ORDER : 1. Petitioners are plaintiff. They are aggrieved by an order dated 29.11.2010 passed by District Judge, Bhojpur at Ara in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 21/2009 whereby and whereunder the appellate court had allowed the Miscellaneous Appeal setting aside the order dated 14.09.2009 passed by 4th Additional Munsif, Bhojpur at Ara in Title Suit No. 12/2008. 2. In order to properly appreciate the submissions as well as legal grounds having been raised at the end of rival parties, the facts of the case is to be noticed first. Petitioners/plaintiffs have asserted that they were selected and appointed as Panchayat Teachers relating to Gram Panchayat, Harpur, Anchal, Garhani, District, Bhojpur at Ara after exhausting all the necessary paraphernalia as prescribed under “Shikshak Niyukti Niyamavali, 2006” subsequently, became victimized at the end of local Mukhiya, Malti Devi who was more eager to appoint her Bhagini, Rita Kumari and in the aforesaid background, the aforesaid Malti Devi who forbade herself to participate during appointment process approached before Deputy Development Commissioner, Bhojpur at Ara who set aside the appointment of the petitioners/plaintiffs so communicated vide Letter No. 956/Confidential dated 13.09.2007 whereupon suit (Title Suit No. 12/2008) has been filed asking for relief to set aside the aforesaid order as being illegal, without jurisdiction, the defendant be restrained from interfering with the due discharge of duty by the plaintiffs, cost of suit, any other relief or reliefs. 3. Subsequently thereof, the petitioners/plaintiffs filed a petition for granting of ad interim injunction in their favour against the defendant asking for stay of execution as well as operation of order dated 13.09.2007 which was allowed vide order dated 21.02.2008 effective till submission of show-cause which, after filing of show-cause as well as hearing respective parties was vacated on 14.09.2009. 4. During intermediary period, on 01.07.2008, petitioners have prayed for directing the defendant/respondent to pay salary and the same was allowed vide order dated 14.09.2009 directing the defendant/respondent to pay within a month against which the defendant/respondent filed a Miscellaneous Appeal No. 21/2009 before learned District Judge, Bhojpur at Ara which has been allowed as indicated above, whereupon the instant petition has been filed. 5. It has been submitted on behalf of petitioners/plaintiffs that the learned appellate court should have considered that no appeal was maintainable against an order having been passed under Section 151 of the CPC. 5. It has been submitted on behalf of petitioners/plaintiffs that the learned appellate court should have considered that no appeal was maintainable against an order having been passed under Section 151 of the CPC. While exercising power under Section 151, the Court deals with the inherent jurisdiction and for that, no appeal has been provided. That being so, the appeal was not maintainable. Because of the fact that appeal was non maintainable, setting aside the order dated 14.09.2009 passed by the learned lower court under the guise of Section 151 of the CPC could not be accepted as a legal order on whatever ground whereupon, the order impugned is fit to be set aside. 6. To substantiate the aforesaid plea, learned counsel for the petitioners/plaintiffs relied upon AIR 1953 SC 23 , AIR 1978 Patna 339, (2008) 12 SCC 331 , (1999) 1 SCC 423 and (2004) 11 SCC 168 . 7. At the end of defendant/respondent, it has been submitted that Misc. Appeal happens to be entertain able when an order having been passed during course of intermediary stage suggests its finality. It has further been submitted that while ad interim injunction was subsisting, the defendant/respondent appeared, filed their show-cause whereupon the propriety of the order was challenged in the background of suit being non maintainable and, the Court after perceiving the same withdrew the order. Therefore, there was no occasion for the learned lower court to pass the order impugned in the background of the fact that after vacating ad interim injunction petitioners/plaintiffs gone out of stream, on account thereof, rightly been set aside by the learned appellate court under Misc. Appeal. In likewise manner, it has also been submitted that the present petition happens to be misconceived and is fit to be rejected. 8. The ambit and scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India is neither perceptible as an appeal nor as a revision. It happens to be an extraordinary power having been vested inherently to the High Court to direct the learned lower court to proceed within the bounds of legal framework. Therefore, whenever High Court is approached under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it not only confines to the order impugned rather during course thereof, it has also to see whether the learned lower court are proceeding in accordance with law irrespective of stage. 9. Therefore, whenever High Court is approached under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it not only confines to the order impugned rather during course thereof, it has also to see whether the learned lower court are proceeding in accordance with law irrespective of stage. 9. Jurisdiction is a theme which could affect the prospect of a suit right from its inception. That being so, the question of maintainability of the suit is permitted to be raised at any stage. In Gujarat Maritime Board v. G.C. Pandya as reported in (2015) 12 SCC 403, it has been held under:- 12. No doubt, the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage, but in the present case, there was no other forum for the plaintiff where he could have sought his remedy. The High Court has observed that the relief could not have been sought by the plaintiff before the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal as the defendant was simply a Board and not covered within the jurisdiction of the said Tribunal. It was not a matter to be heard by the Central Administrative Tribunal either as the plaintiff was not a Central Government employee. As such, we do not find any error in the impugned order passed the High Court. 10. After going through the plaint, it is evident that petitioners/plaintiffs are claiming their rights on account of their appointment as Panchayat Shikshak in accordance with “Shikshak Niyukti Niyamavali, 2006”. Furthermore, Letter No. 956/Confidential dated 13.09.2007 having been issued by the defendant no.2, Deputy Development Commissioner, Bhojpur at Ara nullifying appointment of petitioners have also been perceived by the petitioners/plaintiffs to be contrary to the aforesaid rules wherein identity of Deputy Development Commissioner during course of appointment procedure has not been identified nor his presence happens to be under the aforesaid Rules. Then in that event, it was expected at the end of the plaintiffs to have resorted to adopt the procedure for redressal of their grievance having been provided there under. Rule 18 of the aforesaid Rules provides an appeal. Then in that event, it was expected at the end of the plaintiffs to have resorted to adopt the procedure for redressal of their grievance having been provided there under. Rule 18 of the aforesaid Rules provides an appeal. For better appreciation the same is quoted below:- 18- vihy%& bl fu;ekoyh ds v/khu fu;kstu ,oa lsok 'krksZa ls lEcfU/kr vihy lquus dh 'kfDr ftyk Lrj ij ljdkj }kjk xfBr ,d ;k ,d ls vf/kd lnL;ksa dh izkf/kdkj dks gksxhA ekuo lalk/kku fodkl foHkkx ds }kjk izkf/kdkj dh LFkkiuk ,oa lsok 'krksZa dk fu/kkZj.k fd;k tk;sxkA vihyh; izkf/kdkj dk xBu lsok fuo`Rr fcgkj U;kf;d lsok] Hkkjrh; iz'kklfud lsok] fcgkj iz'kklfud lsok] fcgkj f'k{kk lsok ds inkf/kdkfj;ksa ,oa vko';drkuqlkj f'k{kkfo)ksa ls fd;k tk;sxkA 11. The aforesaid Rule 18 has been amended in the year 2008 and after amendment it reads like this:- 18- vihy%& bl fu;ekoyh ds v/khu fu;kstu ls lEcfU/kr vihy lquus dh 'kfDr ftyk Lrj ij ljdkj }kjk xfBr ,d ;k ,d ls vf/kd lnL;ksa dh izkf/kdkj dks gksxhA ekuo lalk/ku fodkl foHkkx ds }kjk izkf/kdkj dh LFkkiuk ,oa lsok 'krksZa dk fu/kkZj.k fd;k tk;sxkA vihyh; izkf/kdkj dk xBu lsok fuo`Rr fcgkj U;kf;d lsok] Hkkjrh; iz'kklfud lsok] fcgkj iz'kklfud lsok] fcgkj f'k{kk lsok ds inkf/kdkfj;ksa ,oa f'k{kkfonksa ls fd;k tk;sxkA 12. So, it is apparent that before filing of Title Suit No. 12/2008, the appellate court was already established before which, the petitioners/plaintiffs might have had approached challenging legality of Letter No. 956/ dated 13.09.2007 issued by D.D.C. Apart from this, it is also apparent from contents of plaint that petitioners/plaintiffs have not pleaded that appellate forum was not established, nor explained as to what was the reason for ignoring the same. As held in Gujarat Maritime Board’s case (supra) where no forum was available, then in that event, some sort of relaxation was given but in the present case, as disclosed above, the plaint is completely silent. 13. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant as reported in (1995) 5 SSC 75, wherein similar kind of problem was referred to three Judges’ Bench on account of two conflicting judgments relating to provisions of Industrial Dispute Act after ignoring the same, suit was filed, considered the issue, discussed elaborately and then summarized the principles under para-35 which is as follows:- 35. We may now summarize the principles flowing from the above discussion: (1) Where the dispute arises from general law of contract, i.e., where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general law of contract, a suit filed in civil court cannot be said to be not maintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) or Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (2) Where, however, the dispute involves recognition, observance or enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said Act. (3) Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observance or enforcement of rights and obligations created by enactments like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 - which can be called 'sister enactments' to Industrial Disputes Act - and which do not provide a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to approach the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act provided may constitute industrial disputes within the meaning of Section 2(k) and Section 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such dispute shall be either treated as an Industrial dispute or says that it shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created by the industrial Disputes Act. Otherwise, recourse to Civil Court is open. (4) It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act are not equally effective for the reason that access to the forum depends upon a reference being made by the appropriate government. The power to make a reference conferred upon the government is to be exercised to effectuate the object of the enactment and hence not unguided. The rule is to make a reference unless, of course, the dispute raised is a totally frivolous one ex facie. The power conferred is the power to refer and not the power to decide, though it may be that the government is entitled to examine whether the dispute is ex facie frivolous, not meriting an adjudication. The rule is to make a reference unless, of course, the dispute raised is a totally frivolous one ex facie. The power conferred is the power to refer and not the power to decide, though it may be that the government is entitled to examine whether the dispute is ex facie frivolous, not meriting an adjudication. (5) Consistent with the policy of law aforesaid, we commend to the Parliament and the State Legislatures to make a provision enabling a workman to approach the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal directly i.e. without the requirement of a reference by the Government-in case of industrial disputes covered by Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way in removing the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act. (6) The certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance with the Industrial Employment (Standings Orders) Act, 1946 are statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both upon the employers and employees, though they do not amount to "statutory provisions". Any violation of these Standing Orders entitles an employee to appropriate relief either before the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act or the Civil Court where recourse to Civil Court is open according to the principles indicated herein. (7) The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act and its sister enactments is to provide an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to the workmen, a mechanism which is speedy, inexpensive, informal and un-encumbered by the plethora of procedural laws and appeals upon appeals and revisions applicable to civil courts. Indeed, the powers of the Courts and Tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act are far more extensive in the sense that they can grant such relief as they think appropriate in the circumstances for putting an end to an industrial dispute. 14. The aforesaid issue again has been considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad as reported in AIR 2002 SC 997 wherein the aforesaid judgment was taken into consideration and the same view has been re-affirmed and lastly, it has been concluded under para-5 which is as follows:- “5. 14. The aforesaid issue again has been considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad as reported in AIR 2002 SC 997 wherein the aforesaid judgment was taken into consideration and the same view has been re-affirmed and lastly, it has been concluded under para-5 which is as follows:- “5. In the aforesaid premises and having regard to the relief sought for in the suits filed in the Civil Court, we have no manner of hesitation to come to the conclusion that in such cases the jurisdiction of the Civil Court must be held to have been impliedly barred and the appropriate forum for resolution of such dispute is the forum constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity with the impugned judgment of the High Court requiring our interference. The appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed. We would, however, observe that it would be open for the appellants-workmen to approach the appropriate industrial forum and such forum if approached, will dispose of the matter on its own merits. There will be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.” 15. Apart from this, two relevant provisions having visualizing under CPC is also to be taken note of. First happens to be Section 4 which reads as follows:- “4. Savings. – (1) In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the proposition contained in sub-section (1), nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any remedy which a landholder or landlord may have under any law for the time being in force for the recovery of rent of agricultural land from the produce of such land.” 16. The another Section on this score is Section 9 which is being quoted below:- “9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred— The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. 17. The another Section on this score is Section 9 which is being quoted below:- “9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred— The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. 17. After having analysis of relevant provisions of law inconsonance with the exceptions having been incorporated under the CPC, as referred above, it is apparent that whenever by implication the jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred, suit before Civil Court would not lie. When the suit right from its inception is found non-entertain able, then in that event, all the orders so passed will be non-est in the eye of law. Moreover, in the present case, right from appearance, the Respondent/defendants have pleaded that the suit is non maintainable as impliedly barred by the relevant rule itself. The learned lower court should have considered that once plaintiff had claimed his right in terms of “Shikshak Niyukti Niyamavali, 2006” then in that event, it happens to be the “Shikshak Niyukti Niyamavali, 2006” which will take care of the interest of the petitioners/plaintiff and further, the forum was prescribed there under should be the legal forum to be adopted for redressal of any kind of grievance. 18. That being so, the suit since its inception happens to be bad whereupon, the order having been passed by the learned lower court though under the garb of Section 151 of the CPC availing inherent power could not have been exercised. In the aforesaid background, though Misc. Appeal was not maintainable in the peculiar nature of the facts and circumstances, as discussed above, however, on account of non-competency, the order passed by the learned lower court could not be admitted as legal one, and that being so, would not survive. 19. Consequent thereupon, the instant petition is disposed of. However, in terms of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it looks desirable to direct the learned lower court to decide the issue of jurisdiction to entertain a suit at the first instance before proceeding ahead.