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2016 DIGILAW 1072 (JHR)

Rajeshwari Sharma (Jangir) Wife of Sri Binod Sharma v. Durga Devi Jangir, widow of late Ratan Lal Jangir

2016-07-19

RAVI NATH VERMA

body2016
Order : 1. The plaintiff-petitioner by filing this writ petition has questioned the legality of the order dated 15.10.2015 passed by learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division-III), Chaibasa in Title (Partition) Suit no. 07 of 2011, whereby the petition filed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short “the Code”) by the plaintiff to re-open the plaintiff’s evidence has been rejected. 2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. 3. The facts of the case as pleaded in the plaint is that the plaintiff’s grandfather late Magraj Jangir, who had migrated from Nawalgarh in Rajsthan settled in Chaibasa, had nine sons and two daughters. Out of the nine sons, one Ratan Lal Jangir was the third and Mohan Lal Jangri was the fifth son. Ratan Lal Jangir was issueless. He adopted one daughter of younger brother Mohan Lal Jangir, who is the plaintiff of the suit, while she was one year old. In a brief ceremony, Mohan Lal Jangir and his wife following the social customs and rituals gave the plaintiff in adoption to Ratan Lal Jangir and his wife Durga Devi Jangir, who is defendant no.1, in the month of November, 1974. Since after the date of adoption, the plaintiff became the daughter of Ratan Lal Jangir and defendant no.1. In School Register, the name of Ratan Lal Jangir was entered in the father’s column. The said adopted father Ratan Lal Jangir during his lifetime through his earning had purchased two pieces of land, the details of which is given in item no.-1 and item no.-2 of the schedule at the foot of the plaint. However, the property mentioned in Item No.-1 was purchased by Ratan Lal Jangir in the name of his wife the defendant-respondent no.1. On the said plot, (item no.-1), Ratan Lal Jangir later on constructed a pucca house and shifted in that house but as he was feeling isolated in his business, he brought the defendant-respondent no.2- Raj Kumar Jangir, who was the son of the sister of the defendant no.1 to help him in business. On 17th day of February, 1991, her adopted father Ratan Lal Jangir married the plaintiff, whereafter she came to her matrimonial home. The further pleading is that soon after the death of Ratan Lal Jangir, the defendant no.2 started negotiating with different persons to sell the suit properties. On 17th day of February, 1991, her adopted father Ratan Lal Jangir married the plaintiff, whereafter she came to her matrimonial home. The further pleading is that soon after the death of Ratan Lal Jangir, the defendant no.2 started negotiating with different persons to sell the suit properties. The plaintiff also persuaded her mother-defendant no.1 to give 1/3rd share in suit property to defendant-respondent no.2 considering his long association though he was not entitled for any share. Likewise, the plaintiff also demanded 1/3rd of her share but as the defendants refused to give her any share, the suit was filed. 4. The defendant-respondents after their appearance in the suit, filed a joint written statement and pleaded that as the suit property was acquired by defendant no.1 in her own name by registered sale deed dated 27.02.1969, the suit is itself barred under the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and further pleaded that defendant no.1 used to be assisted by her husband and her son defendant no.2 in management of the affairs of tenancy and the plaintiff has wrongly described herself as a daughter of Ratan Lal Jangir. She was never adopted by Ratan Lal Jangir as claimed by her in plaint and the plea of adoption is blatant and brazen lie. In view of the point involved in this writ application, it is not necessary to set out the entire pleading of defendant-respondents here. 5. After framing of issues, both the parties adduced their oral as well as documentary evidences and, thereafter, the suit proceeded for argument. After completion of the defendants argument, the suit was fixed for plaintiff’s argument but the plaintiff filed a petition under Section 151 of the Code to re-open the plaintiff’s evidence to enable her to examine her natural father and mother. 6. The Court below after hearing both the parties rejected the petition holding that the intention of plaintiff behind filing this petition is only to linger the disposal of the case and directed to conclude her argument. Aggrieved by the said order, the plaintiff-petitioner preferred this writ petition. 7. 6. The Court below after hearing both the parties rejected the petition holding that the intention of plaintiff behind filing this petition is only to linger the disposal of the case and directed to conclude her argument. Aggrieved by the said order, the plaintiff-petitioner preferred this writ petition. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner assailing the order impugned as bad in law and perverse seriously contended that the court below erred in rejecting the petition filed by the petitioner under Section 151 of the Code though in the interest of justice and for proper adjudication of the issues involved in this case, it was necessary to examine the natural father and mother of the plaintiff-petitioner to prove the genuineness of her adoption. It was also submitted that merely on the ground that petition was filed at a belated stage, the prayer to re-open the plaintiff’s evidence cannot be rejected. 8. I have gone through the plaint and written statement, which have been filed with the writ application and also examined the order impugned and I find that during the argument by the defendant-respondents in court below, the issue was raised that natural father and mother, who had given the plaintiff in adoption, have not been examined only thereafter the petition under Section 151 of the Code to re-open the plaintiff’s evidence was filed. Apparently, after the closure of the argument of the defendants side, the above petition was filed to fill up the omission and lacuna. The natural father and mother of the plaintiff were never even cited as witnesses in the list of the witnesses submitted by the plaintiff. The last witness of the plaintiff was examined on 24.04.2014 and on the prayer of the plaintiff, her evidence was closed on 05.05.2014. Thereafter, the suit was posted for evidence of defendants. The defendants closed their evidence on 22.06.2015 and the case was posted for argument. After completion of their argument, the above petition was filed. 9. Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code enables the court to recall any witness at any stage, who have already been examined but the said power is not intended to be used to fill up omissions or lacuna in the evidence. After completion of their argument, the above petition was filed. 9. Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code enables the court to recall any witness at any stage, who have already been examined but the said power is not intended to be used to fill up omissions or lacuna in the evidence. The power is discretionary and should be used sparingly in appropriate cases which means only to recall a witness who has already been examined to clarify any doubts it may have in regard to the evidence led by the parties. There is no specific provision in the Code to enable a party to re-open the evidence for the purposes of further examination-in-chief or cross-examination of witnesses. Section 151 of the Code provides that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Obviously, in absence of any specific provision for re-opening of evidence, the inherent power under Section 151 of the Code can be invoked in appropriate cases. The Civil Procedure Code earlier had a specific provision in Order 18 Rule 17-A for production of evidence not previously known or the evidence which could not be produced despite due diligence but later on in 2002, the above provision was deleted due to its misuse. 10. The provisions of the Code contemplate and expect a trial court to hear the argument immediately after the completion of evidence of both the parties. Undoubtedly, if there is a gap between the completion of evidence and hearing the arguments for whatsoever reason, if a party comes across some evidence which he could not lay his hands earlier, it is open to the party to approach the Court and the Court may in exercise of power under Section 151 of the Code was under obligation to permit the production of such evidence but in the instant case, the plaintiff never tried to examine her natural father and mother. It is not a case that even after due diligence, she could not produce the two witnesses. Even their names were not cited in the list of witnesses produced by the plaintiff. The plaintiff even could not say that she comes across some evidence but could not lay her hands earlier. 11. It is not a case that even after due diligence, she could not produce the two witnesses. Even their names were not cited in the list of witnesses produced by the plaintiff. The plaintiff even could not say that she comes across some evidence but could not lay her hands earlier. 11. Hence in view of the discussion made above, I think it is not a fit case for exercise of the inherent power of the Court under Section 151 of the Code. It is not that the court below has mechanically passed the order impugned. In my opinion, the court below considering all the aspects rightly rejected the prayer for re-opening the evidence of plaintiff. Hence, I do not find any plausible ground to interfere in the order impugned. 12. This writ petition, being devoid of any merit, is, accordingly dismissed.