JUDGMENT : Antony Dominic, J. The question to be answered in these cases is whether the Kerala Cashew Workers Apex Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd. (CAPEX, for short) is liable to pay gratuity due under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, to its employees for the period of their service, prior to the appointed day under the Kerala Cashew Factories (Acquisition) Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', for short), when they were employed by the owners of the factories concerned. C. R. 2. In exercise of its powers under Section 3 of the Act, various cashew factories were acquired by the Government, including that of the appellant in Writ Appeal No.1443/2014 and as a result, these factories were vested in the Government under Section 3(3) of the Act. Thereafter, a direction under Section 8(l)(b) of the Act was made on 27.07.1984 and the factory of the appellant was vested in the CAPEX. In course of time, about 284 workers of the factory attained the age of superannuation and retired from the services of CAPEX. The retired workers laid claims against CAPEX for payment of gratuity under Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act. CAPEX resisted the claims contending that its liability a for payment of gratuity is only for the period of service subsequent to the appointed date under the Act and that liability, if any, for the period of service prior to the appointed day, is that of the owner or the occupier of the factory from whom the factory was acquired by the Government in exercise of its powers under the Act. This contention was accepted by the Controlling Authority and the Appellate Authority, placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in writ Petition No.2894/2013. Realising that on the strength of the aforesaid order, recovery proceedings are likely to be initiated against them, the owner from whom the factory was acquired who was not a party to the writ petition obtained leave of this court and filed writ appeal No.1443/2014. 3. Writ petition Nos.22719, 22720,22721, 22722, 22723,23280 of 2014 are also c filed by the appellant in writ appeal No.1443/2014, challenging similar orders passed by the Controlling Authority and the Appellate Authority. Similarly placed employer is the petitioner in writ petition No.25359 and 25360 of 2014. 3. Writ petition Nos.22719, 22720,22721, 22722, 22723,23280 of 2014 are also c filed by the appellant in writ appeal No.1443/2014, challenging similar orders passed by the Controlling Authority and the Appellate Authority. Similarly placed employer is the petitioner in writ petition No.25359 and 25360 of 2014. All the remaining writ petitions were filed by CAPEX where they are challenging the orders passed by the Controlling Authority and the Appellate Authority wherein d it has been held that in respect of the workman whose services were transferred to the CAPEX, the liability to pay gratuity for the entire period of service rendered (including the period prior to the appointed day) is that of CAPEX, from whose services the employees concerned have retired on attaining the age of superannuation. 4. We heard the learned counsel for the employers, the workers, the CAPEX and the learned Government Pleader. 5. Essentially, the question to be resolved is as to who has the liability to pay gratuity to the workers for the services rendered by them for the period prior to the 'appointed day' under the Act in the factories that were acquired. While I according to the owners and the workers, the liability is that of CAPEX in which the factories were vested under Section 8(l)(b) of the Act, the CAPEX contends that its liability is confined to the period of service from the appointed day under the Act. The learned counsel for the appellant in Writ appeal No.1443/2014, and the counsel for the workmen, invited our attention to the various provisions of the Act, judgment of this Court in O.P.No.6996/1992 and connected cases which was confirmed in Writ Appeal No.884/1992 and connected cases, the judgment in Pattathuvila K. Damodharan v. M. Kasimkunju, 1993 (2) LLJ 1211 : 1992 ICO 3470 confirmed in Writ Appeal No.1376/1992 and connected cases and against which leave was declined by the Apex Court by its order dated 28.01.1994 in SLP ©No.13289/1993. Counsel also invited our attention to the comparable provisions of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act 1972 and the judgment of the Apex court in Central Coalfields Ltd. v. Union of India and others, 1998 (9) SCC 192 : 1998 ICO 185. Our attention was also invited to the Apex Court judgment in Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh v. National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Ltd. and others, 1996 (1) SCC 313 : 1995 ICO 4893. Our attention was also invited to the Apex Court judgment in Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh v. National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Ltd. and others, 1996 (1) SCC 313 : 1995 ICO 4893. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, gratuity due to the employees like the workman herein for the service rendered by them for the period prior to the appointed day is that of the CAPEX. 6. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel appearing for the CAPEX that the aforementioned judgments are inapplicable to the facts of these cases and that a reading of the statutory provisions particularly Section 10A of the Act would show that on vesting in CAPEX, a fresh employment commences under it and that therefore, Section 10A (5) is clear that the liability, if any, for the period prior to the appointed day has to be enforced against the owner from whom the factory was acquired. 7. We have considered the submissions made. 8. Before we proceed to answer the question with respect to the liability to pay gratuity, we should at the outset state that the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, recognises the entitlement of employees, who have rendered the prescribed length of continuous service, for gratuity and such gratuity is payable on superannuation or retirement or on resignation or death or disablement due to accident or disease and is based on the last drawn wages. In other words, gratuity is payable to employees having the prescribed continuous service on severance of employment and is payable by the employer based on the last drawn wages drawn by the employees. 9. Insofar as these cases are concerned, it is the conceded case of all the parties that the workmen in question were the employees of different cashew factories in the private sector. When the cashew industry was facing recession, to prevent large scale unemployment of workers and to provide them employment and to secure just conditions of service to them, the State of Kerala enacted the Kerala Cashew Factories (Acquisition) Act, 1974. When the cashew industry was facing recession, to prevent large scale unemployment of workers and to provide them employment and to secure just conditions of service to them, the State of Kerala enacted the Kerala Cashew Factories (Acquisition) Act, 1974. Section 3 of the Act authorised the Government to acquire cashew factories and Section 3(3) provided that on making a declaration under Section 3(1), the cashew factory to which the declaration relates, together with all machinery, other accessories and other movable properties as were immediately before the appointed day in the ownership, possession power or control of the occupier in relation to the factory and all books of accounts, registers and other documents relating thereto shall stand transferred to, and vested in, the Government. Section 4 provided that all property vesting in the Government under Section 3 shall, by force of such vesting, be freed and discharged from any trusts, obligations, mortgages, charges, lien and other encumbrances affecting it, and any attachment, injunction or any decree or order of court restricting the use of such property in any manner shall be deemed to have been withdrawn. Section 9 provides that the occupier of every cashew factory which is acquired under the Act shall be paid by the Government an amount in accordance with the principles specified in the Schedule to the Act. Reference to the Schedule shows that the amount payable by the Government shall be calculated in accordance with paragraph II of the Schedule, which is extracted for easy reference: "Paragraph II (a) (i) In respect of any land which was part of the factory at the time of establishment of the factory, the value of such land at the time of establishment of the factory; (ii) In respect of any land acquired by the owner or occupier for the purposes of the factory subsequent to the establishment of the factory, the value of such land at the time of such acquisition. (b) The coast of any buildings at the time of construction minus depreciation at the rate of 5 per cent per annum subject to a maximum 50 per cent depreciation. (b) The coast of any buildings at the time of construction minus depreciation at the rate of 5 per cent per annum subject to a maximum 50 per cent depreciation. (c) The actual cost of acquiring any plant, machinery or other equipment which has not been worked or used and the written down value (determined in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961) of any other plant, machinery or other equipment provided that such written down value shall not be less than 25 per cent of the actual cost of acquiring such plant, machinery or other equipment." 10. Section 8(l)(a) of the Act provided that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3(l)(a), the Government may, by order in writing, direct that a cashew factory vested in them under this Act shall, instead of continuing to vest in the Government, vest in the Kerala Cashew Development Corporation Ltd. with effect from such date (not being a date earlier than the appointed day) as may be specified in the order. Section 8(l)(b) authorised the Government to entrust a cashew factory vested in them under the Act to the Federation or to a workers' co-operative society or to any other institution approved by the Government in this behalf for management for such period and on such terms and conditions as may be specified in the order. Section 8(2) provided that, where an order vesting a cashew factory in the Corporation is made under sub-section (1), all the rights, liabilities and obligations of the Government in relation to such factory shall on and from the date of such vesting be deemed to have become the rights, liabilities and obligations respectively of the Corporation. 11. Section 10 provided for continuity of employment of the workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act in the Cashew factory vested in the Corporation, which in the facts of these cases, is not relevant. Section 10A provided for continuance of employees where cashew factory is entrusted to the Federation or to a workers' cooperative society or to an institution for management. This provision is extracted below for easy reference. "10 A. Continuance of employees where cashew factory is entrusted to the Federation or two a workers' cooperative society or to an institution for management. Section 10A provided for continuance of employees where cashew factory is entrusted to the Federation or to a workers' cooperative society or to an institution for management. This provision is extracted below for easy reference. "10 A. Continuance of employees where cashew factory is entrusted to the Federation or two a workers' cooperative society or to an institution for management. (1) Where a cashew factory vested under this Act in the Government has been entrusted to the Federation or to any other institution approved by the Government in this behalf under sub-section (1) of Section 8 for management, every person who is a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947), and has been immediately before the appointed day in the employment of the cashew factory, shall become, on and from the date on which the cashew factory is so entrusted for management, an employee of the Federation or, as the case may be, of the institution and shall hold office or service in the cashew factory on the same terms and conditions and with the same rights as to pension, gratuity and other matters as would have been admissible to him if such cashew factory had not been transferred to and vested in the Government and continue to do so unless and until his employment in such cashew factory is duly terminated or until his remuneration, terms and conditions of employment are duly altered, by the Federation or the institution as the case may be. Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 10 or in any other law for the time being in force, where a cashew factory vested under this Act in the Government has been entrusted to a workers' co-operative society under subsection (1) of Section 8 for management, only such of those persons who are workmen within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947(Central Act 14 of 1947), and have been, immediately before the appointed day, in the employment of the cashew factory and who become members of the workers co-operative society to which management has been so entrusted shall be eligible for employment in the cashew factory. (3) Every person who is eligible for employment under sub-section (2) in a cashew factory vested under this Act in the Government and is entrusted to a workers' co-operative society for management, shall become, on and from the date on which the Cashew factory is so entrusted to the society for management or the date on which he becomes a member of such society, whichever is later, an employee of the society and shall, hold office or service in the cashew factory on such remuneration, terms and conditions of employment as may be determined by the society. (4) The Federation or workers' co-operative society or any institution to which the management of a cashew factory vested under this Act in the Government is entrusted under sub-section (1) of Section 8, may employ on mutually acceptable terms and conditions any person who is not a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947( Central Act 14 of 1947) and who has been, immediately before the appointed day, in the employment of such cashew factory and on such employment the said person shall become an employee of the Federation or the society or the institution, as the case may be. (5) Where the management of a cashew factory vested under this Act in the Government is entrusted to the Federation or to a workers co-operative society or to any other institution for management under sub-section (1) of Section 8, any person whose service becomes terminated or who becomes an employee of the Federation or the society or the institution by reason of the provisions of this section, is entitled to any payment by way of gratuity or retirement benefits or for any leave not availed of, or any other benefits, prior to the appointed day, such person may enforce his claim against the occupier of the cashew factory immediately before the appointed day but not against a the Government or the Federation or the society or the institution. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947), or in any other law for the time being in force, any person whose service becomes terminated or whose terms and conditions of employment have been altered in pursuance of the provisions of this section, shall not be entitled to any compensation under this Act or under any other law for the time being in force and no such claim shall be entertained by any Court, tribunal or other authority." 12. Section 10A(1) shows that where a cashew factory vested under the Act in the Government has been entrusted to the Federation or to any other institution approved by the Government in this behalf under Section 8(1) for management, every person who is a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947), and has been immediately before the appointed day in the employment of the cashew factory, shall become, on and from the date on which the cashew factory is so entrusted for management, an employee of the Federation or, as the case may be, of the institution and shall hold office or service in the cashew factory on the same terms and conditions and with the same rights as to pension, gratuity and other matters as would have been admissible to him if such cashew factory had not been transferred to and vested in, the Government and continue to do so unless and until his employment in such cashew factory is duly terminated or until his remuneration, terms and conditions of employment are duly altered, by the Federation or the institution, as the case may be. Sub Section 2 thereof deals with the cashew factories which are entrusted to workers' Co-operative Society under Section 8(1). The term "Workers Co-operative Society" is defined in Section 2(h) of the Act. In respect of such Cooperative Societies, only such of those persons who are workmen within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947), and have been immediately before the appointed day, in the employment of the cashew factory and who become members of the workers co-operative society to which the management has been so entrusted, shall be eligible for employment in the cashew factory. Sub section 3 further provides that such workman will be eligible to continue in the service of the society, on such remuneration, terms and conditions of employment as may be determined by the society. 13. Insofar as the controversy raised in these cases is concerned, what is of utmost relevance is Section 10A (5). Reading of sub section (5) shows that where the management of a cashew factory vested under the Act in the Government is entrusted to the Federation or to a workers' co-operative society or to any other institution for management under sub-section (1) of Section 8, any person whose service becomes terminated or who becomes an employee of the Federation or society or institution by reason of the provisions of this section, is entitled to any payment by way of gratuity or retirement benefits or for any leave not availed of, or any other benefits, prior to the appointed day, such person may enforce his claim against the occupier of the cashew factory immediately before the appointed day but not against the Government or Federation or society or institution. It is relying on this provision, it is argued by the learned counsel appearing for the CAPEX that liability for gratuity for the service rendered by the employees prior to the appointed day should be enforced against the occupier of the cashew factory and not against the CAPEX. According to him, therefore, the liability to pay gratuity for the period of service rendered prior to the appointed day, is that of the owner of the factory, and not CAPEX. However, a close reading of Section 10A(5) shows that the claims for the period prior to the appointed day which are to be enforced by the workmen against the owner or occupier of the cashew factory are the claims which had crystallized into an enforceable liability as on the appointed day. In other words, the workman concerned should have become entitled to payment prior to the appointed day and it is only such payment which can be enforced against the owner or occupier of the factory. In other words, the workman concerned should have become entitled to payment prior to the appointed day and it is only such payment which can be enforced against the owner or occupier of the factory. Where the services of an employee is either terminated or is not continued under Section 10A, his entitlement to be paid gratuity or other monetary benefits pertaining to the period prior to the appointed day is crystallized into an enforceable right as on the appointed day, and such claims should be enforced against the occupier of the factory, who is the owner or occupier of the factory. Therefore, a claim under Section 10A(5) against the previous owner can be raised only by a person, whose claim has matured into an enforceable right for gratuity for the period prior to the appointed day. For that reason itself, a person who has become an employee of the Society and has retired from service long thereafter cannot maintain such a claim, because at the time when factory was taken over by the society, there was no severance of employment, which alone could have conferred on the employee a right to claim gratuity. Therefore, to our mind, it is clear from Section 10A that the gratuity liability of those employees, who have continued in the service of CAPEX is of CAPEX, even if the service rendered includes a period prior to the appointed day, specified under the Act. This position is all the more clear from Section 11 of the Act which, inter alia, provides that the Provident Fund accumulations are payable at the time of superannuation of the employees and be-transferred from the employer to the Society. 14. We find that this view has already been taken by this Court in Pattathuvila K. Damodaran v. M. Kassim Kunju & Ors. (supra), where a similar contention raised by the CAPEX was rejected by a learned single Judge of this Court. Paragraph 6 to 9 of the judgment read thus: "6. Sri. Pirappancode V.S. Sudheer, who appeared for the fourth respondent, attempted to distinguish the decision of the Division Bench by contending that the Division Bench in those decisions had considered only the scope of Section 10(1) vis-a-vis Section 10(4) and had no occasion to consider the scope of Section 10A and 10A(5) and, in the circumstances, the decision of the Division Bench is not applicable to these cases. According to the counsel, it is only Section 10A and 10A(5) which are applicable to the instant case and that makes all the difference. It would be profitable to quote Section 10A(1), which reads as follows: "10. A Continuance of employees where cashew factory is entrusted to the Federation or to a Workers' Cooperative Society or to an institution for management: (1) Where a cashew factory vested under this Act in the Government has been entrusted to the Federation or to any other institution approved by the Government in this behalf under subsection (1) of Section 8 for management every person who is a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947), and has been immediately before the appointed day in the employment of the cashew factory shall become, on and from the date on which the cashew factory is so entrusted for management, an employee of the Federation, or, as the case may be, of the institution and shall hold office or service in the cashew factory on the same terms and conditions and with the same rights as to pension, gratuity and other matters as would have been admissible to him if such cashew factory had not been transferred to, and vested in the Government and continue to do so unless and until his employment in such cashew factory is duly terminated or until his remuneration, terms and conditions of employment are duly altered, by the Federation or the Institution, as the case may be." Learned counsel vehemently relied on the expression "prior to the appointed day" used in Section 10-A(1) and contended that the expression would indicate that only the former employers are liable for gratuity and the CAPEX to whom the factory was transferred by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 10-A is not liable to pay gratuity to the workmen. I am unable to see anything in that section, which would persuade me to accept the contention raised by learned counsel. As a matter of fact, the question of payment of gratuity arises only on the death, retirement or superannuation of the employee and not before that. I am unable to see anything in that section, which would persuade me to accept the contention raised by learned counsel. As a matter of fact, the question of payment of gratuity arises only on the death, retirement or superannuation of the employee and not before that. This is clear from Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act which says that gratuity shall be payable to an employee on the termination of his employment after he has rendered continuous service for not less than five years on his superannuation, or on his retirement or resignation, or on his death or disablement due to accident or disease. The question that arose for consideration is whether there existed the relationship of employer employee at the time when gratuity became payable in these cases. 7. Similar questions have arisen in Pankaja Mills v. Controlling Authority, (1983) I LLJ 260 : 1982 ICO 1125, where the Madras High Court held that Section 4 of the Gratuity Act categorically states that the statutory obligation is only on the employer and if the relationship between the parties had ceased to be that of employer and employee, there is no scope to apply the provisions of the Gratuity Act. 8. The foregoing discussion would show that the direction contained in the order of the controlling authority and the appellate authority that the petitioners are also liable for payment of gratuity cannot be sustained and the direction of the controlling authority as well as the appellate authority to that effect is vacated and it is held that the petitioners are not liable to pay any portion of the gratuity. 9. Since the CAPEX Society has not disputed the length of service of the employees or the quantum of last drawn wages in these original petitions, the Society is directed to pay gratuity as ordered in the impugned orders, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment." 15. In reaching the aforesaid conclusion, the learned single Judge, has relied on the judgment in O.P. No.6376 of 1991, which was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.884 of 1992 : 1999 ICO 3253 and connected cases. In reaching the aforesaid conclusion, the learned single Judge, has relied on the judgment in O.P. No.6376 of 1991, which was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.884 of 1992 : 1999 ICO 3253 and connected cases. The judgment of the learned single Judge in Pattathuvila K. Damodaran's case (supra) was also upheld by a Division Bench of this Court by dismissing W.A. No.1376 of 1992 and connected cases. In this judgment, after referring to the provisions contained in Section 10 and 10A of the Act, the Division Bench held thus : "5. It was contended before the learned single Judge on behalf of the Kerala State Cashew Workers Apex Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd. who were impleaded as respondents in the original petitions that the Bench decision in W.A. No.884/92 and connected cases was not applicable to the facts of the present case. What was considered by the Bench in W.A.884/92 and connected cases was the scope of Section 10(1) vis-a-vis Section 10(4) and there was no occasion to consider the scope of 10A(1) and 10A(5) of the Kerala Cashew Factories (Acquisition) Act, 1974. Since the factories involved in these cases are entrusted with the Kerala State Cashew Workers Apex Industrial Co-operative Society, it is Section 10A that has to be considered. 6. It was contended that the provisions contained under Section 10.A(1) would show that the appellant society is not liable to pay gratuity to the workmen who are already in the employment of the factory which was vested in the Government by virtue of the provisions contained under Section 8 of the Kerala Cashew Factories (Acquisition) Act, 1974, and entrusted with the society. The learned single Judge rejected the above contention and took the view that the dictum laid down in the common judgment in W.A.884/92 and connected cases is fully applicable to the present case also. 7. Even though several contentions are raised in the grounds of appeal learned counsel for the appellant pressed before us only those contentions relating to the interpretation of Section 10A of the Kerala Cashew Factories (Acquisition) Act, 1974. We are not persuaded to hold that the provisions contained under Section 10A(1) are not applicable in the case of the workers whose claim for gratuity is disputed in these cases. We are not persuaded to hold that the provisions contained under Section 10A(1) are not applicable in the case of the workers whose claim for gratuity is disputed in these cases. These workers were employed in the cashew factories which had vested in the Government by virtue of the provisions contained under Section 8 of the Kerala Cashew Factories (Acquisition) Act, 1974. The factories in which they employed were entrusted with the appellant society by the Government as contemplated by Clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 8. In respect of such workers, sub section (1) of section 10.A provides they would be employed on the same terms and conditions and with same rights to pension, gratuity and other matters as if such cashew factory had not been transferred to and vested in, the Government and continue to do so unless and until their employment in such cashew factory is duly terminated or until their remuneration, terms and conditions of employment are duly altered by the Federation of Institution as the case may be. Workers involved in those case have retired from service on superannuation only after the appointed day. 8. It is not in dispute that those who have claimed gratuity in these cases were workmen coming within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947) and were in the employment of the cashew factory immediately before the appointed day. The fact that they are employed after the vesting by a co-operative society would not take them out of the purview of sub section (1) of section 10A. We are therefore, inclined to hold that the learned single Judge has correctly applied in these cases the dictum laid down in the judgment in W.A.884/92 and connected cases." 16. It is also seen that SLP No.13289 of 1993 and connected cases filed against the judgments of the Division Bench were rejected by the Apex Court. 17. Apart from all these, we also note that identical statutory provisions were considered by the Apex Court in its judgment in Central Coalfields Ltd. v. Union of India (1998) 9 SCC 192 : 1996 ICO 1051. That was a case which arose under the provisions of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972. 17. Apart from all these, we also note that identical statutory provisions were considered by the Apex Court in its judgment in Central Coalfields Ltd. v. Union of India (1998) 9 SCC 192 : 1996 ICO 1051. That was a case which arose under the provisions of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972. Section 9 of the said Act provided that every liability of the owner, agent, manager, or managing contractor of a coking coal mine or coke oven plant, in relation to any period prior to the appointed day, shall be the liability of such owner, agent, manager or managing contractor, as the case may be, and shall be enforceable against him and not against the Central Government or the Government company. The Section 17 of the Act which is similar to Section 10A reads thus: "17. Employment of certain employees to continue. - (1) Every person who is a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) and has been, immediately before the appointed day, in the employment of a coking coal mine or coke oven plant, shall become, on an from the appointed day, an employee of the Central Government, or, as the case may be, of the Government company in which the right, title and interest of such mine or plant have vested under this Act, and shall hold office or service in the coking coal mine or coke oven plant, as the case may be, on the same terms and conditions and with the same rights to pension, gratuity and other matters as would have been admissible to him if the rights in relation to such coking coal mine or coke oven plant had not been transferred to, and vested in, the Central Government or Government company, as the case may be, and continue to do so unless and until his employment in such coking coal mine or coke oven plant is duly terminated or until his remuneration, terms and conditions of employment are duly altered, by the Central Government or the Government company. (2) The Central Government or the Government company in which the right, title and interest in relation to a coking coal mine or coke oven plant have vested, may employ, on mutually acceptable terms and conditions, any person who is not a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), and who has been, immediately before the appointed day, in the employment of a coking coal mine or coke oven plant, and on such employment the said person shall become an employee of the Central Government or the Government company, as the case may be. (3) Save as otherwise provided in subsections (1) and (2), the services of every person employed by the owner or occupier of a coking coal mine or coke oven plant before the appointed day shall stand terminated on and from the specified date. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or in any other law for the time being in force, the transfer of the services of any officer or other employee from a coking coal mine or coke oven plant to any other coking coal mine or coke oven plant shall not entitle such officer or other employee to any compensation under this Act or any other law for the time being in force and no such claim shall be entertained by any Court, tribunal or other authority. (5) Where, under the terms of any contract of service or otherwise, any person whose service becomes terminated, or whose service becomes transferred to the Central Government or a Government company by reason of the provisions of this Act, is entitled to any payment by way of gratuity or retirement benefit or for any leave not availed of, or any other benefits, such person may enforce his claim against the owner of the coking coal mine or coke oven plant, as the case may be, but not against the Central Government or the Government company." 18. In the judgment in Central Coalfields Ltd. v. Union of India (supra), the issue considered by the Apex Court is an identical one, namely as to whether the Central Coalfields Ltd. in which the coal mines were vested was liable for gratuity for the period prior to the appointed day. Negativing the contentions, the Apex Court held thus : “1. In the judgment in Central Coalfields Ltd. v. Union of India (supra), the issue considered by the Apex Court is an identical one, namely as to whether the Central Coalfields Ltd. in which the coal mines were vested was liable for gratuity for the period prior to the appointed day. Negativing the contentions, the Apex Court held thus : “1. The only point raised for decision in these appeals is whether the prior service of a workman continuing in service after 1-5-1972 under the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 has to be included in the length of service for determining the amount of gratuity payable to such a workman under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The High Court, by the impugned judgment, has taken the view that the same has to be included. Hence, these appeals by special leave. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the position with regard to such workmen who were employed by one or more contractors prior to the nationalisation, with effect from 1-5-1972, is different from that of the workmen directly employed by the mine owner and, therefore, the workmen employed by the contractor and not directly by the owner would not be entitled to this benefit. Reliance has been placed by learned counsel on Section 9 of the Act to support this submission. In our opinion, Section 9 has to be read along with the other provisions of the enactment including Section 17 thereof. History shows that the originally enacted Section 17 was substituted by Act No.57 of 1986 retrospectively with effect from 1-5-1972 itself. We do not find anything in Section 9 read with Section 17 to support the appellant's contention. 3. The provision in Section 9 is that the Centred Government is not to be liable for the prior liabilities of the owner, agent, Manager or Managing Director of a Coking Coal Mine or Coke Oven Plant in relation to any period prior to the appointed day (1-5-1972) and that such prior liability would be of the earlier owner and shall be enforceable against him. This provision was enacted to indicate clearly that the liabilities already crystallised prior to the appointed day were not passed on to the Central Government or the government company inasmuch as the same had become enforceable prior to the appointed day. This provision was enacted to indicate clearly that the liabilities already crystallised prior to the appointed day were not passed on to the Central Government or the government company inasmuch as the same had become enforceable prior to the appointed day. The question of payment of gratuity, etc., which becomes due only at the end of the service, in respect of workmen who were continuing in service even after the appointed day, arose subsequent to the appointed day and is, therefore, not a prior liability for which the Central Government or the government company would not be liable because of Section 9 of the Act. 4. We also find that the reasons given by the High Court for rejecting the appellant's contention are justified. These appeals must, therefore, fail." 19. From the above, it is obvious that the statutory provisions make it clear that the liability for payment of gratuity of the employees of the cashew factories for the period prior to the appointed day, is also that of CAPEX and the CAPEX will have to pay such gratuity at the time of retirement or otherwise cessation of employment of such employees. 20. From the judgment under appeal in W.A. No. 1443 of 2014 : 2016 ICO 1459, we find that the claim of the CAPEX that it is not liable for gratuity for the service rendered prior to the appointed day has been accepted by the learned single Judge mainly with reference to Section 10A(5) and taking the view that the judgment in Pattathuvila K. Damodaran v. M. Kassim Kunju & Ors. (supra) is per incurium, as it has been rendered without noticing statutory provisions, namely Section 10A(5) of the Act. 21. We have already interpreted Section 10A in its totality and have concluded that the whole liability for gratuity is that of the society. We have also endorsed the view taken by this Court in the judgment in Pattathuvila K. Damodaran v. M. Kassim Kunju & Ors (Supra). The learned single Judge has held that the judgment in Pattathuvila K. Damodaran's case (supra) per incurium, for the reason that the judgment was rendered without noticing Section 10A(5) of the Act. A reading of the judgment, the relevant portion of which has been extracted above, would show that the same was rendered after noticing Section 10A(5) also. The learned single Judge has held that the judgment in Pattathuvila K. Damodaran's case (supra) per incurium, for the reason that the judgment was rendered without noticing Section 10A(5) of the Act. A reading of the judgment, the relevant portion of which has been extracted above, would show that the same was rendered after noticing Section 10A(5) also. This judgment was confirmed by the Division Bench and leave to appeal was declined by the Apex Court. Such a judgment could not have been brushed aside on the ground that the same is per incurium and on the other hand, learned single Judge was bound by it. 22. For all the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to sustain the judgment in W.P.(C) No.2894 of 2013 impugned in W.A. No.1443 of 2014 : 2016 ICO 1459 and is set aside. The writ appeal and the writ petitions are disposed of declaring that the CAPEX, being the employer, is liable to pay gratuity to its employees, including for the period of service prior to the appointed day specified under the Kerala Cashew\ Factories (Acquisition) Act, 1974 and all orders taking contrary view shall stand set aside. The appeal and the writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. 23. We have been informed that CAPEX has deposited an amount of 50 lakh with JO the controlling authority towards its liability. We leave it open to the employees to move the controlling authority for disbursement of the amount, in accordance with law.