JUDGMENT : K.S. Jhaveri, J. 1. Both these appeals are preferred against the judgment and order dated 30.6.2005 passed by learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 1, Bhavnagar, in Sessions Case No. 211 of 2003. By the impugned judgment, accused No. 1 was held guilty for offence punishable under Sections 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, "IPC") and for offence under Section 323 of IPC, he was ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and for offence under Section 504 of IPC, he was ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. Accused No. 2 was held guilty for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and order to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine, accused No. 2 was ordered to undergo imprisonment for two years. For offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC, accused No. 2 was ordered to undergo six months simple imprisonment; for offence under Section 504 of IPC, he was ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and for offence under Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act, he was ordered to undergo three months' simple imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs. 100/- and, in default of payment of fine, he was ordered to undergo one month's imprisonment. Accused No. 1 was acquitted from the charge of offence under Section 302 of IPC. Feeling aggrieved by his conviction, accused No. 2 has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 2371 of 2005, while Criminal Appeal No. 998 of 2006 is preferred by the State against acquittal of the accused. 2. The facts in brief giving rise to the filing of present appeal are as under:- 2.1 It is the case of the prosecution that on 15.7.2003 at about 8.30 p.m., when the complainant was taking his meal, at that time Sudha, daughter of his elder son Vinu came to hima nd informed that some dispute has happened between Raju, son of the complainant, and other persons. He, therefore, ran to Pan Cabin of Bapa Sitaram where he found that present accused were quarreling with his son Raju. He had also seen accused Raju Karsan armed with knife inflicted one blow on the right side and another accused Bhaka also gave fist and kick blows to Raju, who fell down on the ground. He, therefore, ran to Pan Cabin of Bapa Sitaram where he found that present accused were quarreling with his son Raju. He had also seen accused Raju Karsan armed with knife inflicted one blow on the right side and another accused Bhaka also gave fist and kick blows to Raju, who fell down on the ground. Therefore, the complainant ran towards them shouting and the accused ran away. Thereafter, he took his son Raju to Amreli Civil Hospital, preliminary treatment was given to him. Therefore, the complaint was filed stating the motive behind crime that the present accused were involved in prohibition offences as they were transporting liquor. Deceased Raju was also their one of the accomplices, however, later on he left their company and started plying rickshaw. Therefore, by keeping grudge the accused attacked Raju and he died due to the injuries sustained by him. Accordingly, the complaint was given to the Police Station. 2.2 On complaint being filed, investigation was carried out and the accused came to be arrested. At the end of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the accused before the Magistrate Court. Since the offence was exclusively triable by the Court of sessions, the case was committed to Sessions Court and, ultimately, trial was initiated and charge came to be framed. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 2.3 During the trial, the prosecution had examined following witnesses:- Sr. No. Name Exh. 1 City Mamlatdar, Jethalal K. Rathod 21 2 Tusharbhai Ganpatray Dave 24 3 Gaffarbhai Hajibhai 26 4 Ilyasbhai Rahemanbhai Chavda 28 5 Fatesing Jesingbhai 29 6 Pravinsinh R. Raulji, PSI 34 7 Dr. Hemlataben Sanjaybhai 41 8 Nanjibhai Tapubhai 45 9 Daxaben Rajubhai 47 10 Pravinbhai Babubhai 48 11 Ajitbhai Babubhai 50 12 Labhubhai Nanjibhai 51 13 Circle Inspector, Nagjibhai Balubhai Parmar 52 14 PSI, Nirmalsinh Pathubha Gohil 56 15 Vinubhai Nanjibhai 59 16 Mukeshbhai Nanjibhai 60 17 Shivrajbhai Anakbhai Khachar 61 18 PSI, Ambalal Laljibhai Haripara 63 19 Dr. Truptiben Manubhai Dhanani 88 20 Dr. Narendrakumar Somaji Pandey 98 2.4 The prosecution had also produced and relied upon following documentary evidence:- Sr. No. Description Exh. Truptiben Manubhai Dhanani 88 20 Dr. Narendrakumar Somaji Pandey 98 2.4 The prosecution had also produced and relied upon following documentary evidence:- Sr. No. Description Exh. 1 Panchnama of recovery of muddamal 14 2 Arrest panchnama of the accused 15 3 Panchnama seizure of clothes of the accused 16 4 Inquest panchnama 17 5 Postmortem form 18 6 Panchnama of the broken bottle of muddamal blood 19 7 Receipt of handing over dead body 20 8 Yadi written to Executive Magistrate to take DD 22 9 Dying declaration 23 10 Panchnama of the place of offence 25 11 Discovery panchnama 27 12 Station diary 30 13 Report written serious offence 32 14 FIR 33 15 Yadi written by PSO for taking complaint 35 16 Yadi written by Shahibaug Police Station regarding death of Raju 42 17 Postmortem report 43 18 Complaint of Nanjibhai Tapubhai 46 19 Yadi sent to Circle Officer for preparing map 53 20 Map of the place of offence 55 21 Entry of janva jog registrar 57 22 Yadi sent for addition of Section 302 64 23 Notification regarding prohibition on weapons 65 24 Yadi written for taking blood of the accused 66, 68 25 Form-A 67, 69 26 Muddamal dispatch note 70 27 Receipt of muddamal bring received 71 28 Form-C 72 29 Extract of section diary 73 30 Complaint of Rajubhai Nanjibhai 74 31 Analysis report of FSL 84, 85 32 Medical Certificate of Rajubhai 86 33 Case paper of the hospital 90, 93 34 Arrest panchnama of the accused 100 35 Medical Certificate of Rajubhai Nanjibhai 104 2.5 At the end of trial, the Court below recorded further statements of accused persons under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and thereafter, passed the impugned judgment and order awarding the sentence, as aforesaid. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment of the trial Court, present appeals are preferred before this Court. 3. Mr. Ekant Ahuja, learned advocate for the appellant-original accused No. 2 has taken us through the evidence and submitted that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case against the appellants. He submitted that considering the medical evidence on record, it is clear that the deceased died due to the injuries received by him, however, he is not arguing the appeal for acquittal of accused No. 2 and he is arguing only on the quantum of punishment. He submitted that considering the medical evidence on record, it is clear that the deceased died due to the injuries received by him, however, he is not arguing the appeal for acquittal of accused No. 2 and he is arguing only on the quantum of punishment. He submitted that the deceased died 23 days after the incident and that is because of non-following of medical advise, therefore, it cannot be said that the accused is guilty for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. He also submitted that the cause of death is stated to be cardio-respiratory arrest due to stab injury on left side of chest and none of the doctors, PW-7, PW-9 and PW-20, have stated in their evidence that the deceased died due to septicemia, however, considering the fact that the victim died 23 days after the incident due to non-following of medical advise and there was septic in the body, therefore, accused No. 2 cannot be held guilty for offence under Section 302 of IPC and at the most, it can be said that accused No. 2 is guilty of offence under Section 304, Part-II of IPC. Mr. Ahuja has further contended that it has come on record that the incident took place on 15.7.2003 and the deceased died on 7.8.2003 i.e. 23 days after the incident and, therefore, the learned trial Judge has committed an error in convicting the accused for offence under Section 302 of IPC and, at the most, the accused could be held guilty for offence punishable under Section 304, Part-II of IPC. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in B.N. Kavatakar and another v. State of Karnataka [1994 Supp (1) SCC 304]. He has also relied upon the decision of Division Bench of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Harishkumar M. Khalas reported in 2009 (4) GLR 2966. In view of these, he prayed that this appeal may be allowed. 4. On the other hand, Ms. C.M. Shah, learned APP appearing for the State has submitted that the order of conviction recorded against the appellant-accused No. 2 is just and proper and she has supported the conviction recorded by impugned judgment. In view of these, he prayed that this appeal may be allowed. 4. On the other hand, Ms. C.M. Shah, learned APP appearing for the State has submitted that the order of conviction recorded against the appellant-accused No. 2 is just and proper and she has supported the conviction recorded by impugned judgment. Learned APP has contended that taking into consideration the medical evidence, evidence of the complainant, and other witnesses, the view taken by the trial Court is just and proper and no interference is called for. She also submitted that the learned trial Judge has not committed any error while imposing the sentence on the accused No. 2 and, therefore, no interference is called for in the present appeal. 5. We have heard Mr. Ekant Ahuja, learned advocate for the appellants-original accused and Ms. C.M. Shah, learned APP for the State. We have also gone through the evidence on record. We have also perused the medical evidence. The incident in question occurred on 15.7.2003 and the victim died on 7.8.2003. From the complaint, it is clear that due to the injuries received by him, the deceased was admitted in the hospital. From the evidence it is also clear that the deceased died 23 days after the incident. Therefore, it is clear that this injury is the reason for death of the deceased and this is unnatural death. Now coming to the point whether it falls within 302, or 304, part-II, taking into consideration the whole incident and the fact that the deceased died 23 days after the incident, leaves a room to come to the conclusion that this is not a case of offence under Section 302 of IPC. In view of the decision of the Honourable Apex Court relied upon by Mr. Ahuja, it can be said that the learned trial Judge has committed an error while holding the accused guilty for offence under Section 302 of IPC. The main cause of death seems to be septic because of injuries. In B.N. Kavatakar and another v. State of Karnataka [1994 Supp (1) SCC 304], the Honourable Apex Court observed as under:- "9. The next question that comes up for our consideration is what is the nature of the offence that the appellants have committed. The main cause of death seems to be septic because of injuries. In B.N. Kavatakar and another v. State of Karnataka [1994 Supp (1) SCC 304], the Honourable Apex Court observed as under:- "9. The next question that comes up for our consideration is what is the nature of the offence that the appellants have committed. The Medical Officer who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased has opined that the death was as a result of septicemia secondary to injuries and peritonitis. As we have indicated above, the deceased died after five days of the occurrence in the hospital. On an overall scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of the case coupled with the opinion of the Medical Officer, we are of the view that the offence would be one punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34IPC. 10. In the result, we set aside the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed therefore on each of the appellants. Instead we convict them under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC and sentence each of the appellants to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years. With the above modification in the conviction and sentence, the appeal is dismissed." 6. Similarly, in Ganga Dass @ Godha v. State of Haryana [1994 Supp (1) SCC 534], the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para-36 observed as under; "36. We find considerable force in this submission. As stated above the occurrence took place on November 18, 1988 and the deceased died 18 days later on December 5, 1988 due to septicemia and other complications. The Doctor found only one injury on the head and that was due to single blow inflicted with an iron pipe not with any sharp-edged weapon. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, it is difficult to hold that the appellant intended to cause death nor it can be said that he intended to cause that particular injury. In any event the medical evidence shows that the injured deceased was operated but unfortunately some complications set in and ultimately he died because of cardiac failure etc. Under these circumstances, we set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded thereunder. In any event the medical evidence shows that the injured deceased was operated but unfortunately some complications set in and ultimately he died because of cardiac failure etc. Under these circumstances, we set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded thereunder. Instead we convict him under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentence him to undergo six years RI. The sentence of fine of Rs. 2000 along with default clause is confirmed. Accordingly the appeal is partly allowed." 7. In view of above decisions of the Honourable Apex Court, it can be said that the learned trial Judge has committed an error in convicting the accused for offence under Section 302 of IPC. Looking to the nature of the injury and the death of the deceased after 23 days, it can be said that the accused No. 2 is guilty of offence under Section 304, Part II of IPC and not for the offence under Section 302 of IPC. Therefore, this Criminal Appeal is required to be allowed by holding accused No. 2 guilty for offence under Section 304, Part II of IPC and not for offence under Section 302 of IPC and sentence imposed upon him is required to be reduced to five years imprisonment. 8. So far as Criminal Appeal No. 998 of 2006 is concerned, Ms. Shah, learned APP appearing for the State has taken us through the evidence and contended that the trial Court has committed an error in acquitting the accused inspite of voluminous evidence against them and contended that the trial Court ought not to have acquitted the accused. She submitted that the prosecution has successfully proved its case through the evidence of witnesses. She submitted that the injuries sustained by the deceased were the reason for his death and the prosecution has also proved the motive behind the incident, therefore, the trial Court has committed an error in acquitting of some of the charges. She, therefore, prays that this appeal may be allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment acquitting the accused. 9. We have heard learned APP appearing for the appellant-State. We have also gone through the oral as well as documentary evidence on record. She, therefore, prays that this appeal may be allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment acquitting the accused. 9. We have heard learned APP appearing for the appellant-State. We have also gone through the oral as well as documentary evidence on record. Considering various decisions of Honourable Apex Court, when two views are possible, this Court should not interfere with the order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. It is also required to be noted that the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court, against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani Vs. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 S.C.C. 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 9.1 Further, in the case of Chandrappa Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles; "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 9.2 Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 9.3 Even in the case of State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Another, (2007) 3 S.C.C. 75, the Apex Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In para 16 of the said decision, the Court has observed as under: "16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with." 9.4 Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ram Veer Singh & Ors, 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5553 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs Vs. State of M.P. reported in 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5589. Thus, the powers, which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal are well settled. 9.5 In the case of Luna Ram Vs. Bhupat Singh and Ors, (2009) SCC 749, the Apex Court in paras-10 and 11 has held as under: "10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his ankle was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the postmortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in running condition. 11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence." 9.6 Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mookkiah and Anr. Vs. State, rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: "4. Vs. State, rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: "4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be re-appreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal. [Vide State of Rajasthan vs. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]" 9.7 It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Hemareddy, AIR 1981 SC 1417 , wherein it is held as under: "...This Court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Choudhary (1967) 1 SCR 93 , ( AIR 1967 SC 1124 ) that it is not the duty of the Appellate Court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice." 10. Thus, in case the appellate Court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower Court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. Moreover, learned APP is not in a position to show any evidence on record so as to take a contrary view in the matter or to conclude that the approach of the Court below is vitiated by some manifest illegality or that the decision is perverse or that the Court below has ignored material evidence while acquitting the accused. Hence, we are of the considered opinion that the Court below has not committed any error in acquitting the respondents of some of the charges levelled against them. We are in complete agreement with the reasonings given by and the findings arrived at by the Court below in the impugned judgment and, therefore, find no reasons to entertain Criminal Appeal No. 998 of 2006. 11. For the foregoing reasons, Criminal Appeal No. 2371 of 2005 is partly allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 30.6.2005 passed by learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 1, Bhavnagar, in Sessions Case No. 211 of 2003 is modified and, instead of offence under Section 302 of IPC, the appellant-original accused No. 2 is held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 304, Part-II of IPC and ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years. Remaining part of the impugned judgment shall remain unaltered. The period of sentence already undergone by the accused be given set off to him. If the sentence already undergone by accused No. 2 is less than five years, he shall surrender before the jail authorities within a period of ten weeks from today to serve the remaining period of sentence. 12. The period of sentence already undergone by the accused be given set off to him. If the sentence already undergone by accused No. 2 is less than five years, he shall surrender before the jail authorities within a period of ten weeks from today to serve the remaining period of sentence. 12. Criminal Appeal No. 998 of 2006 filed by the State against acquittal of the accused recorded by the aforesaid impugned judgment is dismissed. 13. Bail bond, if any, of the accused shall stand cancelled. Registry to return the R&P, if lying here, to the concerned trial Court forthwith.