JUDGMENT : Pramath Patnaik, J. In the accompanied writ application, the petitioner has inter alia prayed for quashing letter dated 06.05.2014 whereby respondent no. 2 declined to entertain the Memorial; appellate order dated 19.08.2013 whereby respondent no. 3 dismissed the appeal; and order of punishment dated 31.08.2011 whereby respondent no. 4 imposed punishment of reversion of the petitioner to the basic scale of pay. 2. The facts, in brief, is that vide memo dated 26.04.2007, the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet alleging, inter alia, that while he was posted as Officer-in-Charge of Birsa Nagar Police Station, a complaint was lodged by one S. Davidson, which was notified by Dy.S.P (Town) alleging that the petitioner demanded a Television set for the work alleged therein. The petitioner submitted his explanation to the effect that the allegations contained in the memo of charge are false and he never demanded any Television. Thereafter, the Dy.S.P. (Law & Order), Jamshedpur was appointed Enquiry Officer, who upon examining the witnesses held the preliminary enquiry and found the petitioner responsible for the alleged charges. Basing on this enquiry report, the disciplinary authority proposed to impose the punishment by reverting the petitioner to basic scale of pay vide memo dated 31.08.2011. However, subsequently vide memo dated 01.10.2010, the respondent no. 3 approved the proposal made by respondent no. 4 by reducing the petitioner to his basic scale of pay for a period of three years. Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred appeal, which was also dismissed vide memo dated 19.08.2013. Subsequently, on 05.09.2013 the petitioner preferred memorial and by letter dated 06.05.2014, the Inspector General of Police (Training) communicated that the memorial of the petitioner did not merit any consideration and the same was found to be not maintainable. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Enquiry Officer has not examined the complainant and only the Dy. S.P. and Steno (A.S.I) were examined and the petitioner was not provided any liberty to cross-examine them. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that petitioner was not afforded any opportunity to adduce evidence, either oral or documentary and mainly on the basis of ex-parte evidence of two witnesses, the enquiry officer held the petitioner responsible for the alleged charges. 4. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision rendered in the case of Kuldeep Singh Vs. 4. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision rendered in the case of Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police & Ors as reported in (1999) 2 SCC 10 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the Court can interfere with the impugned order of punishment, if the case is based on no evidence. 5. Controverting the averments made in the writ application, learned counsel for the respondents-State submitted that a complaint was lodged against the petitioner alleging, inter alia, that one Manoj Kumar Thakur, who had been in jail custody in connection with Animal Husbandary Case got an agreement signed by force from one Davidson for his house and land, to which, the Davidson reported to the police and hence, that Manoj Kumar Thakur was arrested and sent to jail. After release on bail, Manoj Kumar Thakur threatened Davidson, to which, he again approached the Officer-in-Charge (the present petitioner) with a request to return the agreement to him. On such request, the petitioner demanded a colour T.V from Davidson, who under pressure given a colour T.V set to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the respondents-State submitted that in the enquiry, the above charge levelled against the petitioner was found true. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the finding of the enquiry officer that the petitioner is guilty of charges got further strengthened on account of admission of the petitioner himself that Davidson had come with T.V set, which he returned on the same day. It is submitted that considering all these facts, impugned order of punishment was passed, which has been affirmed by the appellate authority. Learned counsel further submitted that sufficient opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses and to adduce evidence in his defence. It has further been submitted that punishment awarded to the petitioner is in commensurate with the proved charges. On the quantum of punishment, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of U.P. SRTC Vs. Ram Kishan Arora as reported in (2007) 4 SCC 627 , in particular paragraph 7, 9 and 10. 6. It has further been submitted that punishment awarded to the petitioner is in commensurate with the proved charges. On the quantum of punishment, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of U.P. SRTC Vs. Ram Kishan Arora as reported in (2007) 4 SCC 627 , in particular paragraph 7, 9 and 10. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and on perusal of the records, I find that the impugned order of punishment being confirmed by the appellate authority do not call for any interference, in view of the following facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements: (i). Admittedly, the allegation of taking colour T.V from the complainant/informant in lieu of returning of agreement paper of house & land of Manoj Kumar Thakur with Davidson has been fully proved in the enquiry and basing on the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of reversion of the petitioner to the basic scale of pay for three years, which has been affirmed by the appellate authority. (ii). In the case in hand, in view of the seriousness of allegation and misconduct committed by the petitioner, the power of judicial review cannot be applied and moreover the fact finding given by the enquiry officer based on the material on record cannot be interfered with, as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P and others vs. Raj Kishore Yadav and Another as reported in (2006) 5 SCC 673 at paragraph 4 has held that: “4. ……. It is a settled law that the High Court has limited scope of interference in the administrative action of the State in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and, therefore, the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the consequent order of punishment of dismissal from service should not be disturbed ……….” The Hon’ble Apex Court further in the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar Vs. Union of India and Another as reported in (2012) 3 SCC 178 has held that High Court under Article 226 cannot disturb the facts and findings given by the disciplinary authority. (iii). Union of India and Another as reported in (2012) 3 SCC 178 has held that High Court under Article 226 cannot disturb the facts and findings given by the disciplinary authority. (iii). Furthermore, it is not a case of no evidence and disciplinary authority reached on its conclusion after proper appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence, hence, the case laws cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. (iv).The Hon'ble Apex Court further in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India & Others as reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 has held that the Court will not interfere with the order, unless the punishment order is one which shocks the conscience of the Court. In the case at hand, in view of the seriousness of allegation and proved misconduct, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order of punishment on the quantum of punishment. 7. As a cumulative effect of the facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements and in view of the discussions made in the foregoing paragraphs, I am of the considered view that it is not a case in which order of punishment has been passed ignoring the relevant materials on record nor the case is based on no evidence. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority confirmed by the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority, do not warrant any interference of this Court. 8. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merit.