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2016 DIGILAW 1072 (ORI)

Dhoba Behera v. Jagabandhu Behera

2016-11-09

A.K.RATH

body2016
JUDGMENT : A.K. RATH, J. This is an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 27.12.2008 and 9.1.2009 respectively passed by learned Additional District Judge, Talcher in R.F.A. No.1 of 2007 confirming the judgment and decree dated 21.12.2006 and 9.1.2007 respectively passed by learned Civil Judge (Sr.Division), Talcher in Title Suit No.107 of 2001. 2. The appellant as the plaintiff instituted T.S.No.107 of 2011 in the court of the learned Civil Judge (Sr.Division), Talcher for declaration that he is the legal heir and successor of Jataka and Purandar Behera. Case of the plaintiff is that schedule ‘A’ and ‘B’ properties originally belonged to Purandar Behera and Panu Behera. Jatak Behera after being deserted by her first husband, Banamali remarried to Purandar Behera. Purandar and Jatak were issueless. They adopted Bhadri Behera son of Badal Behera and Narangi as their son. Purandar and Badal were brothers. There were giving and taking ceremony. After adoption, Bhadri used to reside with his adoptive parents till his death. He performed obsequies of his adoptive father. He was in possession of the land fell to the share of Purandar. Due to his illness, he could not take steps in the settlement operation to record the land in his favour. The plaintiff being the natural born son of Bhadri Behera succeeded to the property. The defendants are not legal heirs of Purandar. When the defendants claimed to be the legal heirs of Purandar, he instituted the suit. 3. Pursuant to issuance of summons, the defendants entered appearance and filed written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. The case of the defendants is that the plaintiff is no way related to the deceased Jatak Behera. The defendants are the legal heirs of Jatak Behera and Banamali Behera. After death of Banamali, Jatak-mother of defendant no.1 remarried to Purandar. Purandar had no child through Jatak Behera. They adopted the children born through Jatak Behera and Banamali. Purandar died in the year 1967. Jatak had not adopted any child. After death of Purandar, father of the plaintiff tried to garb the property of Jatak. A panchayat meeting was convened. Thereafter father of the plaintiff voluntarily withdraw his claim. 4. Stemming on the pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck seven issues, out of which, issue no.3 is pivotal one. Jatak had not adopted any child. After death of Purandar, father of the plaintiff tried to garb the property of Jatak. A panchayat meeting was convened. Thereafter father of the plaintiff voluntarily withdraw his claim. 4. Stemming on the pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck seven issues, out of which, issue no.3 is pivotal one. The same is :- “(3) Whether the plaintiff is the legal heir/successor of Jataka Behera and Purander Behera ?” 5. To substantiate the case, the plaintiff had examined five witnesses and on his behalf, four documents were exhibited. On behalf of the defendants, six witnesses were examined and four documents had been exhibited. 6. The learned trial court negatived the plea of adoption of Bhadri Behera and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged the same in the court of the learned Additional District Judge, Talcher in R.F.A.No.1 of 2007, which was eventually dismissed. 7. Mr. S.K. Samatray, learned Advocate for the appellant, submitted that the learned courts below have failed to appreciate that it is a case of ancient adoption. No direct evidence was available. The plaintiff had successfully established that his father Bhadri was adopted by Purandar and Jatak, but the claim was negatived on untenable and unsupportable grounds. The submission is difficult to fathom. 8. In the case of Kishori Lal v. Mt. Chaltibai, AIR 1959 SC 504 , the apex court held that as an adoption results in changing the course of succession, depriving wives and daughters of their rights and transferring properties to comparative strangers or more remote relations it is necessary that the evidence to support it should be such that it is free from all suspicion of fraud and so consistent and probable as to leave no occasion for doubting its truth. In Rahasa Pandiani (dead) by L.Rs and others v. Gokulananda Panda and others, AIR 1987 SC 962 , the apex Court held that if there are any suspicious circumstances, just as the propounder of the will is obliged to dispel the cloud of suspicion, the burden is on one who claims to have been adopted to dispel the same beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held that experience of life shows that just as there have been spurious claims about execution of a will, there have been spurious claims about adoption having taken place, and the Court has therefore to be aware of the risk involved in upholding the claim of adoption if there are circumstances which arouse the suspicion of the Court and the conscience of the Court is not satisfied that the evidence preferred to support such adoption is beyond reproach. 9. In Sauney Majhi and another Vrs. Duli Dei and others, AIR 1985 Orissa 22, a Division Bench of this Court has succinctly stated the principles governing ancient adoption. Paragraphs-6 and 7 of the report are quoted hereunder:- “6. The law is fairly settled that the evidence in support of an adoption is sufficient to satisfy the very grave and serious onus that rests upon any person who seeks to displace the natural line of succession by alleging an adoption. The fact of adoption must be proved in the same way as any other fact, but where there is a lapse of long period between the date of adoption and the time when it is being questioned, every allowance for the absence of evidence to prove such fact must be favourably entertained, as after the lapse of a long period, direct evidence to prove adoption may not be available. The Supreme Court in the case of L. Debi Prasad v. Smt. Tribeni Devi, AIR 1970 SC 1286 , observed :- "In the case of all ancient transactions, it is but natural that positive oral evidence will be lacking. Passage of time gradually wipes out such evidence. Human affairs often have to be judged on the basis of probabilities. Rendering of justice will become impossible if a particular mode of proof is insisted upon under all circumstances. In judging whether an adoption pleaded has been satisfactorily proved or not, we have to bear in mind the lapse of time between the date of the alleged adoption and the date on which the concerned party is required to adduce proof. Rendering of justice will become impossible if a particular mode of proof is insisted upon under all circumstances. In judging whether an adoption pleaded has been satisfactorily proved or not, we have to bear in mind the lapse of time between the date of the alleged adoption and the date on which the concerned party is required to adduce proof. In the case of an adoption said to have taken place years before the same is questioned, the most important evidence is likely to be that the alleged adoptive father held out the person claiming to have been adopted as his son; the latter treated the former as his father and their relations and friends treated them as father and son. There is no predetermined way of proving any fact. A fact is said to have been proved where after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. Hence if after taking an overall view of the evidence adduced in the case, we are satisfied that the adoption pleaded is true, we must necessarily proceed on the basis, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that it is a valid adoption as well." The aforesaid view of the Supreme Court has been followed in a number of cases of this Court and of other High Courts. The aforesaid principle only regulates the mode of proof of the factum of adoption. In the decision in the case of Sri Kanchumarthi Venkata Seetharama Chandra Row v. Kanchumarthi Raju, AIR 1925 PC 201 , which has been approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Voleti Venkata Ramarao v. Kesaparagada Bhasararao, AIR 1969 SC 1359 , it has been authoritatively said that in the case of an ancient adoption, it stands to reason that after a very long term of years and a variety of transactions of open life and conduct upon the footing that the adoption was a valid act, the burden must rest heavily upon him who challenges its validity. The appellants in this case rely upon the aforesaid principles and have contended that the date of adoption as available from the evidence on record was 1909 and it is not possible to prove the factum of adoption by direct evidence. Thus, according to them the overall view of the evidence on record should lead to the conclusion that there was a valid adoption as alleged by them. 7. The law is equally well settled that where direct evidence is available for establishing the ceremony of adoption irrespective of lapse of time, the relaxation permissible in the case of an ancient adoption is not available to be applied. (Vide (1968) 34 Cut LT 778, Jadumani Patra v. Padan Patra and AIR 1973 Orissa 160, Jagannath Mohanty, v. Chanchala Bewa).” 10. It was not the case of the plaintiff that all those persons, who were present at the time of adoption of Bhadri Behera, were died and they were not available to be examined in the case. In fact, P.Ws.1 to 4 had been examined by the plaintiff to prove the adoption of Bhadri Behera by Purandar and Jataka. P.W.1 had stated that Purandar and Jataka were issueless. They adopted Bhadri when he was a child. There were giving and taking ceremony. After adoption, Bhadri remained in the house of the adoptive parents. He performed the obsequies of his adoptive parents. He could not say the year of adoption or the name of witnesses present at the time of giving and taking ceremony. P.W.2 had stated that Jatak Behera adopted Bhadri and after adoption, Bhadri remained in the house of his adoptive mother, Jataka Behera. The learned appellate court came to hold that evidence of P.W.2 is contrary to the stand of the plaintiff and other witnesses. He had not whispered a word with regard to the giving and taking ceremony. He stated that he did not remember the exact year of adoption. P.W.5 is the plaintiff. He could not say the day, date, month and place of adoption of Bhadri. In his cross-examination, he had admitted that his father was working under Handidhua Colliery, but no such official document was filed to show that Bhadri was the adopted son of Purandar. The voter list, record of rights, certificate and the identity card had not been filed. Those documents had been purposefully withheld. In his cross-examination, he had admitted that his father was working under Handidhua Colliery, but no such official document was filed to show that Bhadri was the adopted son of Purandar. The voter list, record of rights, certificate and the identity card had not been filed. Those documents had been purposefully withheld. Ext.1, the sale deed no.905 dated 31.12.1973 belies the statement of the plaintiff. The learned appellate court on a vivid analysis came to hold that in Ext.1, the age of Bhadri Behera has been mentioned as sixty years, whereas the age of Jataka Behera to be fifty years, which means Bhadri Behera was ten years older than Jataka Behera, his adoptive mother, which is highly improbable. Clause (iv) of Section 11 of the of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 provides that in case of adoption of a son by a female Hindu, the son must be at least 21 years younger than the adoptive mother. An adoption in contravention of the condition enumerated in Clause (iv) of Section 11 would be void. 11. Much emphasis was laid that Bhadri performed the obsequies of Purendra and Jataka Behera. About 150 years back, the Privy Council in the case of Tayammaul v. Sashachalla Naiker, (1865) 10 Moo Ind App 429 held that performance of funeral rites will not sustain the validity of the adoption, unless it clearly appears that the act itself was performed under such circumstances as would render it perfectly legal. 12. In view of the analysis made in the preceding paragraphs, the irresistible conclusion is that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law and, accordingly, the same is dismissed.