ORDER 1. The present petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India assails the Notification Annexure P-1, dated 19.5.2011 issued under section 1(v) of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948, for brevity ESI Act, and for declaring the same to be inoperative qua the petitioner-institution, which is imparting education at the leval of High Secondary and happens to be an unaided institution. 2. Learned counsel for the rival parties are heard. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the said Notification, Annexure P-1, dated 19.5.2011 extending application of ESI Act to certain establishments described therein do not include unaided schools akin to the one run by the petitioner-institution. To elaborate, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Notification while describing “establishments” provides educational institutions (including public, private, aided or partially aided) run by individuals, trustees, societies or other organizations. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the expression “including public, private, aided or partially aided”, elicits the intention of the Government to apply the provision of 1948 Act only to such educational institutions which are public, private, aided or partially aided and not unaided institution of the like of the petitioner. 3.1 It is further submitted that teachers working in the petitioner institution are part time and thus do not fall within the definition of employee under section 2(9) of ESI Act. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the issue involved herein is no more res integra in view of the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of CBSE School Management Association v. State of Kerala upholding the same Notification assailed herein and also the Division Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Seth Nand Lal Bajaj Education Charitable Society, Chandigarh v. State of Punjab and another, reported in 2015 Labour IC 2991, which in turn has been relied upon by the Coordinate bench of this Court at Indore while deciding Writ Petitions No.7698/2015 and 7806/2015 (Ashashkiya Shikshan Sanstha Sanchalak Sangh v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others), by a common orders dated 20.6.2016. The said judgment has been brought on record as Annexure R-1 filed along with return by respondents No.3 and 4. The said judgment has been brought on record as Annexure R-1 filed along with return by respondents No.3 and 4. 4.1 Bare perusal of the said judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Ashashkiya Shikshan Sanstha Sanchalak Sangh (supra), reflects that the issue raised therein was that since the educational institution is not carrying out any manufacturing activity and thus is not a factory thereby rendering the ESI Act inapplicable. The other ground raised in the said case was that the educational institutions are running on no profit no loss basis and by applying ESI Act, additional burden would be fastened upon them which would be deleterious to fundamental right of free and compulsory education as provided under Article 21A of the Constitution of India. 4.2 Thus, it is evident from the said decision of Ashashkiya Shikshan Sanstha Sanchalak Sangh (supra), that the issue as to whether unaided educational institution is amenable to the provisions of ESI Act, or not was not involved. 4.3 Thus, the above said contention has to be viewed independent of the said decision of the Coordinate Bench of this Court. 4.4 From the above discussion and the decisions cited by the respondents, it is clear that ESI Act is applicable to educational institutions. The question that is posed before this Court is as to whether the expression “educational institution” includes unaided educational institution or not. 4.5 The description of establishments in the table contained in the impugned Notification, Annexure P-1 dated 19.4.2011 while describing the educational institution used the expression “including public, private, aided or partially aided”. The term of “including” is clear indication of the definition being inclusive in character and not exhaustive. The expression “educational institution” contained in column No.1 of the Table of the impugned Notification encompasses even those educational institutions which are not public, which are not private, which are not aided and which are not partially aided. 4.6 Reference in this regard can profitably be had to the case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and others v. Shankar Industries and others, reported in 1993 Supp. 4.6 Reference in this regard can profitably be had to the case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and others v. Shankar Industries and others, reported in 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 361(II), wherein it was held thus :- “it is a well settled rule of interpretation that where the legislature uses the words 'means' and 'includes' such definition is to be given a wider meaning and is not exhaustive or restricted to the items contained or includes in such definition. 4.7 In view of above, the term “educational institution” is all encompassing and includes within its ambit and sweep all kinds of educational institutions including those which are not described in the bracket following the said expression educational institution, provided the educational institution is run by an individual, society, private or other organization where 10 or more persons are employed on any date of during preceding 12 months. 5. In view of above, this Court has no hesitation to hold that even unaided educational institutions are included within the expression “educational institution” found in the “description of establishment” of Notification dated 19.5.2011 thereby rendering the petitioner-institution amenable to ESI Act, by virtue of the said Notification, Annexure P-1. 6. More so, other peripheral questions raised by the petitioner of the teachers employed by the petitioner-institution being part-time or seasonal in nature can very well be raised before the Employees’ Insurance Court constituted by the State Government under section 74 of ESI Act, whereafter further remedy lies by way of an appeal provided under section 82 of the said Act and therefore this Court refrains from going into the said peripheral question. 7. In view of above discussions and findings, the challenge made to the impugned Notification cannot be countenanced in law and therefore, the present writ petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.