JUDGMENT : S.N. Prasad, J. This writ petition has been filed by the management-Allahabad Bank praying therein: (i) to quash the order dated 2.6.2016 in Rest. Misc. Case No. 1 of 2015 arising out of I.D. Case No. 59 of 2011, and (ii) to quash the exparte award dated 31.12.2014 passed in I.D. Case No. 59 of 2011 by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Bhubaneswar. 2. Brief facts of the case of the petitioner as per the pleadings made in the writ petition is that the Government of India being the appropriate Government had referred the industrial dispute existing between the opposite party-workman in relation to the Management of Allahabad Bank at its Sunabeda Branch, Sunabeda, Koraput in exercise of powers conferred by clause (d) of Sub-section (1) and sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vide its letter dated 11.11.2011 making the following reference:- “Whether the action of the Allahabad Bank Sunabeda Branch, District-Koraput, in terminating the services of Shri Srikanta Pradhan, ex-part-time Sweeper/Messenger of Allahabad Bank, College extension counter, Similiguda, Dist. Koraput w.e.f. 11.8.2008 ignoring the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is justified ? What relief the workman is entitled to.” 3. In pursuance to such reference I.D. Case No.59 of 2011 was registered by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Bhubaneswar. The parties have appeared. The workman has pleaded by filing written statement that he was engaged as part-time sweeper in Sunabeda Branch during month of September, 2004 with wage of Rs.20/- per day, accordingly he had started discharging duties and received wages from the bank. In course of engagement as Part-time Sweeper/Messenger from the year 2004 to 2008 he was maintaining/updating cash scroll, cash books, local cheque book(LC) and outstation cheque (OSC) books of the management bank. He had continuously worked there and while he was working the Chief Manager of the Management bank at Bhubaneswar vide letter dated 14.5.2007 had issued to the Sr. Manager of Allahabad Bank, Sunabeda directing to initiate the process of recruitment of Part-Time Sweeper on 1/3rd wage scale through the local employment exchange and marked the copy thereof to the Manager of Allahabad Bank, Semiliguda College Extension Counter. Accordingly the management advertised for the post of part-time sweeper and the workman, who alleged to have valid employment exchange registration, submitted application for the said post vide application dated 5.6.2007. Accordingly the management advertised for the post of part-time sweeper and the workman, who alleged to have valid employment exchange registration, submitted application for the said post vide application dated 5.6.2007. He was called upon to participate in the interview for the post of Part-time Sweeper which was held on 9.8.2008 at the bank premises of the management at Sunabeda, but the management did not consider the case of the workman as Part-time Sweeper and ultimately disengaged him w.e.f. 11.8.2008. Further case of the workman is that without considering his candidature, the management had appointed new person namely Narsingha Jani in the said post ignoring his rightful claim. The workman being aggrieved with the action of the management approached labour authorities at Regional Labour Commissioner, Central and prayed to intervene into the matter, conciliation proceeding started but failed on the plea of the management that the workman had no valid employment registration card at the time of interview for the post of part-time Sweeper held on 9.8.2008, he was not selected, conciliation officer being found that there is no chance of settlement had submitted failure report before the appropriate Government, in terms thereof, reference has been made which fell for consideration before the Tribunal. According to the workman, he was in continuous service for more than 240 days till the date of illegal termination i.e. 11.8.2008, as such the management ought to have followed the statutory provisions as contained in section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but without following the same he was terminated, hence the management had not followed the statutory provision and as such he is entitled for reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits. 4. While on the other hand, case of the management as per the written statement filed is that the workman had been engaged without conducting any recruitment of part-time sweeper/Messenger for the Semiliguda College Extension Counter in the year 2004. It has been disputed that the workman has ever been engaged as part-time sweeper in Semiliguda College Extension Counter. 4. While on the other hand, case of the management as per the written statement filed is that the workman had been engaged without conducting any recruitment of part-time sweeper/Messenger for the Semiliguda College Extension Counter in the year 2004. It has been disputed that the workman has ever been engaged as part-time sweeper in Semiliguda College Extension Counter. Contention of the workman regarding continuation of service for period of 240 days has also been disputed by stating that the workman was not working at Allahabad Branch, no experience certificate was issued to him by Semiliguda College Extension Counter, vacancy of part time weeper on 1/3rd scale wages was notified to local employment exchange and simultaneously the same was notified in the local news paper, the workman had applied, he was called for interview to appear on 9.8.2008, the bank had constituted Interview Committee for fair and impartial selection of the candidate for the post and accordingly post was filled up as per the selection of the Interview Committee. It has been stated that Rs.50,000/- was sanctioned from Allahabad Bank, Sunabeda branch under SJSRY as an unemployed youth on 27.3.2007 which is admissible only to unemployed persons/youths. The workman could not have been selected since he has no valid reemployment exchange registration card at the time of interview which was the condition precedent for candidate to show their eligibility for participating in the interview and as such he was not selected, in view thereof, the management has refuted the claim of the workman. 5. The Tribunal after accepting the reference has initiated proceeding for its adjudication. The award has been passed on 31.12.2014 holding therein to restore the previous engagement of the workman and pay 25% of the back wages from the date of termination till the date of restoration of his services. The back wages has been directed to be paid within three months from the date of publication of the ward in the official gazette, if not paid, failing which simple interest @12% per annum on the back wages will have to be paid by the management in favour of the workman. 6. The management, on initiation of case, had appeared before the tribunal, contested the dispute but on subsequent occasion not appeared and as such the award has been set for exparte hearing. 6. The management, on initiation of case, had appeared before the tribunal, contested the dispute but on subsequent occasion not appeared and as such the award has been set for exparte hearing. Plea of the management that after passing of the award dated 31.12.2014 it was not within its knowledge rather the management came to know about the award by way of communication made vide letter dated 15.7.2015 from the Ministry of Labour, Government of India as notified under section 17 of the I.D. Act in I.D. Case No.59 of 2011 without copy of the award dated 31.12.2014, the petitioner, on receipt of the letter dated 15.9.2015, has made an application before the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal for certified copy of the award dated 31.12.2014 vide its letter and only then the management had got the copy of the award on 15.9.2015 and thereafter an application had been filed for recall of the order dated 17.6.2013 by which the proceeding had been posted for exparte hearing against the management stating, inter alia, reasons thereof that although the management had filed its written statement categorically denying the claim of the workman as per the definition and meaning with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and also denied the existence of employer-employee relationship with the workman but without taking into consideration these aspects of the matter the award has been passed on 31.12.2014 which is due to non-appearance of the management in the dispute and therefore the Tribunal vide order dated 17.6.2013 has posted the case for exparte hearing and on the basis of the exparte hearing the award has been passed on 31.12.2014, hence the management had not been given opportunity to cross-examine the workman witness, adduce its evidence and in that pretext prayer has been made in the application to recall the order dated 17.6.2013, set aside the order of exparte award passed against the management dated 31.12.2014 and allow the management to cross-examine the workman witness, adduce evidence and to contest the case, failing which the management having every chance of successes in the case, shall suffer irreparable loss. The workman had filed objection stating, inter alia, therein that the restoration application is not at all maintainable for the reason that same has been filed after more than the period of 10 months from the date of passing of the award dated 31.12.2014 and after three months of publication/notification therein by the appropriate Government in the Ministry of Labour dated 15.7.2015 and as such the application is not maintainable. 7. The Tribunal, after taking into consideration the rival submissions of the parties and the legal proposition, has passed order dated 2.6.2016 whereby and where under the application filed by the management has been rejected assigning reason that same has been filed after publication of the award in the official Gazette. The management being aggrieved with the order dated 2.6.2016 in Rest. Misc. Case No. 1 of 2015 and the award dated 31.12.2014 passed in I.D. Case No. 59 of 2011 is before this Court by way of this writ petition. 8. Learned senior counsel representing the management has made out two fold arguments, first with regard to the illegality having been committed by the Tribunal while passing the order in Restoration Misc. Case No. 1 of 2015 by submitting that the Tribunal has not appreciated legal proposition as has been settled in this regard, while arguing reference has been made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Anil Sood Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court II reported in (2001) 10 SCC 534 ; Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi Vs. L.H. Patel and another reported in (2009)2 SCC 81 and Ram Shiroman Mishra Vs. Viswanath Panday reported in (2012) 8 SCC 575 . Learned senior counsel relying upon these judgments has submitted that the Tribunal in the ends of justice should have restored the application even after publication of the award in the case of exparte hearing. It has been submitted that the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Grindlays Bank Limited Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal reported in 1980 Supp. SCC 420 has been distinguished by these judgments and the proposition has been laid down that even after publication of the award in the official gazette the Tribunal has the power to restore the proceeding for its hearing afresh in the ends of justice. 9. Central Government Industrial Tribunal reported in 1980 Supp. SCC 420 has been distinguished by these judgments and the proposition has been laid down that even after publication of the award in the official gazette the Tribunal has the power to restore the proceeding for its hearing afresh in the ends of justice. 9. Learned counsel representing the workman has vehemently opposed the prayer made by learned counsel representing the management by submitting that these judgments are not at all applicable for the reason that in all the judgments notices were not served upon the management and taking into consideration this aspect of the matter order has been passed but in the instant case notice has been issued, management had appeared, written statement has been filed and thereafter after appearing for several dates, chosen not to appear further and therefore the Tribunal, after taking into consideration this aspect of the matter, has set the proceeding for exparte hearing vide order dated 17.6.2013 and as such the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in these cases is distinguishable from the facts and circumstance of this case and hence the judgments are not applicable. 10. The Tribunal after adjudicating the dispute submitted a report within 30 days from the date of its receipt by the appropriate Government, to be published in such manner the appropriate Government thinks fit as per the provision of Section 17A of the I.D. Act, the award published under sub-section (1) shall be final and shall not be questioned by any court in any manner whatsoever, since the award will be enforceable after expiry of the period of 30 days as per the provision of section 17A(1). He further submits that in the instant case the award has been passed on 31.12.2014, published in the official Gazette on 15.7.2015, workman had submitted representation along with copy of the award on 29.10.2015 by speed post to the management on 27.7.2015 praying to implement the award but the management despite receipt of his letter through speed post, not chosen to take any initiative in this regard and it is only thereafter application has been filed for getting copy of the award on 21.9.2015, thereafter filed application for recalling the order dated 17.6.2013 on 5.10.2015 to set aside the award dated 31.12.2014, hence same has rightly not been entertained by the Tribunal for the reason that in view of the provision as contained in Section 17A of the I.D. Act, application has been filed after lapse of period of more than three months, hence the award become enforceable, the Tribunal become functus officio, hence application filed by the management under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code has rightly not been entertained and as such rightly been rejected. 11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties with respect to the question of legality and propriety of the order passed in the Restoration Misc. Case No. 1 of 2015 arising out of I.D. Case No. 59 of 2011 and gone through the materials available on record. 12. Before answering this issue it is relevant to have discussion of the relevant provisions as contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which has got bearing with the issue involved in this case, relevant provisions is the provisions of Section 17 and Section 17A as well as the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957. Section 17 of the I.D. Act pertains to the provisions of publication of reports and awards which stipulates a provision that every report of a Board or Court together with any minute of dissent recorded there with, every arbitration award and every award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall, within a period of thirty days from the date of its receipt by the appropriate Government, be published in such manner as the appropriate Government thinks fit, subject to the provisions of Section 17A, the award published under sub-section (1) shall be final and shall not be called in question by any Court in any manner whatsoever. Section 17A contains provision of commencement of the award which contains a provision that an award shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under Section 17 and thereafter proviso is there conferring power upon the Central Government to declare that the award shall not be enforceable on the expiry of the said period of 30 days on public grounds affecting national economy or social justice to give effect to the whole or any part of the award, and provision of sub-section (2) of Section 17A of I.D. Act contains provisions that the appropriate Government or the central Government may, within ninety days from the date of publication of the award under Section 17, make an order rejecting or modifying the award, and shall, on the first available opportunity, lay the award together with a copy of the order before the Legislature of the State, if the order has been made by the State Government, or before Parliament, if the order has been made by the Central Government. Sub-Section (3) of Section 17A provides that where any award as rejected or modified by an order made under sub-section(2) is laid before the Legislature of a State or before Parliament, such award shall become enforceable on the expiry of fifteen days from the date on which it is so laid; and where no order under sub-section (2) is made in pursuance of a declaration under the proviso to sub-section (1), the award shall become enforceable on the expiry of the period of ninety days referred to in Sub-section (2). Further under the provision of sub-section (4) of Section 17A, it provides that subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) regarding the enforceability of an award, the award shall come into operation with effect from such date as may be specified therein, but where no date is so specified, it shall come into operation on the date when the award becomes enforceable under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3), as the case may be. It transpires from the statutory provision as contained under section 17A that award passed under the provisions of Section 17A shall become enforceable within period of thirty days from the date of its gazette notification subject to some relaxation to be exercised by Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be. It transpires from the statutory provision as contained under section 17A that award passed under the provisions of Section 17A shall become enforceable within period of thirty days from the date of its gazette notification subject to some relaxation to be exercised by Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be. This provision stipulates that once the award has been passed the Tribunal or the Labour Court shall have got no jurisdiction to look it afresh. Rule has also been framed in this regard i.e. The Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 and The Orissa Industrial Disputes Rules, 1959. In the Central Rules, 1957 provision has been made under Rule 22 so as under Rule 23 of Orissa Rule 1959 with respect to the matter of exparte proceeding which provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to the proceeding before a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. Thus it is evident that both in the Central as well as Orissa Rules provision is that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceedings before the Tribunal, fails to attend or to be represented, the Tribunal may proceed, as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. This statutory provision has been considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Grindlays Bank Limited Vs. This statutory provision has been considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Grindlays Bank Limited Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal (supra), similar question arose before the Hon’ble Apex Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court on the basis of the facts and circumstances of that case, has laid down at para-14 that the Labour Court or the Tribunal has got jurisdiction to set aside exparte order in the interest of justice but the said power can only be exercised if the application for restoration will be filed before publication of gazette notification of the award and on this factual aspect the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said case has laid down proposition that since the application was filed on 19.1.1977 i.e. before expiry of 30 days of its publication as because gazette notification was issued on 25.12.1976 and from that date one month was to be completed only on 24.12.1976 and since application for restoration was filed on 19.1.1977, hence Hon’ble Court as been pleased to pass order for restoration confirming the view of the Tribunal, for ready reference para-14 of the said judgment is quoted herein below:- “The contention that the Tribunal had become functus officio and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the exparte award and that the Central Government alone could set it aside, does not commend to us. Sub section (3) of Section 20 of the Act provides that the proceedings before the Tribunal would be deemed to continue till the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section. Under Section of the Act, an award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 17. The proceedings with regard to a reference under Section 10 of the Act are, therefore, not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and up to that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. That stage is not reached till the award becomes enforceable under Section. In the instant case, the tribunal made the exparte award on December 9, 1976. That award was published by the Central Government in the Gazette of India dated December 25, 1976. That stage is not reached till the award becomes enforceable under Section. In the instant case, the tribunal made the exparte award on December 9, 1976. That award was published by the Central Government in the Gazette of India dated December 25, 1976. The application for setting aside the exparte award was filed by respondent 3, acting on behalf of respondents 5 to 17 on January 19, 1977 i.e., before the expiry of 30 days of its publication and was, therefore, rightly entertained by the Tribunal. It had jurisdiction to entertain it and decide it on merits.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anil Sood Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (supra) by taking into consideration of the Rule 22 of the Central Rules which includes power to inquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there is sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there is sufficient cause shown which prevented a party from appearing, then if the party is visited with an award without a notice which is a nullity and the Tribunal must necessarily have power to set aside the exparte award. In the said case, the fact was that no notice of the proceeding in the reference has been served upon the appellant of the said case and taking into consideration that aspect of the matter judgment has been rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court for setting aside exparte award and in that pretext it has been held that the view of the High Court and the Tribunal was said to be an error in stating that the Labour Court had become functus officio after making the award exparte. In the case of Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi Vs. L.H. Patel and another (supra) no notice was issued to the appellant in the said case and by taking into consideration factual aspect of the said case, judgment has been rendered. Ram Shiroman Mishra Vs. Viswanath Panday (supra) same was the position as because no notice was served upon the appellant in the said case and on that factual aspect judgment had been rendered. However, due to divergent view the matter had been referred before the Larger Bench. 13. Ram Shiroman Mishra Vs. Viswanath Panday (supra) same was the position as because no notice was served upon the appellant in the said case and on that factual aspect judgment had been rendered. However, due to divergent view the matter had been referred before the Larger Bench. 13. From perusal of the statutory as well as authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court there is no dispute about the fact that the Tribunal has got power to set aside exparte order but the same depends upon the factual aspect of each and every case, in the case of exparte hearing if party has chosen not to appear after putting representation for several dates, in that situation exparte award can be set aside if the award has not become enforceable within the provision of section 17A(1) as because other provisions of section 17A confers power upon the Central Government to extend the date of publication in the exigency as provided under the said provision, meaning thereby the Labour Court or the Tribunal has got no power once the award become enforceable. However, in the case where no notice has been given and the proceeding has been set up for exparte hearing then in that situation Labour Court has got power to set aside exparte order by exdrcising power conferred under section 22 of the Central Rule read with Rule 23 of the Orissa Industrial Disputes Rules,1959. 14. We have examined the case in hand in the light of these statutory provisions and authoritative pronouncement and it is evident from the record and the fact which is not in dispute is that the management had appeared after being noticed by the Tribunal, filed written statement and was represented on several dates but thereafter not chosen to appear hence the Tribunal has posted the case for exparte hearing vide order dated 17.6.2015 and proceeded with the matter. Accordingly, award has been passed on 31.12.2014, notified in the official gazette on 15.7.2015 and as such it has become enforceable on or after 15.8.2015 as per the provisions contained in Section 17A of the I.D. Act. Management has filed Restoration Misc. Accordingly, award has been passed on 31.12.2014, notified in the official gazette on 15.7.2015 and as such it has become enforceable on or after 15.8.2015 as per the provisions contained in Section 17A of the I.D. Act. Management has filed Restoration Misc. Case No.1/2015 on 5.10.2015 which is much after expiry of the period of one month and as such the date when application for recall of the order dated 17.6.2013 was passed, the award has become enforceable from 15.8.2015 as per the provisions contained in Section 17A(1) of the I.D. Act, the case of the management is not coming under the parameter of the case of Grindlays Bank Limited Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal (supra) since in that case application for recall was filed before completion of one month period from the date of gazette notification of the award. Case of the management is also not coming under the parameter of the judgments rendered in the cases of Anil Sood Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court II (supra); Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi Vs. L.H. Patel and another (supra) and Ram Shiroman Mishra Vs. Viswanath Panday (supra) wherein no notice was served upon the appellant of those cases and as such taking into consideration the provision of Rule 22 of the Central Rules, 1957 order has been passed that there was sufficient cause having been shown by the management for recall of the order but such situation is not existing in the instant case for the reason that in this case notice has been issued, the management had appeared but subsequently chosen not to appear, however, explanation has been given for non-appearance but it cannot be said to be sufficient reason rather it cannot be said that the attitude of the management is to linger the dispute which is not accepted from the management like the Allahabad Bank which is a public sector bank having its legal cell in each State/Branch/Regional offices. It is settled that there is difference in between exparte proceeding and exparte hearing. It is settled that there is difference in between exparte proceeding and exparte hearing. Exparte proceeding is where no notice has been issued upon the party or it has not been served sufficiently then court used to fix the proceeding exparte but exparte hearing means that party has already appeared and in the midst chosen not to appear before the court of law or the Tribunal and Tribunal having no option but to fix the case for exparte hearing so that the matter be decided expeditiously. The instant case is of the exparte hearing and not exparte proceeding, hence judgment referred by the learned counsel for the management herein above are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Taking into consideration the provisions of law and the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court, we are of the considered view that the Tribunal has not committed error in passing the order in restoration of Misc. Case No. 1 of 2015 dated 2.6.2016. We, on examination of the application, have found the reason which cannot be said to be sufficient and cogent for non-appearance for the reason that the management which is a public sector bank having its independent legal cell in all the zones and regional office across the country including at Bhubaneswar. Accordingly, part of the prayer, whereby and where under quashing of order dated 2.6.2016 passed in Rest. Misc. Case No.1/2015 has been sought for, is rejected having no merit. 15. Learned senior counsel representing the management has assailed the award on merit also. Contention raised by the management is that the workman was never been engaged as part-time Sweeper and to that effect specific averment has been made in the written statement. It is further case of the management that he has taken loan under SJSRY as an unemployed youth which also suggest that he was not worked as part-time Sweeper under the management. It has been argued that the Tribunal after appreciating this aspect of the matter has found the relationship of employer and employee in between the management and the workman and came to conclusion that the workman has worked 240 days continuous service and as such before terminating him, provision as contained in Section 25-F of the I.D. Act ought to have been followed, since not followed, hence termination has been held to be illegal. While on the other hand, learned counsel representing the workman has submitted that there is no error in the award rather the Tribunal after taking into consideration the factual aspect, evidence, has found that the workman has completed continuous service of 240 days, hence before terminating him from service, provision as contained in Section 25-F of the I.D. Act ought to have been followed, since not followed, hence Tribunal has passed the award. It is the further case of the workman that he was called upon to participate in the interview but his case has not been considered by the Interview committee rather another person has been engaged which is also arbitrary exercise of the management. 16. We have heard learned counsel for the parties in this respect and gone into the award. The fact which is not in dispute is that the workman had participated in the interview by virtue of the advertisement issued on 14.5.2007 for consideration of his candidature to be appointed as part-time sweeper. The advertisement contains a condition that case of such candidate will be considered only having valid employment exchange registration card the workman had appeared in the interview but his case was not considered reason being that he was not found having valid Employment Exchange Registration Card and as such not selected, another candidate namely Narasingha Jani had been selected. From this undisputed fact it is evident that the workman was allowed to participate in the interview but not found successful and as such was not selected and engaged. The fact which is in dispute regarding engagement of the workman from the month of September, 2004 as because the management has contended in the written statement that he was never been engaged as part-time sweeper. We on close scrutiny of the award have found that the workman has not produced any evidence to prove regarding his continuous employment under the management for more than 240 days in the last 12 months. However, on the basis of the evidence the tribunal came to conclusion that the workman was an employee working as part-time Sweeper since 2004. We on close scrutiny of the award have found that the workman has not produced any evidence to prove regarding his continuous employment under the management for more than 240 days in the last 12 months. However, on the basis of the evidence the tribunal came to conclusion that the workman was an employee working as part-time Sweeper since 2004. We have further found that the Tribunal on the one hand has given finding that the workman has not sufficiently proved the fact of his continuous employment under the management for more than 240 days in the last 12 months preceding the date of his termination i.e. 11.8.2008 but in para-10 of the award the Tribunal has given finding that since the workman was employee of the management for more than one year till the date of termination of his service, i.e. 11.8.2008, hence termination of service of the 2nd party amounts to retrenchment and accordingly finding has been given with respect to violation of provision of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, in the result order of reinstatement has been passed. There is no dispute about the fact that provision of section 25-F of the I.D. Act, contains which is condition precedence to retrench a workmen, no workman employed in any industry who has been in continues service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until the workman has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice and thereafter provision is there under section 25-F(b)(c) of the I.D. Act. Continuance of service has been defined under section 25-B of the I.D. Act, according to which workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lockout or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman. This provision clearly provides that continuous service for a period not less than one year in employment. This provision clearly provides that continuous service for a period not less than one year in employment. The fact in this case as per the workman is that he was engaged as part-time Sweeper in the month of September, 2008 which is being disputed by the management. Further contention of the workman is that he was allowed to discharge his duty till 11.8.2008, the date when he was terminated due to engagement of another person by virtue of advertisement in which he had participated but declared unsuccessful. We have examined this case in the light of the provision of Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the I.D. Act and found that the Tribunal itself was not convinced regarding completion of period of service for more than 240 days for last 12 months since in the last of the award it has been held which is being reproduced herein below: “xxx The 2nd party also could not sufficiently prove the fact of his continuous employment under the 1st party for more than 240 days in the last 12 months preceding the date of his termination, that is 11.8.2008.” Subsequently thereafter at paragraph-10 in the very first three lines it has been said by the tribunal which is being referred herein above: “Since the 2nd party was an employee of the 1st party for more than one year till the date of termination of his services, that is, 11.8.2008, the termination of services of the 2nd party amounts to retrenchment.” The Tribunal thus has come to finding regarding violation of the provision of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act without examining and without any conclusive proof regarding continuous service of the workman for a period of 240 days and given finding that he has completed one year till the date of termination of his service. The Tribunal ought to have taken into consideration before arriving to such finding the provision as contained in Section 25-B which contains definition of continuous service but no such evidence has been laid by the workman in this regard. Further the Tribunal has also not appreciated nature of engagement which was admittedly as part-time Sweeper/Messenger. The Tribunal ought to have taken into consideration before arriving to such finding the provision as contained in Section 25-B which contains definition of continuous service but no such evidence has been laid by the workman in this regard. Further the Tribunal has also not appreciated nature of engagement which was admittedly as part-time Sweeper/Messenger. In view thereof, we are of the conscious view that the Tribunal has reached to the conclusion regarding violation of provision of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act without any cogent material produced before it, hence the same is not sustainable in the eye of law. Tribunal has passed order of engagement of the workman even after knowing the fact that the workman who had participated in the selection process in pursuance to the advertisement but declared successful and the same post was filled up by another candidate who has found to be successful in the selection process and subsequently has been engaged, hence the sole post is not vacant against which the workman is claiming to be reinstatement. In view thereof and the reasons stated herein above, the award cannot be said to be not suffered with perversity and error apparent on the face of record. 17. The order of reinstatement is also not perfect since the order of reinstatement cannot be passed in routine manner even in case of violation of the provision of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act as has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad Vs. Employer I/R to Management of F.C.I., reported in AIR 2014 SC 1848 has been pleased to hold at paragraph 17 as follows:- “17. xxxxxxx Taking note of the judgments referred to in the aforesaid paragraphs and also few more cases in other portion of the said judgment, the legal position was summed up in the following manner: “It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimization, unfair labour practice etc. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimization, unfair labour practice etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily wage worker and where the termination is found illegal because of procedural defect, namely in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view in such cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious. Reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25-Fof the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation. Since such a workman was working on daily wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularization. Thus when he cannot claim regularization and he has no right to continue even as a daily wage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be cases where termination of a daily wage worker is found to be illegal on the ground it was resorted to as unfair labour practice or in violation of the principle of last come first go viz. while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him wee regularized under some policy but the concerned workman terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him wee regularized under some policy but the concerned workman terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing, such a relief can be denied”. In another judgment rendered in the case of BSNL Vs. Bhurumal reported in AIR 2014 SC 1188 needs to be made to the paragraph-25, which is being reproduced herein below:- “25. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be cases where termination of a daily wage worker is found to be illegal on the ground it was resorted to as unfair labour practice or in violation of the principle of last come first go viz. while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him were regularized under some policy but the concerned workman terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing, such a relief can be denied.” From perusal of the observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the guideline given therein, it is evident that in which situation the order of reinstatement can be passed and we have examined this case with that angle and found that no case has been made out by the workman in this pretext also. 18. We are conscious of the jurisdiction of judicial review by High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is very limited and can only be exercised in case of perversity of finding or error apparent on the fact of record. Reference in this regard needs to be made of judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein it paragraph 7 their Lordships have been pleaded to hold as follows:- “7. Reference in this regard needs to be made of judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein it paragraph 7 their Lordships have been pleaded to hold as follows:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of tact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the. Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” The proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob (supra) still holds good since the same has been considered by Hon’ble Apex Court recently in the case of M/s. Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of his Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p. 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) “The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the ... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” We have perused the proposition as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court referred herein above and of the considered view that the Tribunal has given finding and direction which is perverse and error apparent on the face of record as per the discussion made herein above. 19. According, we, sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, have got no hesitation in holding that the Tribunal, without appreciating the facts stated herein above, has passed the award. Accordingly, the award is not sustainable, hence quashed. The writ petition is partly allowed.