JUDGMENT : Navin Sinha, J. 1. The three appeals arise from a common order dated 4.10.2012 dismissing three separate writ petitions challenging the orders of dismissal from service dated 12.5.1995 pursuant to inquiry report dated 9.11.1994 in departmental proceedings and the appellate order dated 5.12.1996 declining to interfere with the same. 2. A memorandum of four charges was framed against the Appellants on 18.5.1989. Charge 1 related to demand for illegal gratification of Rs. 2,000/- from candidates at the PHN Training Center, Dholpur and threatening not to pass them if it was not paid. Charge 2 related to drunken misbehaviour and sexual assault upon the students. Charge 3 related to sexual assault against the students and getting their pregnancy medically terminated. Charge 4 was interconnected with Charge No. 1 that the students were allowed to go home to bring the bribe money even while they were shown present and attendance marked in their absence. The charges were accompanied by list of documents and witnesses by which the charges were proposed to be proved. 3. The writ petitions were filed in early 1997 and the appeals filed promptly in January, 2013. Notices were issued in the appeals to the two Official respondents on 27.11.2013. They were validly served on 13.12.2013 despite which they did not enter appearance. On 10.1.2014 the Court directed the Office of the Learned Additional Advocate General to arrange for representation of the respondents. The matter remained pending thereafter and the appeals have been listed together on several occasions. Today when the matter was taken up Learned counsel for the State submitted that copy of the appeal memo has not been provided till date. The order dated 17.4.2015 notices the submission on behalf of the Appellant that copy of the appeal has been served in the Office of the Advocate General. In Civil Special Appeal No. 109 of 2013, a reply to the memo of appeal has been filed on behalf of the State. A last submission was made that the name of the counsel for the State is not appearing in the cause-list. 4. In Civil Special Appeal No. 109 of 2013, a reply to the memo of appeal has been filed on behalf of the State. A last submission was made that the name of the counsel for the State is not appearing in the cause-list. 4. We are at pains to notice that a matter of dismissal emanating from a charge memo dated 18.5.1989 is still to reach its culmination nearly 27 years later and yet adjournment is sought by the State because despite the fact that its officers though validly served have treated the proceedings before the Court with casualness. It would be a travesty of law and justice if we were to adjourn this matter further at the request of the State. The appeal itself has remained pending at the admission stage for the last 3½ years for the aforesaid reasons. It calls for some soul searching by the respondents with regard to their duty to assist in adjudication different from an adversarial approach reflecting official apathy. 5. Charge 1 and 4 has been held proved against Appellants Hari Om Garg and Mahesh Chand Goyal while Charge 3 and 4 has been held proved against Appellant Sita Ram Chaudhary. 6. The submission on behalf of the Appellants Hari Om Garg and Mahesh Chand Goyal was that evidence of two witnesses Nirmala Parashar and Edlina Gred David was recorded behind their back on 22.6.1994 after the evidence was closed on 14.6.1994. The opportunity for cross examination was therefore denied to them. The inquiry officer has cumulatively relied upon the evidence of the two witnesses along with that of one Chandrakanta Saraswat. It will be highly unsafe and prejudicial to the appellants if it is held on basis of the latter's evidence alone that the charge stood proved. There was contradiction in the statements of the latter witness during cross-examination the benefit of which ought to have been given to the appellants. The inquiry report was directly followed by the order of dismissal accompanied with copy of the inquiry report. Non-supply of the inquiry report before ordering dismissal has caused serious prejudice to the appellants depriving them of an opportunity of defence to convince the disciplinary authority not to accept the inquiry report. The requirement to supply a copy of the inquiry report was not an empty formality but a matter of substantive right of defence. Non-supply of the inquiry report before ordering dismissal has caused serious prejudice to the appellants depriving them of an opportunity of defence to convince the disciplinary authority not to accept the inquiry report. The requirement to supply a copy of the inquiry report was not an empty formality but a matter of substantive right of defence. Prejudice is therefore writ large and need not be separately proved. It constitutes material irregularity of procedure which is sufficient to invoke judicial review for vitiating the punishment. 7. The charge-sheet reflected a pre-conceived mind as it holds the appellants guilty and then calls upon them to show-cause. The inquiry Officer had no discretion in the matter as the disciplinary authority had already made up his mind. This again constitutes material irregularity which renders the departmental proceedings vitiated from the very inception. 8. The order of the disciplinary authority dated 12.5.1995 is not in consonance with Rule 16(9) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter called the 'CCA Rules') as the disciplinary authority has not recorded its own findings in respect of each charge based on the inquiry report. 9. Even if the appellate authority was in agreement with the disciplinary authority, an order of affirmance was also required to be briefly reasoned showing application of mind. In absence of the same the appellate order dated 5.12.1996 stands vitiated and is otherwise mechanical and rhetorical in nature. 10. Charge No. 2 and 3 being much graver in nature not having been proved, the punishment of dismissal after long years of service was extremely harsh and disproportionate to the proved charges depriving the benefit of pension not only to the delinquent but having its effect on the family also. A punishment of compulsory retirement could have sufficed. 11. Reliance was placed on 1993 (4) SCC 727 Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Others v. B. Karunakar and Others and AIR 2010 SC 2491 Sarv UP Gramin Bank v. Manoj Kumar Sinha for the proposition that supply of inquiry report was mandatory. Reliance was further placed on 2009 (4) SCC 240 Chairman Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kehetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Sharan Varshney and Others in support of the proposition that even an appellate order of affirmance was required to be reasoned. 12. Reliance was further placed on 2009 (4) SCC 240 Chairman Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kehetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Sharan Varshney and Others in support of the proposition that even an appellate order of affirmance was required to be reasoned. 12. Learned Senior Counsel for Appellant Sita Ram Choudhary submitted that he stands exonerated of Charge No. 1 and 2. The finding of guilt on charge No. 3 is based on a preliminary inquiry report and a letter written by one Anita John to the inquiry officer both of which were never given to the Appellant. Despite summons Anita John failed to appear during inquiry. The Appellant was therefore denied opportunity for cross examination also. The inquiry Officer relied on evidence collected behind the back of the Appellant. The conclusions of the inquiry Officer on charge No. 3 was therefore based on conjunctures and surmises only without a positive finding of guilt. It cannot suffice for indictment in a departmental proceeding. Lastly a common submission was made with regard to the non-supply of the inquiry report before ordering punishment and the appellate order being non-speaking in nature. Reliance was likewise placed on Sarv UP Gramin Bank (supra). 13. A common submission on behalf of all three Appellants was that Charge 4 had not been independently proved but inter linked with charge No. 1 and held to be deemed to have been established. It was therefore unsustainable as each charge had to be proved on basis of evidence and no finding of guilt could be based on presumptions. 14. Learned Counsel for the State supported the impugned order urging that the order of punishment called for no interference considering the nature and gravity of charges and that full opportunity of defence had been provided in the inquiry. No prejudice has been caused by non-supply of the inquiry report as no different conclusion was possible. The appellate order was speaking in nature reflecting due application of mind to the charges, the defence taken, the findings of the inquiry Officer along with grounds taken in the appeal. 15. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. 16. The jurisdiction of this Court in judicial review arising out of punishment orders pursuant to departmental proceedings lies in a narrow compass confined to errors in the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself. 15. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. 16. The jurisdiction of this Court in judicial review arising out of punishment orders pursuant to departmental proceedings lies in a narrow compass confined to errors in the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself. Judicial precedents abound which have only to be considered in the facts of the case as available in the records. Thus, unless there be perversity of findings or the conclusions be such that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same on basis of the materials the Court will not interfere. Procedural irregularity will also not ipso facto vitiate the punishment unless a conclusion of prejudice can be established. 17. A preliminary inquiry was held by three persons, Dr. O.P. Tahin, Dr. S.K. Narula and Smt. P.K. Peters. They submitted a report dated 29.11.1988 in eight pages. It was one of the documents appended to the charge memo. The three persons appeared as witnesses in the inquiry and were cross examined also. The appellants only raised the defence of delay of 1½ months in submission of the preliminary inquiry report. The statement of Anita John was also recorded during the preliminary inquiry. The former two Appellants took the defence that she had named Appellant Sita Ram Chaudhary alone. The Appellants have not pleaded that the preliminary inquiry was held behind their back. The objection with regard to the preliminary inquiry is unsustainable and merits no consideration. 18. The contention that the charge memo reflected a closed mind is a belated plea after participation without demur and the inquiry report has gone adverse. Any such plea ought to have been raised no sooner than the charge sheet was served. That the proceedings have been conducted with an open mind is apparent from the inspection of documents permitted, leading of oral and documentary evidence along with cross-examination of witnesses allowed, representation permitted to the appellants through their authorised representatives and due consideration of their appeal. 19. Non furnishing of the inquiry report before punishment cannot under all circumstances be considered per se to have vitiated the order of punishment. Prejudice will have to be demonstrated. The Court can examine the defence that another conclusion was possible if it had been furnished and reply submitted. If the useless formality theory will apply the punishment shall not stand vitiated. Prejudice will have to be demonstrated. The Court can examine the defence that another conclusion was possible if it had been furnished and reply submitted. If the useless formality theory will apply the punishment shall not stand vitiated. There can be no abstract conclusion that under all circumstances prejudice is writ large by non supply of the inquiry report leaving the punishment vitiated without the need for any further inquiry. In B. Karunakar (supra) relied upon by the Appellants it was observed as follows:- "31 If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment the Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short-cuts. Since it is the Court/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law." 20. Neither the grounds taken in the departmental appeal nor the pleadings before this Court or the submissions made before us demonstrate any plausible defence that the Appellants may have taken if the inquiry report had been furnished and any other conclusion may have been possible. The observation in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379 is considered apposite:- "17. Where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it approves the non-observance of natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs." 21. In a departmental proceeding the findings have to be based on preponderance of probabilities. The strict theory of proof beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal trial has no application. If there be reasonable iota of evidence it will suffice for punishment in a departmental inquiry. So far as Appellants Hari Om Garg and Mahesh Chandra Goyal are concerned, we are of the considered opinion that even if the evidence of Nirmala Parashar and Edlina Gred David are excluded from consideration still the evidence of witness Chandrakanta Saraswat remains un-impeached with regard to Charge 1. The witness has been subjected to cross examination also. There is no contradiction in the evidence of the witness. 22. The witness has been subjected to cross examination also. There is no contradiction in the evidence of the witness. 22. The submission that the disciplinary authority upon consideration of the inquiry report was required to give his own findings on each charge under Rule 16(9) merits no consideration as the disciplinary authority has adequately considered the inquiry report disclosing full application of mind to arrive at concurrence with the same. 23. The submission that the appellate order was not reasoned but mechanical also merits no consideration. An appellate order at variance with the disciplinary authority is undoubtedly required to be reasoned and well considered. An order of affirmance is not required to be reasoned like the former but is only required to disclose due consideration of the charges, the findings of the inquiry Officer, the grounds taken in appeal and brief reasons disclosing application of mind. The appellate order full fills these requirements. The objection that evidence was collected behind the back of the delinquents and reasonable opportunity of hearing was denied has all been considered by the appellate authority recording his satisfaction after examining the evidence also. 24. In Jagdish Sharan Varshney and Others (supra) the requirement of an appellate order for affirmance was explained as follows: - "5......... In our opinion, an order of affirmation need not contain as elaborate reasons as an order of reversal." 25. The objection on behalf of Appellant Sita Ram Chaudhary that no copy of the preliminary inquiry was furnished merits no consideration in view of the foregoing discussion in this regard. The statement of Anita John was recorded at the preliminary inquiry. No questions were put in cross examination to the three witnesses who recorded her statement. Anita John was issued notice to depose before the inquiry officer. It is not the case of the Appellant Sitaram Choudhary that Anita John was a fictitious person or that there was no person by this name at the training center or that she was not required to be summoned as a witness. In her reply to the inquiry officer she did not rescale from her earlier statements in the preliminary inquiry. The reply sent by her to the inquiry officer was perfectly natural that much time had passed, she had since married and had children and did not wish to go back in time to the unfortunate events. In her reply to the inquiry officer she did not rescale from her earlier statements in the preliminary inquiry. The reply sent by her to the inquiry officer was perfectly natural that much time had passed, she had since married and had children and did not wish to go back in time to the unfortunate events. But the inquiry officer gravely erred in not furnishing a copy of her reply to the delinquent and grant him an opportunity of defence. Had the inquiry officer done so entirely different issues may have arisen for consideration in the facts of the present case. This ground raised specifically in his appeal has not been dealt with by the appellate authority. The finding of guilt against the said Appellant on Charge No. 3 therefore suffers from procedural technical irregularity and is unsustainable. 26. The conclusion of the inquiry Officer that Charge No. 4 was connected to Charge No. 1 and therefore stood proved is held to be unsustainable in absence of independent evidence. If demand for bribe stood established it cannot be said that absence for the purpose of bringing the money from home and wrong marking of attendance also stood proved automatically. 27. In conclusion, Charge No. 1 stands established against appellant Hariom Garg and Mahesh Chand Goyal. A demand for illegal gratification from a candidate on assurance to pass the candidate is a matter of serious corruption cancerous to society and needs to be dealt with firmly. The submission that the punishment was disproportionate therefore does not appeal to us and we are of the considered opinion that it was commensurate to the charge and calls for no interference. 28. The appeal of Sita Ram Choudhary has to be allowed. The next question is with regard to the nature of relief to be granted to him. In the facts of the case we are satisfied that the relief is required to be moulded. The present is not a case where consequent to setting aside of the order of termination reinstatement must automatically follow. Normally, if the proceedings are found vitiated from a particular stage, the proper order to be passed is to set aside the proceedings from the stage of regularity and remand the matter for proceeding afresh from that stage. The present is not a case where consequent to setting aside of the order of termination reinstatement must automatically follow. Normally, if the proceedings are found vitiated from a particular stage, the proper order to be passed is to set aside the proceedings from the stage of regularity and remand the matter for proceeding afresh from that stage. In the facts of the present case considering the long passage of time for 27 years and that the Appellant has only two or three years of service left we are not inclined to remand the matter to the enquiry officer. The Appellant Sita Ram Chaudhary is held entitled to reinstatement with no further relief except that the period in the interregnum from dismissal to reinstatement shall count for purposes of pension only. 29. Writ Appeal 100 of 2013 and Writ Appeal 109 of 2013 are dismissed. Writ Appeal No. 23 of 2013 is allowed. 30. In view of the fact that notices were served on the Official respondents as far back as on 13.12.2013 and yet no proper instructions were given to the Government Counsel, we deem it proper to direct that a copy of this order be forwarded to the Chief Secretary of the State of Rajasthan for future reference. Appeal No. 23 of 2013 Allowed. Appeal Nos. 100 of 2013 and 109 of 2013 Dismissed.