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2016 DIGILAW 1109 (KER)

Ray Sudhan v. Sajeendran

2016-12-15

ANIL K.NARENDRAN, V.CHITAMBARESH

body2016
ORDER : V. Chitambaresh, J. - This is an application to amend the Scheme framed for the administration of 'Sree Narayana Trusts' and notice was taken by paper publication as enjoined under Order I Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('C.P.C.'). We heard M/s. R. Rajasekharan Pillai, M. Balagovindan, V.R.K. Kaimal, Advocates in support and Mr. N. Nandakumara Menon, Senior Advocate, M/s. N. Rajan Babu, Sajan Varghese, Advocates in opposition. 2. A Division Bench of this Court by judgment dated 8.3.1978 in A.S. Nos. 689 & 813 of 1972 framed a Scheme for a Trust named Sree Narayana Trusts' and Clause 34 thereof is as follows:- "Any member of the Board of Trustees may move the Honourable High Court of Kerala for appropriate modification of the Scheme or for other directions, if any difficulty arises in the working of the Scheme or if it is found necessary and expedient for the effective functioning of the Trust. (emphasis supplied) Such a clause was incorporated after accepting the draft Scheme submitted by the parties when it was noticed that there were certain inadequacies in Ext.D7 Trust Deed warranting alteration. The Scheme framed for the Trust by the court was marked Ext. A1 and appended as part of the judgment itself evident from the following observations therein; "During the hearing of the appeals, we felt that Ext.D7 has become inadequate to meet the needs of the Trust and serve its interest and that a modified Scheme was necessary. This view was shared by all the counsel appearing in the case and also by defendants 112 and 121, who were present in person, and a draft Scheme signed by counsel and defendant 121 was accordingly submitted in court on 13.1.1978 suitably modifying Ext.D7. This Draft itself was prepared and produced in court after certain earlier proposals made by counsel and the above defendants were discussed in court and in the light of the modifications which were suggested by us. This Draft itself was prepared and produced in court after certain earlier proposals made by counsel and the above defendants were discussed in court and in the light of the modifications which were suggested by us. We perused the Draft Scheme, heard further arguments of counsel and parties and we are satisfied that it can be approved and accepted in the best interest of the Trust, particularly in view of Clause (34) which permits any member of the Board of Trustees to move this Court for appropriate modifications of the Scheme or for other directions, if any difficulty arises in the working of the Scheme or if it is found necessary and expedient for the effective functioning of the Trust. We accept that Scheme for the Trust, mark it as Ext. A1 and append it as part of this judgment. That finally disposes of issue No.17." (emphasis supplied) Thus Clause 34 of the Scheme enabled any member of the Board of Trustees to make a motion in this Court if it is found necessary and expedient for the effective functioning of the Trust. 3. The above enabling provision for any member of the Board of Trustees was deleted by order dated 31.8.1987 in C.M.P. No. 16895/1987 in A.S. Nos. 689 & 813 of 1972. Clause 34 of the Scheme was trimmed down enabling any member of the Board of Trustees to move this Court only for modification of the Scheme as follows:- "Any member of the Board of Trustees may move the Honourable High Court of Kerala for appropriate modification of the Scheme." Any member of the Board of Trustees was thus disabled from making a motion even if there is any difficulty in the working of the Scheme or for the effective functioning of the Trust. The reason for altering Clause 34 of the Scheme as can be found in the order in C.M.P. No. 16895/1997 in A.S. Nos. 689 & 813 of 1972 is as follows:- "Having regard to the best interests of the Trust, it appears to us wholly unnecessary to enable persons concerned to move this Court for interpreting or clarifying any of its provisions as it is obvious that it is a matter which the authorities functioning under the Trust can do satisfactorily. 689 & 813 of 1972 is as follows:- "Having regard to the best interests of the Trust, it appears to us wholly unnecessary to enable persons concerned to move this Court for interpreting or clarifying any of its provisions as it is obvious that it is a matter which the authorities functioning under the Trust can do satisfactorily. The existence of Clause 34 in the Scheme enabling any one to seek directions from this Court has unnecessarily led to enormous litigation which is not conducive for the satisfactory functioning of the Trust under the Scheme. We have therefore no hesitation in taking the view that having regard to the interests of the Trust, proper functioning of the Scheme and to avoid unnecessary litigation it is enough that there is limited scope for approaching the court for the purpose of securing amendment of the Scheme as and when the same becomes necessary." (emphasis supplied) Thus no member of the Board of Trustees can make a motion in this Court unless for amending the Scheme itself and has to be silent as regards the working of the Scheme or functioning of the Trust. 4. I.A. No. 368/2016 in A.S. No. 689/1972 has been filed by a member of the Board of Trustees seeking to incorporate Clause 34A to the Scheme which is extracted below:- "If any 10 members of the Board Trust or 100 voters electing the representatives of any denomination other than Clause (a) to (c) of Clause 3 shall have the right to approach High Court in the event of the office bearers of Trust or the Executive Committee violates the provisions of Trust Scheme or commit any breach of Trust." The petitioner justifies his prayer contending that no other way is out to ventilate his grievances against the illegal acts of the office bearers of the Trust and the relevant averment is as follows:- "However beset in the situation, it is absolutely necessary that amendment in Clause 34 of the Scheme is highly essential. Now the retention of Clause 34 in the Trust Scheme for amending only in respect of modification or amendment of the Scheme. Now the retention of Clause 34 in the Trust Scheme for amending only in respect of modification or amendment of the Scheme. The Board of Trustee have no other way to ventilate the illegal acts of the Executive Committee or the office bearers of the Trust though a suit under Section 92 of the C.P.C. is possible which is cumbersome procedure as observed by the Honourable Supreme Court." The pendency of the above interlocutory application was noticed in I.A. No. 2322/2015 filed by the petitioner challenging the appointment of Assistant Professors to the colleges under the Trust. The same was refused to be interfered with for the reason that Clause 34 of the Scheme as amended earlier did not permit such exercise. The order in I.A. No. 2322/2015 does not forbid us from considering I.A. No .368/2016 on merits nor does it operate as res judicata by any chance. 5. The members of the Board of Trustees cannot be a mute spectator if any difficulty arises in the working of the Scheme or is necessary for the effective functioning of the Trust. There should be venue for them to voice their grievances and there should be an adjudicatory body for the ventilation of their grievances. To file a suit under Section 92 C.P.C. separately questioning an action of the Board of Trustees would be cumbersome taking note of the growth of Trust. The Trust is reportedly running 90 institutions including First Grade colleges, Training college, Law college, Super Speciality Hospitals, Schools etc. A separate suit would also be superfluous when this Court has framed a Scheme and there should be provision for a member aggrieved to make a motion. We are conscious of the fact that each and every action of the Trust should not be questioned by a disgruntled member leading to prolonged litigation. But a member of the Board of Trustees shall not also be silenced for ever for the reason that there is no venue for him to agitate. There should be a check and balance for either sides and the same can be achieved by permitting a motion by a minimum number of persons prescribed. Clause 34A now sought to be incorporated takes care of this situation by prescribing 10 members of the Board of Trustees or 100 members to make a motion. There should be a check and balance for either sides and the same can be achieved by permitting a motion by a minimum number of persons prescribed. Clause 34A now sought to be incorporated takes care of this situation by prescribing 10 members of the Board of Trustees or 100 members to make a motion. The representatives of the denomination falling under sub-clauses (a) to (c) of Clause 3 are however excluded from being reckoned in the 100 voters. This is because sub-clauses (a) to (c) of Clause 3 comprise only of those who become members of the Trust by contribution and not by election, we do feel that the incorporation of Clause 34A to the Scheme would subserve the ends of justice as it provides a platform for the aggrieved member. 6. It was inter alia contended that we cannot sit in appeal over the order in C.M.P. No. 16895/1987 whereby Clause 34 of the Scheme as originally stood was amended. We should state that Clause 34 of the Scheme even after amendment retains the power for modification on motion made by any of the member of the Board of Trustees. This power is precisely called in aid by the petitioner to incorporate Clause 34A in the Scheme to keep the functioning of the Trust on rails. The Scheme can be amended even in the absence of an express enabling provision therein as held in Elias v. Elias ( 1986 KLT 72 ). A fresh suit is warranted only if substantial alterations are proposed to be made in the Scheme necessitating lengthy evidence which is not so in the case on hand. The dictum to that effect in Radhakrishna Pillai v. Bhargavi Amma ( 2012 (2) KLT 842 ) has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in S.L.P.(Civil) No.24355/2012. The jurisdiction of this Court to amend the Scheme framed by it for the administration of the Trust is therefore not open to doubt. 7. A suit under Section 92 C.P.C. wherein a Scheme has been framed for the administration of a Trust is analogous to an Administration suit [See Raje Anandrao v. Shamrao ( AIR 1961 SC 1206 )). Such a Scheme can be amended or altered in order to ensure that there is a fair administration of the Trust with the object for which it was formed. Such a Scheme can be amended or altered in order to ensure that there is a fair administration of the Trust with the object for which it was formed. The bar of res judicata cannot be pleaded against such alteration if considerations justify the same (See Ahmad Adam Sait v. Makhri ( AIR 1964 SC 107 )). A sizable number of the members of the Board of the Trustees or the voters should have an opportunity and form to voice their grievances. The opportunity should not be illusory and the forum should not be inconvenient or the adjudication should not be cumbersome. Such aggrieved members cannot be silenced by restricting the scope of motion under Clause 34 as one available for modification of the Scheme only. We therefore allow amendment of the Scheme by incorporating Clause 34A thereto in the lines indicated above for the effective functioning of the Trust. Whether any relief sought under Clause 34A of the Scheme should be granted or not in a given case would be considered in the fact situation obtaining. I.A. No. 368/2016 in A.S.No.689/1972 is allowed. No costs. Anil K. Narendran, J. (Concurring) 8. I had the benefit of going through the reasons recorded in the order prepared by my brother V. Chitambaresh, J. in I.A. No. 368 of 2016 in A.S.No.689 of 1972.1 find it appropriate to supplement the reasons while concurring with the ultimate decision. 9. As borne out from the pleadings and materials on record, Sree Narayana Trusts, Kollam is a public trust of a charitable nature. Ext.R2(a) deed of trust dated 18.8.1952 would show that, Sree Narayana Trusts (hereinafter referred to as 'SN Trust' for brevity) was constituted by Sree Narayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam (hereinafter referred to as 'SNDP Yogam' for brevity), which is a social organisation formed in the year 1903, as a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act 1882, adopted by the Travancore Regulation of 1063. SNDP Yogam, which has established Sree Narayana College at Kollam, a First Grade College and Technological Institute, pursuant to a resolution adopted at its Annual General Meeting held on 24/25.11.1945, in 27.10 acres of land in the Cantonment Maidan, Kollam, comprised in Sy. Nos. 83/32 and 83/33 of Vadakkevila Pakuthy and Sy. Nos. 245/7 and 245/8 of Eravipuram Pakuthy, leased out to it by the erstwhile Government of the Maharaja of Travancore, in which it has constructed necessary buildings. Nos. 83/32 and 83/33 of Vadakkevila Pakuthy and Sy. Nos. 245/7 and 245/8 of Eravipuram Pakuthy, leased out to it by the erstwhile Government of the Maharaja of Travancore, in which it has constructed necessary buildings. Later, pursuant to another resolution, SNDP Yogam established Sree Narayana College for Women, Kollam, having obtained sub-lease of 2 acres of land comprised in Sy.No.245/1 -2 of Eravipuram Pakuthy leased out to Sree Narayana Samskara Mandiram Committee, Kollam by the erstwhile Government of the Maharaja of Travancore, in which SNDP Yogam has constructed necessary buildings. Still later, SNDP Yogam decided to establish a Technological Institute at Kollam and a College at Sivagiri and for the management, development and expansion of the said institutions, and the General Body of SNDP Yogam by resolution dated 8.5.1949 authorised its Board of Directors to take steps to constitute a Trust and execute the necessary documents on that behalf. It was accordingly that, SN Trust was constituted vide Ext.R2(a) deed of trust, with the object to maintain the said institutions; to establish and maintain other institutions intended for the educational, cultural, economic, social, religious and welfare advancement and for the physical well-being of the people; etc. 10. On 13.10.1969, O.S.No. 2/1969 was filed before the District Court, Thiruva-nanthapuram, with the sanction of the Advocate General under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'CPC' for brevity) for framing a Scheme for SN Trust and for other incidental reliefs. The District Court passed a preliminary decree to frame a Scheme retaining the salutary provisions in the trust deed with the alterations, deletions and additions suggested in the judgment and the parties were directed to file joint Scheme within 30 days. The plaintiffs were directed to apply for the issue of a Commission for examining certain accounts. The preliminary decree provides, among other things, to put the management of SN Trust in the hands of 2 Advocate Receivers till framing of the new Scheme, subject to the terms and directions contained in the judgment. 11. The preliminary decree passed in O.S. No. 2/1969 was under challenge in A.S. No. 689/1972 filed by defendants 1 to 3 and others and A.S.No.813/ 1972 filed by the plaintiffs, which culminated in the judgment of this Court dated 8.3.1978. 11. The preliminary decree passed in O.S. No. 2/1969 was under challenge in A.S. No. 689/1972 filed by defendants 1 to 3 and others and A.S.No.813/ 1972 filed by the plaintiffs, which culminated in the judgment of this Court dated 8.3.1978. During the hearing of the appeals this Court noticed that, by the time the suit was brought on 13.10.1969, SN Trust owned 20 institutions, including 10 First Grade Colleges and one hospital. The Division Bench felt that the deed of trust, which was marked as Ext.D7, has become inadequate to meet the needs of SN Trust and serve its interests and that a modified Scheme was necessary. After due deliberations, the draft Scheme was placed for the consideration of this Court, which was approved and accepted as the Scheme for SN Trust, which was marked as Ext.A1 and appended to the judgment dated 8.3.1978 in those appeals. Accordingly, in supersession of Ext.D7 Scheme, this Court framed Ext.A1 Scheme for the administration of SN Trust and issued directions on other issues involved in those appeals. The District Court was directed to dispose of the suit by passing a final decree in accordance with law and in the light of the findings and directions made in the judgment. Clause 34 of Ext. A1 Scheme provided that, any member of the Board of Trustees may move this Court for appropriate modification of the Scheme or for other directions if any difficulty arises in the working of the Scheme or if it is found necessary and expedient for the effective functioning of the Trust. 12. Late M.K. Ftaghavan, the then Secretary of SN Trust filed C.M.R No. 16895/1987 in A.S. Nos. 689/1972 and 813/1972 seeking an order to substitute Clause 34 of Ext.A1 Scheme as follows; "Any member of the Board of Trustees may apply to the trial court for amending the Scheme or interpreting or clarifying any of its provisions, if it is found necessary in the interest of the Trust." 13. The Division Bench of this court noted that, Clause 34 of the Scheme, as it stands, can be invoked only for the purpose of modification, interpretation, application and implementation of the Scheme and not to resolve disputes in relation to the decisions taken by the functionaries or various other bodies constituted under the Scheme, as explained in its order dated 2.7.1987 in C.M.P. No. 7435/1987. Before the Division Bench, it was argued on behalf of the then Secretary of SN Trust that, Ext.A1 Scheme having been made in appeal by this Court, it is desirable that the power of amending the Scheme continues to be vested with this Court. Having regard to all the relevant circumstances, the Division Bench viewed in its order in C.M.P.No.16895/1987 that, it would be in the interests of everyone that the power to amend the Scheme should be with this Court. 14. Before the Division Bench, it was contended on behalf the objectors that, the amendment sought to be made amounts to amendment of the decree and therefore, the procedure prescribed under the C.P.C. for amending the decree must be followed. After referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in Raje Anadrao v. Shamrao ( AIR 1961 SC 1206 ) and Clause 34 of Ext.A1 Scheme, the Division Bench held that the said Scheme could be amended by this court invoking the power conferred by Clause 34 and as such, the application for amendment is maintainable. Accordingly, this Court by the order dated 31.8.1987 in C.M.P. No. 16895/1987 amended clause 34 of Ext.A1 Scheme, which after amendment reads as follows; "Any member of the Board of Trustees may move the Honourable High Court of Kerala for appropriate modification of the Scheme." 15. Now, one of the members of the Board of Trustees of SN Trust has filed the present application, i.e., I.A.No.368 of 2016 under Clause 34 of Ext.A1 Scheme read with Section 151 of C.P.C. seeking an order to amend the said Scheme by incorporating Clause 34A, which reads as follows; "34A. Any 10 members of the Board of Trust or 100 voters electing the representatives of any denomination other than Clause (a) to (c) to Clause 3 shall have the right to approach the High Court in the event of the office bearers of the Trust or the Executive Committee violates the provisions of the Trust Scheme or commit any breach of trust." 16. The pleadings on record would show that, SN Trust runs 87 institutions including 14 First Grade Colleges, Training Colleges, Law College, Nursing College, Super Speciality Hospitals, 12 Higher Secondary Schools, 12 High Schools, Central Schools, Industrial Training Institute, Polytechnic and 10 Self-financing Colleges. The pleadings on record would show that, SN Trust runs 87 institutions including 14 First Grade Colleges, Training Colleges, Law College, Nursing College, Super Speciality Hospitals, 12 Higher Secondary Schools, 12 High Schools, Central Schools, Industrial Training Institute, Polytechnic and 10 Self-financing Colleges. During the course of arguments, it has come out that the total institutions presently run by SN Trust is 90 and that, the First Grade Colleges, Higher Secondary Schools and High Schools run by SN Trust are Government-aided institutions in which the salary and allowances of the teaching and non-teaching staff appointed by the management are met by the State Government spending crores of rupees from the public exchequer. 17. Section 92 of C.P.C. which deals with 'Public Charities' has attained great significance, in the absence of any comprehensive law on the subject of public trusts in India. Sub-section (1) of Section 92 provides that, in the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the leave of the Court may institute a suit, whether contentious or not, in the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject matter of the trust situate, to obtain a decree for any of the reliefs set out in Clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section (1). Sub-section (2) of Section 92 provides that, save as provided by the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 or by any corresponding law in force in the territories which, immediately before the 1st November, 1956, were comprised in Part B States, no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-section (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section. 18. In Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji v. Ishwarlalbhai Narsibhai ( AIR 1952 SC 143 ) the Apex Court held that, a suit under Section 92 of C.P.C. is of a special nature, which presupposes the existence of a public trust of religious or charitable nature. 18. In Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji v. Ishwarlalbhai Narsibhai ( AIR 1952 SC 143 ) the Apex Court held that, a suit under Section 92 of C.P.C. is of a special nature, which presupposes the existence of a public trust of religious or charitable nature. Such suit can proceed only on the allegation that there is a breach of such trust or that directions from the court are necessary for the administration thereof, and it must pray for one or other of the reliefs that are specifically mentioned in the section. 19. In R. Venugopala Naidu v. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities ( AIR 1990 SC 444 ) the Apex Court held that, a suit under Section 92 of C.P.C. is a suit of a special nature for the protection of public rights in the public trusts and charities. The suit is fundamentally on behalf of the entire body of persons who are interested in the trust. It is for the vindication of public rights. 20. In Swami Shankaranand v. Mahant Sri Sadguru Samanad (2008) 14 SCC 642 ) the Apex Court held that, Section 92 of C.P.C. provides for special power of the Court in regard to public trusts both charitable and religious and in a case of this nature, the judiciary exercises the jurisdiction of parens patriae. 21. As held by the Apex Court, under Section 92 of C.P.C. courts have parens patriae jurisdiction over public trusts of charitable or religious nature. In that view of the matter, any suit instituted in respect of such trusts should be dealt with by courts not as a purely adversarial litigation. In such suits instituted on the allegation of breach of trust or that directions from the court are necessary for the administration of the trust and seeking for any of the reliefs set out in Clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 92, the Court should not be a silent spectator and it is bound to zealously guard the interest of the trust since larger public interest is involved, in the instant case, SN Trust being a public charitable trust, the jurisdiction of the Court is parens patriae. 22. Now the question that arises for consideration is as to the power of this Court to amend Ext.A1 Scheme framed under Section 92 of C.P.C., in view of the power reserved in Clause 34 of the said Scheme. 23. 22. Now the question that arises for consideration is as to the power of this Court to amend Ext.A1 Scheme framed under Section 92 of C.P.C., in view of the power reserved in Clause 34 of the said Scheme. 23. In Raje Anandrao v. Shamrao ( AIR 1961 SC 1206 ) the issue that arose for consideration before the Apex Court was as to whether there is anything in Section 92 of C.P.C. which militates against providing a clause in a Scheme framed thereunder for its modification by an application to the Court framing the Scheme. The Apex Court held that, sub-section (1) of Section 92 of C.P.C. provides for setting a Scheme and if a suit is brought for this purpose it has to comply with the requirements of sub-section (1); but where such a suit has been brought and a Scheme has been settled, there is nothing in sub-section (2) of Section 92 which would make it illegal for the Court to provide a clause in the Scheme itself for its future modification. All that sub-section (2) provides is that, no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-section (1) shall be instituted in respect of a trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section. This sub-section therefore does not bar an application for modification of a Scheme in accordance with the provisions thereof, provided such a provision can be made in the Scheme itself, under sub-section (1) the Court has the power to settle a Scheme. That power is comprehensive enough to permit the inclusion of a provision in the Scheme itself which would make it alterable by the Court if and when found necessary in future to do so. 24. In Raje Anandrao's case (supra) the Apex Court held further that, a suit under Section 92 of C.P.C. certainly comes to an end when a decree is passed therein, including the settlement of a Scheme for the administration of the trust. But there is nothing which prevents the Court, which can settle a Scheme under sub-section (1) of Section 92, from making the Scheme elastic and provide for its modification in the Scheme itself. That does not affect the finality of the decree; all that it provides is that where necessity arises a change may be made in the manner of administration by the modification of the Scheme. That does not affect the finality of the decree; all that it provides is that where necessity arises a change may be made in the manner of administration by the modification of the Scheme. If the Scheme is amended in pursuance of such a clause in the Scheme it will not amount to amending the decree. The decree stands as it was, and all that happens is that a part of the decree which provides for management under the Scheme is being given effect to. It is both appropriate and convenient that a Scheme should contain a provision for its modification, as that would provide a speedier remedy for modification of the manner of administration when circumstances arise calling for such modification than through the cumbersome procedure of a suit. 25. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Madappa v. M.N. Mahanthadevaru ( AIR 1966 SC 878 ) reiterated that, it is open in a suit under Section 92 of C.P.C. for the settlement of a Scheme to provide in the Scheme itself for modifying it whenever necessary by inserting a clause to that effect. A suit for the settlement of a Scheme is analogous to an administration suit and so long as the modification in the Scheme is for the purpose of administration, such modification could be made by an application under the relevant clause of the Scheme, without the necessity of a separate suit under Section 92, the provisions of which were not violated by such a procedure justify it's alteration or modification, the bar of res judicata cannot then be pleaded against such alteration or modification. 26. The legal position that emerges from the decisions of the Apex Court referred to above is that, the power of the Court to frame Scheme under Section 92 of C.P.C. is comprehensive enough to permit the inclusion of a provision in the Scheme itself which would make it alterable by the Court if and when found necessary in future to do so. So long as the modification in the Scheme is for the purpose of administration, such modification could be made, by an application under the relevant clause of the Scheme, without the necessity of a separate suit under Section 92. So long as the modification in the Scheme is for the purpose of administration, such modification could be made, by an application under the relevant clause of the Scheme, without the necessity of a separate suit under Section 92. Even after a Scheme is framed in a suit instituted under Section 92, if supervening considerations justify it's alteration or modification, the bar of res judicata cannot then be pleaded against such alteration or modification. 27. In the instant case, Clause 34 of Ext.A1 Scheme, as it stood originally and after its amendment by the order dated 31.8.1987 in C.M.P. No. 16895/1987, provides for modification of the Scheme by moving this Court. It was invoking Clause 34 of Ext.A1 Scheme, as it stood originally, the then Secretary of SN Trust moved C.M.P. No. 16895/1987 before this Court for amendment of the Scheme. In the said petition, this Court ordered amendment of Clause 34 by the order dated 31.8.1987, taking note of the submission made on behalf of the then Secretary that, Ext.A1 Scheme having been made in appeal by this Court, it is desirable that the power of amending the Scheme continues to be vested with this Court. The Division Bench held that the said Scheme could be amended by this Court invoking the power conferred by Clause 34 and as such, the application for amendment is maintainable. Having obtained such an order for amendment in a petition filed in the appeal suit, it cannot now be contended that I.A. No. 368/2016 filed for amendment of Ext.A1 Scheme is not maintainable in law. The contention to that effect by the contesting respondents can only be repelled as one devoid of merits. 28. Now the question that arises for consideration is as to whether a provision can be incorporated in Ext.A1 Scheme, by way of amendment, as sought for in I.A. No. 368/2016, conferring right to the members of the Board of Trustees of SN Trust to approach this Court in the event of any violation of the provisions of the Scheme or breach of trust committed by any office bearer of the Trust or its Executive Committee. 29. 29. By way of this amendment, the petitioner wants to incorporate Clause 34A to Ext.A1 Scheme, by which any 10 members of the Board of Trust or 100 voters electing the representatives of any denomination other than Clause (a) to (c) to Clause 3 of the Scheme shall have the right to approach this Court in the event of the office bearers of SN Trust or the Executive Committee violates the provisions of the trust Scheme or commit any breach of trust. 30. Going by the averments in the affidavit accompanying I.A. No. 368/2016, members of the Board of Trustees have no way to ventilate their grievances against the illegal acts of the Executive Committee or the office bearers of the Trust other than through a suit under Section 92 of C.P.C., which is a cumbersome procedure. Therefore, the proposed amendment by incorporating Clause 34A to Ext.A1 Scheme is intended to ventilate their grievances against the illegal acts/breach of trust committed by any office bearer of the Trust or its Executive Committee, by seeking appropriate reliefs by way of an application filed before this Court in the appeal suit, instead of filing a regular suit under Section 92 of C.P.C. before the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. 31. In this regard, at the outset, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that, I.A. No. 368/2016 is not legally maintainable in view of the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court dated 31.8.1987 in C.M.P No. 16895/1987 and that of another Division Bench dated 19.1.2016 in I.A. No. 2322/2015. 32. 31. In this regard, at the outset, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that, I.A. No. 368/2016 is not legally maintainable in view of the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court dated 31.8.1987 in C.M.P No. 16895/1987 and that of another Division Bench dated 19.1.2016 in I.A. No. 2322/2015. 32. As far as the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court dated 19.1.2016 in I.A. No. 2322/2015 is concerned, it was an application filed by the petitioner herein seeking an order to direct SN Trust not to proceed with the selection and appointment of Assistant Professors in various subjects in the colleges under the Trust, pursuant to a notification dated 19.8.2015 published in the Hindu daily, as discernible from the said order, the said interlocutory application was not one seeking amendment of any provision in Ext.A1 Scheme by incorporating a provisions similar to that proposed as Clause 34A in the present application, making a provision for the members of the Board of Trustees to approach this Court in the event of the office bearers of the Trust or its Executive Committee violates any provision of the trust Scheme or commit any breach of trust. In the said order, the Division Bench has also noticed the pendency of the present interlocutory application for amendment of Ext.A1 Scheme. After referring to Clause 34 of the Scheme, as amended by the order dated 31.8.1987 in C.M.P. No. 16895/1987, the Division Bench observed that under the said clause, this Court can consider only applications by the members of the Board of Trustees for appropriate modification of Ext.A1 Scheme and that, any complaint relating to mismanagement or abuse of office, misfeasance, malfeasance or failure in the matter of administering the Trust in accordance with the provisions that govern are away from the domain of the applications provided under Clause 34 of the Scheme. 33. 33. As far as the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court dated 31.8.1987 in C.M.P. No. 16895/1987 is concerned, it was an order passed by the Division Bench, taking note of its earlier order dated 2.7.1987 in C.M.P. No. 7435/1987, which was filed by the members of the Executive Committee of SN Trust, invoking Clause 34 of Ext.A1 Scheme seeking various reliefs including a declaration that, Late M.K. Raghavan, the then Secretary of the Trust has become ineligible to continue as such in view of the misconduct committed by him in the administration of the Trust and for his removal from that post. The said application was dismissed by the order dated 2.7.1987, without prejudice to the right of the petitioners therein to invoke other remedies that may be available to them in accordance with law in the said order, the Division Bench held that, under Clause 34 of Ext.A1 Scheme this Court can be approached (a) when appropriate modification of the Scheme is required or (b) when other directions are required (i) if any difficulty arises in the working of the Scheme and (ii) if it is found necessary and expedient for the effective functioning of the Trust. Thus, Clause 34 of the Scheme can be invoked in cases where a modification, interpretation, application and implementation of the Scheme is involved and not for disputes in relation to the decisions taken by the functionaries or various bodies constituted under the Scheme. The Division Bench noticed that, what has been sought for by the petitioners therein is a declaration that the 1st respondent therein, the then Secretary of the Trust misconducted himself in the administration of the Trust and thereby become ineligible to continue any longer as Secretary of the Trust. The Division Bench held that, it was not a matter covered by Clause 34 of Ext.A1 Scheme. Paras.2 to 6 of the said order is extracted hereunder; "2. The first question we would like to address ourselves is as to whether this petition is maintainable under paragraph 34 of the Scheme. The Division Bench held that, it was not a matter covered by Clause 34 of Ext.A1 Scheme. Paras.2 to 6 of the said order is extracted hereunder; "2. The first question we would like to address ourselves is as to whether this petition is maintainable under paragraph 34 of the Scheme. Paragraph 34 of the Scheme reads as follows: "Any member of the Board of Trustees may move the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala for appropriate modification of the Scheme or for other directions, if any difficulty arises in the working of this Scheme or if it is found necessary and expedient for the effective functioning of the Trust." If we analyse paragraph 34 of the Scheme it becomes clear that the High Court can be approached (a) when appropriate modification of the Scheme is required (b) when other directions are required: (i) if any difficulty raises in the working of the Scheme and (ii) if it is found necessary and expedient for the effective functioning of the Trust. 3. On a plain reading of this provision in the Scheme, the High Court can be approached when a modification of the Scheme is required. The court having framed the Scheme, the power is vested in the court itself to modify the Scheme. The Trust is bound by the Scheme as modified from time to time by the court. A member of the Board of Trustees can approach this court for any directions "if any difficulty a rises in the working of the Scheme." The difficulty contemplated is regarding the working of the Scheme and its implementation. Thus difficulty may arise out of doubt, obscurity, inadequacy uncertainty or lacuna in the Scheme itself. If the Scheme presents difficulty in its working, this court can be approached for appropriate directions, under the last category, directions can be sought from the High Court "if it is found necessary and expedient for the effective functioning of the Trust." Ancillary and implied powers are implicit in the Scheme itself, if, for effective functioning of the T rust under the Scheme, directions are required regarding these implied provisions, this court can be approached. In other words, the function is to find whether the Scheme is effective for the efficient functioning of the Trust. In other words, the function is to find whether the Scheme is effective for the efficient functioning of the Trust. This provision does not give and cannot give any supervisory, revisional or appellate jurisdiction to this court to revise or set aside the decision taken, by the general body or any other body or functionary under the Scheme. This clause, however liberally construed, does not entitle a member of the Board of Trustees to come to this court for substituting the decision taken by one or the other of functionaries under the Scheme in the matter of the management of the Trust. In other words, this power has been conferred on the High Court with a view to avoid unforeseen difficulty in applying the Scheme for effective functioning of the Trust. Thus paragraph 34 of the Scheme can be invoked in cases, where a modification, interpretation, application and implementation of the scheme is involved and not for disputes in relation to decisions taken by the functionaries or various bodies constituted under the Scheme. 4. What has been sought for by the petitioner is a declaration that the first respondent misconducted himself in the administration of the Trust and thereby became ineligible to continue any longer as Secretary of the T rust. This is not a matter covered by paragraph 34 in the light of our understanding and interpretation of the said paragraph. 5. It was however contended by Sri. Chacko, learned counsel for some of the petitioners that on an earlier occasion in an application C.M.P. 14190/82 invoking para.34 of the Scheme, this court gave a declaration that the second defendant therein should not stand for election as a member of the Executive Committee of the Trust. This court did not decide the scope of paragraph 34 as no such question was raised then. No reliance can therefore be placed on that order, as the question of jurisdiction under Paragraph 34 was not raised or decided. 6. So far as the second and third prayers for removing the first respondent from the post of Secretary. This court did not decide the scope of paragraph 34 as no such question was raised then. No reliance can therefore be placed on that order, as the question of jurisdiction under Paragraph 34 was not raised or decided. 6. So far as the second and third prayers for removing the first respondent from the post of Secretary. S.N.Trust and appointing an Administrator and for declaring the first respondent ineligible to contest for any responsible office in the Trust are concerned, apart from the larger question, it has to be held that paragraph 34 does not cover these aspects and exercise of powers under that provisions does not arise in this case." (emphasis supplied) 34. As noticed by the Division Bench in its order dated 2.7.1987 in C.M.P. No. 7435/1987, Clause 34 of Ext.A1 Scheme was intended for approaching this Court when appropriate modifications of the Scheme are required or when other directions are required in case any difficulty arises in the working of the Scheme and if it is found necessary and expedient for the effective functioning of the Trust. As rightly noticed by the Division Bench, any complaint relating to breach of trust or maladministration by the Board of Trustees was not within the ambit of Clause 34 of Ext.A1 Scheme, as it stood prior to its amendment by the order dated 31.8.1987 of the Division Bench in C.M.P. No. 16895/1987. As such, the submission made on behalf of the respondents that, I.A. No. 368/2016 is not legally maintainable in view of the orders passed by the Division Bench of this Court dated 31.8.1987 in C.M.P. No. 16895/1987 and that dated 19.1.2016 in I.A. No. 2322/2015, is devoid of any substance. 35. Now I shall consider whether the incorporation of Clause 34A to Ext.A1 Scheme, which is intended to ventilate the grievances of the members of the Board of Trustees against the illegal acts/breach of trust committed by any office bearer of the Trust or its Executive Committee, by seeking appropriate reliefs by way of an application filed before this Court in the appeal suit is legally permissible. 36. 36. In Madappa v. M.N. Mahanthadevaru ( AIR 1966 SC 878 ) a Constitution Bench of the Apex court held that, the main purpose of sub-section (1) of Section 92 of C.P.C. is to give protection to public trusts of a charitable or religious nature from being subjected to harassment by suits being filed against them. That is why it provides that suits under that Section can only be filed either by the Advocate General or two or more persons having an interest in the trust with the [consent in writing of the Advocate General]. The object is that before the Advocate General files a suit or gives his consent for filing a suit, he would satisfy himself that there is a prima facie case either of breach of trust or of the necessity for obtaining directions of the court. ['Substituted as 'leave of the Court' by Act 104 of 1974] 37. In Harnam Singh v. Gurdial Singh ( AIR 1967 SC 1415 ) a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court reiterated the view of the Privy Council in the decision in Vaidvanatha Ayyar v. Swaminatha Ayyar (AIR 192 PC 221) that, the object of Section 92 of C.P.C. was to prevent people interfering by virtue of this section in the administration of charitable trusts merely in the interests of others and without any real interests of their own. 38. In R.M. Narayana Chettiarv. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar ( AIR 1991 SC 221 ) the Apex Court held that, under Section 92 of C.P.C. leave of the Court is a pre-condition or a condition precedent for the institution of a suit against a public trust for the reliefs set out in the said section; unless all the beneficiaries join in instituting the suit, if such a suit is instituted without leave, it would not be maintainable at all. Having in mind, the objectives underlying Section 92 and the language thereof, as a rule of caution, the Court should normally, unless it is impracticable or inconvenient to do so, give a notice to the proposed defendants before granting leave under Section 92 to institute a suit. The defendants could bring to the notice of the Court for instance that the allegations made in the plaint are frivolous or reckless. The defendants could bring to the notice of the Court for instance that the allegations made in the plaint are frivolous or reckless. Apart from this, they could, in a given case, point out that the persons who are applying for leave under Section 92 are doing so merely with a view to harass the trust or have such antecedents that it would be undesirable to grant leave to such persons. 39. R.M. Narayana Chettiar's case (supra) the Apex Court held further that, the desirability of notice being given to the defendants, however, cannot be regarded as a statutory requirement to be complied with before leave under Section 92 can be granted as that would lead to unnecessary delay and, in a given case, cause considerable loss to the public trust. Such a construction of the provisions of Section 92 of C.P.C. would render it difficult for the beneficiaries of a public trust to obtain urgent interim orders from the Court even though the circumstances might warrant such relief being granted. Keeping in mind these considerations, although, as a rule of caution. Court should normally give notice to the defendants before granting leave under the said Section to institute a suit, the Court is not bound to do so. If a suit is instituted on the basis of such leave, granted without notice to the defendants, the suit would not thereby be rendered bad in law or non-maintainable. The grant of leave cannot be regarded as defeating or even seriously prejudicing any right of the proposed defendants because it is always open to them to file an application for revocation of the leave which can be considered on merits and according to law. 40. In Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad R. (2008 (2) KLT 68 (SC) : (2008) 4 SCC 115 ) the Apex Court reiterated that, the object of Section 92 of C.P.C. is to protect the public trust of a charitable and religious nature from being subjected to harassment by suits filed against them. Public trusts for charitable and religious purpose are run for the benefit of the public. No individual should take benefit from them. If the persons in management of the trusts are subjected to multiplicity of legal proceedings, funds which are to be used for charitable or religious purposes would be wasted on litigation. Public trusts for charitable and religious purpose are run for the benefit of the public. No individual should take benefit from them. If the persons in management of the trusts are subjected to multiplicity of legal proceedings, funds which are to be used for charitable or religious purposes would be wasted on litigation. The harassment might dissuade respectable and honest people from becoming trustees of public trusts. Thus, there is need for scrutiny. In the suit against public trusts, if on analysis of the averments contained in the plaint it transpires that the primary object behind the suit was the vindication of individual or personal rights of some persons, an action under the provision does not lie. 41. The legal position that emerges from the decisions of the Apex Court referred to above is that, under Section 92 of C.P.C. leave of the Court is a pre-condition for the institution of a suit by two or more persons having an interest in a public trust, against such public trust, for the reliefs set out in sub-section (1) of Section 92. While granting leave, the Court must be satisfied that, there is a prima facie case either of breach of trust or of the necessity for obtaining directions of the Court and that, the primary object behind the suit is not the vindication of individual or personal rights of some persons or merely to harass the trust or its trustees. As a rule of caution, the Court should normally, unless it is impracticable or inconvenient to do so, give a notice to the proposed defendants before granting leave under Section 92 to institute a suit. In case of leave granted without notice to the proposed defendants, it is always open to them to file an application for revocation of the leave, which can be considered on merits and according to law. 42. In Raje Anandrao v. Shamrao ( AIR 1961 SC 1206 ), the Apex Court held that sub-section (2) of Section 92 of C.RC. does not bar an application for modification of a Scheme in accordance with the provisions made in the Scheme itself and that, the power of the Court under sub-section (1) of Section 92 to settle a Scheme is comprehensive enough to permit inclusion of a provision in the Scheme for its modification by the Court, if and when found necessary. does not bar an application for modification of a Scheme in accordance with the provisions made in the Scheme itself and that, the power of the Court under sub-section (1) of Section 92 to settle a Scheme is comprehensive enough to permit inclusion of a provision in the Scheme for its modification by the Court, if and when found necessary. In the said decision, the Apex Court was concerned only with the modification of the Scheme and not with appointment or removal of trustees or any other relief set out in sub-section (1) of Section 92 of C.P.C. Therefore, in Raje Anandrao's case the Apex Court was not concerned with the question as to whether it would be open to the Court to appoint or remove trustees, etc., on the ground of breach of trust, etc. without recourse to a regular suit under Section 92 of C.P.C. Para. 10 of the judgment, which is relevant, is extracted hereunder; "10 Further sub-section (2) of Section 92 bars a suit claiming the above reliefs unless the suit is filed in conformity with Section 92(1). In the present appeal we are concerned only with the modification of a Scheme: we are not concerned with appointment or removal of trustees or any other matter enumerated in sub-section (1) of Section 92. We do not therefore propose to consider whether it would be open to appoint or remove trustees etc. on the around of breach of trust without recourse to a suit under Section 92. We shall confine ourselves only to the question whether in a case where there is provision in the Scheme for its modification by an application to the Court, it is open to the court to make modifications therein without the necessity of a suit under Section 92. So far as the Scheme is concerned, Section 92(1) provides for setting a Scheme and if a suit is brought for this purpose it has to comply with the requirements of Section 92(1); but where such a suit has been brought and a Scheme has been settled, we see nothing in Section 92(2) which would make it illegal for the Court to provide a clause in the Scheme itself for its future modification. All that sub-section provides is that no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-section (1) shall be instituted in respect of a trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section. This sub-section therefore does not bar an application for modification of a Scheme in accordance with the provisions thereof, provided such a provision can be made in the Scheme itself. Under sub-section (1) the Court has the power to settle a Scheme. That power to our mind appears to be comprehensive enough to permit the inclusion of a provision in the Scheme itself which would make it alterable by the Court if and when found necessary in future to do so." (emphasis supplied) 43. In Madappa v. M.N. Mahanthadevaru ( AIR 1966 SC 878 ) the Apex Court held that, a suit for the settlement of a Scheme is analogous to an administration suit and so long as the modification in the Scheme is for the purpose of administration, such modification could be made by an application under the relevant clause of the Scheme, without the necessity of a separate suit under Section 92 of C.P.C. In that case, the question that came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court was as to whether there is anything in clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 92 of C.P.C. which prohibits the giving of any directions as provided in Paras. (11) and (12) of the Scheme in the ordinary administration of the muth. Para.(11) of the Scheme provides for the appointment of two managers for a period of five years who will be eligible for re-appointment. One of the managers appointed under the Scheme of 1948 was the then first defendant in the suit of 1942. The last part of para.(11) of the Scheme is extracted hereunder; "(11) "If the first defendant neglects or refuses to co-operate with his co-manager, the co-manager or any two of the veerashaivas interested in the institution may apply for necessary directions to the Court." Paragraph (12) of the Scheme is extracted hereunder; "(12) The parties herein or any two veerashaivas interested in the institution and either of the managers are at liberty to apply for directions to the District Court as and when occasion arises for carrying out the Scheme." 44. In Madappa's case (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, Section 92(1) provides for two classes of cases, namely, (i) where there is a breach of trust in a trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, and (ii) where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust. The reliefs to be sought in a suit under sub-section (1) of Section 92 are indicated in that section and include removal of any trustee, appointment of a new trustee, vesting of any property in a trustee, directing a removed trustee or person who has ceased to be a trustee to deliver possession of trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property, directing accounts and enquiries, declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust, authorisation of the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged, or settlement of a Scheme. The nature of these reliefs will show that a suit under Section 92 may be filed when there is a breach of trust or when the administration of the trust generally requires improvement. 45. In Madappa's case (supra), the Apex Court observed that, clause (f) of Section 92(1) does not have the effect of circumscribing the powers of trustees or managers to carry on ordinary administration of trust property and to deal with it in such manner as they think best for the benefit of the trust and if necessary even to let, sell, mortgage or exchange it. Clause (f) was put in, inter alia, to give power to the Court to permit lease, sale, mortgage or exchange of property where, for example, there may be a prohibition in this regard in the trust deed relating to a public trust. There may be other situations where it may be necessary to alienate trust property which might require Court's sanction and that is why there is such a provision in Clause (0 of sub-section (1) of Section 92. There may be other situations where it may be necessary to alienate trust property which might require Court's sanction and that is why there is such a provision in Clause (0 of sub-section (1) of Section 92. The Apex Court held that, clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 92 cannot be read in such a way as to hamper the ordinary administration of trust properties by trustees or managers thereof; and if that is so, there can be no invalidity in a provision in the Scheme which directs the trustees or managers or, even one out of two co-managers when they cannot agree to obtain directions of the Court with respect to the disposal or alienation of the property belonging to the trust. Therefore, clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 92 does not apply to the circumstances of the case and no suit under Section 92 was necessary in consequence. The Apex Court has also clarified that, whether a direction as provided in paras.(11) and (12) of the Scheme can be sought by persons other than trustees or managers or one of two managers is a matter which does not arise for consideration in the present case and the Bench express no opinion thereon. Paras. 9 to 11 of the judgment are extracted hereunder; "9. The contention on behalf of the respondent is that these two provisions have clearly reserved power in the District Court to give directions for carrying out the Scheme whenever occasion arises for the same. It is contended that by these provisions power was reserved in the District Court to give directions as to the ordinary administration of the muth in order to carry out the purposes of the Scheme. We are of opinion that this contention on behalf of the respondent is correct. We cannot accept the contention on behalf of the appellant that these paragraphs merely provide for carrying out nitya poojas and vishesh poojas mentioned in the Scheme and nothing else. The generality of the words used in these paragraphs clearly show that power was reserved in the Scheme to get directions of the Court for the ordinary administration of the muth from time to time and that such directions could be sought amongst others by either of the co-managers. The generality of the words used in these paragraphs clearly show that power was reserved in the Scheme to get directions of the Court for the ordinary administration of the muth from time to time and that such directions could be sought amongst others by either of the co-managers. We are further of opinion that it cannot be disputed in the present case that the directions asked for by the respondent were in the nature of directions for the ordinary administration of the muth. It is obvious that in order to carry on the ordinary administration of an institution like the present, the managers have the power to dispose of movable property and to deal with lands in such manner as to maximise the income of the muth. Therefore, when the respondent asked for directions of the Court in the interest of economy and practical utility for the sale of cattle and for selling the right of cultivation of lands from year to year on payment of cash, he was only asking for directions in connection with the ordinary administration of the muth, and the Court would have power under these paragraphs of the Scheme to give such directions as it thought necessary for that purpose. 10. Let us now see if there is anything in Section 92(1). Clause (f) which prohibits the giving of such directions even if there is a provision to that effect in the Scheme. Section 920) provides for two classes of cases, namely, (if where there is a breach of trust in a trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, and (ii) where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust. The main purpose of Section 92(1) is to give protection to public trusts of a charitable or religious nature from being subjected to harassment by suits being filed against them. That is why it provides that suits under that section can only be filed either by the Advocate General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust with the consent in writing of the Advocate General. That is why it provides that suits under that section can only be filed either by the Advocate General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust with the consent in writing of the Advocate General. The object clearly is that before the Advocate General files a suit or gives his consent for filing a suit under Section 92, he would satisfy himself that there is a prima facie case either of breach of trust or of the necessity for obtaining directions of the Court. The reliefs to be sought in a suit under section 92(11 are indicated in that section and include removal of any trustee appointment of a new trustee, vesting of any property in a trustee, directing a removed trustee or person who has ceased to be a trustee to deliver possession of trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property, directing accounts and enquiries, declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust, authorisation of the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged, or settlement of a Scheme. The nature of these reliefs will show that a suit under Section 92 may be filed when there is a breach of trust or when the administration of the trust generally requires improvement. One of the reliefs which can be sought in such a suit is to obtain the authority of the Court for letting, selling, mortgaging or exchanging the whole or any part of the property of the trust, as provided in Clause (f) of the reliefs. 11. We are, however, of opinion that prayer for such a relief though permissible in a suit under Section 92 does not in any way circumscribe or take away from trustees or managers of public trusts the right of ordinary administration of trust property which would include letting, selling, mortgaging or exchanging such property for the benefit of the trust. We cannot infer from the presence of such a relief being provided in a suit under Section 92(1) that the right of trustees or managers of the trust to carry on the ordinary administration of trust property is in any way affected thereby. We cannot infer from the presence of such a relief being provided in a suit under Section 92(1) that the right of trustees or managers of the trust to carry on the ordinary administration of trust property is in any way affected thereby. If this were so, it would make administration of trust property by trustees or managers next to impossible. This will be clear from a few examples which we may give. Suppose there is a lot of odds and ends accumulated and the trustees or managers of a public trust want to dispose of those odds and ends if they are of no use to the trust. If the interpretation suggested on behalf of the appellant is accepted, the trustees or managers could not sell even such odds and ends without filing a suit for authorising them to sell such movable property. Obviously this could not have been the intention behind Clause (f) in Section 92(1). Take another case where the public trust has a good deal of land and arranges to cultivate it itself and gets crops every half year. If the produce is not all required for the trust and has to be sold, the presence of Clause (f) in Section 92(1) does not require that every half year a suit should be filed by trustees or managers with the permission of the Advocate General to sell such crop. The absurdity of the argument on behalf of the appellant based on clause (f) of Section 92f (1) is therefore, obvious and that clause does not in our opinion have the effect of Circumscribing the powers of trustees or managers to carry on ordinary administration of trust property and to deal with it in such manner as they think best for the benefit of the trust and if necessary even to let, sell, mortgage or exchange it. It seems that Clause (f) was put in inter alia to give power to Court to permit lease, sale, mortgage or exchange property where, for example, there may be a prohibition in this regard in the trust deed relating to a public trust. There may be other situations where it may be necessary to alienate trust property which might require Court's sanction and that is why there is such a provision in Clause (f) in Section 92(1). There may be other situations where it may be necessary to alienate trust property which might require Court's sanction and that is why there is such a provision in Clause (f) in Section 92(1). But that clause in our opinion was not meant to limit in any way the power of trustees or managers to manage the trust property to the best advantage of the trust and in its interest, and if necessary, even to let, sell, mortgage or exchange such property. Further if Clause (f) cannot be read to limit the powers of trustees or managers to manage the trust property in the interest of the trust and to deal with it in such manner as would be to the best advantage of the trust, there can be no bar to a provision being made in a Scheme for directions by the Court in that behalf. If anything, such a provision would be in the interest of the trust, for the Court would not give directions to let, sell, mortgage or exchange the trust property or any part thereof unless it was clearly in the interest of the trust. Such a direction can certainly be sought by the trustees or managers or even by one manager out of two if they cannot agree, and there is nothing in Clause (f) in our opinion which militates against the provision in the Scheme for obtaining such direction. We may add that we say nothing about obtaining of such directions by persons other than managers or trustees, for this is not a case where the direction was sought by a person other than a co-manager. Whether such a direction can be sought by persons other than trustees or managers or one of two managers as provided in paragraphs (11) and (12) of the Scheme is a matter which does not arise for consideration in the present case and we express no opinion thereon. Whether such a direction can be sought by persons other than trustees or managers or one of two managers as provided in paragraphs (11) and (12) of the Scheme is a matter which does not arise for consideration in the present case and we express no opinion thereon. We are dealing with a case where the prayer is made by one trustee an the order passed thereon relates to matters which are incidental to acts of management of the trust property and we have no doubt that Clause (f) in Section 92(1) cannot be read in such a way as to hamper the ordinary administration of trust properties by trustees or managers thereof: and if that is so there can be no invalidity in a provision in the Scheme which directs the trustees or managers or, even one out of two co-managers when they cannot agree to obtain directions of the Court with respect to the disposal or alienation of the property belonging to the trust. We are, therefore, of opinion that Clause (f) does not apply to the circumstances of this case and no suit under Section 92 was necessary in consequence. The Additional District Judge had jurisdiction to give directions which he did under paras.(11) and (12) of the Scheme, as these directions are of the nature of ordinary administration of trust property and do not fall within clause (f) in Section 92(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure." (emphasis supplied) 46. The legal position that emerges from the decisions of the Apex Court referred to above is that, sub-section (2) of Section 92 of C.P.C. does not bar an application for modification for the purpose of administration of a Scheme in accordance with the provisions made therein, without the necessity of a separate suit under Section 92 of C.P.C. Similarly, clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 92 does not in any way hamper the ordinary administration of trust properties by the trustees and as such, there can be no invalidity in a provision in the Scheme which permit the trustees to obtain directions from the Court as to administration of trust properties. However, if the nature of relief sought for is one set out in clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 92 of C.P.C. on the allegation of breach of trust, maladministration, etc., such relief can be sought for only in a suit filed under Section 92, subject to the bar under subsection (2) of Section 92. 47. In the instant case, by incorporation of Clause 34A to Ext.A1 Scheme, a sizable number of the members of the Board of Trustees will only get an opportunity to ventilate their grievances in the administration of the Trust, in the event of the office bearers of the Trust or the Executive Committee violate the provisions of Ext.A1 Scheme or commit any breach of trust, by seeking appropriate directions from this Court. However, Clause 34A will not entitle them to seek any reliefs as set out in Clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 92 of C.P.C. in such an application, which is legally permissible only by way of a regular suit filed under Section 92, subject to the bar under sub-section (2) of Section 92 of C.P.C.