JUDGMENT : S.N. Prasad, J. The award dated 26.12.2000 passed by the Labour Court, Jeypore in Industrial Dispute Case No. 29 of 1998 is under challenge whereby and where under dismissal of he workman w.e.f. 15.3.1997 has been held to be legal and justified. Management has been directed to pay subsistence allowance and other dues considering his past services since 1988 within three months from the date of passing of the award. 2. Case of the workman in short is that he was engaged as a casual worker with effect from 18.7.1983 on daily wages in the scale of pay of Rs.890/- to 1240/-, the management appointed him as dairyman in the scale of Rs.750/- to 940/-. Being aggrieved he issued notice to the management, his period of probation was over on 30.4.1996, he was sent for training for operation, maintenance and repair of mini dairy for a period of one month w.e.f. 12.6.96 and after completion of training period he was transferred to Paralakhemundi. He was not allowed to avail usual transit period. His first increment has also not been paid. For the said demand having been made by him he was illegally been transferred, hence by not making payment of salary in the usual scale of a dairyman, non-payment of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension and as such he has made complaint against the management before the District Labour Officer. Accordingly a criminal case was lodged against him in which he was taken into custody, enquiry has been set up but without concluding enquiry he has been terminated from service which is in violation of principles of natural justice and as such prayer has been made to pass order of reinstatement in service with full back wages. 3. While on the other hand, case of management is that during the period of probation the workman misbehaved with superior officers, took a 20 litre jar containing mobile from office campus, addressed pseudonymous letters against the management and threatened staff and officers to kill causing an atmosphere of chaos. Several reports were lodged with the police station against him, in one of such incident he was charge sheeted by police, as his performances were not satisfactory he was not confirmed after expiry of the probation period of one year. The probation period was extended for six months from 1.6.1996, it was further extended from 1.12.1996. Several reports were lodged with the police station against him, in one of such incident he was charge sheeted by police, as his performances were not satisfactory he was not confirmed after expiry of the probation period of one year. The probation period was extended for six months from 1.6.1996, it was further extended from 1.12.1996. Charges were served on the workman who took time on several occasions to file his written statement but did not file it. The management taking into the conditions of appointment and misconduct of the workman dismissed him from service. 4. Being aggrieved with the dismissal has raised a dispute which ultimately culminated into the following reference:- “Whether the dismissal of services of Sri Suresh Cahndra Sahu by the management of the Greater Ganjam-Gajapati Cooperative Milk Producers Union, Behermpur w.e.f. 15.3.1997 is legal and or justified? If not, to what relief he is entitled ?” The Labour Court, after taking into consideration the depositions, oral evidence, has passed the award answering the reference against the workman which is under challenge in this writ petition. 5. The workman has challenged the award on the ground that even in the case of probation regular departmental proceeding is to be initiated and taking into consideration this principle, charge sheet has been served upon him, but no Enquiry Officer was appointed and in the meantime he was terminated from service and as such the order of termination is in gross violation of principle of natural justice. On the other hand, plea of the management is that the order of termination being not punitive in nature rather it is simpliciter which has been issued in course of subsistence period of probation of the workman and as such there is no requirement to initiate a regular departmental proceeding. Learned counsel for the management has submitted that charge sheet was served upon the workman but he has not chosen to submit explanation and as such the management has dropped the idea to proceed with the departmental enquiry and taken decision to dispense with his service being unsatisfactory during the probation period and as such order of dismissal has been passed which is simpliciter and not punitive in nature. Labour Court, after taking into consideration these aspects of the matter, has passed the award which does not warrant interference by this Court. 6. Labour Court, after taking into consideration these aspects of the matter, has passed the award which does not warrant interference by this Court. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record. 7. The Sole question pertains for consideration as to whether during the period of probation departmental enquiry is required to be initiated or not ? Law is well settled that there cannot be any discrimination among the employees who are in probation and the employees who have been confirmed in service so far it relates to inflicting punishment upon them is concerned and for taking this in a case of misconduct departmental enquiry is to be initiated against the employee, but when in course of probation service is not found to be satisfactory then it is the prerogative of the employer to dispense with service of the employee without making any comment regarding misconduct. Here in the instant case the fact is that the workman was engaged on 18.7.1983 and thereafter he was appointed as Dairyman vide order dated 30.5.1995 with the condition that - “3. You will be on probation for a period of one year from the date of joining in which period your services may be terminated without assigning any reason if your services are unsatisfactory. On successful completion of probation you will be confirmed.” The specific condition as contained in the letter is that services of the petitioner being Dairyman will be on probation for a period of one year and it will be confirmed on successful completion of probation, meaning thereby the employer has reserved his right to assess performance of the petitioner and only in case the performance will be found to be satisfactory within a period of one year then only order of confirmation would be passed, meaning further thereby that there is no condition of deemed confirmation in the appointment letter. The workman had been separated from service in this case as his services were found to be unsatisfactory as because several allegations of irregularities have been leveled against him which relates to disobedience of orders passed by the higher authorities, theft of material from the office of the management, forcibly signed attendance register for his absence even absence without any permission from the competent authority and all these irregularities have been committed during the period of one year from the date of issuance of appointment order and as such he has not been confirmed rather his probation period was extended twice, one vide letter dated 27.5.1996 which was extended from 1.6.1996 (Ext.13) and another vide letter dated 7.10.1996 (Ext.13/A) from 1.12.1996. It transpires from the record that initially charges were served upon the workman with a direction upon him to submit his reply within stipulated period but no such reply has been submitted and thereafter the management has come out with the order of dismissal as contained in letter no.1064 dated 14.3.1997 (Annexure-15), contents of the said letter is quoted hereunder: “xxxx You are dismissed from the service of “Dairyman” of Greater Ganjam Gajapati Co. Op. Milk Producers Union Ltd. with effect of 15.3.97. As per our letter no.361 dtd. 3.8.96 you have not vacated the quarter. Necessary action as deemed fit will be taken against you to vacate the quarter. xxx” 8. The petitioner being aggrieved with the order of dismissal has questioned the order of dismissal on the ground that no regular departmental enquiry has been initiated and as such the order of dismissal is not sustainable in the eye of law. While on the other hand, the management has taken plea that the order of dismissal contains no stigma rather it is simpliciter having been issued in course of subsistence period of probation, hence there is no requirement to go for regular departmental enquiry. 9. In order to appreciate this arguments, we have gone through the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Radhey Shyam Gupta Vs. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and another, reported in (1999)2 SCC 21 wherein the facts of the case was that the workman was working in the Corporation as a Branch Manager, was asked to submit his explanation in respect of allegation of having fraudulently taken Rs.2000/- from the complainant. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and another, reported in (1999)2 SCC 21 wherein the facts of the case was that the workman was working in the Corporation as a Branch Manager, was asked to submit his explanation in respect of allegation of having fraudulently taken Rs.2000/- from the complainant. Thereafter neither any disciplinary enquiry nor any oral enquiry in presence of the employee was conducted. The enquiry officer had examined the witnesses and submitted his report without issuing any charge memo or giving a hearing. In his report he concluded that the employee had taken a sum of Rs.2000/- from the complainant and thereafter referring to the facts he recommended that the services of the employee may be terminated and one months salary may be given to him in lieu of the notice. The very next day a simple order of termination was passed in terms of the appointment order stating that his services were being terminated with immediate effect on payment of one months salary. The Administrative Tribunal allowed the employees application and quashed the termination order declaring it to be violative of the principles of natural justice and hence void. The High Court, however, took the view that the enquiry was conducted “to assess the work” of the employee as it was decided to dispense with his temporary service in terms of condition 3 of the order of appointment, which permitted such termination on payment of one months salary or after giving one months notice. That was why a simple order of termination was passed and it did not cause any stigma inasmuch as it did not refer to any disciplinary enquiry. 10. We have examined the parameter of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Radhey Shyam Gupta Vs. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and another (supra) and the proposition laid down is applicable for the reason that in the instant case service of the workman was under probation, however, memorandum of charge has been served upon the workman to give reply to which he has not responded and thereafter order of termination has been passed. In the case of Radhey Shyam Gupta Vs. In the case of Radhey Shyam Gupta Vs. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and another (supra) which relates to Branch Manager working in the U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Limited being a confirmed employee and the Hon’ble Apex Court after taking into consideration the factual aspect of that case especially taking into consideration the fact that the order of termination since been simpliciter in nature without making reference of disciplinary enquiry, declined to interfere with the decision of the disciplinary authority terminating the employee therein under probation. Further, it transpires from the judgment in the case of Radhey Shyam Gupta Vs. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and another (supra) enquiry proceeding was initiated but the enquiry was dropped and simple notice of termination, but here in the instant case, the workman was under probation period and the probation period was twice extended due to unsatisfactory performance of the workman, meaning thereby he was not confirmed employee and as such the terms and conditions of offer of appointment will be applicable as per the settled principle that benefit of service rule can only be given to the regular employee under regular establishment and further in this case no enquiry has been initiated and the management has thought it proper to invoke condition no.3 of the offer of appointment which stipulates condition that he will be on probation for a period of one year from the date of joining, in which period his service may be terminated without assigning any reason if services are unsatisfactory. The management, after taking into consideration this specific condition and also taking into consideration the fact that his services was not found to be satisfactory in course of probation period, has passed order of dismissal and we, on examination, have found that the order of dismissal is simpliciter having no reference to allegations or pending disciplinary enquiry and as such we found that the case in hand is coming under the factual and legal aspect of the case of Radhey Shyam Gupta Vs. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and another (supra), hence applying the said principle we have examined the award and found that the Labour Court, after taking into consideration all these aspects of the matter as referred herein above, has come to a finding that the order of dismissal is legal and justified, even otherwise also the High Court cannot act as a court of appeal to differ with the finding given by the Tribunal which is based upon cogent evidence and the materials placed before it subject to exceptions that if there is perversity in finding or there is error apparent on the face of record or order is without jurisdiction, reference in this regard needs to be made of the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein it paragraph 7 their Lordships have been pleaded to hold as follows:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of tact, however grave it may appear to be. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of tact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the. Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” The proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob (supra) still holds good since the same has been considered by Hon’ble Apex Court recently in the case of M/s. Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of his Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p. 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) “The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the ... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case:- It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 11. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 11. We have found that in case of perversity or error apparent on the face of the record, hence applying the principles laid down and on the basis of appreciation of factual aspects herein above, since no perversity or error apparent on the face of the record has been pointed out hence no interference is warranted with the award. Accordingly, the writ petition lacks merit, hence it is dismissed.