JUDGMENT : A.S. Supehia, J. 1. The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed seeking declaration that the impugned order of termination of the petitioner's service dated 30.07.2003 passed by respondent No. 2 is unfair, illegal and unconstitutional. By way of an amendment direction is sought upon the respondents to notionally reinstate the petitioner will all consequential benefits including back wages and continuity in service w.e.f. termination order dated 30.07.2003 in view of the judgment and order of acquittal dated 17.04.2007 passed by Sessions Court, Deesa in Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 2003. It is further prayed that the respondents may be directed to grant all retirement benefits, including pensionary benefits with interest as accrued w.e.f. 25.02.2008 within a stipulated period of time. 2. The facts that can be culled out from the petition are that the petitioner was appointed as a Helper in the respondent-Board w.e.f. 02.02.1971. After completion of probation period, his services were regularized. Petitioner was promoted to the post of Meter Reader in the year 1975. In 1980, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Junior Assistant followed by another promotion in 1980 as Senior Assistant. 3. In 1994, the petitioner was working as Cashier in Deesa Division Office of the respondent-Board in Banaskantha District. On 28.06.1994, the petitioner left the office to deposit Rs. 8,100/- in Dena Bank at Palanpur in the account of the Respondent-Board. However, the said amount was not deposited by him. The petitioner did not resume his duties and remained absent. 4. On 30.06.1994, the Executive Engineer, Deesa, lodged an FIR against the petitioner being C.R. No. I-138/94 alleging embezzlement and thereby commission of offence under the Indian Penal Code. Petitioner was arrested on 15.07.1994 at Deesa. Immediately, thereafter, the petitioner deposited the amount, which was accepted by the respondent-Board. Petitioner was charge-sheeted vide charge-sheet No. 159/94 on 21.11.1994 for commission of offence punishable under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. Petitioner was suspended on 01.07.1994 with immediate effect on account of mis-appropriation of cash of the respondent-Board in contemplation of holding an inquiry for major misconduct. Petitioner was charge-sheeted in the departmental inquiry on 11.08.1994. 5. Departmental inquiry was initiated against the petitioner for mis-appropriation of money from the exchequer of the respondent-Board and was found guilty for the alleged misconduct. Petitioner was charge-sheeted in the departmental inquiry on 11.08.1994. 5. Departmental inquiry was initiated against the petitioner for mis-appropriation of money from the exchequer of the respondent-Board and was found guilty for the alleged misconduct. However, the petitioner was not terminated from his service for the misconduct committed by him. Looking to his representation and with a view to protect livelihood of his family, the respondent No. 2 vide Order dated 18.03.1995 imposed punishment of reversion from the post of Senior Assistant to Junior Assistant in the lower pay-scale for a period of five years, as if he was not promoted with a direction to consider his case for promotion only after five years. Petitioner was reinstated and posted at Radhanpur (O&M) treating his suspension period as not on duty and denying him all allowance for the said period. Thereafter, petitioner was given promotion to the post of Senior Assistant from the post of Junior Assistant on 26.04.2000. 6. Pursuant to filing of the charge-sheet in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Deesa (Court No. 1) by Deesa Police for commission of offence punishable under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, the petitioner was subject to trial in Criminal Case No. 2920 of 1994. Petitioner was found guilty by Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- by an order dated 16.01.2003. 7. Against the aforesaid order of conviction, the petitioner filed Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 2003 in District and Sessions Court, Banaskantha, wherein vide order dated 23.01.2003 the order of execution of sentence came to be suspended. 8. Following the conviction of the petitioner, a show cause notice dated 21.07.2003 was issued by the Respondent as to why on his conviction, his service should not be terminated by way of dismissal and gratuity be forfeited. Petitioner gave reply to the aforesaid show cause notice. By the impugned Order dated 30.07.2003, the service of the petitioner was terminated. 9. Learned Advocate Mr. Anand Yagnik appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that Clause-6 of Chapter 8 about Departmental Act of service regulations and by-laws of the respondent-Board is about procedure for dealing with acts of misconduct. Clause 7 is about exceptions to Clause-6. By the impugned Order dated 30.07.2003, the service of the petitioner was terminated. 9. Learned Advocate Mr. Anand Yagnik appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that Clause-6 of Chapter 8 about Departmental Act of service regulations and by-laws of the respondent-Board is about procedure for dealing with acts of misconduct. Clause 7 is about exceptions to Clause-6. However, sub-clause (g) of clause-7 is as under: "(g) When summary proceedings are held by the competent authority as provided in clause 8 in cases (i) Where the employee is caught red-handed having committed or while committing an act of misconduct, (ii) Where there is obvious evidence to the misconduct, OR (iii) Where the misconduct or misbehaviour is considered to grave and convincing to warrant or justify the normal procedure to be followed. Provided that - 1. No person shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him: (a) Where a person is dismissed or removed or reproduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. (b) Where an authority empowered to dismissed or remove or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by that authority in writing it is not reasonably practicable to give to that person an opportunity of showing cause. 2. If any question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to give to any person an opportunity of showing case under clause (1)(b), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such a person or to reduce him in the rank as the case may be shall be final." 10. He further states that the service of the petitioner is terminated on the ground of conviction by the respondent-Board relying upon the aforesaid sub-clause 1(a) of clause 7 of the regulations. If this sub-clause is properly read, one immediately comes to know that the respondent-Board has incorporated verbatim what has been stated in Article 311(2)(a) of the Constitution of India, and in case of acquittal, the order of penalty is required to be set aside. 11. Mr. Anand Yagnik has submitted that the petitioner was subjected to departmental inquiry and criminal prosecution for the same incident regarding misappropriation of Rs. 8,100/-. 11. Mr. Anand Yagnik has submitted that the petitioner was subjected to departmental inquiry and criminal prosecution for the same incident regarding misappropriation of Rs. 8,100/-. The disciplinary authority of the respondent-Board did not either dismiss or terminate the services of the petitioner, and looking to the representation of the petitioner and overall circumstances rather chose to award punishment or reversion with reduction in pay-scale. He has contended that the for the same misconduct the petitioner cannot be terminated in view of his subsequent conviction once he is imposed penalty in departmental proceedings. 12. Mr. Yagnik has further contended that the petitioner has reached the age of superannuation during the pendency of the petition on 25.02.2008. He has also drawn attention of this Court to the fact that during pendency of the petition, the petitioner is honourably acquitted by judgment and order dated 17.04.2007 passed by Sessions Court, Deesa, in Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 2003, and, therefore, the basis of termination of the petitioner does not survive. Hence, he is required to be notionally reinstated with all consequential benefits including back wages and continuity of services with retrospective effect from the date of his termination till the date of his superannuation, and accordingly he is entitled to all retirement benefits including pensionary benefits with interest as accrued till date. 13. Mr. Hasurker appearing on behalf of the Respondent does not dispute the acquittal of the petitioner. He further states that the petitioner has reached the age of superannuation on 25.02.2008, and accordingly paid an amount of Rs. 3,54,200 towards provident fund and Rs.1,62,041 towards gratuity. He further contends that the petitioner is not entitled to the back wages for the entire period from termination to retirement. He has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India & Anr. v. Mohammed Abdul Rahim, (2013) 11 S.C.C. 67 . He has stated that his acquittal does not operates retrospectively which wipes out the legal consequences. Relying on the said judgment he has submitted that the petitioner is entitled to the wages from the date he demanded for the same i.e. when a show cause notice dated 14.05.2007 was served by the petitioner to the respondents to reinstate him in service in view of his acquittal in criminal appeal. Relying on the said judgment he has submitted that the petitioner is entitled to the wages from the date he demanded for the same i.e. when a show cause notice dated 14.05.2007 was served by the petitioner to the respondents to reinstate him in service in view of his acquittal in criminal appeal. He has also relied upon the judgment in the case of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, reported in, 2006(5) SCC 446 wherein similar view is taken. No further contention is raised. 14. Having given thoughtful consideration to the entire record and the arguments advanced by the Learned advocates appearing on behalf of the petitioners, in my considered opinion, the impugned order of termination is required to be quashed and set aside in view of acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court in the case of Mohammed Abdul Rahim, (supra) has observed that if the dismissal is based solely on the conviction then on acquittal the substratum of the cause that led to the employee's dismissal/discharge cease to exists. In such eventuality the employee deserves to be reinstated in service. In the case of Chairman, Food Corporation of India and Ors. v. Sudarsha, (2007) 14 S.C.C. 766, similar view is taken by the Supreme Court. 15. In the present case, as noticed above, the petitioner was terminated in view of his conviction in a criminal case. One relevant aspect which deserves consideration is that for the same incident the petitioner was initially imposed a penalty of reversion from the post of Senior Assistant to Junior Assistant in the lower pay-scale for a period of five years vide order dated 18.03.1995. The Respondents did not think it fit to terminate the petitioner from service in the departmental inquiry. Subsequently, in criminal proceedings on conviction, the petitioner is terminated from his service. Learned Advocate, Mr. Hasurker is unable to dispute that the cause for initiation of departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings is the same and based on identical facts. The petitioner was also further promoted. In appeal, the petitioner is honourably acquitted. In case of G.M. Tank (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under: "In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings being the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The petitioner was also further promoted. In appeal, the petitioner is honourably acquitted. In case of G.M. Tank (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under: "In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings being the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony's case (supra) will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed." Thus, the impugned Order of termination requires to be quashed and set aside in view of acquittal of the petitioner. In the present case the respondent-authorities were satisfied with imposition of penalty of reversion on the petitioner. 16. So far on the aspect of treating the interregnum period is concerned, the undisputed facts are that the petitioner was terminated on 30.07.2003, he was acquitted on 17.04.2007, and on acquittal he issued notice on 14.05.2007 for reinstatement in service. He retired on superannuation on 25.02.2008. The petitioner immediately on his acquittal vide notice dated 14.05.2007 requested the respondent to reinstate him in service. The law on the present aspect is no more res integra. In view of the observations made by the Apex Court in case of Mohammed Abdul Rahim, (supra), it can be said that the Respondent Company was prohibited in law from employing the petitioner after his conviction in view of Clause 6 Chapter 8 of departmental proceedings. As observed by the Apex Court though subsequent acquittal obliterates conviction, the same does not operate retrospectively and wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction. The reinstatement of the petitioner, undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and the same was done. The Supreme Court granted back wages from the date of demand until the date of reinstatement. Thus, in my view the petitioner is entitled to back wages from 14.05.2007, i.e., from date of demand till he retired on superannuation on 25.02.2008. 17. The reinstatement of the petitioner, undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and the same was done. The Supreme Court granted back wages from the date of demand until the date of reinstatement. Thus, in my view the petitioner is entitled to back wages from 14.05.2007, i.e., from date of demand till he retired on superannuation on 25.02.2008. 17. Accordingly, after in-depth analysis on facts and law, I issue the following directions: "(a) The impugned order of penalty dated 30.07.2003 terminating the petitioner's service is quashed and set aside. (b) The petitioner will be entitled to back wages for the period from 14.05.2007 to 25.2.2008, i.e. date of demand till he retired on superannuation. (c) The period from termination, i.e. from 30.7.2003 till superannuation will be treated as continuous for the purpose of fixation of retirement benefits. Accordingly, the Respondent-Company is directed to revise the retirement benefits of the petitioner and pay the same by adjusting the amount already paid. (d) The aforesaid directions shall be complied within a period of eight weeks from the receipt of this order." 18. Petition is allowed. RULE is made absolute.