JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri Kh. Binoykumar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner and Shri Samarjit Hawaibam, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents. 2. By the instant writ petition, the petitioner has questioned the validity and correctness of the order dated 07-02-2014 issued by the Commandant, 5th Bn. Manipur Rifles, Khongjaron, the respondent No. 4 herein by which the petitioner was placed under suspension in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding. 3.1. According to the petitioner, he was an outstanding sportsperson (football player) who represented India in the 19th Asian Schools Soccer Tournament held at Shenyang (China) from 21st to 31st July, 1990 and in recognition of his outstanding position as sportsperson, he was appointed as Rifleman vide order dated 14-08-1991 issued by the Commandant, 1st Bn. Manipur Rifles. On his joining the service as Rifleman, he was directed to work/serve as a football player and no other duty was allotted to him. Sometime in the year 1997, the petitioner was directed to undergo a basic training at Manipur Police Training Centre, Pangei and after having undergone the said basic training, he was declared successful in it by the competent authority. While he was serving as Rifleman in the 1st Bn. Manipur Rifles, he was promoted first to the post of Lance Naik and then, to the post of Naik and after serving for sometime as Naik, he was again promoted to the post of Havildar. 3.2. In the year 2007 while he was serving as Havildar in the 1st Bn. Manipur Rifles, a DPC came to be held for promotion to the post of Jamandar and the petitioner being eligible for consideration, appeared as a candidate before the said DPC but the result thereof was not announced at all. 3.3. On 9th July, 2011 the petitioner was transferred to 5th Bn. Manipur Rifles at Khongjaron and in the month of February, 2014 while he was posted there, the petitioner was falsely implicated in a case being registered as F.I.R. No. 12(2)2014 LLI PS U/S 20 U.A.(P)A. Act and section 25(1C)A. Act and accordingly, he was formally arrested by the Lamlai P.S. in connection with the said case. But having no prima facie evidence being found against him in connection with the said case, the petitioner was released on bail. But having no prima facie evidence being found against him in connection with the said case, the petitioner was released on bail. Unfortunately, on 07-02-2014 the petitioner was placed under suspension vide impugned order which has been challenged by the petitioner on the interalia grounds that no disciplinary proceeding has been initiated against him; that the suspension order has neither been reviewed nor has it been cancelled; that the respondents have failed to take any step to complete the investigation; that although suspension being considered not as a punishment, the prolong suspension constitutes a hardship and that since the petitioner is under suspension, he is being paid only the subsistence allowance. Being aggrieved by the continuance of his suspension, the petitioner has submitted a representation dated 25-07-2015 requesting the concerned authorities to review the suspension and increase the subsistence allowances till the suspension is revoked. 4. It may be noted that notice was issued in the above writ petition on 10-08-2015 and despite number of opportunities being granted to the respondents for filing counter affidavit, they have failed to file it. On 17-12-2015, when the above matter was listed, two weeks time as last chance was granted to the respondents for filing counter with the rider that in the event of the counter affidavit not being filed by the respondents within the time granted by this court, the matter would be considered and decided on the next date without any counter affidavit on behalf of the respondents and ultimately, the matter was heard on 15-01-2016. 5. There can be no any dispute as regards the fact that the petitioner was placed under suspension vide impugned order dated 07-02-2014 issued by the respondent No. 4 and moreover, since the averments made in the writ petition are not controverted by the respondents by way of filing an affidavit-in-opposition, the same are to be accepted as to be true in terms of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions. 6. The word “suspension” refers to state of position, when any employee is temporarily debarred by his employer, for the time being, from performing any of his official functions or enjoying certain privileges. After referring to a large of number of earlier decisions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has, in the case of Union of India Vs. 6. The word “suspension” refers to state of position, when any employee is temporarily debarred by his employer, for the time being, from performing any of his official functions or enjoying certain privileges. After referring to a large of number of earlier decisions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has, in the case of Union of India Vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal reported in (2013) 16 SCC 147, examined as to what is suspension; as to what is the power of suspension; as to how power of suspension can be exercised and as to what is the scope of interference by the court and has held:- “19. During suspension, the relationship of master and servant continues between the employer and the employee. However, the employee is forbidden to perform his official duties. Thus, a suspension order does not put an end to the service. Suspension means the action of debarring for the time being from a function or privilege or temporary deprivation of working in the office. In certain cases, suspension may cause stigma even after exoneration in the departmental proceedings or acquittal by the criminal court, but it cannot be treated as a punishment even by any stretch of imagination in the strict legal sense. (Vide O.P. Gupta v. Union of India and Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. 20. State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty this Court observed as under: (SCC p. 133, para 13) “13. … the order of suspension would be passed after taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct sought to be inquired into or investigated and the nature of the evidence placed before the appointing authority and on application of the mind by the disciplinary authority. Appointing authority or disciplinary authority should consider … and decide whether it is expedient to keep an employee under suspension pending aforesaid action. It would not be as an administrative routine or an automatic order to suspend an employee. It should be on consideration of the gravity of the alleged misconduct or the nature of the allegations imputed to the delinquent employee. The court or the Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and no general law could be laid down in that behalf. It should be on consideration of the gravity of the alleged misconduct or the nature of the allegations imputed to the delinquent employee. The court or the Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and no general law could be laid down in that behalf. … In other words it is to refrain him to avail further opportunity to perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression among the members of service that dereliction of duty would pay fruits and the offending employee could get away even pending inquiry without any impediment or to provide an opportunity to the delinquent officer to scuttle the inquiry or investigation or to win over the witnesses or the delinquent having had an opportunity in office to impede the progress of the investigation or inquiry, etc. … It would be another thing if the action is actuated by mala fides, arbitrarily or for ulterior purpose. The suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or inquiry. The authority also should keep in mind public interest of the impact of the delinquent’s continuance in office while facing departmental inquiry or trial of a criminal charge.” 21. The power of suspension should not be exercised in an arbitrary manner and without any reasonable ground or as vindictive misuse of power. Suspension should be made only in a case where there is a strong prima facie case against the delinquent employee and the allegations involving moral turpitude, grave misconduct or indiscipline or refusal to carry out the orders of superior authority are there, or there is a strong prima facie case against him, if proved, would ordinarily result in reduction in rank, removal or dismissal from service. The authority should also take into account all the available material as to whether in a given case, it is advisable to allow the delinquent to continue to perform his duties in the office or his retention in office is likely to hamper or frustrate the inquiry. 22. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that suspension order can be passed by the competent authority considering the gravity of the alleged misconduct i.e. serious act of omission or commission and the nature of evidence available. It cannot be actuated by mala fide, arbitrariness, or for ulterior purpose. 22. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that suspension order can be passed by the competent authority considering the gravity of the alleged misconduct i.e. serious act of omission or commission and the nature of evidence available. It cannot be actuated by mala fide, arbitrariness, or for ulterior purpose. Effect on public interest due to the employee’s continuation in office is also a relevant and determining factor. The facts of each case have to be taken into consideration as no formula of universal application can be laid down in this regard. However, suspension order should be passed only where there is a strong prima facie case against the delinquent, and if the charges stand proved, would ordinarily warrant imposition of major punishment i.e. removal or dismissal from service, or reduction in rank, etc. 23. In Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel v. Anilbhai Nathubhai Patel this Court explained: (SCC p. 209, para 18) “18. Having regard to it all, it is manifest that the power of judicial review may not be exercised unless the administrative decision is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or it shocks the conscience of the court in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards but no standardised formula, universally applicable to all cases, can be evolved. Each case has to be considered on its own facts, depending upon the authority that exercises the power, the source, the nature or scope of power and the indelible effects it generates in the operation of law or affects the individual or society. Though judicial restraint, albeit self-recognised, is the order of the day, yet an administrative decision or action which is based on wholly irrelevant considerations or material; or excludes from consideration the relevant material; or it is so absurd that no reasonable person could have arrived at it on the given material, may be struck down. In other words, when a court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power, and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is incumbent on the court to intervene. It is nevertheless, trite that the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision.” 24. Long period of suspension does not make the order of suspension invalid. It is nevertheless, trite that the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision.” 24. Long period of suspension does not make the order of suspension invalid. However, in State of H.P. v. B.C. Thakur, this Court held that where for any reason it is not possible to proceed with the domestic enquiry the delinquent may not be kept under suspension. 26. The scope of interference by the Court with the order of suspension has been examined by the Court in a large number of cases, particularly in State of M.P. v. Shardul Singh, P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller & Auditor General, ESI v. T. Abdul Razak, Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad v. Sanjiv Rajan, State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena, Prohibition and Excise Deptt. v. L. Srinivasan and Allahabad Bank v. Deepak Kumar Bhola, wherein it has been observed that even if a criminal trial or enquiry takes a long time, it is ordinarily not open to the court to interfere in case of suspension as it is in the exclusive domain of the competent authority who can always review its order of suspension being an inherent power conferred upon them by the provisions of Article 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and while exercising such a power, the authority can consider the case of an employee for revoking the suspension order, if satisfied that the criminal case pending would be concluded after an unusual delay for no fault of the employee concerned. Where the charges are baseless, mala fide or vindictive and are framed only to keep the delinquent employee out of job, a case for judicial review is made out. But in a case where no conclusion can be arrived at without examining the entire record in question and in order that the disciplinary proceedings may continue unhindered the court may not interfere. In case the court comes to the conclusion that the authority is not proceeding expeditiously as it ought to have been and it results in prolongation of sufferings for the delinquent employee, the court may issue directions. The court may, in case the authority fails to furnish proper explanation for delay in conclusion of the enquiry, direct to complete the enquiry within a stipulated period. The court may, in case the authority fails to furnish proper explanation for delay in conclusion of the enquiry, direct to complete the enquiry within a stipulated period. However, mere delay in conclusion of enquiry or trial cannot be a ground for quashing the suspension order, if the charges are grave in nature. But, whether the employee should or should not continue in his office during the period of enquiry is a matter to be assessed by the disciplinary authority concerned and ordinarily the court should not interfere with the orders of suspension unless they are passed in mala fide and without there being even a prima facie evidence on record connecting the employee with the misconduct in question. 27. Suspension is a device to keep the delinquent out of the mischief range. The purpose is to complete the proceedings unhindered. Suspension is an interim measure in the aid of disciplinary proceedings so that the delinquent may not gain custody or control of papers or take any advantage of his position. Moreso, at this stage, it is not desirable that the court may find out as to which version is true when there are claims and counterclaims on factual issues. The court cannot act as if it is an appellate forum de hors the powers of judicial review. 29. The Vigilance Manual issued by CVC on 12-01-2005 specifically deals with suspension of a public servant. Clause 5.13 thereof provides that the Commission can lay down the guidelines for suspension of a government servant. However, if CBI has recommended suspension of a public servant and the competent authority does not propose to accept the said recommendation, the matter may be referred to CVC for its advice. CBI may be consulted if the administrative authority proposes to revoke the suspension order. Clause 6.1 read with Clause 6.3.2 thereof provide that suspension is an executive order only to prevent the delinquent employee to perform his duties during the period of suspension. However, as the suspension order constitutes a great hardship to the person concerned as it leads to reduction in emoluments, adversely affects his prospects of promotion and also carried a stigma, an order of suspension should not be made in a perfunctory or in a routine and casual manner but with due care and caution after taking all factors into account.” 7. Admittedly, the impugned order dated 07-02-2014 was issued by the respondent No. 4 in exercise of power conferred under Section 7 of the Police Act, 1861. But the procedure to be followed before and after the suspension order is issued under Section 7 of the Act, is not prescribed therein. It is submitted by Shri Kh. Binoykumar, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner that while issuing the suspension order, the respondent No. 4 had applied the spirit of Sub-Rule 2 of Rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (CCA) Rules and therefore, it ought to apply the spirit of other provisions of Rule 10 and in particular, Sub-Rule (6) and (7) by which the suspension order is required to be reviewed before the expiry of 90 days and the suspension order shall not be valid after the period of 90 days unless extended after a review for a further period of 90 days and in any case, it cannot be extended beyond 180 days at a time. Relying upon the provisions of Sub-Rule (6) and (7) of Rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, it is further submitted that the suspension order dated 07-02-2014 is not sustainable in the eyes of law for the simple reason that it was not reviewed before the expiry of 90 days from the date of order of suspension. To substantiate his contention, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & ors. Vs. Deepak Mali, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 222 . 8. Sub-Rule (6) and (7) Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 are reproduced herein below:- “(6) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall be reviewed by the authority which is competent to modify or revoke the suspension [before the expiry of ninety days from the effective date of suspension] on the recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose and pass orders either extending or revoking the suspension. Subsequent reviews shall be made before the expiry of the extended period of suspension. Extension of suspension shall not be for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days at a time. Subsequent reviews shall be made before the expiry of the extended period of suspension. Extension of suspension shall not be for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days at a time. (7) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under Sub-Rule (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be valid after a period of ninety days unless it is extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of ninety days.” It appears that the Sub-Rules (6) and (7) came to be inserted by way of amendment vide Notification dated 23-12-2003 and the Sub-Rule (6) was substituted later vide Notification dated 16-06-2007. It may be noted that the wordings of Sub-Rule (6) and (7) are very clear and unambiguous which require no interpretation at all. 9. In the case of Union of India & ors Vs. Dipak Mali (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:- “10. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and having also considered the relevant dates relating to suspension of the respondent and when the petitioner’s case came up for review on 20-10-2004, we are inclined to agree with the views expressed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, as confirmed by the High Court, that having regard to the amended provisions of Sub-Rules (6) and (7) of Rule 10, the review for modification or revocation of the order of suspension was required to be done before the expiry of 90 days from the date of order of suspension and as categorically provided under Sub-Rule (7), the order of suspension made or deemed would not be valid after a period of 90 days unless it was extended after review for a further period of ninety days. 11. The case sought to be made out on behalf of the petition Union of India as to the cause of delay in reviewing the respondent’s case, is not convincing. Section 19(4) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, speaks of abatement of proceedings once an original application under the said Act was admitted. In this case, what is important is that by operation of Sub-Rule (6) of Rule 10 of the 1965 Rules, the order of suspension would not survive after the period of 90 days unless it was extended after review. In this case, what is important is that by operation of Sub-Rule (6) of Rule 10 of the 1965 Rules, the order of suspension would not survive after the period of 90 days unless it was extended after review. Since admittedly the review had not been conducted within 90 days from the date of suspension, it became invalid after 90 days, since neither was there any review nor extension within the said period of 90 days. Subsequent review and extension in our view, could not revive the order which had already become invalid after the expiry of 90 days from the date of suspension.” This judgment has been referred to and relied upon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Ashok Kumar Aggrawal (supra) wherein it has been reiterated that if the initial or subsequent period of extension has expired, the suspension order comes to an end because of the expiry of the period provided under Rule 10(6) of the Rules, 1965. Subsequent review of extension thereof is not permissible for the reason that earlier order had become invalid after expiry of the original period of 90 days or extended period of 180 days. It may be noted that relying upon the said judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this court also has passed two judgments dated 22-04-2014 in W.P. (C) No. 847 of 2013, Shri Th. Tombi Singh Vs. State Manipur & ors. and 11-03-2015 in W.P. (C) No. 1032 of 2014, Shri B. Lalhari Singh Vs. State of Manipur. 10. During the course of the proceedings and in particular, on 07-12-2015, the learned Government Advocate submitted that Sub-Rule (6) and (7) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules had not been adopted by the Government of Manipur and accordingly, time was granted so as to enable them to file an affidavit. Despite number of opportunities being granted to the respondents, they were unable to file an affidavit in that regard and therefore, the matter was taken up for hearing on 15-01-2016. It is not in dispute that the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 have been adopted by the Government of Manipur. Despite number of opportunities being granted to the respondents, they were unable to file an affidavit in that regard and therefore, the matter was taken up for hearing on 15-01-2016. It is not in dispute that the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 have been adopted by the Government of Manipur. But in case the State Government wishes to contend that only the Sub-Rule (6) and (7), inserted by way of amendment, have not been adopted, a duty is cast on the State Government to produce any document which specifically states that the Sub-Rule (6) and (7) have not been adopted and in the absence of such a document, this court will have no option but to go by the undisputed fact that the main Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 which would include the Sub-Rule (6) and (7) after amendment forming part thereof, have been adopted by the Government of Manipur. Moreover, this Court has rendered some judgments and order quashing the suspension orders, as shown in the preceding para, but the learned Government Advocate has not placed on record any material to show that the said judgment and orders have been challenged by way of writ appeals or petitions for special leave to appeal. But the short question is as to whether Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 would apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The suspension order was issued under Section 7 of the Police Act, 1861 and in the absence of any material that the suspension had really been issued under the provisions of Sub-Rule 2 of Rule 10 of Central Civil Services (CCA) Rules, this court cannot come to the conclusion that merely because the provisions of Sub-Rule 6 & 7 of Rule 10 have not been followed, the impugned suspension order has become illegal and is liable to be quashed by this court. 11. On perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that the petitioner was arrested as he was found to be involved in an unlawful activities, although the learned Government Advocate was unable to inform the court as to whether a disciplinary proceeding had been initiated against the petitioner or not and if not yet, as to what is the stage of investigation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra) has interalia held that long period of suspension does not make the order of suspension invalid and even if a criminal trial or enquiry takes a long time, it is ordinarily not open to the court to interfere in case of suspension as it is in the exclusive domain of the competent authority who can always review its order of suspension being an inherent power conferred upon them by the provisions of Article 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and while exercising such a power, the authority can consider the case of an employee for revoking the suspension order, if satisfied that the criminal case pending would be concluded after an unusual delay for no fault of the employee concerned. It has also been held that mere delay in conclusion of enquiry or trial cannot be a ground for quashing the suspension order, if the charges are grave in nature. In the present case, the stand of the State Government is not clear as to the stage of investigation but considering the limited facts and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra), this court is of the view that the end of justice will be made by disposing of the present writ petition with the direction that the State respondents shall review the suspension order and issue an appropriate order thereof. 12. In view of the above observations, the instant writ petitions being W.P. (C) No. 638 of 2015 is disposed with the following directions:- (a) The respondents shall review the suspension order dated 07-02-2014 within a period of a month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order taking all factors into account and keeping strictly in mind the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra); (b) issue an appropriate order, thereafter, with cogent reasons in case the suspension order is required to be extended for further period.