JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This appeal has been instituted against Judgment dated 1.8.2015 passed by the learned Additional District Judge (II), Shimla in HMA Petition No. 29-S/3 of 2014/11. 2. “Key facts" necessary for the adjudication of the present appeal are that the appellant instituted a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, before the Additional District Judge (II) Shimla, for the dissolution of marriage between the parties by way of a decree of divorce. According to the averments made in the petition, marriage between the appellant and respondent was solemnised in the month of March, 1993 at Hamirpur, in accordance with Hindu rites and rituals. Both the parties cohabited as husband-wife. Out of said wedlock a daughter and a son were born. Attitude and behaviour of the respondent was cordial towards the appellant but after 4-5 months of their marriage, all of a sudden, her behaviour became very harsh, cruel and insulting towards the appellant. Respondent started pressurizing and compelling the appellant to reside separately from the parents. There was no one to look after and maintain the old aged mother and sister after the death of father of the appellant. Respondent stopped doing minor household works and pressurized the appellant to live separately. Respondent used to misbehave and used abusive language against the mother and sister of the appellant. Matter was amicably settled between the parties by way of compromise. However there was no change in the attitude of the respondent. Separate accommodation was also provided to them in the month of October 1998. Respondent left the matrimonial home in October, 2008. She also developed unwanted relations with one Shri Gurjeet Singh. According to the appellant, he was treated with cruelty by the respondent. She deserted the appellant without assigning any sufficient reasons. 3. The petition was contested by the respondent. She has denied that she treated the appellant with cruelty. She had never pressurized the appellant to live separately from his family. Appellant was responsible for forcing the respondent to live with her parents. Rejoinder was filed by the appellant. Issues were framed by the learned Additional District Judge on 18.8.2012. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record carefully. 5. Appellant has appeared as PW-1. He has led his evidence by way of filing an affidavit, Ext. Rejoinder was filed by the appellant. Issues were framed by the learned Additional District Judge on 18.8.2012. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record carefully. 5. Appellant has appeared as PW-1. He has led his evidence by way of filing an affidavit, Ext. PW-1/A. According to the averments made in the affidavit, relations between the parties were cordial for 4-5 months. Thereafter, relations deteriorated. Respondent used to pick up quarrels with him. She used to pressurize him to live separately. His mother provided them with separate accommodation. She left the daughter unattended. He has placed on record Exts. PA to PY. Respondent used to file false complaints against him with the police. She has not maintained any physical relations with him since 2001. Ext. PW-1/B-1 is the envelope. In Ext. PW-1/B, respondent has merely stated that she was not well and the appellant should take care of his daughter. Ext. PW-1/B-3 is a copy of summons issued by the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hamirpur under Section 125 CrPC. Ext. PW-1/B-2 a copy of application filed by the respondent under Section 125 CrPC seeking maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs.500/- per month. Ext. PW-1/B-7 is legal notice served upon the respondent at the instance of the landlord Shri Jagat Ram, whereby respondent was asked to vacate the accommodation within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. Legal notice was replied vide Ext. PW- 1/B-8 by the respondent. She has denied that the house was owned by Jagat Ram. Ext.PW-1/B-9 is a copy of the petition filed by Jagat Ram under Section 14(2)(i) of the HP Rent Control Act against the respondent. Appellant has also filed a complaint against Shri Gurjeet Singh, who was working in Central Potato Research Institute (CPRI), Shimla. Ext. PW-1/B-14 is a copy of letter addressed by the father of the respondent to the Hon'ble Chief Minister bringing to his notice that his daughter was being harassed for bringing insufficient dowry. Appellant has again filed a complaint against Shri Gurjeet Singh vide Ext. PW-1/B-21. Ext. PW-1/B-24 has no relevance in the present case since it is a complaint filed by the wife of Shri Gurjeet Singh, namely Kamaljeet Kaur against her husband. Matter was also looked into by a duly constituted committee as per Ext. PW-1/B-43. Appellant has again filed a complaint against Shri Gurjeet Singh vide Ext. PW-1/B-21. Ext. PW-1/B-24 has no relevance in the present case since it is a complaint filed by the wife of Shri Gurjeet Singh, namely Kamaljeet Kaur against her husband. Matter was also looked into by a duly constituted committee as per Ext. PW-1/B-43. The Committee has not found any substance about illegal relations between Gurjeet Singh and the respondent. 6. Respondent has appeared as RW-1. In her statement, she has refuted the averments made in affidavit Ext. PW-1/A. According to her statement, relations between the parties remained normal for 4/5 years. Thereafter, appellant started harassing her. She was forcibly sent to Hamirpur for delivery. She was residing with her husband. She has denied that she has left the matrimonial house in the year 2008. She has denied the allegations about relations with Gurjeet Singh. She also specifically testified that the matter was compromised several times but the appellant was still harassing her. She has denied the suggestion that she was forcing the appellant to live separately. She has admitted that she has filed petition under section 125 CrPC. She used to look after the guests. She has never picked up any quarrel with her husband. She denied the suggestion that she was provided separate accommodation. She was residing with her children in the same house where the appellant was residing. She has admitted that her father has sent a letter to the Hon'ble Chief Minister vide Ext. PW-1/B-14. She has denied the suggestion that she has not served food to her mother-inlaw. She has admitted that she has filed complaint before the Police since appellant was not paying her maintenance. Her daughter was pursuing B.Tech. and her son was in 10+2 at the time of recording of her statement. 7. The allegations contained in the petition against the respondent are vague and sketchy. He has miserably failed to prove that the respondent has treated the appellant with cruelty. Merely that the respondent has refused to look after the household work occasionally would not amount to cruelty. No specific year, month or date has been given when the respondent has used abusive language against the appellant. 8. Thus, it is duly proved that it is the appellant who has treated the respondent with cruelty by not providing her the maintenance. She is looking after her two children. No specific year, month or date has been given when the respondent has used abusive language against the appellant. 8. Thus, it is duly proved that it is the appellant who has treated the respondent with cruelty by not providing her the maintenance. She is looking after her two children. It was in these circumstances that the respondent was forced to file a petition under Section 125 CrPC against the appellant. The appellant has not even looked after his children. She has no independent source of income. Appellant could not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrongs. It is intriguing to note that both the parties are living in the same house and despite that ground has been taken that the respondent has deserted him. Besides this, the averments made by appellant are nothing but normal wear and tear of life and trivial in nature. Respondent has never deserted the appellant. It is the appellant who, has forced the respondent to live separately, particularly by creating a hostile environment. Appellant has failed to prove that he was treated with cruelty by the respondent. The plaintiff has also failed to prove that the respondent has deserted him without any cause. 9. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah versus Prabhavati, AIR 1957 SC 176 have held that two essential conditions must be there to prove the desertion: (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Their Lordships have held that desertion is a matter of interference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. Their Lordships have held as under: “What is desertion? "Rayden on Divorce" which is a standard work on the subject at p.128 (6th Edn.) has summarized the case-law on the subject in these terms:- "Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party". The legal position has been admirably summarized in paras 453 and 454 at pp. 241. to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. The legal position has been admirably summarized in paras 453 and 454 at pp. 241. to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words:- "In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from the state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, 'the home'. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an allowance to a wife whom he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of desertion. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted. Desertion is a continuing offence". Thus the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears the burden of proving those elements in the two spouses respectively. Here a difference between the English law and the law as enacted by the Bombay Legislature may be pointed out. Whereas under the English law those essential conditions must continue throughout the course of the three years immediately preceding the institution of the suit for divorce, under the Act, the period is four years without specifying that it should immediately precede the commencement of proceedings for divorce. Whether the omission of the last clause has any practical result need not detain us, as it does not call for decision in the present case. Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances to each case. The inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. If in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi co-exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time. The de facto separation may have commenced without the necessary animus or it may be that the separation and the (animus deserendi) coincide in point of time; for example, when the separating spouse abandons the marital home with the intention, express or implied of bringing cohabitation permanently to a close. The law in England has prescribed a three years period and the Bombay Act prescribed a period of four years as a continuous period during which the two elements must subsist. The law in England has prescribed a three years period and the Bombay Act prescribed a period of four years as a continuous period during which the two elements must subsist. Hence, if a deserting spouse takes advantage of the locus poenitentiae thus provided by law and decides to come back to the deserted spouse by a bona fide offer of resuming the matrimonial home with all the implications of marital life, before the statutory period is out or even after the lapse of that period, unless proceedings for divorce have been commenced, desertion comes to an end, and if the deserted spouse unreasonably refuses to offer, the latter may be in desertion and not the former. Hence it is necessary that during all the period that there has been a desertion, the deserted spouse must affirm the marriage and be ready and willing to resume married life on such conditions as may be reasonable. It is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion, like and other matrimonial offence, beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, though corroboration is not required as an absolute rule of law the courts insist upon corroborative evidence, unless its absence is accounted for to the satisfaction of the court. In this connection the following observations of Lord Goddard CJ. in the case of Lawson v. Lawson, 1955-1 All E R 341 at p. 342(A), may be referred to :- "These cases are not cases in which corroboration is required as a matter of law. It is required as a matter of precaution....... "With these preliminary observations we now proceed to examine the evidence led on behalf of the parties to find out whether desertion has been proved in this case and, if so, whether there was a bona fide offer by the wife to return to her matrimonial home with a view to discharging marital duties and, if so, whether there was an unreasonable refusal on the part of the husband to take her back. 10. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manisha Tyagi vs. Deepak Kumar reported in 2010(1) Divorce & Matrimonial Cases 451, have explained the term ‘cruelty’ as under: “24. This is no longer the required standard. 10. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manisha Tyagi vs. Deepak Kumar reported in 2010(1) Divorce & Matrimonial Cases 451, have explained the term ‘cruelty’ as under: “24. This is no longer the required standard. Now it would be sufficient to show that the conduct of one of the spouses is so abnormal and below the accepted norm that the other spouse could not reasonable be expected to put up with it. The conduct is no longer required to be so atrociously abominable which would cause a reasonable apprehension that would be harmful or injurious to continue the cohabitation with the other spouse. Therefore, to establish cruelty it is not necessary that physical violence should be used. However, continued ill-treatment cessation of marital intercourse, studied neglect, indifference of one spouse to the other may lead to an inference of cruelty. However, in this case even with aforesaid standard both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had accepted that the conduct of the wife did not amount to cruelty of such a nature to enable the husband to obtain a decree of divorce.” 11. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravi Kumar vs. Julumidevi reported in (2010) 4 SCC 476, have explained the term ‘cruelty’ as under: “19. It may be true that there is no definition of cruelty under the said Act. Actually such a definition is not possible. In matrimonial relationship, cruelty would obviously mean absence of mutual respect and understanding between the spouses which embitters the relationship and often leads to various outbursts of behaviour which can be termed as cruelty. Sometime cruelty in a matrimonial relationship may take the form of violence, sometime it may take a different form. At times, it ma be just an attitude or an approach. Silence in some situations may amount to cruelty. 20. Therefore, cruelty in matrimonial behaviour defies any definition and its categories can never be closed. Whether the husband is cruel to his wife or the wife is cruel to her husband has to be ascertained and judged by taking into account the entire facts and circumstances of the given case and not by any predetermined rigid formula. Cruelty in matrimonial case can be of infinite variety – it may be subtle or even brutal and may be by gestures and word. Cruelty in matrimonial case can be of infinite variety – it may be subtle or even brutal and may be by gestures and word. That possible explains why Lord Denning in Sheldon v. Sheldon held that categories of cruelty in matrimonial case are never closed. 21. This Court is reminded of what was said by Lord Reid in Gollins v. Gollins about judging cruelty in matrimonial cases. The pertinent observations are (AC p.660) “.. In matrimonial cases we are not concerned with the reasonable man as we are in cases of negligence. We are dealing with this man and this woman and the fewer a priori assumptions we make about them the better. In cruelty cases one can hardly ever even start with a presumption that the parties are reasonable people, because it is hard to imagine any cruelty case ever arising if both the spouses think and behave as reasonable people.” 22. “About the changing perception of cruelty in matrimonial cases, this Court observed in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi at AIR p. 123, para 5 of the report: (SCC p.108, para 5) “5. It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has been (a) marked change in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular, we find a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house to house or person to person. Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatized as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. We, the Judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import our own notions of life. We may not go in parallel with them. There may be a generation gap between us and the parties.” 12. In view of the discussion and analysis made herein above, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. No costs.