JUDGMENT : GOVIND MATHUR, J. 1. To examine correctness of the judgment dated 24.9.2015, passed by learned Single Bench, this appeal is before us. 2. The facts relevant are that in the year 1969, one Shri Bahadur Singh Kothari rented out a premises to Shri Sukhlal, father of the appellant-petitioners. The landlord had temporary possession of a part of the rented premises being required for some marriage in family. The possession of the premises aforesaid, however, was not handed over to the tenant, therefore, a suit for recovery of possession was preferred which came to be decreed in favour of the plaintiff tenant on 22.8.1994. An appeal preferred by the landlord also came to be dismissed under the judgment and decree dated 8.2.1996. The possession of the premises in question was handed over to the plaintiff tenant as a consequence to the execution of decree after dismissal of the second appeal vide judgment and decree dated 22.3.1996. Suffice to mention that during pendency of litigation the rented premises was purchased by Jain Shwetambar Oswal Samaj (hereinafter referred to as 'the Samaj'). The Samaj preferred a suit for eviction of the tenant from the rented premises on the ground of bona-fide necessity, default in payment of rent and availability of alternative accommodation to tenant. The suit came to be decreed by the trial court under the judgment dated 2.5.1998. The tenant being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 2.5.1998 preferred an appeal before the court of learned District Judge, Banswara. 3. During pendency of the appeal, Shri Godi Parshwanath Shwetambar Jain Mandir Bawan Deri Trust, Banswara (hereinafter referred to as 'the Trust') claiming itself to be owner of property, terminated the tenancy of the tenant petitioners invoking provisions of Section 106/111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It was also disclosed in the notice dated 5.3.1999 that the State of Rajasthan by invoking powers under sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1950') exempted the Trust from applicability of the provisions of the aforesaid Act. The tenant petitioners responded the notice with several objections, but ultimately preferred a petition for writ giving challenge to the notification of the State of Rajasthan dated 12.11.1998. The tenant petitioners responded the notice with several objections, but ultimately preferred a petition for writ giving challenge to the notification of the State of Rajasthan dated 12.11.1998. The case of the petitioners before learned Single Bench was that the State Government while invoking powers under sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act of 1950 did not apply its mind and as such the same is bad. 4. No reply to the writ petition was filed by the State Government, however, the notification was defended by the State and respondent Shri Godi Parshwanath Shwetambar Jain Mandir Bawan Deri Trust with assertion that as per sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act of 1950, it is permissible to grant exemption in respect of any premises owned by educational, religious or charitable institution, if whole of the income derived is utilised for the purpose of the institution and in the instant matter the respondent No. 3 is a religious Trust utilising complete income for religious purposes, hence, the notification dated 12.11.1998 does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality. 5. Learned Single Bench, after considering the arguments advanced, dismissed the writ petition by arriving at the conclusion that the Trust availing exemption is a religious Trust, utilising whole of the income derived from the premises for the purpose of institution itself, hence was entitled to get the exemption and no need was there to disclose any further facts except referred in the notification dated 12.11.1998 itself. 6. Aggrieved by the conclusion arrived, the instant appeal is preferred with contention that to invoke powers under sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act of 1950, the State Government must satisfy itself that exemption from the provisions of the Act of 1950 is necessary or expedient in public interest, but in the case in hand no material is available on record to establish that the State Government issued the notification impugned after arriving at such satisfaction. It is asserted that the State Government neither filed reply to the writ petition nor disclosed its record to satisfy existence of the ingredients necessary to invoke the powers under sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act of 1950, as such, the conclusion arrived by learned Single Bench is ill-founded. 7. It is asserted that the State Government neither filed reply to the writ petition nor disclosed its record to satisfy existence of the ingredients necessary to invoke the powers under sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act of 1950, as such, the conclusion arrived by learned Single Bench is ill-founded. 7. The counsels appearing on behalf of the respondents, per contra, stated that the Government of Rajasthan acted upon a recommendation made by the Commissioner of Devsthan and the Collector, Banswara after adequate application of mind, as such, learned Single Bench rightly dismissed the petition for writ. 8. Heard learned counsels. 9. Before coming to the merits of the arguments advanced, it would be appropriate to mention that during the course of hearing this Court directed the respondent State to produce the original records leading to issuance of the notification dated 12.11.1998. A photocopy whereof is made available for perusal of the Court. From record, it reveals that the respondent Trust submitted an application to the Assistant Commissioner, Devsthan, Rishabhdev on 5.11.1997 to have exemption from application of the provisions of the Act of 1950. It was stated on behalf of the Trust that its property is in occupation with tenants on very small rent and a civil suit for evicting one of its tenants is also pending, but on account of proverbial delay in court cases, no one can predict as to what would be the fate of the case filed/to be filed and as to when would they be finally decided. As per the Trust, the only way out available was to have exemption of the Trust from the purview of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. 10. The Assistant Commissioner forwarded the same to the Commissioner, Devsthan, Udaipur and the Commissioner under a letter dated 12.1.1998 made a recommendation to the State for grant of exemption as proposed. 10. The Assistant Commissioner forwarded the same to the Commissioner, Devsthan, Udaipur and the Commissioner under a letter dated 12.1.1998 made a recommendation to the State for grant of exemption as proposed. For ready reference, we deem it appropriate to quote the letter dated 12.1.1998 referred above, as under:- ^^Jh ?kksM+h ik'oZukFk tSu] 'osrkEcj eafnj VªLV ckou Msjh] ckalokM+k tks lkoZtfud izU;kl vf/kfu;e 1959 ds rgr bl foHkkx esa iathd`r izU;kl gS dks jktLFkku Hkwx`gkfn fdjk;k fu;=a.k ,oa csn[kyh vf/kfu;e 1950 dh /kkjk 2¼3½ ds rgr NwV iznku djus gsrq lgk;d vk;qDr] nsoLFkku foHkkx] _`"kHknso us i= dzekad 1523 fnukad 5-11-97 }kjk fu/kkZfjr izi= esa vko';d i=kfn layXu dj izLrko fd;s gSA vr% izU;klh dk izkFkZuk&i= e; fu/kkZfjr izi= ,oa layXud ds bl i= ds lkFk izsf"kr fd;s tk jgs gSA d`i;k mDr izU;kl dks NwV iznku djkus dk d"V djkosaA** 11. The recommendation made by the Commissioner, Devsthan was sent to the Deputy Legal Remembrance to have opinion. The Deputy Legal Remembrance, on 25.6.1998, sought certain clarifications about use of the income derived and about the litigation said to be pending before different courts. The recommendation made by the Commissioner, Devsthan was sent to the Deputy Legal Remembrance to have opinion. The Deputy Legal Remembrance, on 25.6.1998, sought certain clarifications about use of the income derived and about the litigation said to be pending before different courts. The note made by the Deputy Legal Remembrance reads as under:- ^^vk;qDr] nsoLFkku foHkkx us Jh ?kksM+h ik'oZukFk tSu 'osrkEcj eafnj VªLV ckou Msjh ckalokM+k ds lEcU/k esa viuh fVIi.kh izsf"kr djrs gq, jktLFkku Hkwx`gkfn fdjk;k fu;=a.k ,oa csn[kyh vf/kfu;e 1950 dh /kkjk 2¼3½ ds vUrxZr NwV iznku djus dh flQkfj'k dh gSA blh izdkj ls ftyk dyDVj ckalokM+k us Hkh NwV iznku dh flQkfj'k djrs gq, ;g fy[kk gS fd vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 2¼3½ esa NwV nsus ls /kkfeZd O;oLFkk esa lqn`<+rk vk;sxh vkSj lEifr lqjf{kr jgsxhA izkFkhZ laLFkk dk izkFkZuk i= i`"V 42&43@lh ij miyC/k gSA ;g laLFkk o"kZ 1990 ls iathd`r gS vkSj bl laLFkk ds v/khu 5 nqdkusa o ,d vkoklh; edku crk;k x;k gSA laLFkk us vk;&O; ds C;ksjs Hkh layXu dj fHktok;s gS tks o"kZ 1990&91 ls 1996&97 rd ds gSA vk;&O; ds C;ksjksa esa o"kZ 1994&95 ¼iŒ 21@lh½ esa nqdkuksa ds fdjk;s ds vk; gksuk ugha n'kkZ;k x;k gS tcfd vU; o"kksZ esa 1995&96 esa nqdku fdjk;k 18]348@& :i;s dh vk; gksuk n'kkZ;k x;k gS vkSj o"kZ 1993&94 esa Hkh 13]840@& :i;s nqdku fdjk;s ls vk; gksuk n'kkZ;k x;k gS tcfd 90&91 esa nqdku fdjk;s ls vk; gksuk 15]545@& :i;s n'kkZ;k x;kA blds vfrfjDr izkFkhZ laLFkk us vius izkFkZuk i= esa ,d fdjk;snkj ds fo:} nqdku [kkyh djokus dk eqdnek flfoy U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu gksuk crk;k x;k gSA bldk vFkZ ;g gS fd laLFkk dk mn~ns'; nqdku [kkyh djokdj vPNs fdjk;s esa vU; yksxksa dks mDr nqdkusa nsuk pkgrh gSA izkFkhZ laLFkk }kjk izsf"kr fd;s x;s vk;&O; ds C;ksjs xyr izrhr gksrk gSA D;ksafd o"kZ 1990&91 esa tks fdjk;k laLFkk izkIr dj jgh Fkh blds ckn fdjk;k fdl izdkj ls de gqvk bldh Li"V tkudkjh blls ugha feyrhA ,slh fLFkfr esa laLFkk ls tkudkjh dh tkos fd o"kZ 1994&95 esa D;k fdjk;snkjksa ls fcYdqy Hkh fdjk;k ugha fy;k x;k ,oa 90&91 ds i'pkr fdjk;s ls vk; fdl izdkj de gqbZA blds vfrfjDr ekuuh; U;k;ky; esa D;k ,d gh fdjk;snkj ds fo:} eqdnek fopkjk/khu gS\ ;fn vU; fdjk;snkjksa ds fo:} Hkh dksbZ okn U;k;ky; esa gks bldh lwpuk bl foHkkx dks nh tkos ,oa fopkjk/khu eqdnesa dh fLFkfr ls bl foHkkx dks voxr djk;k tkosA** 12. The matter then was placed before the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan, Department of Urban Development, who in turn ordered to have details as per the opinion given by the Deputy Legal Remembrance. After having necessary information, it was noticed that a suit was decreed in favour of the Trust under the judgment dated 2.5.1998 but that was also subject matter of an appeal wherein an interim order was also in operation against the Trust. A note then was drawn as under:- ^^Jh xkSMh ik'oZukFk tSu eafnj ckou Msjh VªLV us izkFkZuk i= izLrqr dj fuosnu fd;k gS fd VªLV dh lEifr ftlesa 3 nqdkus cM+h o 1 nqdku NksVh] ,d nqdku NksVh eafnj ckuMsjh esa ,oa vkuUnyC/kh mik{kjk dk iw.kZ edku gS dks jktLFkku ifjlj ¼fdjk;k rFkk csn[kyh fu;=a.k½ vf/kfu;e 1950 dh /kkjk 2¼3½ ds vUrxZr vf/kfu;e ds mica/kksa ls NwV iznku dh tkosA ¼vkj 3@lh½ ;g VªLV o"kZ 1990 esa jftLVMZ gqvk Fkk vkSj laLFkk }kjk 1990&91 ls 1996&97 rd ds vk; O;; ds C;kSjs izLrqr fd, gSA ¼vkj 27] 29] 31] 33] 37] 39 ,oa 62@lh½ bl izdj.k ds lEcU/k esa vk;qDr nsoLFkku foHkkx ,oa ftyk dysDVj ckalokM+k us Hkh bl laLFkk dks vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 2¼3½ ds vUrxZr NwV iznku djus dh flQkfj'k dh gSA ¼vkj 1 ,oa 41@lh½ mfpr gks rks ftyk DysDVj ckalokM+k ,oa vk;qDr nsoLFkku foHkkx dh flQkfj'k ds vk/kkj ij izkFkhZ laLFkk dh lEifr dks vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 2¼3½ ds vUrxZr vf/kfu;e ds mica/kksa ls NwV iznku dh tkosaA** 13. Acting upon the note aforesaid, the State Government issued the notification impugned dated 12.11.1998, which reads as under:- ^^la[;k i- 4¼1½ fufoo] 398 %& jktLFkku ifjlj ¼fdjk;k fu;U=.k rFkk csn[kyh½ vf/kfu;e] 1950 ¼1950 dk jktLFkku vf/kfu;e XV–II) dh /kkjk&1 dh mi/kkjk ¼3½ }kjk iznr 'kfDr;ksa ds iz;ksx esa jkT; ljdkj dk lek/kku gks tkus ij fd yksdfgr esa ,slk djuk vko';d gS] jkT; ljdkj Jh xksMh ik'oZukFk 'osrkEcj tSu efUnj ckou MsjhVªLV ckalokMk ¼jktLFkku½ ds leLr ifjokjksa dks tks mlds LokfeRo esa gS] mDr vf/kfu;e ds leLr mica/kksa ds izorZu ls NwV nsrh gSA** 14. Precisely, the issue under consideration is that whether this notification is in consonance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act of 1950, which reads as follows:- "(3) The State Government if it is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in public interest may, be notification in the Official Gazette, exempt from all or any of the provisions of this Act any premises owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution the whole of the income derived from which is utilised for the purpose of the institution.” 15. A bare perusal of sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act of 1950 discloses that the State is not empowered to invoke this provision ipse dixit but only after satisfying itself about necessity of extending exemption from the normal rule in public interest. Meaning thereby, the State is supposed to reach at a definite conclusion about the existence of public interest demanding exemption from the law which must be otherwise adhered. Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanhaiyalal and others, reported in 1969 All India Rent Control Journals 695, while examining a provision analogous to sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act of 1950, held that any institution covered under exemption from the provision of Rent Control Act has to allege why it has become necessary for it to apply for exemption. If relevant grounds are alleged by the trust seeking exemption, it would be open to the State Government to consider the same and pass an order thereon. Where the State Government does not apply its mind which is required to do under the Act, the notification is not valid. 16. As already stated, neither any reply to the writ petition was filed nor the State made available the record of facts and considerations culminating into the notification impugned dated 12.11.1998, for perusal of the writ court. Learned Single Bench without examining the factual and legal foundation of the notification dated 12.11.1998, affirmed the same by relying upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Mohd. Yamin v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. AIR 1989 Rajasthan 30. Learned Single Bench without examining the factual and legal foundation of the notification dated 12.11.1998, affirmed the same by relying upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Mohd. Yamin v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. AIR 1989 Rajasthan 30. In the case aforesaid a challenge was given to sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act of 1950 with an argument that it discriminates between the landlords by granting exemption only to the landlords falling within the ambit of educational, religious or charitable institutions. The argument aforesaid was negatived by arriving at the conclusion that the classification made is reasonable and is based on intelligible criteria. In the same case it was also held that being not suggested as to what particular reason in addition was necessary to justify issue of the notification, no further reasons except those mentioned in the notification were required to be disclosed. From minute reading of the judgment, we are satisfied that the facts of the instant case are different to the extent that in the case in hand a specific suggestion is made that no material was available with the State or its functionaries to satisfy the existence of public interest demanding exemption from application of the provisions of the Act of 1950 and that has not been contradicted by filing any response to the writ petition. 17. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, while defending the judgment passed by learned Single Bench and the notification dated 12.11.1998, relied upon two judgments of the Division Bench of this Court in Madan Lal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 2008 (1) WLN 92 (Raj.) and Ayal Das & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in AIR 2014 Rajasthan 126. 18. In Madan Lal's case (supra) validity of a notification issued by the State under sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act of 1950 was affirmed. In the case aforesaid the Division Bench after examining the record held that on basis of the report given by the Tehsildar, the Collector formed opinion that in public interest the exemption required to be granted. The State Government acted upon such opinion, therefore, the public interest was existing. 19. In Ayal Das's case (supra) neither reply to the writ petition was filed nor any record was shown to the court, but the court affirmed the validity of the notification. The State Government acted upon such opinion, therefore, the public interest was existing. 19. In Ayal Das's case (supra) neither reply to the writ petition was filed nor any record was shown to the court, but the court affirmed the validity of the notification. From reading of the judgment aforesaid, we are afraid that the same shall be of any help to the respondents. True it is, in the case aforesaid no reply to the writ petition was filed, but in appeal a detailed reply was given with assertion that the Commissioner, Devsthan while forwarding the case mentioned all details to establish public interest. The details given by the Commissioner were also referred in the reply and that is not the position in instant case. 20. From perusal of the record available with us, there is no material to have satisfaction that it was necessary or expedient so to do in public interest to exempt the respondent Trust from application of the Act of 1950. The Trust in its application submitted to the Assistant Commissioner, Devsthan simply stated that its property has been rented out and some litigation is pending for its eviction. A helplessness was also disclosed in getting the litigation decided at an early stage, but it nowhere discloses any public interest demanding exemption from application of law. The communication forwarded to the State Government by the Commissioner, Devsthan also nowhere mentions about any public interest or necessity demanding exemption as per sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act of 1950. The Deputy Legal Remembrance of the Government of Rajasthan very specifically mentioned that the sole purpose of demanding exemption is only to get rid from litigation pending before the civil courts and, therefore, he also mentioned that the Trust desires eviction of the tenant from rented premises to have higher rent. The State Government after getting some documents from the Trust without recording anything to satisfy itself about existence of necessity or public interest issued the notification impugned. It is well settled that in general, every person is required to adhere law and exemption from that can be given in exceptional circumstances. Such exceptional circumstances should be visible atleast from the administrative notings. In the case in hand, we failed to notice any exceptional circumstance as desired under sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act of 1950. 21. Such exceptional circumstances should be visible atleast from the administrative notings. In the case in hand, we failed to notice any exceptional circumstance as desired under sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act of 1950. 21. In view of whatever discussed above, we are of considered opinion that the notification impugned dated 12.11.1998 was issued by the State Government without satisfying itself that exemption to the respondent Trust from application of the provisions of the Act of 1950 was necessary and expedient in public interest, hence the same is illegal. 22. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The judgment impugned dated 24.9.2015, passed by learned Single Bench, is set aside. The writ petition preferred by the petitioners is allowed. The notification dated 12.11.1998 issued by the Government of Rajasthan invoking powers under sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 is quashed. No order to costs.