JUDGMENT : Arun Bhansali, J. This appeal is directed against the order dated 26.4.2012 passed by the Additional District Judge No. 2, Udaipur, whereby the application filed by the appellant under Order 39, Rule 1 & 2 CPC has been rejected. 2. The appellant filed a suit for injunction and declaration against the respondents inter-alia with the averments that he had purchased the suit property on 28.2.2008 from respondents No. 5 & 6. The respondent-Bank pursuant to recovery proceedings against the respondent No. 4 was seeking to attach and auction the property and therefore, injunction was sought against the said action of the Bank and a declaration was sought that the appellant was owner of the suit property. 3. The facts are checkered, inasmuch as, it is claimed that the property in question belonged to Bheru Lal, who transferred the said property to Durga Bai though consideration was paid by Keshar Bai, her mother and sister of Bheru Lal, the sale deed was registered on 15.6.1957. It is claimed that the said transaction took place pursuant to the agreement dated 15.4.1957. 4. On 18.7.1961, a declaration was executed by Durga Bai inter-alia indicating rights of Keshar Bai, her mother qua the said property indicating that the property belonged to her. Keshar Bai executed a will on 27.10.979 bequeathing the property in question to Durga Bai and her six sons and in the map attached to the will specific portions were indicated. Durga Bai acting on the said will transferred parts of the property from time to time. The portion of the suit property which fell in share of the respondent Nos. 5 & 6, which is residential in nature was transferred to the appellant. However, in between in the year 1997, the entire property which was subject matter of sale deed dated 14.5.1957 was mortgaged and Durga Bai was the guarantor to the loan which was obtained by the respondent No. 4. 5. The proceedings were initiated by the respondent-Bank for recovery against the respondent No. 4 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, wherein the proceedings were rejected as not maintainable, leaving it open for the Bank to take appropriate proceedings. Where after, when the Bank initiated proceedings under the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 2001, the appellant filed the present proceedings seeking injunction and declaration. 6. Where after, when the Bank initiated proceedings under the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 2001, the appellant filed the present proceedings seeking injunction and declaration. 6. Along with the suit, an application was filed seeking injunction against the action of the respondent-Bank in proceedings further with the attachment and auction of the property. 7. The application was resisted by the Bank and by the impugned order dated 26.4.2016, the trial court came to the conclusion that even if the appellant is in possession of the suit property, the possession would not get disturbed by the auction proceedings initiated by the respondent-Bank and if any proceedings are initiated for taking possession of the said property, it would be open for the appellant to take defence qua the said action. 8. Qua the declaration dated 18.7.1961, wherein Durga Bai declared status of her rights qua the suit property, the same was held to be of no value and based on it, the Court prima facie came to the conclusion that the appellant do not have title over the suit property, the possession is not being disturbed and therefore, there was no prima facie case and issue pertaining to balance of convenience and irreparable injury were also held against the appellant resulting in rejection of the application seeking temporary injunction. 9. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the trial court was not justified in dismissing the application filed by the appellant, inasmuch as, the sequence of events clearly indicate that the transaction in question which resulted in sale deed dated 14.5.1957 was a benami transaction and the appellant and/or the transferors are entitled to take the said plea, which is not barred under the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 ('the Act') as the same falls within the exception as provided under Section 4(3) of the Act. 10. It is submitted that the transferors Vishnu Jhala and Kailash Jhala have transferred that part of the property, which has been bequeath by will dated 27.10.1979 by Keshar Bai and nothing beyond it. It is submitted that conduct of Durga Bai herself qua the suit property itself clearly indicates that she had relinquished and/or had stood by the declaration dated 18.7.1961 and therefore, the trial court committed error in rejecting the application filed by the appellant. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank vehemently opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant. It is submitted that conduct of Durga Bai herself qua the suit property itself clearly indicates that she had relinquished and/or had stood by the declaration dated 18.7.1961 and therefore, the trial court committed error in rejecting the application filed by the appellant. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank vehemently opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant. 12. It was submitted that the property in question was mortgaged with the Bank by way of deposit of title deeds and the original title deeds have been produced before the Bank. It is further submitted that on default committed by the borrower, the Bank has been making efforts by way of approaching various forums for the purpose of recovery of its due, which are huge and the transfer in question has apparently been made without any legal right in favour of Vishal Jhala and Kailash Jhala and consequently, the appellant also had no right in the suit property. 13. It is submitted that the suit is pending since year 2008 without any material progress, inasmuch as, the same is still languishing at the stage of plaintiff's evidence and therefore, the trial court was justified in rejecting the application filed by the appellant. 14. I have considered the submissions made by the parties and have perused the order passed by the trial court. 15. The finding of the trial court that as the property is only being attached and auctioned by the respondent-Bank and therefore, the appellant cannot have objection to the same as his possession is not being disturbed and that as and when the action is taken against the appellant for recovery of possession, it would be free for him to take defence and initiate action, is on its face incorrect. The property, which is claimed by the plaintiff, as having been purchased by payment of due consideration by a registered document and he is in possession of the said property, it cannot be said that the property in question if it is being attached and auctioned, the plaintiff cannot have a cause qua the said auction and it is only when the possession is being taken, he would have a cause. The said determination by the trial court while examining the prima facie case is wholly unsustainable. 16. The said determination by the trial court while examining the prima facie case is wholly unsustainable. 16. So far as the issue as to whether Vishal Jhala and Kailash Jhala, the transferors of the appellant had any right to do so, looking to the checkered events starting from 15.4.1957 when the agreement is alleged to have been executed between Keshar Bai and Bheru Lal culminating into transfer of the property on 28.2.2008 by Vishal Jhala and Kailash Jhala interdicted by declaration dated 18.7.1961 by Durga Bai and will dated 27.10.1979 by Keshar Bai, it cannot said that the appellant has not raised triable issue so as to indicate a lack of prima facie case in his favour. The finding of the court based on the prima facie validity of the declaration dated 18.7.1961 is not justified, inasmuch as, besides the document dated 18.7.1961 there are certain other documents and actions of Durga Bai, which needs to be examined at the trial. 17. In view of the above discussion, the finding recorded by the trial court regarding lack of prima facie case in favour of the appellant cannot be sustained. 18. So far as the issues of balance of convenience and irreparable injury are concerned, admittedly, the appellant is in possession of the suit property and in case, the same is attached and put to auction, the same is likely to create further complications in already checkered case and therefore, the balance of convenience lies in favour of the appellant and irreparable injury also would be caused to the appellant, in case, the injunction is not granted. 19. There is substance in the submissions made by learned counsel for the respondents that the suit which was filed in the year 2009, after seven years, is still at the stage of plaintiff's evidence, which clearly indicates that the same is not making progress as is expected of such litigations. 20. In view of the above discussion, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. The order impugned is set-aside, the application filed by the appellant is allowed, the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 are restrained from attaching and/or auctioning the suit property during the pendency of the suit. 20. In view of the above discussion, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. The order impugned is set-aside, the application filed by the appellant is allowed, the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 are restrained from attaching and/or auctioning the suit property during the pendency of the suit. The trial court is directed to expedite the hearing of the suit and ensure that unnecessary adjournments are not granted to any of the parties and make efforts to decide the suit within a period of 18 months from the date a certified copy of this order is placed before the said Court. 21. It is made clear that any observations made herein-above in the judgment is only for the purpose of examining the prima facie case and shall not effect the consideration and/or the final outcome of the suit.