Research › Search › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 1136 (KER)

Moidu, A. P. v. Narayanan, P. V.

2016-12-19

A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE, K.T.SANKARAN

body2016
ORDER : A. Muhamed Mustaque, J. This revision petition is filed challenging the decision of the Wakf Tribunal, Kozhikode holding that no wakf is created in respect of the plaint schedule properly, which is the subject-matter of a suit. The first defendant in the suit is the revision petitioner. The plaintiff in the suit is the first respondent herein. 2. The first respondent/plaintiff approached the Munsiff's Court, Thalasscry in O.S. No. 324 of 2007 for a relief of permanent prohibitory injunction against the revision petitioner/first defendant. The suit was filed on 21-11-2007. In the suit, the revision petitioner contended that the suit property is a wakf and registered with the Wakf Board. In view of the fact that the suit property is registered as a wakf, the learned Munsiff returned the plaint for representation before proper forum. Accordingly, the first respondent/plaintiff re-presented the suit before the Wakf Tribunal, Kozhikode. The suit was renumbered as O.S. 45 of 2009. Thereafter, again the plaint was returned to the Munsiff's Court, Thalassery. The Munsiff's Court, Thalassery again returned the suit for presentation before the Wakf Tribunal in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf [2010 (3) KLT 862 (SC)]. Thereafter, the suit was numbered as O.S. No. 51 of 2011. 3. Pending suit, the original reliefs were amended by incorporating prayer for declaration, recovery of possession and injunction. The prayer also was amended to include the relief that the suit property is not wakf property. The tribunal, after the trial, concluded that suit property is not a wakf property. It is challenging this finding, the revision [petitioner/first defendant filed this revision. 4. Heard Sri Saji, P.M., learned counsel appearing for the revision [petitioner, Sri P.B. Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent and Sri K. Shibili Naha, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Wakf Board. 5. Sri Saji, P.M., learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner, submitted that the Wakf Tribunal has no original jurisdiction and the jurisdiction to be exercised by the Wakf Tribunal in respect of matters covered by Sections 6 and 7 are in the nature of appellate jurisdiction and not in the nature of original jurisdiction. 5. Sri Saji, P.M., learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner, submitted that the Wakf Tribunal has no original jurisdiction and the jurisdiction to be exercised by the Wakf Tribunal in respect of matters covered by Sections 6 and 7 are in the nature of appellate jurisdiction and not in the nature of original jurisdiction. Therefore, the suit filed by the first respondent is not maintainable and further that going by the nature of the order impugned in this revision, such an order cannot be passed by the tribunal. The first respondent/plaintiff should have challenged the order passed by the Wakf Board and the registration of wakf in the manner known to law and that the prayer for a declaration that the registration of the wakf and the order of the Wakf Board are not binding on him, is not a pro]per legal remedy. 6. The counsel contended that going by the recitals in Ext. B-1 it can be seen that it constitutes a wakf-alal-aulad attracting the definition of Section 3(r) (iii) of the Wakf Act, 1995. He submitted that what is required is that the purpose should be either pious, religious or charitable and that it is not necessary that all the three ingredients should be available to attract the definition of 'wakf-alal-aulad'. The learned counsel submitted that going by sub-section (2) of Section 40 of the Wakf Act, an order passed by the Wakf Board shall be final unless it is revoked or modified by the tribunal. The revocation or modification is in the nature of challenging that order in an appellate forum and that the jurisdiction of the Wakf Tribunal in a matter like this would be in the nature of an appellate jurisdiction. The counsel submitted that the Wakf Tribunal did not deal with the various clauses in Ext. B-1 and their impact on the interpretation of the deed to arrive at a conclusion as to whether Ext. B-1 constitutes a wakf-alal-aulad. He submitted that the tribunal did not consider the value of the property, the income therefrom, the income that would be made available for the purpose mentioned in Ext. B-1, for a pious, religious or charitable purpose, etc. and therefore, the order of the tribunal is liable to be interfered with. B-1 constitutes a wakf-alal-aulad. He submitted that the tribunal did not consider the value of the property, the income therefrom, the income that would be made available for the purpose mentioned in Ext. B-1, for a pious, religious or charitable purpose, etc. and therefore, the order of the tribunal is liable to be interfered with. The counsel submitted that there are three different authorities under the Wakf Act, namely, Mutavalli, Wakf Board and the Wakf Tribunal, each of whom has its own or his own jurisdiction. One cannot encroach upon the jurisdiction of the other and the authorities should function within the limits of the authority conferred on them by the Act. The Wakf Board having recognised the wakf and having registered the same, the tribunal is not entitled to examine the correctness of the same without there being a direct challenge to the order of the Wakf Board. Ext. B-4 Registration Certificate issued by the Wakf Board is final and it cannot be interfered with in a suit of this nature. Sri Saji, P.M. also submitted that the first defendant in the suit was examined as D.W. 1 and four beneficiaries were examined as D.W. 2 to D.W. 5. It is submitted that their evidence would unmistakably indicate that a Wakf was created and that the property was not dealt with as thavazhi property of 40 persons. Even the beneficiaries stated that the nature of the property is that of a Wakf property and this crucial aspect was not taken note of by the Wakf Tribunal. Sri Saji, P. M. cited the following decisions: 1. Kunhiniohammcd Haji v. Darul Huda Islamic Acadcmy, 2008 (I) K.L.T. 957) 2. Alappuzha Muhiyideen Masjid Association v. Abdulkhader, 2011 (1) K LT. 772 (FB) 3. Mohd. Khasim v. Mohd. Daslagir and others, (2006) 13 S.C.C. 497 4. Bibi Saddiqa Fatima v. Saiyed Mohammad Mahmood Hasan, (1978) 3 S.C.C. 299 5. M.P. Wakf Board v. Subhan Shah (Dead) by LRs. and others, (2006) 10 S.C.C. 696 6. Naval Kishore Somani v. Poonam Somani, A.I.R. 1999 Andhra Pradesh 1 7. Sri P.B. Krishnan, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent submitted that the various clauses in Ext. B-1 would clearly indicate that the property was demised as a gift deed and title vested in 40 persons, who constituted the thavazhi. and others, (2006) 10 S.C.C. 696 6. Naval Kishore Somani v. Poonam Somani, A.I.R. 1999 Andhra Pradesh 1 7. Sri P.B. Krishnan, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent submitted that the various clauses in Ext. B-1 would clearly indicate that the property was demised as a gift deed and title vested in 40 persons, who constituted the thavazhi. The nomenclature of the document, the various stipulations made therein and the clear provisions which would indicate that the thavazhi has to manage and enjoy the property for ever without any power of alienation would clearly indicate that the predeccssor-in-interest of the plaintiff never intended to create a wakf. He submitted that the purpose mentioned as religious or pious or charitable in Ext. B-1 does not make the demise a wakf. He relied on the decisions reported in: 1. Hydrose v. Ayisumma and others, I.L.R. 1981 (1) Kerala 602 2. Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Yusuf Bhai Chawala and others, (2012) 6 S.C.C. 328 3. Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Huinayun Mirza Wakf, 2010 (3) K.L.T. 862 (SC) 4. Punjab Wakf Board v. Gram Panchayat Alias Gram Sabha, (2000) 2 S.C.C. 121 5. Abdul Rais and others v. M.P. Wakf Board and others, (2005) 1 S.C.C. 741 6. The Kerala Wakf Board, Ernakulam v. Valia Maliyekkal, Koyanji Koya Thangal, 1985 K.L.J. 61. 8. He submitted that the decisions of this court in Hydrose v. Ayisumma and others, I.L.R. 1981 (1) Kerala 602 and The Kerala Wakf Board, Ernakulam v. Valia Maliyekkal, Koyanji Koya Thangal, 1985 K.L.J. 61 were decided with reference to the definition of 'wakf-alal-aulad'. Sri P. B. Krishnan submitted that what is of utmost importance is a dedication of the property to the Almighty and that such a dedication is conspicuously absent in Ext. B-1. The settler never intended that the members of thavazhi should not be benefited or that the property should vest in the God Almighty. He only intended that certain religious requirements are meted out, from the income from the property once in a year for the benefit of the individuals of the thavazhi. 9. Sri Shibili Naha, the learned counsel appearing for the Wakf Board submitted that the tribunal ought to have considered the oral and documentary evidence in the case in detail and ought to have held that a wakf was created by Ext. B-1. 9. Sri Shibili Naha, the learned counsel appearing for the Wakf Board submitted that the tribunal ought to have considered the oral and documentary evidence in the case in detail and ought to have held that a wakf was created by Ext. B-1. In answer to the submission made by Sri P.B. Krishnan that the Wakf Board did not even file a written statement in the case and they were ex parte before the tribunal, Sri Shibili Naha submitted that he only submitted with reference to the admitted and proved facts and nothing else. 10. Mr. Saji, P.M., learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner submitted that the latest decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Faseela. M. v. Munnerul Islam Madrasa Committee and another, I.L.R. 2014 (2) Kerala 893, it was held that the Wakf Tribunal can remand the case to the Wakf Board. That is in tune with the Full Bench decision of Kerala High Court. It means that the tribunal is exercising an appellate power. Sri P.B. Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent submitted that neither the Board nor the tribunal has power to grant a relief of recovery of possession. Therefore, this Court can ignore the decision of the Board. 11. The controversies involved in this case are centered on interpretation of Ext. B-1, a gift deed executed by Smt. Sainabi, widow of Parakkal Assankutty Haji and her children, in favour of 40 persons, who arc near relatives of Assankutty Haji. This deed was executed in the name of descendants of Ambalathil Parakkat Mariyam to be enjoyed as thavazhi property through female descendants. It is to be noted that the parties and beneficiaries to the gift deed are mappilas of North Malabar who also follow marumakkathayam system for devolution and enjoyment of property as governed by Mappila-Marumakkathayam Act, 1939. It is also stipulated in the gift deed that the property therein shall not be alienated and shall be enjoyed as a thavazhi of female descendants. It is further stipulated that 10% of income from the property can be appropriated by the kamavar of thavazhi. There is also a stipulation to utilise the income for maintenance of residential building in the property. It is further stipulated that 10% of income from the property can be appropriated by the kamavar of thavazhi. There is also a stipulation to utilise the income for maintenance of residential building in the property. There are other stipulations, which perhaps have more relevance in this case, namely, the stipulation as to the utilisation of the agricultural income for the religious purpose, such as reciting Quran for the benefit of departed members of thavazhi once in a year, for treatment expenses of thavazhi members, religious education and funeral service of the members of the tharavad. The recitals as to the expending of the amount for religious purpose are the bone of contention as to the constitution of wakf. Therefore, the entire issue would depend upon interpreting the Ext. B-1, whether such recitals constitute wakf or not. Apart from the above, learned counsel for the revision petitioner, very strenuously argued before this Court as to the maintainability of the suit without there being a challenge to the registration of wakf by way of appeal. Though tins aspect has not been considered by the tribunal, considering it as pure questions of law, we deem it fit to consider this point as well in this revision. Therefore, the following points arise for consideration: Point No. (i): whether a suit is maintainable before the Wakf Tribunal in respect of the property which is the subject-matter of registration before the Wakf Board, without challenging the registration by way of an appeal before the Tribunal. Point No. (ii): whether recitals in Ext. B-1 gift deed would constitute a Wakf-alal-aulad or not. Point No. (i): 11.i (a) The learned counsel for the revision petitioner referred to Ext. B-4 registration given by the Wakf Board in respect of the wakf. This registration appears to have been given by the Wakf Board in the month of July, 2007 some months prior to lire institution of the suit. It is argued that when characteristics of a property have been declared by Wakf Board, no suit would be maintainable before the tribunal without there being a challenge to the registration by a separate proceeding in appeal or application before the tribunal. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel that in the light of Section 40(2) of the Wakf Act, 1995 the decision of the Board is final unless it is revoked or modified by the tribunal. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel that in the light of Section 40(2) of the Wakf Act, 1995 the decision of the Board is final unless it is revoked or modified by the tribunal. He also drew our attention to Section 7 of the Wakf Act to buttress his argument. 11.i (b) It appears that Wakf Board has granted registration sometimes in the month of July, 2007 few months prior to the institution of the suit before the Munsiff's Court, Thalassery. Therefore, registration with Wakf Board will not hit by principles of lis pendens. It is apposite to quote Sections 40(1) and 40(2) of the Wakf Act in this context, which read as follows: "40. Decision if a property is Wakf property. - (1) The Board may itself collect information regarding any property which it has reason to believe to be VVakf property and if any question arises whether a particular property is Wakf property or not or whether a Wakf is a Sunni Wakf or a Shia Wakf, it may, after making such inquiry as it may deem fit, decide the question. (2) The decision of the Board on a question under sub-section (1) shall, unless revoked or modified by the Tribunal, be final." In this case, the provisions of the Wakf Act before the amendment in the year 2013 are referred. 11.i (c) The list of wakfs is prepared and published in terms of Section 5 of the Wakf Act. Once a decision is taken in terms of Section 40, this w ill form part of the list published under Section 5. It is open for the party to challenge the inclusion of the property in the list. This challenge is referred to under Sections 6 and 7 of the Wakf Act. It is appropriate to refer to Sections 6 and 7 of the Wakf Act in this context, which is reproduced hereunder : "6. Disputes regarding Wakfs. It is open for the party to challenge the inclusion of the property in the list. This challenge is referred to under Sections 6 and 7 of the Wakf Act. It is appropriate to refer to Sections 6 and 7 of the Wakf Act in this context, which is reproduced hereunder : "6. Disputes regarding Wakfs. - (1) If any question arises whether a particular property specified as Wakf property in the list of Wakfs is Wakf property or not or whether a Wakf specified in such list is a Shia Wakf or Sunni Wakf, the Board or the mutawalli of the Wakf or any person interested therein may institute a suit in a Tribunal for the decision of the question and the decision of the Tribunal in respect of such matter shall be final : Provided that 110 such suit shall be entertained by the Tribunal after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the list of Wakfs. Explanation. - For the purposes of this Section and Section 7, the expression 'any person interested therein', shall, in relation to any property specified as Wakf property in the list of Wakfs published alter the commencement of this Act. shall include also every person who, though not interested in the Wakf concerned, is interested in such property and to whom a reasonable opportunity had been afforded to represent his case by notice served on him in that behalf during the course of the relevant inquiry under Section 4. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), no proceeding under this Act in respect of any Wakf shall be stayed by reason only of the pendency of any such suit or of any appeal or other proceeding arising out of such suit. (3) The Survey Commissioner shall not be made a party to any suit under subsection (1) and no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against him in respect of anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rules made thereunder. (4) The list of Wakfs shall, unless it is modified in pursuance of a decision of the Tribunal under sub-section (1) be final and conclusive. (4) The list of Wakfs shall, unless it is modified in pursuance of a decision of the Tribunal under sub-section (1) be final and conclusive. (5) On and from the commencement of this Act in a State, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted or commenced in a Court in that State in relation to any question referred to in sub-section (1). 7. Power of Tribunal to determine disputes regarding Wakfs. - (1) If, after the commencement of this Act, any question arises, whether a particular property specified as Wakf property in a list of Wakfs is Wakf property or not, or whether a Wakf specified in such list is a Shia Wakf or a Sunni Wakf, the Board or the mutawalli of the Wakf, or any person interested therein, may apply to the Tribunal having jurisdiction in relation to such property, for the decision of the question and the decision of the Tribunal thereon shall be final: Provided that- (a) in the case of the list of Wakfs relating to any part of the State and published after the commencement of this Act no such application shall be entertained after the expiry of one year from the date of publication of the list of Wakfs; and (b) in the case of the list of Wakfs relating to any part of the State and published at any time within a period of one year immediately preceding the commencement of this Act, such an application may be entertained by Tribunal within the period of one year from such commencement: Provided further that where any such question has been heard and finally decided by a Civil Court in a suit instituted before such commencement, the Tribunal shall not reopen such question. (2) Except where the Tribunal has no jurisdiction by reason of the provisions of sub-section (5), no proceeding under this section in respect of any Wakf shall be stayed by any Court, Tribunal or other authority by reason only of the pendency of any suit, application or appeal or other proceeding arising out of any such suit, application, appeal or other proceeding. (3) The Chief Executive Officer shall not be made a party to any application under sub-section (1). (3) The Chief Executive Officer shall not be made a party to any application under sub-section (1). (4) The list of Wakfs and where any such list is modified in pursuance of a decision of the Tribunal under sub-section (1), the list as so modified, shall be final. (5) The Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to determine any matter which is the subject-matter of any suit or proceeding instituted in a Civil Court under sub-section (1) of Section 6, before the commencement of this Act or which is the subject-matter of any appeal from the decree passed before such commencement in any such suit or proceeding or of any application for revision or review arising out of such suit, proceeding or appeal, as the case may be." Two different modes of the challenge are referred in Sections 6 and 7. Section 6 refers to the institution of a suit before the tribunal. Section 7 refers to the filing of an application before the tribunal. It is therefore appropriate for this Court to decide this issue in the context of the difference between Sections 6 and 7. This Court also feels, before proceeding to distinguish between Sections 6 and 7, it is apposite to refer definition of Wakf. The Wakf is defined under Section 3(r) of the Wakf Act as follows: "3(r) 'Wakf' means the permanent dedication by a person professing Islam, of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and includes- (i) a Wakf by user hut such Wakf shall not cease to be a Wakf by reason only of the user having ceased irrespective of the period of such cesser; (ii) 'grants', including mashrat-ul-khidmat for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable; and (iii) a Wakf-al-al-aulad to the extent to which the property is dedicated for any purpose recognised by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable, and 'Wakif' means any person making such dedication;" 11.i (d) Therefore, going by the definition of wakf, there are three elements to constitute a wakf, - (i) the act of the party, permanent dedication by a person professing Islam (ii) subject matter of wakf, movable or immovable property (iii) object of the wakf, any purpose recognised by muslim law as pious, religious or charitable. Thus, wakf is an endowment of institutional nature in the religious context of Islamic law parallel to a Trust in secular law. It is because of this institutional nature, Wakf Act underwent amendment in 2013 and distinguished between wakf identifiable with the subject of wakf and wakf referring it in institutional form as "auqaf". Therefore, wakf as an institution can have both the property dedicated as a wakf and also the property of a secular or non-dedicated for a religious purpose. Thus, the wakf dispute pertaining to immovable property has to be classified as a dispute in the nature of proprietary interest and that of the character of wakf or dispute exclusively related to the character of the property as wakf. In the former, dispute is more to do with the settler's proprietary interest in the immovable property, which is the subject-matter of wakf or otherwise. In the latter, characteristics of wakf alone can be questioned. 11.i (e) The Wakf Board is a statutory body constituted for general superintendence of wakf. It has no power to adjudicate any dispute involving proprietary interest in the immovable property. The power of the Wakf Board as referable under Section 40 is only to decide on the characteristics of the nature of property i.e., whether it is a wakf property or not. Section 7 therefore, has to be understood as providing a measure to challenge the decision of the Wakf Board as to the characteristics of the property. On the other hand. Section 6 provides for resolution of the disputes by instituting a comprehensive suit. In the suit, therefore, the tribunal gets the widest power to decide all issues including proprietary interest of the settler. The word "suit" has not been defined anywhere and it is a term of wide amplitude. The suit referred under Section 6 is meant to understand that the tribunal is given the power of a civil court to decide the entire issue relating to the immovable property including wakf character of the property. If in a dispute there involves a question regarding the proprietary interest of settler, certainly, suit alone would be maintainable as the tribunal cannot decide the dispute without adverting to the title of the settler. On the other hand under Section 7, the tribunal is having only limited jurisdiction to decide the issue regarding characteristics of the wakf, or not. If in a dispute there involves a question regarding the proprietary interest of settler, certainly, suit alone would be maintainable as the tribunal cannot decide the dispute without adverting to the title of the settler. On the other hand under Section 7, the tribunal is having only limited jurisdiction to decide the issue regarding characteristics of the wakf, or not. The challenge by the institution of the suit being a comprehensive challenge, including the character of the wakf property, we arc of the view that the suit is maintainable without any separate challenge to the decision of the Wakf Board, as to the character of the property by way of appeal or application before the tribunal. This comprehensive nature of suit takes in also a challenge to the nature of the character of the wakf as well. Point No. (ii): 11.ii (a) The revision petitioner set up a case of wakf-alal-aulad. According to the revision petitioner, income from the wakf property is dedicated for utilisation of religious purpose and use by the members of the family. It is the case of the revision petitioner that income is set up for charity on a religious line. It is a pious act creating a wakf. It is also pointed out that the income set apart for utilisation of the family members and use of religious purposes is for an indefinite period and therefore, it implies that the entire income has been dedicated to constitute itself as a wakf. Wakf-alal-aulad is also a wakf as defined under the Wakf Act. To constitute a wakf-alal-aulad, the property must be dedicated to the God Almighty and the family members of settler are the beneficiaries of the dedication. It is possible to dedicate entire income for the benefit of wakif. In the book written by S.A. Khader, he refers such wakf-alal-aulad as simpliciter. The author also refers to wakf-alal-aulad composite, in which a portion of the income is dedicated for pious or for other purpose recognised by muslim law as a pious, religious or charitable and the remaining portion for the benefit of the settler, (page 119, The Law of Wakfs, S.A. Khader 2nd edn.) 11.ii (b) As noted in the foregoing paragraphs, there must be three elements to constitute wakf, i.e.. dedication, subject and object. One among them is the dedication of property to God Almighty. Dedication means tying up of property with God. dedication, subject and object. One among them is the dedication of property to God Almighty. Dedication means tying up of property with God. Once the property is tied up with God, the owner of the property is the Almighty and none would have any power of alienation. Dedication of property with Almighty God would extinguish proprietary interest in the immovable property of wakif. In wakf-alal-aulad, property has to be dedicated to God ruid beneficiaries can be family members of the settler (wakif). 11.ii (c) Here, in this case, the recitals in Ext. B-1 gift deed clearly rules out any dedication to the Almighty. It is stipulated that property has to be enjoyed through female descendants without being alienated. The mere stipulation that income will have to be utilised for the religious purpose will not itself constitute a wakf. It is to be noted that parties arc Mappilas of North Malabar and followers of pristine Marumakkathayam Law. T he matrilineal line of descent is the essence of Marumakkathayam. The clog on alienation against the members of thavazhi cannot be construed as a dedication to the Almighty by expression or implication unless the property is dedicated in the name of God. There is no dedication of income of the property to the God either entirely or partially. It is possible in the context of wakf-alal-aulad to dedicate the income to the God and the family of the wakif becomes the beneficiary of the income. Utilisation of the income either wholly or partially for religious practices will not itself result in the dedication of the property to the God Almighty. The income has to be tied up with Almighty through dedication. It is to be noted that one of tire stipulations in the gift deed is that the property has to be enjoyed by female descendants without encumbering and persons who would consume liquor and also persons who marry non-muslim would lose the right to claim the property. The restriction against alienation in that context is clear that the intention of the settler is to retain the characteristics of the thavazhi property through female descendants. Further, income is also dedicated for use of karanavan and other secular purposes. To constitute a dedication, there must be a clear intention to tie up the income with God. The restriction against alienation in that context is clear that the intention of the settler is to retain the characteristics of the thavazhi property through female descendants. Further, income is also dedicated for use of karanavan and other secular purposes. To constitute a dedication, there must be a clear intention to tie up the income with God. We are not entering into the controversies on the restrictions for utilisation of income as referred to in the document as it is a matter for the civil court to decide at an appropriate stage. This observation is made only in the context of the characteristics of the property as a wakf, as claimed by the revision petitioner. 12. A Bench of this Court in Hydrose v. Ayisumma and others, I.L.R. 1981 (I) Kerala 602, in the context of wakf-alal-aulad, held that in a document the stipulation as to the utilisation of the fraction of the income which remotely referred to as religious though not charitable cannot invest the document with the characteristics of a wakf deed and it was further held as follows: "Wakf means a permanent dedication by a Muslim for any purpose recognised by Muslim Law as religious, pious or charitable. The dedication must be permanent. Reading of Quran in the private house or at the settler's tomb is a pious object. But it cannot be said that it constitutes a charitable purpose..." 13. In Mohd Khasim v. Mohd Dastagir and others, (2006) 13 S.C.C. 497 it was held as follows: "Mulla: Principles of Mohammedan Law relied on. In order to constitute a wakf, there must be a permanent dedication of the properties in question in favour of God Almighty and while the objects of wakf may initially be for the benefit of the wakif's family and other descendants, the ultimate beneficiary has to be God. Neither of the said two conditions were fulfilled by the document dated 29-2-1960 The other important test is the nature of inalienability of the properties forming the nucleus of the wakf. Once a wakf is created, the title of the wakif in the dedicated property is extinguished and vests in God. Neither of the said two conditions were fulfilled by the document dated 29-2-1960 The other important test is the nature of inalienability of the properties forming the nucleus of the wakf. Once a wakf is created, the title of the wakif in the dedicated property is extinguished and vests in God. The wakif is entitled to reserve power to alienate any portion of the wakf properties, but for the benefit of the wakf." The precedents cited on either side, other than as noted above, have no relevance in this context in the light of the discussions as above. Therefore, in the absence of any dedication to the Almighty, it has to be concluded that no valid wakf is created. As has been already noted, it is for the civil court to decide as to the right of any party to claim as a beneficiary of the income in the property. Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed. No costs.