistrate. Relevant paragraphs 27, 29, 30 and 31 of the said judgment read as under: "27. Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation of law, it needs to be reiterated that the learned Magistrate has to remain vigilant with regard to allegations made and the nature of allegations and not to issue directions without proper application of mind. He has also to bear in mind that sending the matter would be conducive to justice and then he may pass the requisite order........ 29. At this stage, it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the Code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. 29. At this stage, it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the Code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principles and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellow citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same. 30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of the said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores. 31. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit is so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR." Thus, while observing and propounding the aforesaid law point on the issue of section 156(3) of the Code, the Supreme Court has considered various judgments in vogue and the situation prevailing in the society is observed by the Supreme Court and has held that filing of even an affidavit would curb practice of preferring applications under Section 156(3) of the Code in a routine and casual manner without any responsibility merely to harass certain persons. 9. A bare reading of the complaint on hand is nothing but a classic example of such kind of practice which is visualised by the Supreme Court in the above referred decision. Here, in the present case, the incident is alleged to have taken place on 5.9.2010 and by making averments in an articulate manner, tried to lodge serious offence upon the petitioners. The complaint is filed on 5.9.2011 and on the very same day, by two line order, without application of mind, straightaway the learned Magistrate sent the same to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. It appears that the learned Magistrate has not at all gone into paragraphs 1 and 3 of the complaint. Had the learned Magistrate gone into the averments contained in these paragraphs, possibly this exercise of sending the complaint in routine manner for investigation under Section 156(3) ought not to have been sent by the learned Magistrate. It appears that the learned Magistrate has fallen in serious error in exercise of jurisdiction and on the contrary, allowed the complainants to utilise criminal machinery for securing oblique motive. It appears that the learned Magistrate has fallen in serious error in exercise of jurisdiction and on the contrary, allowed the complainants to utilise criminal machinery for securing oblique motive. The learned Magistrate has further not questioned the complainants on the issue of Will as it appears especially when the Will in question is tried to be pressed into service and he ought to have inquired as to why the same is not attached by way of document to the complaint. Even the complaint in question is not supported by any cogent material except bald assertions. This has compelled this Court to go cursorily look into the Will which has been attached by the petitioners at page-22. The authenticity of the Will requires that it must be in writing and must be attested by two witnesses and signed by the concerned person, namely executor. Here, in the present case, it appears that the Will which is attached at page 22 is not only properly executed but also attested by two witnesses who are practising lawyers and have also substantiated the contents of the Will by separate affidavit. The fact that the Will is signed by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4-original complainants is not disputed even by the learned advocate representing respondent Nos. 3 and 4-original complainants. On inquiry, learned advocate representing the original complainants has conveyed to this Court that Will in question is nowhere under challenge, no proceedings are initiated either filed before Charity Commissioner or Civil Court for questioning the validity of the Will. Therefore, in the background of these facts, it clearly emerges that this complaint is nothing but a sheer abuse of process of law. Even from a bare reading of the averments contained in the complaint, the main incident in question is also not inspiring any confidence, rather it appears to be far from truth. When the averments made in the complaint are taken into consideration at the time of hearing of this petition, and when it was asked to the learned advocate representing the complainants about any other substantial material available on records of the complaint, except ignorance and inability, nothing is reflected and responded. This has also raised serious doubts and supports the belief of mala fide and sheer misuse of process of law by respondent Nos. 3 and 4-original complainants. This has also raised serious doubts and supports the belief of mala fide and sheer misuse of process of law by respondent Nos. 3 and 4-original complainants. From these overall material on the record of the case and the averments contained in the complaint postulate that the complaint is not only belated but it is at a gross belated stage filed after a period of more than one year. The record indicates that even the conduct of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 that there is a serious no attempt of any nature by them when Shahibaug police station did not deal with their earlier complaint which is said to have been filed is not reflected in para-3. This conduct also speaks volumes about it and therefore, conduct of the complainants is also very relevant factor while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code in addition to the other requirements has spelt out in a series of decisions on the issue of exercise of jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code. Even the fact is not in dispute that the Will in question is not challenged in any other proceedings nor any steps are taken by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3-original complainants over a period of more than 12 months to enter into premises if they have been really drifted. This conduct is also sufficient enough to suggest that the complaint appears to have been filed for the purpose of achieving some oblique motive. This has taken this Court to go through the contents mentioned in the Will whereby the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have been continued as Trustees in the Trust and therefore, their surprise silence on the real grievance mentioned in the complaint is also raising serious doubts about credentials and on the contrary they substantiate the belief of the petitioners that the complaint in question is filed with a mala fide intention to abuse the process of law. 10. In the background of aforesaid facts, it leads to a situation where there appears to be serious attempt on the part of the complainants to put criminal machinery in motion to achieve some oblique motive. From the above situation and circumstances prevailing, there is no hesitation to this Court in coming to the conclusion that the complaint in question is nothing but a clear example of abuse of process of court. From the above situation and circumstances prevailing, there is no hesitation to this Court in coming to the conclusion that the complaint in question is nothing but a clear example of abuse of process of court. Now, this takes this Court to another proposition of law; whether at the stage of Section 156(3) of the Code, inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code can be exercised? Time and again, in a catena of decisions, it has been propounded that whenever conscience of the court is satisfied that the complainant has put criminal machinery into motion for some oblique reason, the power under section 482 of the Code can always be exercised. In exercise of the wholesome power under section 482 of the Code, the High Court is entitled to quash the proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the prosecution to continue would be an abuse of process of law and that ends of justice require that proceedings ought to be quashed. In the case of Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia and another vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and others reported in AIR 1988 SC 709 , the Supreme Court has observed as under in para-7 of the judgment. "7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may, while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceedings even though it may be at a preliminary stage." 11. Similarly, it has also been propounded that the power of quashing has to be sparingly exercised by the Court with due regards to several set norms. Similarly, it has also been propounded that the power of quashing has to be sparingly exercised by the Court with due regards to several set norms. It is not possible to lay down any clearly defined or sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines as held by the Supreme Court, but extraordinary powers can be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. 12. Therefore, considering the aforesaid situation prevailing on exercise of powers under section 482 of the Code, the background of the present case, constrains this Court to exercise power under section482 of the Code. As stated above, for the alleged incident which is said to have taken place on 5.9.2010, respondent Nos. 2 and 3-original complainants have not taken any action and after almost a period of more than 12 months, the complaint came to be filed in the manner stated above. Secondly, the Will in question which is tried to be relied upon appears to be in favour of the petitioners and to which the learned advocate representing the original complainants also tacitly admitted and further more, the said Will appears to have been properly executed which is signed by the complainants themselves. In addition thereto, the conduct on the part of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 as stated above, to remain surprisingly silent and inactive over a period of time also speaks volumes about it. It appears that with a view to apply pressure on the petitioners, this complaint appears to have been filed which does not constitute any offence as alleged nor inspiring any confidence. There appears to be some grievance with respect to controlling administration of Trust, but for that appropriate forum is not a criminal court but either Charity Commissioner or other civil forum which may be available under law. Apart from this, as alleged in the complaint that 25 persons have rushed to the Ashram and drifted and took away cash, ornaments etc., but except bald assertion, there is absolutely nothing to substantiate these allegations. Prima facie, it appears to this Court that there is some internal rift amongst the trustees which might have led the complainants to put criminal machinery in motion for achieving some oblique motive. Prima facie, it appears to this Court that there is some internal rift amongst the trustees which might have led the complainants to put criminal machinery in motion for achieving some oblique motive. Otherwise, in such a situation, the complainants would not have remained silent and inactive for a period of more than one year. It is an undisputed position as stated above that for the period of time, smooth administration is going on in Ashram/Trust at Ahmedabad as well as Dholka and there is nothing incriminating pointed out by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to indicate that the petitioners are even prima facie responsible for the offence. The learned advocate representing respondent Nos. 2 and 3 is not in a position to controvert some of the aspects touching to the root of the matter as stated above and therefore, has left it to the Court. Considering the facts and circumstances as stated above, and taking into consideration the averments made in the complaint as they are, this Court finds that the complaint in question is nothing but a glaring example of abuse of process of Court and such an attempt on the part of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 cannot be permitted or encouraged. Hence, the complaint in question deserves to be quashed. 13. In view of what is discussed above and in view of the principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions, this Court is of the view that the present petition deserves to be allowed and the complaint in question deserves to be quashed. Therefore, the petition is allowed. The complaint being M. case No. 3 of 2011 registered with Shahibaug police station and Inquiry case No. 13 of 2011 pending in the Court of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad are hereby quashed and set aside.