ORDER : Sujoy Paul, J. 1. This is second visit of the applicant to this Court under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1996). 2. The admitted facts between the parties are that the parties entered into an agreement on 20.05.1999. This agreement contains the arbitration clause. Since the dispute was not referred to an Arbitrator, the applicant earlier filed AC No. 76/2011 before this Court. The parties reached to a consensus before this Court and accordingly A.C. No. 76/2011 was disposed of on 21.01.2014 (Annexure-A/4). Shri B.P. Chawla, Ex-Chairman of M.P. Electricity Board and Shri H.S. Sohane, Retired Additional Chief Engineer of the Board were appointed as Arbitrators on behalf of applicant and non-applicant respectively. Both the Arbitrators were permitted to nominate an Umpire in terms of Clause 12.3(a) of the agreement within stipulated time. It is informed that because of non-payment of due fees to the Arbitrator by the other side, they expressed their inability to continue with the arbitration proceedings. 3. Shri J.K. Pilai, learned counsel for the applicant submits that in the arbitration clause, there is no prohibition for appointment of another Arbitrator. The discontinuance of the Arbitrator is for the reasons solely attributable to the other side. Accordingly, in view of 2016 (3) SCC 619 (Shailesh Dhairyawan vs. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla), new Arbitrators may be directed to be appointed. 4. Shri Dubey, learned counsel for the respondents submits that as per the Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 2003), the proper remedy for the applicant is to approach the State Commission. Reliance is placed on Section 86(1)(f) of the Act of 2003 to contend that it is for the State Commission to decide the dispute itself or appoint an Arbitrator. Reliance is also placed on Section 74 of the Electricity Act to contend that this is a later act has an overriding effect on any other law including Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. Hence, the present application is not tenable and the applicant may take recourse of the Act of 2003. 5. Shri J.K. Pillai in his rejoinder submission contended that the respondents did not take this objection and submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court in the first round. This matter is a sequel of the earlier litigation. Hence, the present application is not tenable and the applicant may take recourse of the Act of 2003. 5. Shri J.K. Pillai in his rejoinder submission contended that the respondents did not take this objection and submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court in the first round. This matter is a sequel of the earlier litigation. Even otherwise, there is no inconsistency between the two Acts and, therefore, this application is maintainable. 6. No other point is pressed by learned counsel for the parties. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. Before dealing with rival contentions advanced by the counsel, it is apt to quote Section 86(1)(f) and Section 174 of the Act of 2003. The same read as under: 86. Functions of State Commission.- (1) The State Commission shall discharge the following functions, namely:- (a) xxx xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx xxx xxx (c) xxx xxx xxx xxx (d) xxx xxx xxx xxx (e) xxx xxx xxx xxx (f) adjudicate upon the disputes between the licensees and generating companies and to refer any dispute for arbitration; 174. Act to have overriding effect.-Save as otherwise provided in section 173, the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act. (Emphasis supplied) 9. I will be failing in my duty if the basic objection raised by Shri Manoj Dubey about maintainability of this application is not dealt with. Merely because in earlier round of litigation, the objection of maintainability was not taken, it will not preclude the other side to raise such objection if it goes to the root of the matter. This is trite law that jurisdiction cannot be assumed by consent of the parties. If a statute does not provide jurisdiction to entertain an application/petition, the petition cannot be entertained for any reason whatsoever. Thus, I am not inclined to hold that since for the reason that in the earlier round of litigation i.e. A.C. No. 76/2011 parties reached to a consensus for appointment of Arbitrators, this application is also maintainable. I deem it proper to examine whether because of operation of Section 174 of the Act of 2003, the present application under the Act of 1996 is not maintainable. 10. I deem it proper to examine whether because of operation of Section 174 of the Act of 2003, the present application under the Act of 1996 is not maintainable. 10. Section 11 (6) of the Act of 1996 permits the Chief Justice or his designate to appoint Arbitrator/s if conditions mentioned in Section 11 are satisfied. The pivotal question is: whether this power flowing from Section 11 of the Act of 1996 stands superseded because of overriding effect of Section 174 of the Act of 2003. In my view, Section 11(6) prescribes the alternative dispute resolution mechanism through appointment of Arbitrator. Section 86(1)(f) of the Act of 2003 provides that the State Commission may itself adjudicate upon the dispute or it can refer any dispute for arbitration. Thus, Section 11(6) of the Act of 1996 and Section 86(1)(f) of the Act of 2003 simultaneously provide for appointment of an Arbitrator. In the Act of 2003, another option is left with the State Commission to adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties. In my view, there is no inconsistency between Section 11(6) of the Act of 1996 and Section 86(1)(f) of the Act of 2003. In Black's Law Dictionary the meaning of inconsistent is mutually repugnant or contradictory. Contrary, the one to the other, so that both cannot stand, but the acceptance or establishment of the one implies the abrogation or abandonment of the other; as, in speaking of inconsistent defences. or the repeal by a statute of "all laws inconsistent herewith." 11. As per this dictionary meaning also, I am unable to hold that there exists any such inconsistency between two enactments. In other words, there is no "head on clash" between the said two Statutes. This is trite law that provision of one section of a Statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. [See: Mohd. Sher Khan vs. Raja Seth Swami Dayal, AIR 1922 SC PC 17 : AIR 1967 SC 1211 ]. 12. Similarly, this is settled in law that it should not be lightly assumed that Parliament had given with one hand what it took away with other hand. [See: AIR 1959 SC 1012 , Tahsildar Singh and Another vs. State of U.P. and 2002 (1) SCC 367 , Central Bank of India vs. Ravindra and Others]. 12. Similarly, this is settled in law that it should not be lightly assumed that Parliament had given with one hand what it took away with other hand. [See: AIR 1959 SC 1012 , Tahsildar Singh and Another vs. State of U.P. and 2002 (1) SCC 367 , Central Bank of India vs. Ravindra and Others]. Thus the principle of harmonious construction can be applied in the present case. The rule of construction is well settled that when there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is what is known as the rule of harmonious construction. [See: Venkataramana Devaru vs. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255 ]. That effect should be given to both, is the very essence of the rule. Thus a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "useless lumber" [See: Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. vs. State of W.B. AIR 1962 SC 1044 ] or dead letter [See: J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills vs. State of U.P. AIR 1961 SC 1170 ] is not harmonious construction. To harmonise is not to destroy. [See: J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills (supra)]. 13. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this Court is of the considered opinion that both the remedies i.e. under the Act of 1996 and under the Act of 2003 are parallely available to the parties. The Apex Court held that even if two remedies happen to be inconsistent, they continue for the person concerned to choose from until he elects one of them. [See: 1992 (4) SCC 196 , Bihar State Co-operative Marketing Union Ltd. vs. Uma Shankar Sharan and Another]. 14. In Shailesh Dhairyawan (supra), the Apex Court held that the Court has power to appoint Substitute Arbitrator. In absence of any bar in the Arbitration Clause, Substitute Arbitrator can be appointed by the Court. In the light of this judgment and for the reasons stated above, I am unable to hold that this application is not maintainable and directions for appointment for Substitute Arbitrators cannot be passed. 15. Resultantly, I deem it proper to appoint Hon'ble Shri Justice K.K. Trivedi, Former Judge of this Court as an Arbitrator in this matter. The parties shall contact the Arbitrator within fifteen days from today. 15. Resultantly, I deem it proper to appoint Hon'ble Shri Justice K.K. Trivedi, Former Judge of this Court as an Arbitrator in this matter. The parties shall contact the Arbitrator within fifteen days from today. Needless to mention that learned Arbitrator will be at liberty to fix his fees. 16. This arbitration application is allowed.