ORDER : Sandeep Mehta, J. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner Ashok Kumar has approached this Court for assailing the award (Annexure-6) dated 03.08.2004 passed by the learned Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal, Sri Ganganagar in Labour Case No.1/2004 whereby, the claim of the petitioner was rejected and his termination by order dated 01.06.2001 was upheld on the ground that the respondent Gaushala is not covered within the definition of Industry. 2. Shri Vishal Singhal, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Madras High Court judgment rendered in the case of The Management of Madras Pinjarapole v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madras, reported in AIR 1961 (Madras) 239, which was relied upon by the learned Tribunal for holding that the Gaushala is not covered in the definition of Industry, was subsequently reversed by the Division Bench of the very same court and therefore, the impugned award cannot be sustained as being grossly illegal. 3. Per contra, Shri G.R. Goyal, learned counsel representing the respondent employer urges that the Gaushala is indulged in charitable work of up-keep and treatment of ailing bovine animals. Thus, it cannot be covered by the definition of Industry as provided under Rule 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. He submits that apart from relying on the judgment of the Madras High Court referred to above which was reversed in appeal, the learned Tribunal independently came to a conclusion that the petitioner could not prove that the Gaushala was being run for any of the purposes set out in Rule 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act so as to bring it within the definition of Industry. He thus urged that no interference is called for in the award impugned. 4. I have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 5. He thus urged that no interference is called for in the award impugned. 4. I have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 5. The sole question calling for the Court’s consideration in the matter is as to whether the respondent employer Gaushala was covered within the definition of Industry as provided in Rule 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act which reads as under:- “Rule 2(j) "industry" means any systematic activity carried on by co-operation between an employer and his workmen (whether such workmen are employed by such employer directly or by or through any agency, including a contractor) for the production, supply or distribution of goods or services with a view to satisfy human wants or wishes (not being wants or wishes which are merely spiritual or religious in nature), whether or not,-- (i) any capital has been invested for the purpose of carrying on such activity; or (ii) such activity is carried on with a motive to make any gain or profit, and includes-- (a) any activity of the Dock Labour Board established under section 5-A of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948 ); (b) any activity relating to the promotion of sales or business or both carried on by an establishment, but does not include-- (1) any agricultural operation except where such agricultural operation is carried on in an integrated manner with any other activity (being any such activity as is referred to in the foregoing provisions of this clause) and such other activity is the predominant one. Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-clause, "agricultural operation" does not include any activity carried on in a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951; or (2) hospitals or dispensaries; or (3) educational, scientific, research or training institutions; or (4) institutions owned or managed by organisations wholly or substantially engaged in any charitable, social or philanthropic service; or (5) khadi or village industries; or (6) any activity of the Government relatable to the sovereign functions of the Government including all the activities carried on by the departments of the Central Government dealing with defence research, atomic energy and space; or (7) any domestic service; or (8) any activity, being a profession practised by an individual or body or individuals, if the number of persons employed by the individual or body of individuals in relation to such profession is less than ten; or (9) any activity, being an activity carried on by a co-operative society or a club or any other like body of individuals, if the number of persons employed by the co-operative society, club or other like body of individuals in relation to such activity is less than ten.” 6. The respondent, took a specific plea in its reply before the Tribunal that Gaushala does not involve any of the activities illustrated in Rule 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, referred to supra, and thus, is not an industry. At that point of time, the burden shifted on to the petitioner to prove to the otherwise. The petitioner, if he so desired, could have summoned the accounts of the Gaushala to prove that the Gaushala was being run with the motive to make gain or profit, trade or business purposes as warranted in Rule 2(j)(ii) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 7. Therefore, I am of the firm opinion that the learned Tribunal was perfectly justified in holding that the respondent Gaushala was not covered by the definition of Industry and rejected the claim. Evidently, as the employer was not covered within the definition of Industry, the learned Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the petitioner under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Thus, the impugned award being just and legal does not call for any interference by this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction. 8. Evidently, as the employer was not covered within the definition of Industry, the learned Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the petitioner under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Thus, the impugned award being just and legal does not call for any interference by this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction. 8. As a consequence, the writ petition being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.