JUDGMENT : Biswanath Rath, J. This writ petition has been filed assailing the order dated 29.3.2016 passed by the Commissioner, Consolidation, Bhubaneswar in Revision Case No.577 of 2012. 2. Short fact involved in the case is that the land in dispute originally belongs to one Jayakrushna Das. The opposite party No.4-Madan Jena purchased the suit land on behalf of his minor daughter namely Pramila Dei-opposite party No.3 through Registered Sale Deed bearing R.S.D. No.477 dated 2.2.1972 from Jayakrushna Das. At a subsequent stage, this opposite party No.4 transferred the land to the present petitioner-Asheema Samantray through registered sale deed vide R.S.D. No.3625 dated 24.8.1974 and the petitioner is in continuous and exclusive possession of the land since August, 1974. The petitioner filed an objection case under Section 9(3) of the O.C.H. & P.F.L. Act, 1972 registered as Objection Case No.2724/418. One Purnanda Parida and others also filed different objection cases concerning the same land. All these matters were heard together by the Consolidation Officer and the Consolidation Officer rejected the claim of the present petitioner on the premises that the opposite party No.4-Madan Jena had disposed the land on behalf of a minor in contravention of the provisions under Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and the sale transaction is not sustainable in the eye of Law. While the matter stood thus, the opposite party no.3 entered into a registered consent deed and the sale took place in between her and the petitioner in the year 1995. It is the admitted case that the petitioner did not take any step to correct the R.O.R. even after the consent deed came into existence and in the meantime, the suit land was once again recorded in the name of Pramila Dei-opposite party No.3. In the meantime one Namita Singh executed a nominal sale deed in her name. It is in the year 2012 the present petitioner initiated a proceeding under Section 37(1) of the O.C.H. & P.F.L. Act being registered as Revision Case no.577 of 2012. 3. On their appearance, the contesting opposite parties therein contended that the orders passed by the Consolidation Officer in the Objection Case No.27775 of 419 on 2.1.1981 being challenged after 31 years, the revision U/s. 37(1) of the Act was not maintainable but did not challenge to the claim that the money utilized in the sale was paid by Pramila’s maternal grandmother. Further, pleading of the contesting opposite parties was that on 11.4.2012 Pramila Dei-opposite party No.3 sold the property to one Namita Singh by a registered sale deed and Namita Singh got the land mutated in her name by initiating a mutation case bearing No.932/2002. It is also further contended by the contesting opposite parties that the order passed in the objection case in the year 1981 for not being challenged, the petitioner is stopped from raising a dispute under Section 37(1) of the O.C.H. & P.F.L. Act. Further for the development taken place in the matter of mutation case No.932/2012 and a Civil Suit bearing No.237/2012 being sub-judiced, the contesting parties contended that the revision was not maintainable. 4. On the query of this Court with regard to the dispute involved in the suit, a joint statement is made by all the parties in the present writ petition that the suit involves injunction involving the disputed property. 5. In opposing the stand of the petitioner, Mr. A.K. Dash, learned Advocate though appearing for the opposite party Nos.3 & 4 confined his argument in respect of the opposite party No.4. During course of argument, Mr. P.K. Sahu, learned counsel for the caveator while reiterating his parties stand by way of objection before the revisional Court contended that the revision was not maintainable firstly on the ground of delay of 31 years, secondly on the premises of not being challenged the order involving the objection case passed in the year 1981, thirdly the petitioner having failed in establishing his case that the purchase of the disputed property involved spending of the opposite party No.3 the minor and fourthly, the opposite party No.4 has a clear case that the property though purchased in the name of the opposite party No.3 but involved the spending of the opposite party No.4. 6. Answering the objection raised by the counsels for the different opposite parties Sri Mohapatra, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that for creation of the document by the opposite party No.3-the original owner of the land by way of rectification of registered sale deed in the year 1984, the petitioner had an independent cause of action for raising the dispute under Section 37(1) of the O.C.H. & P.F.L. Act. It is further argued that the proceeding under Section 37(1) of the Act initiated in the year 2012 has nothing to do with the rejection of the petitioner’s claim by disposal of an objection case on the ground of voidability of the sale deed dependant upon the fact situation prior to the coming into existence of the ratification registered deed and the revision under Section 37(1) of the Act, was dependant on a development taken place after coming into existence of the registered document confirming the sale. Therefore, the sole question required to be determined by the Commissioner in the impugned action was as to in the existence of the registered consent deed confirming the earlier sale whether the subsequent sale in favour of the opposite party No.5 on 11.4.2012 was valid or not?, and then to proceed for a direction for correction of the record of rights. It is thus contended by Sri Mohaptra that the revisional authority has totally failed in appreciating the fact involved in the case and landed in a mess by itself, in observing that the petitioner had no remedy under Section 37(1) of the Act for his no challenge to the order passed in the objection case decided in the year 1981. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his case relied on a decisions reported in 65(1988) C.L.T 56 and basing upon the decisions therein contended that the decision fully supports the case of the petitioner. 7. Learned counsel for the opposite party in his opposition to the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner in referring to a decision reported in 75(1993) C.L.T. 522 and taking this Court’s attention to several paragraphs of the decision tried to impress upon the Court that for the observations made therein, there is no sale involving the opposite party No.3 and the petitioner in the eye of law and the writ petition should be dismissed following the decision referred to hereinabove. Learned counsel for the opposite parties further submitted that for the decision of the Division Bench in the matter of avoiding a sale by a minor, the 2nd sale here shall be construed as avoiding the 1st sale, consequently, the 1st sale becomes void. 8. Learned counsel for the opposite parties further submitted that for the decision of the Division Bench in the matter of avoiding a sale by a minor, the 2nd sale here shall be construed as avoiding the 1st sale, consequently, the 1st sale becomes void. 8. Considering the rival contentions of the parties, this Court finds a direct revision involving the subsequent development taken place in the meantime for the reason of the registered consent deed by the original seller actual land owner and not being a revision under Section 36 of the O.C.H. & P.F.L. Act after the provision of appeal is exhausted against the order passed in the objection case was very much maintainable. Challenge or no challenge to the order passed in the objection case remain immaterial. This difference aspect has not been properly understood by the revisional authority. Further, the admitted position by the contesting opposite parties in the revision is that the disputed property was purchased in the name of the opposite party No.3 by opposite party No.4 in the year 1972 on the money being paid by Pramila’s maternal grandmother. Therefore, there remains no doubt that the money involved in the purchase of the disputed land in favour of the opposite party No.2 did not involve the income of opposite party No.4. In the year 1974 through Madan Jena-opposite party no.4 sold the disputed land to the petitioner for a consideration of Rs.3,000/-without obtaining the permission of the District Judge, Puri as required under section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, but this defect has been cured for the land owner entering into a registered consent deed on her attaining majority. 9. Perused the decision cited at Bar. From perusal of the decision reported in 65(1988) C.L.T 56, this Court finds the case had the following points for determination: (i) “That defendant No.1, father of the defendants 2 to 4 as their natural guardian executed the sale deed as per Ext. 1 without taking prior permission of the Court. (ii) This transaction was hit by section 8 (2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and, therefore, was voidable at the instance of the minors or any person claiming under them as provided under section 8 (3). (iii) Defendants 2 and 3 on attaining majority xx xx xx file any suit to set aside the sale under Ext. (ii) This transaction was hit by section 8 (2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and, therefore, was voidable at the instance of the minors or any person claiming under them as provided under section 8 (3). (iii) Defendants 2 and 3 on attaining majority xx xx xx file any suit to set aside the sale under Ext. 1, but sold the xx xx xx property in favour of the defendants 6 to 8 by executing the deed as per Ext. A.” In considering the rival case therein, the Hon’ble Single Judge held as follows: “The xxx sensus that emerges on perusal of these decisions, as it xxx to me, is that a transfer of property of the minor by xxx guardian without permission of Court is voidable at the instance of the minor. It is not voidable in the sense that it is xxx on him until set aside, but it means that although not binding him the transfer may be retified by the minor on attaining majority.” The Hon’ble Single Judge also referred to a decision of a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court as reported in A.I.R. 1962 Ker. 164 reads as follows: “In a subsequent decision of the same Court, in the case of “Santha v. Cherukutty, V. R. Krishna Iyer, J. (as xx then was) discussing the provision of Section 8(2) and (3) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 observed as follows: “In the present case, however, we are xxx with a specific statute, namely, Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. It is in xxx that no sanction of the Court was taken for the xxx in the present case by the mother acting as guardian of the minor and, therefore, there is a xxx violation of section 8 (2) of the Act. Consequently, Section 8 (3) is attracted and the disposal of the xxx even though by a natural guardian, becomes xxx at the instance of the minor. Should this xxx avoidable be effected by a suit to set aside the xxx, or is it enough if the minor repudiates transaction by his own act. I have considered xxx question in an unreported decision in S.A. No.683 1969 (Ker) and the view (1971 Ker. Should this xxx avoidable be effected by a suit to set aside the xxx, or is it enough if the minor repudiates transaction by his own act. I have considered xxx question in an unreported decision in S.A. No.683 1969 (Ker) and the view (1971 Ker. L.T. (S.N.) expressed by me there, which, after all the argument on both sides, I am not inclined to change, is xxx when a minor is entitled to avoid a transfer effected by his guardian on the ground of absence of permission of the Court, it becomes a nullity on his xxx act. He can merely avoid it by his conduct and there is no need to file a suit for avoiding the transfer…. xx xx xx From the language of this provision, read in the light of 1962 Ker. L. J. 177 = (A.I.R. 1962 Ker. 164) xx follows that the alienation in question is voidable the minor’s instance; rather he can treat it as void without the assistance of the Court.” Further looking to the decision reported in 75 (1993) C.L.T. 522, this Court finds the observations of the Division Bench reads as follows: “3. The sole contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the sale by the father of a minor’s property without permission of the Court being voidable as provided under sub-Section (3) of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, the sale has to be avoided by the minor on attaining his majority and the sale not having been avoided by the minor, the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to get that sale avoided in the consolidation proceedings and, therefore, the Commissioner committed gross error of law in directing that the land should be recorded in the name of the minor opposite party No.1. The learned counsel appearing for opp. Party No.1, on the other hand, contends that no doubt, the sale of a minor’s property without permission of the Court is voidable and has to be avoided by the minor, but that avoidance may not necessarily be by filing a suit and it can be avoided in several ways including by remaining in possession of the property by the minor himself. In that view of the matter and in view of the findings that the minor has never been dispossessed of the property and is continuing his possession, the minor has avoided the sale and, therefore, the Consolidation Commissioner has rightly disposed of the matter. 4. In view of the rival submissions at the Bar, the first question that requires out consideration is what is the effect of a sale of minor’s property by the guardian without permission of the Court. Section 8 of the Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act deals with the question of power of natural guardian of a minor in dealing with the minor’s property. Sub-section (2) of section 8 of the said Act prohibits any transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange of the minor’s property without previous permission of the Court. Sub-section (3) thereof provides that any disposal of immovable property by natural guardian in contravention of sub-section (2) is voidable at the instance of minor or any person claiming under him. But what is the real meaning of the expression “voidable” under Section 8(3) has now been considered and determined by several High Courts, the best exposition being that of Justice Krishna Iyer, J. (as he then was) of Kerala High Court in the case of Irruppakkata Vettil Viswanathan’s wife Santha v. Deceased Kandan’s L.Rs. Wife Cherukrutty and others, A.I.R. 1972 Ker. 71. The learned Judge after discussing elaborately the provisions of law as well as several decisions of other High Courts came to the conclusion that the transfer of a minor’s property by his natural guardian without sanction of the Court is voidable at the instance of the minor and the minor can avoid it by his unilateral conduct without filing a suit. The learned Juge followed the earlier Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court reported in A.I.R. 1962 Ker. 164 (Chacro Mathew v. Ayyappanrutty) wherein Madhavan Nair, J., after a survey of all the precedents in the High Courts had stated the law thus:- “It is not always necessary that a party entitled to avoid a transaction not binding on him should sue for its rescission. 164 (Chacro Mathew v. Ayyappanrutty) wherein Madhavan Nair, J., after a survey of all the precedents in the High Courts had stated the law thus:- “It is not always necessary that a party entitled to avoid a transaction not binding on him should sue for its rescission. He can himself avoid it by an unequivocal act repudiating it.” Justice Krishna Iyer, J. in the aforesaid Kerala case ultimately came to hold:- “…… when a minor is entitled to avoid a transfer effected by his guardian on the ground of absence of permission of the Court, it becomes a nullity on his unilateral act. He can merely avoid it by his conduct and there is no need to file a suit for avoiding the transfer….” A learned Single Judge of this Court has considered this question in a recent case of Chaniram Sahu v. Samaru Nag (name deleted) and after him Murali Nag and others, 65(1988) C.L.T.56, wherein, it has been held that the transfer of a minor’s property by the guardian without permission of the Court as required under section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act is voidable under section 8(3), but not in the sense that it is binding on the minor until he sets it aside. The minor can avoid it on attaining his majority and the mode of avoidance may be by a unilateral actor conduct like transferring the property to somebody else or by remaining in possession of the property. In an unreported decision of this Court in O.J.C. No.1035 of 1980, (Prasanna Kumar Pradhan v. Gopal Ch. Sahoo and others) disposed of on 1st September, 1987, Chief Justice Agrawal, concluded the matter by holding that the deed executed by natural guardian of the minor is voidable so far as it related to the share and interest of the minor and was duly avoided by him by his conduct in filing objection before the Assistant Consolidation Officer and it was not necessary for him to institute a suit for setting aside the voidable sale and for correction of the Record-of-Rights. The aforesaid writ application, in fact, arose out of a proceeding under the Consolidation Act and the revisional authority had taken the view that since no suit has been filed for avoiding the voidable sale, he had no jurisdiction to avoid the same, relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh and others : A.I.R. 1973 S.C.2451. The Division Bench, however, came to the conclusion that the order of the revisional authority was bad in law since the minor has himself avoided the voidable transaction by his act and conduct.” xx xx xx Perusal of the aforesaid decisions, this Court finds both the decisions referred to hereinabove though did not involve a case of ratification of a sale deed by virtue of a registered document by a minor on his attending majority but the ratio decided therein fully supports the case of the petitioner. 10. Under the circumstances, this Court finds the Revisional Order is bad and while setting aside the order under Annexure-1 for being contrary to the factual scenario as well as the law referred to hereinabove, this Court allows the Revision Case bearing No.577 of 2012 and directs the competent authority to set right the record concerning the disputed property in the name of the petitioner. 11. The writ petition stands allowed. Parties to bear their own cost.