JUDGMENT : S.N. Prasad, J. The award dated 02.02.2009 passed by Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneswar in I.D. case No.26 of 2005 directing the Management to reinstate the workman in service forthwith with a compensation to the tune of Rs.10,000/- towards back wages to be paid in favour of the workman, has been assailed by the Management. 2. The brief facts of the case of the workman is that he was appointed as Scientific Assistant under the Management, namely, Chilika Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Management’) w.e.f. 16.4.1998 on a consolidated salary of Rs.48/- per day which was enhanced to Rs.58/- per day w.e.f. 1.4.99 and thereafter he was being paid Rs.3,000/- per month w.e.f. June, 2000 till 31.3.2004 when his services were illegally and arbitrarily terminated by the Management. It is the further case of the workman that before dispensing with its service, the provision as contained in Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the Act, 1947) was not complied with at the time of termination of his service and as such, he is entitled to be reinstated in service with back wages and consequential benefits. Learned counsel representing the workman has relied upon an unreported decision of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 8924 of 2009 and submitted that the facts of this case is similar to that of the instant case and as such, the same order be passed. 3. While on the other hand, the case of the Management as per the written statement filed by it is that the engagement of the workman was a casual daily wage basis w.e.f. 16.04.1998 till December, 1998 and on consolidated remuneration basis from 1999 till February, 2000. It is the specific case of the Management that from June, 2000 till February, 2004 the workman was reengaged in Hydrobiological Monitoring Project on a consolidated remuneration of Rs.3,000/- per month and on completion of the said project all the persons including the workman were disengaged w.e.f. 31.3.2004. It is the further case of the Management that vide notice no.2875(7) dated 31.12.2003, the workman was intimated that the project work was going to be completed on 31.3.2004 and accordingly his service will be discontinued w.e.f. the said date and knowing fully well about the same, the workman has made a false claim arising out of the industrial dispute. It is the further case of the Management that vide notice no.2875(7) dated 31.12.2003, the workman was intimated that the project work was going to be completed on 31.3.2004 and accordingly his service will be discontinued w.e.f. the said date and knowing fully well about the same, the workman has made a false claim arising out of the industrial dispute. The workman against his termination has raised a dispute which ultimately culminated into a reference, i.e., the management being not an industry as per the provision made U/s.2(j) of the I.D. Act and in order to substantiate his argument he has referred the provision of Sec.2(j) of the I.D. Act, 1947. 4. The Tribunal after taking into consideration the plea taken by the Management in the written statement has framed the following issues : (i) Whether the action of the Management of Chilika Development Authority in terminating the services of Sri Girija Prasad Sahoo, Scientific Assistant, Chilika Development Authority w.e.f. 1.4.2004 is legal/justified ? (ii) If not, to what relief Sri Sahoo is entitled to ? 5. To substantiate his claim, the workman examined himself as W.W.1 and filed documents. Similarly, the Management also examined the Scientific Officer of the Authority as MW.1 and relied upon certain documents. The Tribunal on the basis of the material produced before it has answered the reference in the following terms. The action of the Management in retrenching the workman w.e.f. 01.04.2004, is held to be illegal and unjustified. The Management is directed to re-instate the workman forthwith. As regards back wages, since there is nothing on record to the effect that from the date of termination till today the workman is not gainfully employed elsewhere, a compensation to the tune of Rs.10,000/- is awarded in his favour. However, the Management is directed to carry out the orders within a period of one month from the date of publication of the award in the official Gazette. 6. Learned counsel representing the Management while assailing the award has placed the following grounds : (i) The Management is not an industry as per the definition as contained in section 2(j) of the Act. (ii) The provision of section 25F of the Act is not applicable since the workman working under the project was for a specific period and his service was given which was co-terminus with the project. (ii) The provision of section 25F of the Act is not applicable since the workman working under the project was for a specific period and his service was given which was co-terminus with the project. (iii) The order of re-instatement should not have been passed by the Tribunal as per the decision of the Hon’ble apex court wherein it has been laid down that order of re-instatement in case of violation of provision of section 25F of the Act should not have been passed in a routine manner. But the Tribunal without appreciating this aspect of the matter has passed the order of re-instatement which is not sustainable in the eye of law. (iv) The workman was allowed to participate in the selection process but, however, he was found not to be successful and accordingly not selected, as such the plea taken by the workman that junior to him has been allowed to continue in service, cannot be treated to be a case of discrimination. 7. Learned counsel for the workman has opposed the grounds by submitting that the facts regarding the Management is an industry or not, has never been raised before the Tribunal and as such this point is not available to be raised by the Management before this Court for the first time in writ jurisdiction in which prayer has been made to issue a writ of certiorari. So far as second ground that there can not be an automatic order of reinstatement, it has been argued that the instant case is falling under exception as has been held by the Hon’ble apex Court in Hari Nandan Prasad and another v. Employer I/R to Management of FCI and another reported in AIR 2014 SC 1848 and as such the order of reinstatement having been passed by the Tribunal, cannot be said to be in the routine manner. So far as ground that there cannot be any violation of provision of section 25F of the Act, since appointment on which the workman was engaged was given which was co-terminus with the project, but while rebutting this ground, it has been submitted that the workman was engaged initially to monitor the work in the Chilika Development and subsequently he was engaged as Scientific Assistant in the project, the said project is still going which has been meant for monitoring the development of the Chilika lake and as such it is wrong to say that the work in question is not available with the management. It has been submitted that the Management has come out with an advertisement for fulfilling the post of Scientific Assistant on contract basis which itself shows that the availability of the post of Scientific Assistant on contractual basis and it is settled that one set of stop gap arrangement cannot be replaced by another set of stop gap arrangement and taking into consideration this aspect of the matter, it cannot be said that the Tribunal while passing the award of reinstatement in service, has committed any error. He has argued that the Tribunal ought to have directed for disbursement of entire back wages instead of awarding Rs.10,000/- only for the reason that due to illegal action of the Management not only the workman rather his entire family members have put in penury leading to grave financial hardship and as such the Tribunal ought to have directed full back wages and it has been urged that this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is competent enough to modify that part of the award. He further submits that the writ of certiorari is only to be issued by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if the order is without jurisdiction or the finding is perverse or there is error apparent on the face of record. Learned counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No.8924 of 2009 and has submitted that the case in hand is squarely covered by the judgment rendered in W.P.(C) No.8924 of 2009 and as such similar order is required to be passed by following the principle of equity. 8. Learned counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No.8924 of 2009 and has submitted that the case in hand is squarely covered by the judgment rendered in W.P.(C) No.8924 of 2009 and as such similar order is required to be passed by following the principle of equity. 8. Before reaching to the conclusion with respect to the finding given by the Tribunal, it would be relevant to have a discussion regarding the provision which is relevant for the present case, i.e. Section 25F which reads as follows:- “25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. – No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until- (a) The workman has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; (b) The workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) Notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government for such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.” This section was inserted as a part of chapter VA by Section 3 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1953. The object behind inserting this provision is that an employer could not be expected to carry the economic dead weight of surplussage of labour, the legislature provided for the compensation under this section to soften the rigour of hardship resulting from an employee being thrown out of employment thought for not fault of his. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Parry & Co. ltd. Vrs. P.C. Pal, reported in (1970) 2 LLJ 429 . In enacting Section 25F, the legislature has also standardized the payment of compensation to workmen, ‘retrenched in normal or ordinary sense in an existing or continuous industry’ (reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Management of Hindustan Steel Ltd. Vrs. In enacting Section 25F, the legislature has also standardized the payment of compensation to workmen, ‘retrenched in normal or ordinary sense in an existing or continuous industry’ (reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Management of Hindustan Steel Ltd. Vrs. Workmen, reported in 1973 Lab IC 461 (SC). This section is captioned ‘conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen’ and the conditions laid down in it have been preamble with the words, ‘no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by the employer until. The postulates of this provision are that the person claiming its protection must be; (i) Having the relation of employee with the employer, (ii) He must be a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act, (iii) The establishment in which he is employed must be an industry within the meaning of Sec.2(j) and (iv) He must have put in not less than one year of continuous service as defined by Section 25B under the employer. These conditions are cumulative. If any one of these conditions is lacking, the provisions of this section will not be attracted. 9. The next question arises as to whether should an order of reinstatement automatically followed in a case where the engagement of a daily wager has been brought to end in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Hon’ble Apex Court in various decisions was of the opinion that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jagbir Singh Vrs. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board, reported in (2009) 15 SCC 327 , U.P. State Brassware Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Uday Narain Pandey, reported in (2006) 1 SCC 479 , Uttaranchal Forest Department Corporation Vrs. M. C. Joshi, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 353 , State of M.P. Vrs. Lalit Kumar Verma, reported in (2007) 1 SCC 575, M.P. Administration Vrs. Tribhuban, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 748 , Sita Ram Vrs. Moti lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, reported in (2008) 5 SCC 75 , Jaipur Development Authority Vrs. M. C. Joshi, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 353 , State of M.P. Vrs. Lalit Kumar Verma, reported in (2007) 1 SCC 575, M.P. Administration Vrs. Tribhuban, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 748 , Sita Ram Vrs. Moti lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute, reported in (2008) 5 SCC 75 , Jaipur Development Authority Vrs. Ramsahai, reported in (2006) 11 SCC 684 , G.D.A. Vrs. Ashok Kumar, reported in (2008) 4 SCC 261 and Mahboob Deepak Vrs. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula, reported in (2008) 1 SCC 575 . But the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad Vrs. Employer I/R to Management of F.C.I., reported in AIR 2014 SC 1848 has laid down the proposition differing with the earlier proposition of automatic reinstatement in case of violation of Section 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947 on the analogy and reasons that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation, since such a workman was working on daily wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularization in pursuance to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vrs. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 and that he cannot claim regularization and when he has no right to continue even as a daily wage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose. It has been laid that the order of re-instatement can be passed in such a position where the service of a regular / permanent workman are terminated illegally and / or mala fide and / or by way of victimization, unfair labour practice, etc. 10. It has been laid that the order of re-instatement can be passed in such a position where the service of a regular / permanent workman are terminated illegally and / or mala fide and / or by way of victimization, unfair labour practice, etc. 10. The Management has raised the dispute regarding the management being not an industry as per the provision made U/s.2(j) of the I.D. Act and in order to substantiate his argument he has referred the provision of Sec.2(j) of the I.D. Act, 1947. Before answering this issue, we have examined the award, written statement and other documents available on record and found that the management has not raised this point before the Tribunal and as such no finding has been given in this regard. The management is raising this issue for the first time before this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India wherein this writ petition has been filed for issuance of writ of certiorari; there is no dispute about the settled position that writ of certiorari can only be issued in case of adverse finding or error apparent on the face of record or the order is without jurisdiction. Perversity will be said to have been occurred in an order, in case, point / issue having been raised before the administrative authority / quasi judicial authority / judicial authority / before any court of law and if no finding is being given by appreciating the rival submission of the parties based upon the document, it will be said that the finding is perverse, meaning thereby the finding has been given without considering the materials available on record. There is no dispute about the fact that the award passed by the Labour Court or the Tribunal can be assailed before the High Court for seeking a writ of certiorari on the ground of perversity or error apparent on the face of the record or the order having without jurisdiction, but whether in the case at hand can it be said that the finding is perverse regarding non-framing of issue as to whether the management is an industry within the meaning of Sec.2(j) of the I.D. Act, 1947 or not. According to us since this point has not been raised before the Tribunal, as such the management cannot be allowed to raise this point for the first time after passing of an award on 31.3.2009, i.e. after lapse of about 8 years before the Writ Court by accepting the argument of the management that it can be raised at any time since it is purely legal issue, but we differ from this submission for the reason that this issue is not a legal issue, rather it is mixed question of law and facts which can only be adjudicated before the Tribunal. It is also not that this point was not available with the management and accordingly on this pretext the finding cannot be said to be perverse and if we will allow this submission of the management, then it will be said to be allowing the management to fill up the lacuna by directing the Tribunal to adjudicate a new issue which has not been raised at any time in course of adjudication of the issue. We also not thought it proper to remit the matter before the Tribunal for the reason that the dispute is of the year 2004 and since then 12 years have already elapsed and if the matter would be remitted before the Tribunal, it will not only be harsh for the workmen, rather the entire purpose of adjudication of dispute would frustrate and thereby the purpose and intent of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would be frustrated. Since this Act has been legislated by way of a beneficial piece of legislation and perhaps due to lingering attitude the management has not raised this point before the Tribunal at the initial stage. 11. So far as the fact that there is violation of Sec.25F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, we have gathered from the documents available on record that the petitioner was appointed as Scientific Assistant on 15.4.1998 on a daily wage of Rs.48/- per day and from 2.4.99 daily wage was raised to Rs.58/-. The remuneration was subsequently enhanced to Rs.3,000/- per month till the date of retrenchment i.e. on 31.3.2004. The remuneration was subsequently enhanced to Rs.3,000/- per month till the date of retrenchment i.e. on 31.3.2004. According to the Management, the workman was engaged on daily wage basis w.e.f. 15.4.1998 and since he was not engaged against sanctioned post, not appointed on regular basis, rather he was engaged on Hydrobiological Monitoring Project and since the project itself has been closed, as such he was disengaged w.e.f. 1.4.2004. According to the management it is a case U/s.2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act, 1947 which contains definition of ‘retrenchment’ which means termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include termination of service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, hence the workman will come under the zone of Section 2(oo)(bb), so, there is no question of applicability of Section 25F of the Act, 1947. The Labour Court after discussing in detail regarding applicability of Section 2(oo)(bb) has taken into consideration various documents and on appreciation of the same it has been held that the respondent employer has failed in alleging and proving the ingredients of sub-clause (bb) and all that has been proved is that the appellants were engaged as casual workers or daily wagers in a project, for want of proof attracting applicability of sub-clause (bb) it has been held that the termination of services of the appellant amounting to retrenchment and thereafter it has been held that since in the present case the management has failed to prove the ingredients of sub-clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hence the termination of services of the workman has been held to be retrenchment. This finding has been given after taking into consideration the deposition of M.W.1 wherein he has stated that the workman was first appointed on 16.4.1998 and continued to work till 31.3.2004. He further deposed that the workman was working on daily wage basis. He was appointed in the post of Scientific Assistant in the Hydrobiological Monitoring Project w.e.f. 20.06.2000 with some terms and conditions. He further deposed that the workman was working on daily wage basis. He was appointed in the post of Scientific Assistant in the Hydrobiological Monitoring Project w.e.f. 20.06.2000 with some terms and conditions. He has also taken note of the fact that while shifting the petitioner in the Hydrobiological Monitoring Project on 20th June, 2000 no intimation has been given to the workman and to that effect management has not produced any document to prove that the workman had knowledge about his engagement in the aforesaid project. The Labour Court came to finding after taking into consideration Ext.D which is a copy of the letter written by the Chief Executive to Padmashree (Dr.) P. Mohanty Hejmadi wherein the workman has been identified as Scientific Assistant of the management, Ext.4 which is a copy of the letter of training programme of the workman signed by the Chief Executive of the management on 18.12.2000 wherein also the workman has been identified as Scientific Assistant, Ext.5 which is a copy of certificate issued to the workman for participating in a training programme from 19.12.2000 to 22.12.2000 signed by the Chief Engineer, Project Planning & Formulation, Orissa, Secha Sadan, Bhubaneswar, Ext.7 which is a copy of work programme of Scientific Assistants including the workman for the month of August, 2001 issued by the M.W.1, Ext.9 which is a copy of another letter issued by M.W.1 wherein the workman was directed to appear before the Chief Executive of the Management on 4.6.2002 for review of the work, Ext.10 which is copy of minutes of the work review meeting of Scientific Assistants held on 4.6.2002 and Ext.11 which is a copy of direction by the Chief Executive of the management to the workman on 10.10.2002, Ext.13 to 13/g and Ext.14 to 14/b which are the vouchers regarding receipt of salary of the workman, but in none of these aforesaid documents there is mention about engagement of the workman in a project named as Hydrobiological Monitoring Project, rather in all the vouchers marked as Ext.13 series and Ext.14 series it is noted that the workman has received an amount of Rs.3000/- per month towards his consolidated salary for a particular month from the Chief Executive of the Management. This finding has been given taking into consideration the deposition of M.W.1 wherein he has stated that the workman was appointed on 15.4.1998, thereafter engaged in the Hydro-Biological Monitoring Project thereafter w.e.f. the month of June, 2000 which came to an end w.e.f. 31.3.2004 with same terms and conditions he was also taken note to the fact that while shifting the workman in the Hydro-Biological Monitoring Project in June, 2000, no intimation was given to the workman. Moreover, he was not given any document. The Tribunal came to the finding after taking into consideration that Exts. A, 2 and 2/a are the Xerox copies of the vouchers of the Management wherein the workman has endorsed his signature on revenue stamps mentioning therein that he had received his consolidated salary for the months of September, 2001 and June, 2003 respectively. The Tribunal has came to conclusion taking into consideration the admitted position that the salary of the workman was enhanced from time to time. But no order to that effect is available to ascertain other terms and conditions of engagement of the workman. Taking into consideration these documents, the contention of the Management regarding the nature of job has been held not tenable. The Tribunal after taking into consideration the period of service rendered by the workman, has come to the conclusion that such action adopted by the Management with a view to defeat provision of the Act, so that the workman may come under the exception under clauses as provided under section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. The Tribunal has also examined the case of the workman as to whether the same is coming within section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act or not, considering the deposition and material available on record, it has been observed by the Tribunal that the plea have been taken consistently by the workman that in spite of his rendering continuous service under the management which is more than 240 days preceding his date of employment, Management has neither given any notice/nor paid any retrenchment compensation and as such the assertion of the workman regarding his engagement under the Management stands terminated. In the cross-examination of the Management witness no.1 he has stated that the workman has stated that the workman has rendered continuous service under the management from 16.4.1998 to 31.3.2004. In the cross-examination of the Management witness no.1 he has stated that the workman has stated that the workman has rendered continuous service under the management from 16.4.1998 to 31.3.2004. The genuineness of the experience certificate marked as Ext.1, has also not been challenged, which also reveals that he was continuing with his assignment under the management from 16.4.1998. Taking into consideration these aspects of the matter, the Tribunal came to finding that all these actions of the Management attract the ingredients of section 25-F of the Act and the provision contained therein has not been followed by the Management and accordingly came to conclusion that the order of termination is illegal being in violation of section 25-F of the Act. 12. We have examined the order passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 8924 of 2009 and after close scrutiny of the judgment delivered therein we found that the terms of reference is same as in the instant case. We also found that the adjudicatory authority has passed the award placing reliance upon the evidence which are exactly similar to that of the instant case. We further gathered from the judgment passed therein that by taking into consideration the judgment relied upon by us, having been delivered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad (supra) and in the case of B.S.N.L. Vrs. Bhurumal, reported in AIR 2014 SC 1188 and comparing the fact of these two cases with the case of the workmen of W.P.(C) No. 8924 of 2009 came to finding that the Labour Court has not committed any error in passing the order of reinstatement in case of violation of provision of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947. This conclusion has been arrived at by us by taking into consideration the fact that the Management has come out with an advertisement for fulfilling the post of Scientific Assistant on contractual basis and as such applying the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the of State of Haryana Vrs. Piara Singh, reported in (1992) 4 SCC 118 wherein at paragraph 46 their Lordships have been pleased to hold that “Secondly, an ad hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad hoc or temporary employee; he must be replaced only by a regular selected employee. Piara Singh, reported in (1992) 4 SCC 118 wherein at paragraph 46 their Lordships have been pleased to hold that “Secondly, an ad hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad hoc or temporary employee; he must be replaced only by a regular selected employee. This is necessary to avoid arbitrary action on the part of the appointing authority.” We have also considered the fact that the judgment in the case of State of Haryana Vrs. Piara Singh (supra) has been taken note by the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court while delivering judgment in the case of State of Karnataka Vrs. Umadevi (3), reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 wherein the ratio laid down in the case of Piara Singh with respect to regularization aspect has been over-ruled but the ratio laid down with respect to the replacement of one ad hoc or temporary employee by another set of ad hoc or temporary employee has not been said to be bad law. We on examination of the facts and circumstances of this case have found that the workman was engaged initially as a daily wage worker, but subsequently he was engaged as Scientific Assistant, the post on which he continued and from which he has been terminated. We also gathered from the fact of W.P.(C) No. 8924 of 2009 that the authorities have come out with the advertisement to fulfill the post of Scientific Assistant, purely on contract basis, the post hold by the workman during the time of termination in the instant case was Scientific Assistant, hence the order of reinstatement passed by the Labour Court in the case of violation of the provision of Section 25-F cannot be held to be improper. In W.P.(C) No. 8924 of 2009 we have dealt with the finding of Award and have found that the Tribunal has passed the order of reinstatement which according to us has been found to be correct for the reason that one advertisement was published by the Management inviting application for filling of vacant post of Scientific Assistant on contract basis, taking into consideration the stand of the Management that there were requirement of Scientific Assistant for that reason that the advertisement was published and also taking into consideration the settled principle that one stop gap arrangement cannot be substituted by another stop gap arrangement. In this regard reference of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble apex Court in the case of State of Haryana Vrs. Piara Singh (supra) has been taken into consideration by this Court and, therefore, the order of reinstatement has been said to be correct. The fact of this case is exactly similar to the said case since in the instant case, the workman was working as Scientific Assistant and from that post he was terminated and subsequently an advertisement was published. Hence in this case also the judgment rendered by this Court in W.P.(C) No.8924 of 2009 is squarely applicable, applying the principle of parity and also applying the said judgment in the instant case, we find that the order of reinstatement cannot be said to be an illegal order for the reason that the Management cannot be allowed to substitute one set of stop gap arrangement by another set of stop gap arrangement and as such the case of workman in this case has also been taken into consideration by taking into consideration the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble apex Court in the case of Hari Nandan Prasad and BSNL (supra). However, in these two cases, the facts are different to that of the instant case. But it is found t hat since the Management has come out with the appointment of a Scientific Assistant on contract basis which states that there is requirement of workman and as such the Management cannot be allowed to substitute one ad hoc workman by another ad hoc appointment. In this case also nothing found from record t hat the workman has discharged his duties on complaint and as such, the workman of this case is also entitled for reinstatement in service otherwise it will lead to unfair labour practice and workman will be subjected to exploitation which will hit the very purpose of the Constitution. In view of the observations made hereinabove, we find that the learned Tribunal has not committed any error in passing the award. 13. So far as the back wages is concerned, we are conscious of the fact that the award has been challenged by the Management, but sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India this Court thought it proper also to scrutinize the finding given by the Labour Court with respect to the back wages. 13. So far as the back wages is concerned, we are conscious of the fact that the award has been challenged by the Management, but sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India this Court thought it proper also to scrutinize the finding given by the Labour Court with respect to the back wages. We have examined that part of the Award in the light of the settled proposition of law as has been settled by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase Vrs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) and others, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324 which has been delivered by Hon’ble Apex Court after dealing with the previous judgments rendered in the case of J.K. Synthetics Ltd. Vrs. K.P. Agarwal, reported in (227) 2 SCC 433 and Zilla Parishad, Gadchiroli Vrs. Prakash, reported in (2009) 4 Mah.L.J. 628, Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd., Vrs. Employees, reported in (1979) 2 SCC 80 , Surendra Kumar Verma Vrs. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, reported in (1980) 4 SCC 443 , Mohan lal Vrs. Bharat Electronics Ltd., reported in (1981) 3 SCC 478 has given its verdict whereby and where under it has been held that the order directing the management to pay full back wages and to that effect the proposition laid down at paragraph 35 is being reproduced here under as:- “35. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board, reported in (2009) 15 SCC 327 , this Court noted that as on the date of retrenchment, respondent No.1 had worked for less than 11 months and held: (SCC p.335, paras 14-15) “14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-Falthough may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee. 15. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee. 15. Therefore, the view of the High Court that the Labour Court erred in granting reinstatement and back wages in the facts and circumstances of the present case cannot be said to suffer from any legal flaw. However, in our view, the High Court erred in not awarding compensation to the appellant while upsetting the award of reinstatement and back wages.” In another judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Tapas Kumar Paul Vrs. BSNL and another, 2014 (4) SCR 875 wherein also the order of re-instatement with full back-wages has been directed to be paid and this order has been passed taking into consideration the fact that “True occasional hardship may be caused to an employer but we must remember that, more often than not, comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than to the employer if the relief is granted” and after taking into consideration the pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Deepali Gundu (supra) in which reliance has been placed in the case of Surendra Kumar Verma (supra) and Hindustan Tin Workers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) the order of reinstatement with back wages has been passed. In view of the settled position of law as on date as per the judgments rendered in the case of Deepali Gundu’s case (supra), Tapas Kumar Paul’s case (supra), etc, the direction of Tribunal to pay lump sum amount of Rs.10,000/- is too less and that part of award needs to be modified in view of the judgments pronounced by Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Deepali Gunda, Tapas Kumar Paul, etc. as referred herein above. We accordingly modified the part of the award by directing the Management to reinstate the petitioner with all back wages. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of in terms of observations and directions made hereinabove.