JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. Heard Shri M. Hemchandra and Shri A. Romenkumar, the learned counsels appearing for the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 966 of 2015, Shri P. Tamphamani, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 622 of 2015, Shri I. Lalitkumar, the learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Th. Rommel, the learned counsels appearing for the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 1025 of 2015, Shri B.P. Sahu, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Phungyo Zingkhai, the learned counsels appearing for the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 239 of 2016 and Shri Kh. Tarunkumar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 320 of 2016; Shri N. Ibotombi, the learned Addl. Advocate General, Manipur assisted by Shri A. Rommel, the learned Jr. Govt. Advocate, Shri R.K. Umakanta, the learned Addl. Government Advocate and Shri Y. Ashang, the learned Addl. Government Advocate appearing for the respondents. 2. Few issues have arisen out of these writ petitions and the main question of law commonly involved in all of them is as to whether the Sub-Rule (6) & (7), inserted by way of amendment, in Rule 10 of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 [hereinafter referred to as the “CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965”] are applicable in the State of Manipur or not. Since the main issue involved herein is common, all the writ petitions are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. W.P. (C) No. 966 of 2015 3.1 According to the petitioner, he was initially appointed as Process Server on officiating basis in the Office of the Revenue Commissioner, Manipur vide order dated 29-04-1986 and his ad-hoc/officiating service was regularized w.e.f. 27-03-1993 vide order dated 08-04-1993 and since then, he had been discharging his duties with full dedication. To his utter shock and surprise, the Under Secretary (Revenue), Government of Manipur issued an order dated 17-03-2015 placing the petitioner under suspension because of his alleged involvement in a case being FIR No. 3(3) 2015-VPS u/s. 120-B/420/468 IPC & 8, 9, 13 P.C. Act, by exercising the power conferred under Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10 of the CCA Rules, 1965. 3.2 A memorandum dated 16-04-2015 was issued by the Deputy Secretary (Revenue), Government of Manipur enclosing therewith the articles of charges framed against him. 3.2 A memorandum dated 16-04-2015 was issued by the Deputy Secretary (Revenue), Government of Manipur enclosing therewith the articles of charges framed against him. The petitioner submitted his written statement of defence on 02-05-2015 denying the allegations made in the memorandum. Since the petitioner belongs to a poor family, he submitted a representation dated 29-06-2015 to the Deputy Secretary (Revenue), Government of Manipur requesting him to grant subsistence allowance. Although it has been more than eight months from the date of suspension, there has not been any investigation/enquiry and other development in connection with the said case. Ninety days period as prescribed in Sub-Rule (6) had expired from the date of suspension but there was no Review Committee being constituted nor was any review being done in respect of the suspension of the petitioner. Therefore, the impugned suspension order dated 17-03-2015 is not sustainable in the eyes of law for the reason that it contravenes the provisions of Sub-Rule (6) and (7) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and therefore, the suspension order is liable to be quashed and set aside. Hence, the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner praying for quashing/setting aside the impugned suspension order. W.P. (C) No. 622 of 2015 4.1 According to the petitioner, he is a Government employee serving as Khalasi/ Borganda in the P.W.D., Electrical Division No. III, Manipur. He was posted and utilized as Borganda for moving bills to the Treasury Office. He had been discharging his duties sincerely to the satisfaction of his superior Officers and there was no adverse record in his service career. However, on 21-09-2012, he was arrested by the Police Personnel of City Police Station in connection with FIR Case No. 137(8) 2012 City P.S. u/s 468/471/420/120-B IPC and on the basis of the said FIR being registered, the petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 28-09-2012 issued in exercise of powers conferred under Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 10 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. 4.2 While the petitioner was in Police custody, the District Magistrate, Imphal West issued a detention order dated 29-09-2012 detaining him under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 until further orders on the ground that he was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and was, accordingly, lodged at Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa. 4.2 While the petitioner was in Police custody, the District Magistrate, Imphal West issued a detention order dated 29-09-2012 detaining him under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 until further orders on the ground that he was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and was, accordingly, lodged at Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa. The said order of detention was approved on 04-10-2012 and confirmed by the Government of Manipur on 06-11-2012. On a representation being submitted by the petitioner to the Central Government and the State Government, the detention order was revoked by the Government of Manipur on 03-12-2012. Even though the detention order having been revoked, the suspension order remained in operation because of the said criminal case. Accordingly, the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner, relying upon the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary Vs. Union of India, reported in 2015 (2) Scale 432 , for setting aside the suspension order. 4.3 The instant writ petition is vehemently contested by the State respondents by way of filing an affidavit stating therein that there is no specific adoption of Sub-Rule (6) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 except the Notification dated 21-01-1972 issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of Manipur. W.P. (C) No. 1025 of 2015 5.1 According to the petitioner, he was initially appointed as a Lecturer in Economics at Moirang College, Government of Manipur in the year 1989 and was subsequently placed/ promoted as Selection Grade Lecturer vide Government order dated 05-04-2002 and was, thereafter, confirmed as Reader which later on came to be re-designated as Associate Professor on 01-01-2006. He was appointed as Principal (i/c), Hill College, Tadubi vide order dated 16-09-2011 and while he was serving in the said capacity, the Director of University and Higher Education, Government of Manipur issued an official letter dated 14-11-2014 and superseded by another letter dated 25-11-2014 regarding the option to be exercised by the Assistant/Associate Professors in respect of their transfer and posting and in response thereto, the petitioner had submitted his option on 22-11-2014. 5.2 While the petitioner was serving as Principal (i/c) at Hill College, Tadubi, the Deputy Secretary, Higher Education issued an order dated 10-10-2014 (back dated) transferring him as the Associate Professor in Economics at D.M. College of Commerce. 5.2 While the petitioner was serving as Principal (i/c) at Hill College, Tadubi, the Deputy Secretary, Higher Education issued an order dated 10-10-2014 (back dated) transferring him as the Associate Professor in Economics at D.M. College of Commerce. The said transfer order came to be a subject matter in writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 77 of 2015 which was disposed of on 26-05-2015 thereby quashing the transfer and posting order dated 10-10-2014. Many writ appeals being W.A. Nos. 30, 31 and 32 of 2015 came to be preferred against the said judgment and order dated 26-05-2015 which are pending for adjudication by this court. During the pendency of the said writ appeals, the Deputy Secretary, Higher Education, Government of Manipur issued an order dated 27-11-2015 thereby placing the petitioner under suspension with immediate effect under the provisions of Rule 10 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 with a view to facilitate the Vigilance Department to conduct an enquiry/investigation against him smoothly and effectively. The suspension order is being challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the suspension order was issued as a mala-fide intention in view of the fact that any disciplinary proceedings is not contemplated nor is it pending against the petitioner. 5.3 Denying the averments made in the petition except those admitted by the State Government in its affidavit, it has justified its stand as regards the suspension of the petitioner. According to the respondents, a field inspection report was submitted by the Director of Univ. & Hr. Edn. vide its letter dated 27-08-2015 alleging irregularities, doubtful lapses in the utilisation of UGC and NLCPR funded projects etc. and after examining the said report, the Administrative Department vide its letter dated 18-11-2015 requested the Director, State Vigilance Department to conduct an enquiry. Thereafter, the Vigilance Department registered a case being No. 8/SP-V/2015-652 dated 27-11-2015 and in order to facilitate a smooth enquiry, the petitioner was placed under suspension. But the petitioner has unnecessarily attempted to mix up his suspension and the subject matter in issue involved in the writ appeals pending before this court. The receipt of his representation is not denied but it has been submitted that before an appropriate decision can be taken by the State Government in respect thereof, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition resulting in the matter being sub-judice. The receipt of his representation is not denied but it has been submitted that before an appropriate decision can be taken by the State Government in respect thereof, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition resulting in the matter being sub-judice. W.P. (C) No. 239 of 2016 6.1 According to the petitioner, he was initially appointed to the post of Forester in the Department of Forest, Government of Manipur vide order dated 31-11-1981 and had been discharging his duties to the full satisfaction of his superior as well as public in general. 6.2 While the petitioner was posted at the Forest Beat Office, Serou Lamkhai, the Divisional Forest Officer, Tengnoupal, Chandel District, he was attached to the Range Forest Officer vide order dated 24-01-2014. The Divisional Forest Officer, Tengnoupal Forest Division, Chandel issued an order dated 19-04-2014 instructing him and four others to conduct sample studies for the Forest Resource Survey (FRS) under Moreh Range for review of the current working plan in respect of the Forest Division and they were directed to report to the concerned Range Officer to obtain Geo-co-ordinates of the sample plots to be surveyed and the data so collected by them should be handed over to the Range Officer, Moreh for onward submission to the Divisional Forest Officer. The Divisional Forest Officer, Tengnoupal informed him to appear before the Superintendent of Police, Imphal East District, Manipur in connection with FIR No. 240(08) 2014 PRPT-PS u/s 380/457 IPC and when the petitioner appeared before the SP, Imphal East on 03-09-2014, he was detained in the custody of the Porompat P.S. and thereafter, in the judicial custody. In view of his detention under NSA, the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Government of Manipur (i/c) issued an order dated 11-09-2014 placing the petitioner under suspension by invoking the proviso to Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. In view of his detention under NSA, the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Government of Manipur (i/c) issued an order dated 11-09-2014 placing the petitioner under suspension by invoking the proviso to Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. 6.3 The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the suspension order on the ground that for the purpose of placing the petitioner under suspension, Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 10 is not applicable; that he is entitled to subsistence allowances; that since the suspension order has not been reviewed within a period of ninety days as prescribed under Sub-Rule (6), the order of suspension has ceased to exist after the expiry of ninety days in view of the proviso to Sub-Rule (6) and (7) of Rule 10 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and that the suspension order is liable to be quashed in terms of the order dated 31-03-2015 passed by this court in W.P. (C) No. 1030 of 2014. W.P. (C) No. 320 of 2016 7.1 According to the petitioner, he was serving as Joint Director (Vety.), Government of Manipur. On 26-07-2006, the Commissioner (Veterinary & A.H.), Government of Manipur issued an order by which the petitioner was placed under suspension in terms of the Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 in connection with a criminal offence which was under investigation at the relevant time and his detention in police custody on 17-07-2006 for a period exceeding 48 hours. 7.2 While the petitioner was under suspension, he was allowed to retire on attaining the age of superannuation vide order dated 09-02-2009 w.e.f. 28-02-2009. Before his retirement, a case was taken up against him under the provisions of the Manipur Public Servants’ Personal Liability Act, 2006 and in pursuance to the proceedings of the said Act, the Principal Secretary (Finance), Government of Manipur issued an order on 17-06-2010 whereby a sum of Rs. 53,16,608/- was ordered to be recovered from the petitioner from the alleged total amount of Rs.1,88,83,124/-. Being aggrieved by the said order as well as various acts of illegalities committed during the process of enquiry initiated against him, the petitioner filed a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 525 of 2010 which was allowed on 22-07-2014 thereby quashing the said order dated 17-06-2010 with a liberty being granted to the respondents to initiate a fresh enquiry. Being aggrieved by the said order as well as various acts of illegalities committed during the process of enquiry initiated against him, the petitioner filed a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 525 of 2010 which was allowed on 22-07-2014 thereby quashing the said order dated 17-06-2010 with a liberty being granted to the respondents to initiate a fresh enquiry. In compliance with the order of the Hon’ble High Court dated 22-07-2014, a fresh case was initiated against him under the provisions of the Manipur Public Servants’ Personal Liability Act, 2006. 7.3 From the date of suspension on 26-07-2006, the order has not been reviewed by the concerned authorities before the expiry of ninety days as prescribed in Sub-Rule (6) and till today, the said suspension order has not been reviewed. To find out whether the provisions of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 with its amendments made from time to time are adopted by the State of Manipur, an application under Section 6 of the RTI Act, 2005 was filed and in response thereto, the Deputy Secretary (DP), Government of Manipur gave a reply on 17-03-2015 to Shri R.K. Mohendro Singh, Advocate wherein it is clearly stated that the provisions of all the CCS (CCA) Rules,1965 with its amendments, made from time to time, are applicable to the State Government employees. 7.4 The instant writ petition is being filed by the petitioner on the ground that since the order of suspension has not been reviewed within a period of ninety days, the same has become invalid and in support of his contention, the petitioner has relied upon the judgment and order dated 26-02-2015 passed by this court in W.P. (C) No. 361 of 2014 as well as the judgment and order dated 31-03-2015 passed by this court in writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 1030 of 2014. 8. Out of these five writ petitions, no affidavit-in-opposition has been filed by the State Government in respect of three writ petitions namely W.P. (C) No. 966 of 2015, W.P. (C) No. 239 of 2016 and W.P. (C) No. 320 of 2016 and therefore, the said three writ petitions could have ordinarily been allowed in terms of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Naseem Bano (Smt.) Vs. State of UP & Ors. 1993 Suppl. (4) SCC 46; State of Assam Vs. State of UP & Ors. 1993 Suppl. (4) SCC 46; State of Assam Vs. Union of India (2010) 10 SCC 403; Asha Vs. PT. B.D. Sharama University of Health Sciences & Ors., (2012) 7 SCC 389 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that an averment made in the petition is expected to be specifically denied by the replying party and if there is no specific denial, such averment is deemed to have been admitted by the respondent. In other words, it is well settled that in case the averments made in the petition are not denied or controverted by the respondents therein, the same shall be deemed to have been admitted by them. But since a question of law has arisen in writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 622 of 2015 on account of a new stance of the Department of Works, Government of Manipur and any decision rendered therein will have a bearing on the said three writ petitions also, this court proposes to dispose of all the writ petitions together. In fact, the question of law is being raised by the Department of Works for the first time after this court has already delivered a number of judgments in respect of many Departments, in terms of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Deepak Mali, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 222 , by which many suspension orders have been either quashed or directed to be reviewed by the State Government. The Department of Works appears to have become wiser in the backdrop of these judgments. 9. The submissions made by the learned counsels appearing for the petitioners can be categorised into two - (a) It has been submitted by Shri Kh. Tarunkumar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 320 of 2016 that Sub-Rule (6) & (7) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 are applicable to the employees of the State of Manipur relying upon an information furnished by the Department of Personnel, Government of Manipur in an application filed under Section 6 of the Right to Information Act, 2005. In order to substantiate his contention, he has further relied upon a letter dated 17-03-2015 addressed to the State Government Counsel (HC), Manipur by the Deputy Secretary (DP), Government of Manipur whereby it has been informed that the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 have been adopted as a whole and not on partly basis and (b) it has been submitted by Shri A. Romenkumar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 966 of 2015 that since the Notification dated 21-01-1972 has been issued, in exercise of power conferred under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, referring that all rules/ regulations/orders etc. governing conditions of service in the erstwhile Union Territory of Manipur, will continue to be in force and will apply to the persons serving in the State of Manipur subject to modification, the provisions of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 with amendments are applicable in the State Government in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttarkhand Vs. Mohan Singh, reported in (2012) 13 SCC 281 . In other words, his submission is that from the said Notification dated 21-01-1972, it is clear that the application of the provisions of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 is by way of referential legislation and as such, Sub-Rule (6) & (7) thereof, inserted by way of amendment, will be applicable in the State of Manipur. By and large, their submissions have been adopted by the learned counsels appearing for the petitioners in respect of the other writ petitions. On the other hand, Shri N. Ibotombi, the learned Addl. Advocate General has submitted that in view of the said Notification dated 21-01-1972, there is no specific adoption of Sub-Rule (6) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and in support of his argument, he has also relied upon the same decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttarkhand Vs. Mohan Singh (supra). 10. From the aforesaid rival contentions, it appears that the main issue boils down to the interpretation of the Notification dated 21-01-1972 and the applicability of the law, laid down in the case of State of Uttarkhand Vs. Mohan Singh (supra), to the facts of the present cases. But before considering the main issue, it is appropriate for this court to consider the submission of Shri Kh. Mohan Singh (supra), to the facts of the present cases. But before considering the main issue, it is appropriate for this court to consider the submission of Shri Kh. Tarunkumar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 320 of 2016. In order to counter his submission, the learned Addl. Advocate General has submitted that the information furnished by an officer in an application under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005 cannot be said to be based on the decision of the State Government. His submission is not convincing and not acceptable to this court. The main purpose of enacting the Right to Information Act, 2005 is to ensure access to information. Section 3 provides that all citizens shall have the right to information except those which are exempted under Section 8 of the Act. Section 4 enjoins upon the public authority to maintain records in the manner prescribed therein so that access to such information is facilitated. To obtain information, a person has to make a request in writing in terms of the provisions of Section 6 and in the event of such application being made by a person, the officer concerned shall provide the information on payment of fees. The word “information” is defined in Section 2(f) and the words “right to information” as defined in Section 2(j) means the right to information accessible under this Act which is held by or under the control of any public authority. Admittedly, an application under Section 6 was filed and in response thereto, the information was furnished to the effect that the provisions of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 with amendments, made from time to time, are applicable to the employees of the State Government. This information has been provided by him in his official capacity and that too, in terms of the provisions of the RTI Act and in case the information is found to be incorrect, it is the responsibility of the officer who has furnished it and in that event, the consequence ought to follow in accordance with law. For the present, there is no material on record to show that an action has been taken against the officer for having furnished the information and therefore, it cannot be said that the information furnished by him is not based on decision of the State Government. For the present, there is no material on record to show that an action has been taken against the officer for having furnished the information and therefore, it cannot be said that the information furnished by him is not based on decision of the State Government. Moreover, it is the Department of Personnel, Government of Manipur which concerns with the framing of rules, regulation etc. in consultation with the Law Department. Thus, it can be inferred that the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 with amendments have been adopted and referred to apply to all the employees of the State Government. 11. The stand of the Department of Works, Government of Manipur as indicated and reflected in its affidavit, is that except the Notification dated 21-01-1972 issued by the State Government, there is no specific adoption of Sub-Rule (6) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The Notification dated 21-01-1972 is reproduced herein below: “No. 1.39/71-S SECRETARIAT – APPOINTMENT AND SERVICES DEPARTMENT NOTIFICATION Imphal, the 21st January, 1972 In exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Article 309 of the Constitution, the Governor of Manipur is pleased to order that all the rules/regulations/orders, etc. governing the conditions of service of the persons serving in connection with the affairs of the erstwhile Union Territory of Manipur which were in force immediately before 21st January, 1972 will continue to be in force and will apply to the persons serving in connection with the affairs of the new State of Manipur subject to such modifications as may be ordered from time to time and until further orders and with the adaptation that wherever the word/words “Chief Commissioner”/“Administrator”/“Lieutenant Governor” has/have been referred to in the aforesaid rules/regulations/orders, etc. the same will be construed as referring to the Governor of Manipur. By order etc. D.G. BHAVE, Chief Secretary to the Government of Manipur.” It may be true to some extent that there is no specific order of adopting Sub-Rule (6) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 in the State but it may not be required at all in view of the said Notification, the wordings of which are plain and unambiguous which will mean not only the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 but also the amendments made therein. Prior to the issuance of the said Notification, Manipur was a Union Territory and the provisions of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 were applicable to its employees. Prior to the issuance of the said Notification, Manipur was a Union Territory and the provisions of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 were applicable to its employees. The said Notification was issued, immediately after Manipur attained statehood, adopting all existing CCS rules and regulations including the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. It is common knowledge that any Act enacted by the State Legislature or Rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India can be amended depending upon the circumstances and any change or insertion or replacement of any provision of the Act or Rules will form part of the main Act or Rules after the amendment having been duly and validly made by the State Government. Moreover, there is no order or Notification being issued by the State Government to the effect that any amendment made in any of the CCS Rules and in particular, the CCS (CCA) Rules,1965 adopted vide the Notification dated 21-01-1972, will not be applicable to the employees of the State Government. On a careful reading of the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttarkhand Vs. Mohan Singh (supra), this court is of the view that it will be applicable to the facts of the present cases in favour of the petitioners and in other words, the perception of the learned counsels appearing for the petitioners as regards the law laid down therein and as understood by them, seems to be the correct one. In State of Uttarkhand Vs. Mohan Singh (supra), the question that was called for consideration was as to whether Sub-Section (4) of Section 331 carries with it the amended Section 100 CPC as well, consequently, making it obligatory for the Board of Revenue to frame substantial question of law? In other words, the question was as to whether reference to Section 100 in Sub-Section (4) of Section 331 is by way of referential legislation or legislation by incorporation? The Hon’ble Supreme Court, referring to its earlier decisions, examined the principles of referential legislation and legislation by incorporation and the distinction between the two legislations and held: “17. A subsequent legislation often makes a reference to earlier legislation so as to make the provisions of the earlier legislation applicable to matters covered by later legislation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, referring to its earlier decisions, examined the principles of referential legislation and legislation by incorporation and the distinction between the two legislations and held: “17. A subsequent legislation often makes a reference to earlier legislation so as to make the provisions of the earlier legislation applicable to matters covered by later legislation. Such a legislation may either be (i) a referential legislation which merely contains a reference to or the citation of the provisions of the earlier statute; or (ii) a legislation by incorporation whereunder the provisions of the earlier legislation to which reference is made are incorporated into the later legislation by reference. 19. The law is, therefore, clear that a distinction has to be drawn between a mere reference or citation of one statute into another and incorporation. In the case of mere reference of citation, a modification, repeal or re-enactment of the statute that is referred will also have effect for the statute in which it is referred; but in the latter case any change in the incorporated statute by way of amendment or repeal has no repercussion on the incorporating statute. 25. In Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. after referring to the abovementioned judgment, this Court held as follows: (SCC pp. 550-51, para 9) “9. We have no doubt that Section 55 is an instance of legislation by incorporation and not legislation by reference. Section 55 provides for an appeal to this Court on ‘one or more of the grounds specified in Section 100’. It is obvious that the legislature did not want to confer an unlimited right of appeal, but wanted to restrict it and turning to Section 100, it found that the grounds there set out were appropriate for restricting the right of appeal and hence it incorporated them in Section 55. The right of appeal was clearly intended to be limited to the grounds set out in the then existing Section 100. Those were the grounds which were before the legislature and to which the legislature could have applied its mind and it is reasonable to assume that it was with reference to those specific and known grounds that the legislature intended to restrict the right of appeal. Those were the grounds which were before the legislature and to which the legislature could have applied its mind and it is reasonable to assume that it was with reference to those specific and known grounds that the legislature intended to restrict the right of appeal. The legislature could never have intended to limit the right of appeal to any ground or grounds which might from time to time find place in Section 100 without knowing what those grounds were. The grounds specified in Section 100 might be changed from time to time having regard to the legislative policy relating to second appeals and it is difficult to see any valid reason why the legislature should have thought it necessary that these changes should also be reflected in Section 55 which deals with the right of appeal in a totally different context. We fail to appreciate what relevance the legislative policy in regard to second appeals has to the right of appeal under Section 55 so that Section 55 should be inseparably linked or yoked to Section 100 and whatever changes take place in Section 100 must be automatically read into Section 55. It must be remembered that the Act is a self-contained code dealing with monopolies and restrictive trade practices and it is not possible to believe that the legislature could have made the right of appeal under such a code dependent on the vicissitudes through which a section in another statute might pass from time to time. The scope and ambit of the appeal could not have been intended to fluctuate or vary with every change in the grounds set out in Section 100. Apart from the absence of any rational justification for doing so, such an indissoluble linking of Section 55 with Section 100 could conceivably lead to a rather absurd and startling result. Take for example a situation where Section 100 might be repealed altogether by the legislature—a situation which cannot be regarded as wholly unthinkable. If the construction contended for on behalf of the respondents were accepted, Section 55 would in such a case be reduced to futility and the right of appeal would be wholly gone, because then there would be no grounds on which an appeal could lie. Could such a consequence ever have been contemplated by the legislature? If the construction contended for on behalf of the respondents were accepted, Section 55 would in such a case be reduced to futility and the right of appeal would be wholly gone, because then there would be no grounds on which an appeal could lie. Could such a consequence ever have been contemplated by the legislature? The legislature clearly intended that there should be a right of appeal, though on limited grounds, and it would be absurd to place on the language of Section 55 an interpretation which might, in a given situation, result in denial of the right of appeal altogether and thus defeat the plain object and purpose of the section. We must, therefore, hold that on a proper interpretation the grounds specified in the then existing Section 100 were incorporated in Section 55 and the substitution of the new Section 100 did not affect or restrict the grounds as incorporated and since the present appeal admittedly raises questions of law, it is clearly maintainable under Section 55. We may point out that even if the right of appeal under Section 55 were restricted to the ground specified in the new Section 100, the present appeal would still be maintainable, since it involves a substantial question of law relating to the interpretation of Section 13(2).” 26. We are of the view that the principle laid down in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. and the judgments referred to earlier clearly apply when we interpret sub-section (4) of Section 331 of the U.P. Act. Sub-section (4), as we have already indicated, has used the expression “on any of the grounds” specified in Section 100 CPC. Consequently, the then existing Section 100 (i.e. Section 100, as it existed in 1908 un-amended) was incorporated in sub-section (4) of Section 331 and substitution of the new Section 100 does not affect or restrict the grounds as incorporated. Sub-section (4), as we have already indicated, has used the expression “on any of the grounds” specified in Section 100 CPC. Consequently, the then existing Section 100 (i.e. Section 100, as it existed in 1908 un-amended) was incorporated in sub-section (4) of Section 331 and substitution of the new Section 100 does not affect or restrict the grounds as incorporated. The right of appeal to the Board of Revenue under sub-section (4) of Section 331 clearly intended to be limited to the grounds set out in the then existing Section 100, since those were the grounds which were before the legislature and to which the legislature could have applied its mind and it is reasonable to assume that it was with reference to those specific and known grounds that the legislature intended to limit the right of appeal.” Thus, it is seen that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttarkhand Vs. Mohan Singh (supra) has re-affirmed the law as regards the said two principles of legislation. Referential Legislation means a legislation which merely contains a reference to or the citation of the provisions of the earlier statute whereas Legislation by Incorporation means a legislation where under the provisions of the earlier legislation to which reference is made are incorporated into the later legislation by reference. The distinction between the two is clear and apparent. In the case of mere reference of citation, a modification, repeal or re-enactment of the statute that is referred, will also have the effect for the statute in which it is referred but in the case of legislation by incorporation, any change in the incorporated statute by way of amendment or repeal has no repercussion on the incorporating statute. Coming to the facts of the present cases, the State Government made the legislation by way of issuing a Notification dated 21-01-1972 stating therein that all rules/regulations/orders etc. governing conditions of service in the erstwhile Union Territory of Manipur, will continue to be in force and will apply to the persons serving in the State of Manipur subject to modification. Coming to the facts of the present cases, the State Government made the legislation by way of issuing a Notification dated 21-01-1972 stating therein that all rules/regulations/orders etc. governing conditions of service in the erstwhile Union Territory of Manipur, will continue to be in force and will apply to the persons serving in the State of Manipur subject to modification. It may be noted that although the said Notification has been issued in exercise of power conferred under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the State Government appears to have chosen not to frame specific rules in the name of the State and therefore, all that the said Notification provides, is that all existing CCS rules, regulations etc. will continue to apply in the State of Manipur and that too, without mentioning the specific rules. Specific rules called “the Manipur Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1977” came to be made vide Notification dated 03-03-1977 issued by the State Government. Such specific rules corresponding to various other CCS rules and incorporating therein the relevant provisions of the CCS Rules, have not yet been made by the State Government. As has been stated in the preceding paras, according to the Department of Personnel, the Government of Manipur, all the CCS Rules have been adopted without any exception in the State of Manipur, even though there is no such legislation by adoption. The legislation by incorporation will arise in a case where the specific rules have been made in the name of the State incorporating therein the provisions of another earlier legislation by reference. This is not so in the present cases and in any case, the legislation made by the State Government by way of the said Notification is not the legislation by incorporation. It is a referential legislation or legislation by adoption whatever the terminology that the Departments of the State Government may use and therefore, it can be safely held that Sub-Rule (6) & (7) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 are applicable in the State of Manipur. In view of the above, the main issue is decided in favour of the petitioners. 12. Having held that Sub-Rule (6) & (7) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 are applicable in the State of Manipur, this court proposes to dispose of all the writ petitions based on the factual position of each case. In view of the above, the main issue is decided in favour of the petitioners. 12. Having held that Sub-Rule (6) & (7) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 are applicable in the State of Manipur, this court proposes to dispose of all the writ petitions based on the factual position of each case. In writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 966 of 2015, the suspension order was issued on 17-03-2015 and since it had not been reviewed within 90 days as prescribed under Sub-Rule (6), it had become invalid in terms of the provisions under Sub-Rule (7) and accordingly, the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. Similar is the case with the writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 622 of 2015 wherein the suspension order was issued on 28-09-2012 in exercise of power conferred under Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and even though the detention order dated 29-09-2012 having been revoked, the suspension order was neither reviewed within 90 days as prescribed under Sub-Rule (6) nor had it been cancelled or withdrawn and therefore, the suspension order is bad in law and is liable to be quashed and set aside. In wit petition being W.P. (C) No. 239 of 2016, the suspension order was issued on 11-09-2014 invoking the power under proviso to Sub-Rule (1) of the CCS (CCA) Rule, 1965 and since it had not been reviewed within 90 days as prescribed under Sub-Rule (6), it had become invalid in terms of the provisions under Sub-Rule (7) and accordingly, the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. 13. In writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 1025 of 2015, the petition was placed under suspension on 27-11-2015 with a view to facilitate the Vigilance Department to conduct an enquiry or investigation against him. The petitioner has questioned it on the ground that the reason for suspension does not fall in any of the grounds specified in Rule 10(1)(b) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and therefore, the suspension order is mala-fide. However, this contention has been denied by the respondents. The petitioner has questioned it on the ground that the reason for suspension does not fall in any of the grounds specified in Rule 10(1)(b) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and therefore, the suspension order is mala-fide. However, this contention has been denied by the respondents. Without adverting to the rival contentions, this court is of the view that the writ petition can be allowed, quashing the suspension order, on the ground that since it had not been reviewed within 90 days as prescribed under Sub-Rule (6), it had become invalid in terms of the provisions under Sub-Rule (7) of Rule 10. In writ petition being W.P (C) No. 320 of 2016, the suspension order was issued on 26-07-2006 in connection with a criminal case and while the petitioner was under suspension, he had retired on attaining the age of superannuation. Proceedings under the provisions of the Manipur Public Servant’s Personal Liability Act, 2006 were initiated against him. Since the suspension order was not reviewed within 90 days as prescribed under Sub-Rule (6) nor was it cancelled or withdrawn even after nine years of suspension, the petitioner had challenged it relying upon the judgment and order dated 26-02-2015 passed by this court in W.P (C) No. 361 of 2014; the order dated 19-10-1992 passed by the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 2185 of 1988 and the judgment dated 24-03-1983 rendered by the Karnataka High Court in W.A. No. 48 of 1982. Since the issue involved herein is covered by the judgment and order rendered by this court as stated herein above, the writ petition is allowed quashing the suspension order and therefore, the other two decisions rendered by other High Courts are not being referred to herein. 14 For the reasons stated herein above, all the writ petitions being W.P. (C) No. 966 of 2015; W.P. (C) No. 622 of 2015; W.P. (C) No. 1025 of 2015; W.P. (C) No. 239 of 2016 and W.P. (C) No. 320 of 2016 are allowed and consequently, all the Government orders namely the Government order dated 17-03-2015 issued by the Under Secretary (Revenue), Government of Manipur in W.P. (C) No. 966 of 2015; the Office order dated 28-09-2012 issued by the Chief Engineer, PWD, Manipur in W.P. (C) No. 622 of 2015; the Government order dated 27-11-2015 issued by the Commissioner (Hr. & Tech. & Tech. Edn.), Government of Manipur in W.P. (C) No. 1025 of 2015; the Government order dated 11-09-2014 issued by PCCF (i/c), Government of Manipur in W.P. (C) No. 239 of 2016 and the Government order dated 26-07-2006 issued by the Commissioner (Vety. & A.H), Government of Manipur in W.P. (C) No. 320 of 2016, are quashed and set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.