JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. Instead of hearing the civil application filed for appropriate directions, the main writ application itself is taken up for final hearing here and now. 2. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the University has prayed for the following reliefs; (A) Your Lordships be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus and/or writ of certiorari and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the like nature to quash and set aside the judgment and order 2.2.2006 passed by the Hon'ble Gujarat Higher Secondary Schools Services Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Application No. 78 of 1997. (B) Pending the hearing and final disposal of this petition, Your Lordships be pleased to stay the execution, implementation and operation of the impugned judgment and order dated 2.2.2006 passed by the Hon'ble Gujarat Higher Secondary Schools Services Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Application No. 78 of 1997. (C) To pass such further and other orders as to Your Lordships may deem just and proper in the interest of justice." 3. The facts of this case may be summarized as under; 3.1 The respondent No. 1 herein came to be appointed as a Librarian on temporary basis by a School affiliated to the University vide order dated 24th April, 1993. The appointment order is at Page-12. The plain reading of the appointment order would indicate that the respondent No. 1 was appointed as a Librarian on a fixed remuneration of Rs. 30/- per day. As on date, the remuneration was revised and I am told that he is being paid about Rs. 414/- per day. 3.2 The respondent No. 1 preferred an application before the Gujarat Higher Secondary Schools Services Tribunal at Ahmedabad with a prayer that he should be paid regular pay scale. As, at the relevant point of time, he was also apprehending termination from the service, he prayed before the Tribunal that his services may be protected. 3.3 The Tribunal, by an order dated 2nd February, 2006, partly allowed the application which was filed by the respondent No. 1, observing as under; "9. From the record available it is clear that the applicant was appointed on 21.1.1993 as a daily wager. He was appointed without following any procedure. NOC from the department was granted on 27.4.1995 that means there is a clear vacancy. From the record available it is clear that the applicant was appointed on 21.1.1993 as a daily wager. He was appointed without following any procedure. NOC from the department was granted on 27.4.1995 that means there is a clear vacancy. The school management has not appointed any person by following legal procedure for a reason and the applicant is only working as a full time Librarian since 1993 till today. He has worked for about 12 years. The judgment cited by the opponent-school in 2004 (3) GLH p. 23 is perused. I held therein that a person appointed for a specific period on a temporary basis cannot granted protection under sec. 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act and such temporary/daily wage employees whose appointments are without due procedure of law, have no right to be continued and must be relieved. The judgment cited by the applicant in Application No. 417/96 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Tribunal is also gone through. In the said judgment, the fact is that a person was appointed on a leave vacancy but after following the procedure. There was an advertisement. As the post was vacant the appointment was made for three months on leave vacancy. Alter advertisement, interview committee was constituted under sec. 35 of the Act, the committee selected the applicant and the appointment was approved. In the said case: the Secondary Tribunal has ordered for equal pay for equal work and recommended to regularize the services of the applicant, but the prayer for declaration to consider her as a regular employee was rejected. In the present case also there is a vacant post, procedure for regular appointment of the applicant has not been followed and he has been continued in service for 12 years on daily wages. He has not been paid even as per Schedule prepared by the Notification for daily rated workers. There is no other Librarian in the school and the applicant is working as a full time Librarian. In such facts of the case and in view of the judgment cited above, when the appointment is made without following the procedure and on daily wages, declaration to treat him a regularly appointed employee cannot be granted. But, since he is working on the vacant post and performing full time duties, he is entitled to the equal salary like the regular Librarian. But, since he is working on the vacant post and performing full time duties, he is entitled to the equal salary like the regular Librarian. Since he is working for more that 12 years he is entitled to the protection of sec. 14(1) of the GHSSST Act, and his services terminated abruptly without following the procedure. He is also entitled to the scheme published by the Gujarat Krishi University to regularize the service of such persons. Therefore, it is directed that the opponents will pay to the applicant the same salary to which other regularly appointed Librarian is entitled, together with pay difference. Since the applicant is working full time for more than 12 years, he is entitled to the protection under sec. 14(1) of the GHSST Act, and his request to declare him a regularly appointed librarian is rejected. But the applicant's case will also be considered for giving the benefit of the scheme framed by the respondent to regularize the services of such persons, However, at the same time, the authorities are directed to fill up the post permanently and it is recommended that they will consider the case of the applicant giving the weightage to his experience of the said post. With this observation, the application is partly allowed." 3.4 Hence, this application by the University. 4. It appears that on 14th February, 2007, rule was issued and the impugned order passed by the Tribunal was stayed. 5. As on date, the respondent No. 1 continues to receive Rs. 414/- per day towards his remuneration. 6. Mr. Chauhan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-University, while assailing the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, submitted that at the relevant point of time in the year 1995, an advertisement was issued for the purpose of recruitment on the post of the Librarian and pursuant to the advertisement which was issued, many applications were received. After due process of recruitment, the respondent No. 1 was appointed. Mr. Chauhan clarified that at the relevant point of time, there was a policy of the State Government not to make any appointments on regular basis. On account of such policy, the University had to appoint the respondent No. 1 as a temporary Librarian. 7. He submitted that the Tribunal committed an error in passing the impugned order. 8. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. On account of such policy, the University had to appoint the respondent No. 1 as a temporary Librarian. 7. He submitted that the Tribunal committed an error in passing the impugned order. 8. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Archit Jani, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1. Mr. Jani submitted that the Tribunal committed no error not to speak of any error of law in passing the impugned order. He, therefore, prays that this application deserves to be rejected. 9. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the Tribunal committed any error in passing the impugned order. 10. The following facts are not in dispute; (I) In the year 1993, the School appointed the respondent No. 1 herein as a Librarian on temporary basis with a fixed remuneration of Rs. 30/- per day. (II) On 27th April, 1994, the School received a No Objection Certificate from the DEO for the purpose of undertaking regular recruitment for the post of the Librarian. (III) On receipt of the No Objection Certificate, an advertisement was issued on 4th May, 1995 for the purpose of recruitment on the post of the Librarian. (IV) Pursuant to the advertisement which was issued, many applications were received including one of the respondent No. 1 herein. (V) Although, the advertisement was issued and the applications were received by the School, yet having regard to the policy of the State Government prevailing at the relevant point of time not to make any appointments, the School was unable to make any recruitment. (VI) In such circumstances referred to above, the respondent No. 1 continued to serve as a Librarian on temporary basis. (VII) Ultimately, in the year 1997, he had to approach the Tribunal for the relief of regular pay scale. 11. It is not in dispute that as on date, there is a vacant sanctioned post of the Librarian on the establishment of the School. This sanctioned vacant post is past almost 22 years. If there is a sanctioned vacant post, then at least, it is expected of the University to put the respondent No. 1 herein in the minimum of the pay scale till appropriate sanction is accorded by the Government to regularize the services of the respondent No. 1. This sanctioned vacant post is past almost 22 years. If there is a sanctioned vacant post, then at least, it is expected of the University to put the respondent No. 1 herein in the minimum of the pay scale till appropriate sanction is accorded by the Government to regularize the services of the respondent No. 1. In taking the aforesaid view of the matter, I am supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Land Development Corporation & Anr. vs. Mohd. Khursheed Anwar & Anr., AIR 2010 SC 2287 . I may quote the observations made by the Supreme Court as under; "12. The question whether the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' can be read as part of the doctrine of equality has been considered by this Court in large number of cases. In Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1139 , this Court observed that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' as an abstract doctrine had nothing to do with Article 14. This view has not been followed in most of the subsequent judgments. In Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 618 , the Court distinguished the three earlier judgments including Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi v. Union of India (supra) and observed: "Our attention was drawn to Binoy Kumar Mukerjee v. Union of India and Makhan Singh v. Union of India, where reference was made to the observations of this Court in Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi v. Union of India describing the principle of "equal pay for equal work" as an abstract doctrine which had nothing to do with Article 14. We shall presently point out how the principle, "equal pay for equal work", is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance. Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi v. Union of India is not itself of any real assistance to us since what was decided there was that there could be different scales of pay for different grades of a service. It is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade. It is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade. The higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Article 14 if sought to be applied to them. It is true that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a constitutional goal. Article 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims "equal pay for equal work for both men and women" as a directive principle of State Policy. "Equal pay for equal work for both men and women" means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Article 14 of the Constitution enjoins the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay. Whether the special procedure prescribed by a statute for trying alleged robber-barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with tax evaders is discriminatory, whether a particular governmental policy in the matter of grant of licences or permits confers unfettered discretion on the Executive, whether the take-over of the empires of industrial tycoons is arbitrary and unconstitutional and other questions of like nature, leave the millions of people of this country untouched. Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them. The Preamble to the Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic. Again the word "socialist" must mean something. Even if it does not mean 'to each according to his need', it must at least mean "equal pay for equal work". "The principle of "equal pay for equal work" is expressly recognized by all socialist systems of law, e.g., Section 59 of the Hungarian Labour Code, para 2 of Section 111 of the Czechoslovak Code, Section 67 of the Bulgarian Code, Section 40of the Code of the German Democratic Republic, para 2 of Section 33 of the Rumanian Code. Indeed this principle has been incorporated in several western Labour Codes too. Under provisions in Section 31(g. No. 2d) of Book I of the French Code du Travail, and according to Argentinean law, this principle must be applied to female workers in all collective bargaining agreements. In accordance with Section 3 of the Grundgesetz of the German Federal Republic, and Clause 7, Section 123 of the Mexican Constitution, the principle is given universal significance" (vide International Labour Law by Istvan Szaszy, p. 265). The Preamble to the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation recognises the principle of 'equal remuneration for work of equal value' as constituting one of the means of achieving the improvement of conditions "involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperiled". Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Article 39(d), we are of the view that the principle "equal pay for equal work" is deducible from those Articles and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer." 13. The ratio of the judgment in Randhir Singh's case was invoked and applied in Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P. (1986) 1 SCC 637 , Surinder Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief, CPWD (1986) 1 SCC 639 and other cases for extending the benefit of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' to different types of employees including daily wagers but the same was distinguished in Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognized) v. Union of India (1988) 3 SCC 91 , State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia (1989) 1 SCC 121 , Mewa Ram Kanojia v. Al India Institute of Medical Sciences (1989) 2 SCC 235 , Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Vikram Chaudhry (1995) 5 SCC 210 , State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh (1996) 11 SCC 77 , Orissa University of Agriculture and Technology v. Manoj K. Mohanty (2003) 5 SCC 188 , State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj (2003) 6 SCC 123 , Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy (2004) 1 SCC 347 , State of Haryana v. Charanjit (2006) 9 SCC 321 , S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand (2007) 8 SCC 279 , Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and others (2008) 10 SCC 1 and very recently in State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh (2009) 9 SCC 514 . 14. In Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University v. T. Sumalatha (2003) 10 SCC 405 , a two-Judge Bench set aside the direction given by the High Court to the appellant to absorb the respondents in accordance with the policy contained in G.O. No. 212 dated 22.4.1994, but made some significant observations on the issue of payment of higher salary to them. The same are extracted below: "Though the plea of regularisation in respect of any of the fifth respondents cannot be countenanced, the respondent employees should have a fair deal consistent with the guarantee enshrined in Articles 21 and 14 of the Constitution. They should not be made to work on a meagre salary for years together. It would be unfair and unreasonable to extract work from the employees who have been associated with the nodal centre almost from its inception by paying them remuneration which, by any objective standards, is grossly low. The Central Government itself has rightly realised the need to revise the consolidated salary and accordingly enhanced the grant on that account on two occasions. The Central Government itself has rightly realised the need to revise the consolidated salary and accordingly enhanced the grant on that account on two occasions. That revision was made more than six years back. It is high time that another revision is made. It is therefore imperative that the Ministry concerned of the Union of India should take expeditious steps to increase the salary of the investigators viz. Respondents 1 to 4 working in the nodal centre in Hyderabad. In the absence of details regarding the nature of work done by the said respondents and the equivalence of the job done by them to the other posts prevailing in the University or the Central Government institutions, we are not in a position to give any direction based on the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'. However, we consider it just and expedient to direct Respondent 7 or 8, as the case may be, to take an expeditious decision to increase the consolidated salary that is being paid to Respondents 1 to 4 to a reasonable level commensurate with the work done by them and keeping in view the minimum salary that is being paid to the personnel doing a more or less similar job. As far as the fifth respondent is concerned, though we refrain from giving similar directions in view of the fact that the post is not specifically sanctioned under the Scheme, we would like to observe that the Central Government may consider increasing the quantum of office expenditure suitably so that the University will be able to disburse higher salary to the fifth respondent." 15. In Dayanand's case, the Court observed that the ratio of Randhir Singh's case has not been followed in later judgments and held that similarity in the designation or quantum of work are not determinative of equality in the matter of pay scales and that before entertaining and accepting the claim based on the principle of equal pay for equal work, the Court must consider the factors like the source and mode of recruitment/appointment, the qualifications, the nature of work, the value judgment, responsibilities, reliability, experience, confidentiality, functional need etc. 16. In Surjit Singh's case, the Court reviewed large number of judicial precedents and observed: "Undoubtedly, the doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a court of law. 16. In Surjit Singh's case, the Court reviewed large number of judicial precedents and observed: "Undoubtedly, the doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a court of law. But equal pay must be for equal work of equal value. The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' has no mechanical application in every case. Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those who were left out. Of course, the qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for the purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in administration. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. The very fact that the person has not gone through the process of recruitment may itself, in certain cases, make a difference. If the educational qualifications are different, then also the doctrine may have no application. Even though persons may do the same work, their quality of work may differ. Where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such persons who are evaluated by the competent authority cannot be challenged. A classification based on difference in educational qualifications justifies a difference in pay scales. A mere nomenclature designating a person as say a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that he is doing the same work as another carpenter or craftsman in regular service. The quality of work which is produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. Thus normally the applicability of this principle must be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body. These are not matters where a writ court can lightly interfere. Normally a party claiming equal pay for equal work should be required to raise a dispute in this regard. In any event, the party who claims equal pay for equal work has to make necessary averments and prove that all things are equal. Thus, before any direction can be issued by a court, the court must first see that there are necessary averments and there is a proof. If the High Court is, on basis of material placed before it, convinced that there was equal work of equal quality and all other relevant factors are fulfilled it may direct payment of equal pay from the date of the filing of the respective writ petition. In all these cases, we find that the High Court has blindly proceeded on the basis that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work applies without examining any relevant factors." 17. In the light of the above stated legal position, we shall now consider whether the direction given by the Division Bench of the High Court to the appellants to pay salary to the respondents in the regular pay scale prescribed for the post of Assistant Engineer is legally correct. Here it is apposite to note that the High Court granted relief to the respondents by presuming that two posts of Assistant Engineer were utilized for appointing them. This assumption is ex facie fallacious because the documents produced before the High Court and this Court show that the respondents were engaged for a fixed period on a consolidated salary. There is nothing in the language of orders dated 18.2.1991 from which it can be inferred that the respondents were appointed against the sanctioned posts of Assistant Engineer (Civil). The correspondence exchanged between the State Government and the Corporation after 18.2.1991 cannot be relied upon for recording a finding that the respondents were appointed against the sanctioned posts of Assistant Engineer. The correspondence exchanged between the State Government and the Corporation after 18.2.1991 cannot be relied upon for recording a finding that the respondents were appointed against the sanctioned posts of Assistant Engineer. Therefore, the direction given by the High Court for payment of salary to the respondents in the regular pay scale prescribed for the post of Assistant Engineer cannot be sustained. But, at the same time, we are convinced that the appellants were not justified in continuing the respondents on a consolidated salary of Rs. 2000/- per month despite the fact that at the time of their selection, two sanctioned posts of Assistant Engineer and one post of Junior Engineer were lying vacant and proposal for appointing the respondents without any nomenclature was made with the sole object of taking work of the particular post from them without paying salary in the regular pay-scale of any post. To say the least, the decision of the Corporation to effect economy by depriving the respondents' even minimum of the pay-scale was totally arbitrary and unjustified. The very fact that the respondents were engaged on a consolidated salary of Rs. 2,000/- per month and the prescribed pay-scale of the post of Assistant Engineer in other branches was Rs. 2200-4000/- and that of the Junior Engineer was Rs. 1,600 - 2,660/- gives a clear indication that they were engaged to do the work of Assistant Engineer. The appellants had neither pleaded before the High Court nor it has been shown to this Court that the respondents were not qualified for the post of Assistant Engineer. It is also not the case of the appellants that the respondents suffered from any other disability which could impede their appointment on the post of Assistant Engineer. In the written statement filed before the High Court, the appellants did make a statement that the respondents were not discharging the duties of Assistant Engineer but no material was produced either before the High Court or before this Court to show any difference in the nature of duties being performed by the respondents and those which were required to be performed by an Assistant Engineer. It is, therefore, reasonable to take the view that the respondents had been arbitrarily deprived of their legitimate right to get minimum of the pay-scale prescribed for the post of Assistant Engineer. 18. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. It is, therefore, reasonable to take the view that the respondents had been arbitrarily deprived of their legitimate right to get minimum of the pay-scale prescribed for the post of Assistant Engineer. 18. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The impugned order is set aside. However, the appellants are directed to pay to the respondents minimum of the pay-scale prescribed for the post of Assistant Engineer (as revised from time to time) from the date of their appointment till they continued in the employment of the Corporation." 12. I propose to modify the order of the Tribunal to a certain extent. 13. In the result, this petition is partly allowed. The University is directed to pay to the respondent No. 1 the minimum of the pay scale prescribed for the post of the Librarian (as revised from time to time) from next month onwards. 14. The University is further directed to prepare a proposal for regularization of the service of the respondent No. 1 in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and forward the same to the State Government in its Cooperation and Agriculture Department. The University shall prepare an appropriate proposal within a period of four weeks from the date of the receipt of the writ of the order and forward the same to the State Government. The State Government, on receipt of the proposal, shall look into the same and pass appropriate orders within a period of four weeks thereafter in accordance with law. While forwarding the proposal, the University shall also state the details as regards the qualifications and experience and such experience and qualifications shall be considered by the Government while considering the proposal. 15. With the above, this writ application is disposed of. Direct service is permitted.