JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Michael Zothankhuma, J. Heard Mr. J.C. Lalnunsanga, learned Amicus Curiae and Mr. A.K. Rokhum, learned Public Prosecutor, Mizoram. 2. This appeal has been filed against the impugned Judgment & Order dated 12.12.2015 passed by the learned Sessions Court, Lunglei in Criminal Trial No. 562/2013, arising out of Saiha PS Case No. 135/2013 under Section 302 IPC, wherein the appellant has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default, 30 days. 3. The prosecution case in brief is that on 11.10.2013 @11:30pm, one Tluangtincheuva S/o Hrinhniara (L) of Khawmawi Village submitted a written report to the O/C Lawngtlai P.S to the effect that his wife Dawthahleiiangi @Pumpumi 36 years was murdered by his domestic servant Thawngchungbik of Halkha Myanmar on 11.10.2013@ 9:30 pm at their residence Khawmawi village by using a knife. Hence O.C. Lawngtlai registered a Lawngtlai PS Case No. Zero u/s 302 IPC r/w section 6 @PP (EII) Rule, 1950 dated 11.10.2013, which was duly investigated into. After conducting preliminary investigation O/C Lawngtlai transferred the case to O/C Lunglei for completion of the case, as the place of occurrence fell under Lunglei P.S. jurisdiction. O.C., Lunglei subsequently registered a case vide LLI P.S. C/No. 135/2013 u/s 302 IPC r/w 14 Foreigner Act dated 26.10.2013 and continued the investigation. 4. After completion of the investigation, the charge sheet was filed. The learned Trial Court, thereafter, framed the charge under Section 302 IPC against the appellant on 19.03.2014, where the appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, 12 prosecution witnesses were examined and after examining the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C, where the appellant admitted to stabbing the deceased, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment. 5. The learned Amicus Curiae has in the first instance stated that though the date of the judgment as reflected in the first page of the impugned judgment and order shows the date as 12.12.2015, the issuance of the said judgment and order vide Memo No. 79/D&SJ/LLI/2015 bears the date 10.12.2015. He also submits that the said judgment was signed by the Session Judge on 11.12.2015. Besides the above, the learned Amicus Curiae submits that the appellant was sentenced to undergo imprisonment on 10.12.2015. He also submits that the said judgment was signed by the Session Judge on 11.12.2015. Besides the above, the learned Amicus Curiae submits that the appellant was sentenced to undergo imprisonment on 10.12.2015. He submits that the learned Trial Court could not have sentenced the appellant for imprisonment on a date prior to the conviction of the appellant. 6. The learned Amicus Curiae submits that in the case of Allauddin Mian & Others Sharif Mian & Another v. State of Bihar reported in (1989) 3 SCC 5 , the Apex Court has held that the learned Trial Court after recording the conviction order, should adjourn the matter to a future date, for pronouncing the sentence to be imposed upon the offender. 7. Mr. A.K. Rokhum, learned Public Prosecutor submits that there seems to be typographical errors in the impugned "judgment & order" and the sentencing order. He submits that the mistake is a mere technicality and in that view of the matter, the case may be sent back to the learned Trial Court to re-fix the date for sentence hearing. 8. Mr. J. C. Lalnunsanga, learned Amicus Curiae does not have any objection to the said prayer of the Public Prosecutor. 9. We have heard the counsels for the parties and on perusal of the original record, we find that the submission of the learned Amicus Curiae is correct. The impugned judgment and order has got three dates i.e., 12.12.2015, 11.12.2015 and 10.12.2015. Besides the above, the sentence hearing was held on 10.12.2015 and sentence was also awarded on 10.12.2015. We are also of the view that some typographical error has occurred in the impugned judgment and orders. Accordingly, we deem it appropriate that learned Trial Court should correct the errors. The Trial Court should also be more vigilant in the future so that such errors do not occur in the future. 10. Section 235 Cr.P.C states as follows: "235. Judgment of acquittal or conviction.- (1) After hearing arguments and points of law (if any), the Judge shall give a judgment in the case. (2) If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of Section 360, hear the accused on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to law." 11. (2) If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of Section 360, hear the accused on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to law." 11. In the case of Allauddin Mian & Others Sharif Mian & Another(supra),the Apex Court has held as follows: "10. ....The requirement of hearing the accused is intended to satisfy the rule of natural justice. It is a fundamental requirement of fair play that the accused who was hitherto concentrating on the prosecution evidence on the question of guilt should, on being found guilty, be asked if he has anything to say or any evidence to tender on the question of sentence. This is all the more necessary since the courts are generally required to make the choice from a wide range of discretion in the matter of sentencing. To assist the court in determining the correct sentence to be imposed the legislature introduced sub-section (2) to Section 235. The said provision therefore satisfies a dual purpose; it satisfies the rule of natural justice by according to the accused an opportunity of being heard on the question of sentence and at the same time helps the court to choose the sentence to be awarded. Since the provision is intended to give the accused an opportunity to place before the court all the relevant material having a bearing on the question of sentence there can be no doubt that the provision is salutary and must be strictly followed. It is clearly mandatory and should not be treated as a mere formality…… In a case of life or death as stated earlier, the presiding officer must show a high decree of concern for the statutory right of the accused and should not treat it as a mere formality to be crossed before making the choice of sentence. If the choice is made, as in this case, without giving the accused an effective and real opportunity to place his antecedents, social and economic background, mitigating and extenuating circumstances, etc., before the court, the court's decision on the sentence would be vulnerable. If the choice is made, as in this case, without giving the accused an effective and real opportunity to place his antecedents, social and economic background, mitigating and extenuating circumstances, etc., before the court, the court's decision on the sentence would be vulnerable. We need hardly mention that in many cases a sentencing decision has far more serious consequences on the offender and his family members than in the case of a purely administrative decision; a fortiori, therefore, the principle of fair play must apply with greater vigour in the case of the former than the latter. An administrative decision having civil consequences, if taken without giving a hearing is generally struck down as violative of the rule of natural justice. Likewise a sentencing decision taken without following the requirements of sub-section (2) of Section 235 of the Code in letter and spirit would also meet a similar fate and may have to be replaced by an appropriate order. The sentencing court must approach the question seriously and must endeavour to see that all the relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence are brought on record. Only after giving due weight to the mitigating as well as the aggravating circumstances placed before it, it must pronounce the sentence. We think as a general rule the trial courts should after recording the conviction adjourn the matter to a future date and call upon both the prosecution as well as the defence to place the relevant material bearing on the question of sentence before it and thereafter pronounce the sentence to be imposed on the offender…." 12. The purpose of adjourning the matter to a future date for having a sentence hearing is to enable the parties to prepare themselves with regard to the sentence to be awarded and the same is in consonance with the principles of natural justice. In the case of Matloob v. State (Delhi Administration), 1997 (3) Crimes 98 Delhi, the Delhi High Court has held that by virtue of Section 235(2), conviction and sentence cannot be passed on the same day. 13. In view of the law laid down, we are of the view that the sentence hearing and award of sentence could not have been made by the learned Trial Court on 10.12.2015. 13. In view of the law laid down, we are of the view that the sentence hearing and award of sentence could not have been made by the learned Trial Court on 10.12.2015. The Trial Courts should also ensure that the conviction order and the date of sentence hearing should not be on the same day. A future date should be fixed for hearing on the sentence to be awarded. In view of the submission made by the learned Public Prosecutor that the mistake could have been due to some typographical errors, we deem it proper to remand the case back to the learned Trial Court to have a sentence hearing by fixing a date after receipt of the LCRs. Accordingly, without going into the merit of the case, we remand the case back to the learned Trial Court to make a correction to the dates of issuance of the impugned judgment and order as reflected in the first page and the last page of the impugned judgment and order. Thereafter, the learned Trial Court shall fix a date for sentence hearing and pass necessary orders as it deem fit and proper. The entire exercise should be carried out within a period of 2 (two) months from the date of receipt of the LCRs. 14. Though the impugned judgment and order is not being set aside in the present case, however, the sentence order dated 10.12.2015 is set aside. 15. Send back the LCRs. 16. In appreciation of the assistance rendered by the learned Amicus Curiae Mr. J.C. Lalnunsanga, the fee of the Amicus Curiae is fixed at Rs. 9000/- (Rupees nine thousand), which shall be paid by the Mizoram State Legal Services Authority as per the Notification No. J.11013/1/2011-LJE dated 4.12.2014 issued by the Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, Law & Judicial Department and published in the Mizoram Gazette dated 5.12.2014.