JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. The instant appeal arises from the impugned order of the learned Collector, Sub Division-cum-Commissioner, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (for short the “Commissioner”), whereby he dismissed the application preferred thereat under Section 22 of the Workmen Compensation Act (for short the “Act”)) by the successors-in-interest of deceased Rakesh Kumar, who in an accident involving car bearing No. HP-23A-2077 which on 11.10.2004 while standing plied on National Highway from Chandigarh to Mandi developed a mechanical fault sequeling its rolling into a gorge, in consequence whereof deceased Rakesh Kumar sustained grievous injuries to which he succumbed, as apparent on a reading of the apposite postmortem report comprised in Ex.P-8. 2. The learned Commissioner dismissed the petition preferred thereat by the dependents of deceased Rakesh Kumar. The applicants standing aggrieved by the rendition of the learned Commissioner hence concert to assail it by preferring an appeal there from before this Court. 3. 2. The learned Commissioner dismissed the petition preferred thereat by the dependents of deceased Rakesh Kumar. The applicants standing aggrieved by the rendition of the learned Commissioner hence concert to assail it by preferring an appeal there from before this Court. 3. The primary reason which prevailed upon the learned Commissioner to dismiss the application preferred by the successors-in-interest of the deceased stood anvilled upon an interpretation by him qua the definition of 'workman' encapsulated in Section 2(n) of the Act, definition whereof stands extracted herein below:- “2(n) “workman” means any person (other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business) who is - (i) a railway servant as defined in Section 3 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 ( 9 of 1980), not permanently employed in any administrative, district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II or (ii) employed [* * * *] [* * * ] in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, whether the contract of employment was made before or after passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of [the Armed Forces of the Union] [* * * ]; and any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead includes a reference of his dependence or any of them.” On an analysis of the material adduced before the learned Commissioner, he concluded there from of given the evident fact of the deceased at the relevant time driving the vehicle owned by his father, constituted his driving it at the relevant time in a “casual nature” whereupon he concluded of with the aforesaid nature of employment under his father as rendered by the deceased in the ill-fated vehicle driven by him at the relevant time, standing excluded from the definition of “workman” existing in Section 2(n) of the Act, rendered him to hence fall outside the ambit of “workman”, whereupon he concluded of the petition preferred before him by the dependents of the deceased being not maintainable. 4. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants contends that with Shri Santokh Singh, the father of deceased Rakesh Kumar in his reply furnished to the petition admitting the fact of his engaging the deceased in the ill-fated vehicle as its driver on payment of wages, constituted an admission by him qua the capacity of his engagement by him in the ill-fated vehicle being not of a “casual nature” as erroneously concluded by the learned Commissioner rather being magnificatory of his engaging his deceased son in the ill-fated vehicle as a “workman” as defined in Section 2(n) of the Act, whereupon the counsel contends of the apposite interpretation afforded by the learned Commissioner in his impugned rendition qua the deceased falling outside the definition of “workman” being off the mark, as its standing rendered by him while his remaining wholly oblivious to the admission of Santokh Singh, the father of the deceased qua his engaging the latter as a driver in the ill-fated vehicle on a monthly remuneration of Rs.5000/-. 5. The aforesaid submission addressed before this Court by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is un-amenable to acceptance by this Court, as Santokh Singh had recorded a statement before the learned Commissioner of his not intending to adduce evidence in support of the aforesaid apposite averments constituted in his reply furnished to the petition. Even if, the omission on the part of Santokh Singh to step into witness box to support the aforesaid apposite averments would not belittle the effect of the principle of law, of admissions in pleadings qua the facet aforesaid yet working against the Insurance-company, especially when the learned counsel for the Insurance- company omitted to at the stage when Santokh Singh made his statement before the learned Commissioner wherein he portrayed his unwillingness to step into the witness box to substantiate the apposite averments constituted in his reply, wherein, he acquiesces to the apposite averments in the petition qua his son standing engaged by him as a driver in the ill-fated vehicle on a monthly remuneration of Rs.5000/-, make a prayer thereat qua the necessity of examination of Santokh Singh for, hence, facilitating his holding him to cross-examination qua the facet aforesaid, besides to repel any inference of the petition constituted by the legal heirs of the deceased son of Santokh Singh, standing hence spurred by collusion. Nonetheless, even if, Santokh Singh in his pleadings acquiesces to his engaging his deceased son as a driver in the ill-fated vehicle also his admitting in his reply furnished to the apposite petition of his defraying to him a remuneration quantified at Rs.5000/- per month, acquiescences aforesaid may constrain this Court to infer therefrom of the learned Commissioner rendering an erroneous finding qua the capacity in which Santokh Singh engaged his deceased son as a driver in the ill-fated vehicle being of a “casual nature” whereupon this Court would be constrained to conclude of the deceased contrarily falling within the ambit of a “workman” as defined in the apposite provisions of the Act, for its hence holding of the impugned rendition of the Commissioner being amenable for its being quashed and set aside. However, the effect, if any, of acquiescences by Santokh Singh in his pleadings qua the facet aforesaid, would not yet relieve him from stepping into the witness box for proving the aforesaid factum nor would the effect of the admissions aforesaid qua the facet aforesaid comprised in his reply furnished to the petition be amenable to a construction of theirs per se proving the factum of his engaging his son in the ill-fated vehicle as its driver on a monthly remuneration of Rs.5000/- nor would omissions, if any, on the part of the learned counsel for the Insurance Company to at the stage when Santokh Singh under his statement recorded thereat portrayed his unwillingness to step into the witness box to prove the averments constituted in his apposite reply furnished to the petition make a motion thereat qua the imperativeness of his examination before the Commissioner constrain any inference from this Court of Santokh Singh thereupon discharging the onus of proving the factum of his paying salary quantified at Rs.5000/- per month to his deceased son, who at the relevant time was driving the ill-fated vehicle. The necessity of Santokh Singh stepping into the witness box to prove the factum aforesaid was imperative, especially when he holds with the deceased a blood relation of his being his father, factum whereof would hence not facilitate any deduction from this Court on the anvil of his mere apposite acquiescences qua the facet aforesaid of his paying salary to his deceased son quantified at Rs.5000/- per month, of hence, the factum probandum aforesaid standing convincingly proved. Further, his apposite acquiescences in his pleadings, would not relieve him from proving the aforesaid factum by his stepping into the witness box. His omission to step into the witness box rather appears to stand engendered by the factum of his not possessing any cogent proof in display of his paying salary to his deceased son comprised in a sum of Rs.5000/- per month. His omission to step into the witness box sequels also the drawing of an adverse inference against him of his not holding any proof qua any facets of the apposite contentions/averments constituted in his pleadings, wherein he has supported the petition filed by the legal heirs/dependents of his deceased son. Contrarily, it engenders an inference of his apposite acquiescences in his reply being obviously collusive, whereupon no credence is imputable. For reiteration, given his active collusiveness with the applicants/appellants herein, he appears to hence acquiesce to his engaging his deceased son as a driver in the ill-fated vehicle on a monthly remuneration quantified at Rs.5000/-. In sequel, it would be inappropriate to attract the principle of admissions qua the facet aforesaid in his pleadings, constituting sufficient proof qua the prime factum of his paying to his deceased son Rs.5000/- per month as salary to the latter for his performing work under him as a driver in the ill-fated vehicle, rendering him to hence fall outside the ambit of the definition of “workman” extracted hereinabove, definition whereof excludes his evident casual nature of employment/engagement thereon, as aptly concluded by the learned Commissioner, from its ambit, rendering him hence incapacitated for his being construable to be a “workman”. The attraction of the principle qua admissions in pleadings constituting proof is not attractable hereat, given the peculiar fact of his holding a relationship of his being the father of his deceased son, whose dependents/legal heirs constituted the apposite petition before the learned Commissioner, proximity whereof, of his relationship with the deceased engenders an inference of his obviously holding collusion with the petitioners, whereupon rather conclusive proof by his adducing, on his stepping into the witness box, receipts in portrayal of his defraying wages to his deceased son quantified at Rs.5000/- per month for the latter performing under him work as a driver in the ill-fated vehicle, was hence a peremptory obligation cast upon him. His not possessing the aforesaid receipts which he was enjoined to adduce in evidence led him to not step into the witness box. In sequel, the effect of his admitting in his pleadings of, his employing his son as a driver in the ill-fated vehicle does not constitute any proof qua the facet aforesaid, prominently, when he has for reasons aforesaid not discharged the aforesaid onus cast upon him. 6. Be that as it may, subsequent to the institution of the petition by the dependents of his deceased son, he did not depict in Ex.R-3, the factum of his employing his son in the ill-fated vehicle as a driver on his defraying to him wages quantified at Rs.5000/- per month. The aforesaid exhibit stood tendered into evidence by the learned counsel for the Insurance Company. It appears that with the apposite manifestations in Ex.R-3, portrayals whereof dispel the factum of Santokh Singh engaging his deceased son as a driver in the ill-fated vehicle on his defraying to him a sum of Rs.5000/- per month, Santokh Singh for obviating his standing confronted with the manifestations in Ex.R-3 besides his not possessing the apposite receipts displaying his defraying to his deceased son a sum of Rs.5000/- per month as salary for his employing him as a driver in the ill-fated vehicle, hence, omitted to step into the witness box. Consequently, the learned Commissioner has aptly held of his son merely driving the illfated vehicle of his father in a casual capacity. Given his driving the apposite vehicle at the relevant time in a “casual nature” when hence excludes him to fall within the ambit of the definition of “workman” encapsulated in Section 2(n) of the Act, constrains this Court to affirm the order impugned before this Court. 7. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the instant appeal is dismissed and the order impugned before this Court is affirmed and maintained. All pending applications also stand disposed of. No order as to costs.