Union of India, represented by The Chairman, Brahmaputra Board, Basistha, Guwahati v. Poly Product represented by Its proprietor Mr. Ashim Baruah, Son of Late Sarbananda Barua
2016-12-16
PARAN KUMAR PHUKAN
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT AND ORDER : This delay condonation application is filed u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay of 382 days in presenting the connected appeal before this court to challenge the judgment and order dated 07.02.2015, passed by the learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge No.1, Kamrup(M), Guwahati in Misc. Arb. Case No. 01/2012. 2. The Brahmaputra Board awarded contract to respondent No.1 M/S Poly Product for construction of sluices at Kakrakhal and Kinnorkhal under Harang Drainage Development Scheme at a cost of Rs.3,57,92,786.00 with a stringent condition that the works would be completed within 18 months from the date of execution of the agreement on 08.03.1999. Due to various hurdles faced by him in executing the works, which were brought to the notice of the authorities, the respondent No.1 could not complete the works within the specified time and consequently there was slow progress of the works and in spite of repeated extension it could not be completed which ultimately led to rescinding of the contract and it was assigned to some other party. 3. The respondent No.1 thereafter requested the Board for making payment of the dues for the works done by him and for referring the dispute to Arbitration and ultimately at the intervention of the High Court, a sole Arbitrator was appointed for adjudication of the dispute between them. 4. Accordingly, arbitration proceeding commenced before the learned sole Arbitrator and on completion of the proceedings, the sole Arbitrator awarded an amount of Rs. 98,586,64.76/- with pendentilite interest on the aforesaid amount in favour of the respondent No.1 against which a petition u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was filed by the Board for setting aside the award, however, the learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge No.1, Kamrup(M), Guwahati refused to interfere with the findings of the sole Arbitrator and the petition u/s 34 of the Act was accordingly dismissed. 5. Against the order of dismissal the Union of India represented by the Chairman of the Brahmaputra Board and Chief Engineer(I&W) Brahmaputra Board preferred this appeal u/s 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act to challenge the order dated 07.02.2015, passed by the learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge No.1, Kamrup(M), Guwahati, as there was delay of 382 days in presenting the appeal this application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act is filed for condonation of delay. 6. Heard Mr.
District and Sessions Judge No.1, Kamrup(M), Guwahati, as there was delay of 382 days in presenting the appeal this application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act is filed for condonation of delay. 6. Heard Mr. S. C. Keyal, learned Asstt. S.G.I. and Mr. P. D. Nair, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 7. The application is filed along with an affidavit of Chan Mohan Das Superintending Engineer, Office of the Chief Engineer, Brahmaputra Board, Basistha, Guwahati. The relevant paragraphs 2 and 3 of the petition are reproduced below:-- “2.That the applicants state that after judgment has been passed, the application accordingly obtained the certified copy of the order dated 07.02.2015 and communicated the same to the Ministry of Water Resource, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation(MoWR,RD7GR), Government of India, New Delhi for taking decision in preferring an appeal against the judgment. As per the procedure, the MoWR. RD&GR submitted the matter before the Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India, to suggest follow up course of action. Considering the involvement of amount in multi crores, the matter has been discussed with Ministry of Finance, Government of India etc., and meticulous examination on various aspects of the case was necessary before taking a decision on the follow up course of action. In order to examine the matter with pros cone, records from various offices were called for, by the ministry. As such, the whole process took some time which cannot but to bear with. Here, the applicants honestly submit before the court that there was no unreasonable or deliberate delay caused by any quarter on the matter yet the delay for a period of 471 days could not be avoided. 3. That the applicant stated that finally, the Chairman, Brahmaputra Board, received a letter dated 09.12.2015 from the Ministry of Water Resource, River Development and Ganga Rejunenation, B&B wing, New Delhi with a direction to the Brahmaputra Board for preferring appeal before the Hon’ble High Court on the judgment dated 07.02.2015, to protect the interest of the Government of India. that the applicants state that in the process of the preparation of the appeal petition in a comprehensive way vis-a-vis some new developments have taken place on the matter it took some time. The applicants state that in the process of preparation of the Appeal petition, the delay has taken place which was beyond their reasonable control.
that the applicants state that in the process of the preparation of the appeal petition in a comprehensive way vis-a-vis some new developments have taken place on the matter it took some time. The applicants state that in the process of preparation of the Appeal petition, the delay has taken place which was beyond their reasonable control. The applicants states that there was no lacks on their part in the matter and they were diligently pursuing the matter and therefore this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to condone the delay and consider the appeal on its merit.” 8. The respondent No. 1 has filed an objection on 08.06.2016 contending therein that the Union of India who is neither a party to the Arbitration Proceeding nor connected with the awarding of the contract has any locus standi to prefer the appeal before this court. The agreement was executed between the Brahmaputra Board and the respondent No.1 and the Board being a statutory body should have been impleaded as an appellant in the appeal but the same has not been done and as such, this Interlocutory Application is not maintainable. It is also contended that the Union of India is a stranger to the Arbitration proceeding as well as the petition u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and consequently have no right to file any appeal or petition for condonation of delay. 9. Mr. P. D. Nair, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 strenuously contends that the Brahmaputra Board is an autonomous body and is a creation of the statute and the contract agreement was executed between the Board and the respondent No.1 and as such the Chairman of the Board does not have any authority to represent the Union of India in his capacity as the Chairman of the said Board. The condonation petition is liable to be dismissed on this count alone. 10. Mr. Keyal, on the other hand submits that the agreement was executed not only between the Board and the respondent but also the Union of India and it is the Union of India which provided the requisite fund for execution of the works and as such it is a necessary party to the case. 11. This interlocutory application is filed for condonation of delay in filing the connected appeal to challenge the order of the learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge.
11. This interlocutory application is filed for condonation of delay in filing the connected appeal to challenge the order of the learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge. The parties will get ample opportunities to raise the pleas regarding non-joinder and mis-joinder in the appeal provided the delayed approach is condoned. At this stage, no finding on the issues is required to be given. 12. The learned Asstt. S.G.I. refers to the State of Nagaland vs. Lipok Ao and Ors., reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752 and also Executive Officer, Antiyur Town Panchayat Vs. G. Armugam (dead) by legal heirs, reported in (2015) 3 SCC 569 to project that the State is an impersonal machinery working through their officers and they should not be treated as a independent litigant and their delay condonation application should be liberally construed. 13. Mr. Keyal also submits that the circumstances for which the appeal could not be filed in time construed sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and as such this court may be pleased to condone the delay of 382 days in filing the connected appeal. He also contends that the circumstances beyond the control of the petitioners prevented them from preferring the appeal earlier and it took sufficient time to the authorities to discuss the matter at various levels which is a usual procedure followed in all State matter and considering this aspect a liberal approach may be taken and delay may be condoned. 14. While the liberal approach in the delay condonation application of the State can be an option, the question is whether sufficient cause shown for the delayed approach and whether the applicants were not diligent in presenting the appeal. 15. In the instant case as noted earlier the application u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was disposed of on 07.02.2015 but nothing has been reflected in the petition as regards the date on which the certified copy of the order was received and when it was forwarded to the Ministry of Water Resource, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation, Government of India for taking appropriate decision and there is also nothing in the petition to show for how many months the matter was kept pending in the Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India to suggest follow up action.
No specific reason has been assigned for the inordinate delay in taking the decision to prefer the appeal. Moreover, from the petition itself it appears that the Chairman of the Board received the letter from the Ministry of Water Resource on 09.12.2015 but the appeal was preferred on 25.05.2016 and there is no explanation as to how this delay of more than 5 months occurred in preferring the appeal. Thus, long after the judgment, the appeal was preferred and therefore, want of reasonable diligence is clearly discernible from the facts of the present case as the applicant took 382 days time to prefer the appeal. Nothing has also been mentioned regarding time taken for obtaining the legal opinion, for the already delayed matter, the applicant took more than 5 months further time to prepare the appeal and finally it was filed on 25.05.2016. In a recent decision rendered by this court in Case No. I.A.(C) 1047/2016 this court observed as follows:-- “12. While the length of the delay may not be the key factor for entertainment of application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is nevertheless important for the applicant to demonstrate that they were prevented by sufficient cause from approaching the Court in due time, despite due diligence. In the context of the explanations furnished by them even if we liberally construe them, it is apparent that due diligence could not be demonstrated by the applicants as they slept over the matter for nearly a year after the judgment was delivered on 27-09-2013 and the State machinery woke up only when they received the notices in the contempt case. Even, thereafter, only to obtain legal opinion to file the Appeal, another 9 months and 3 days' time was taken and this, in our mind, cannot be accepted as sufficient explanation even with a liberal approach. 13. Even when the applicant is treated to be impersonal state machinery, it is important for the law to apply equally to all litigants and the liberal approach doctrine cannot be invoked to condone inordinate delay, when explanations are lacking and want of diligence is perceived.” 16.
13. Even when the applicant is treated to be impersonal state machinery, it is important for the law to apply equally to all litigants and the liberal approach doctrine cannot be invoked to condone inordinate delay, when explanations are lacking and want of diligence is perceived.” 16. In Post Master General and Anr., vs. Living Media India Limited and Anr., reported in AIR (2012) 3 SCC 563 the Supreme Court has observed that at this point in the case there was delay of 427 days in filing the appeal before the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court. The High Court after examining the other dates mentioned in the affidavit of the person in-charge of the case to justify the delay found that there was delay at several stages with no explanation for the cause of delay. The Supreme Court also took serious note of the causal manner in which the Government Department are functioning in response to the law of Limitation and when dismissing the appeal on this ground of delay the Supreme Court made the following observations:-- “The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the Government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government department. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 17.
The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government department. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 17. The Supreme Court in another decision in Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai AIR 2012 SC 1629 held as follows: “That in cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest.” 18. An identical view has been expressed by the Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh through Executive Engineer an Anr., vs Amar Nath Yadav where there was delay of 481 days in filing the Special Leave Petition before the Court, the Court observed that the delay attributed to the moving file from one department/officer to the other cannot be said to be sufficient explanation for condoning such abnormal delay and consequently, the delay application was dismissed. 19. Admittedly, in the instant case the judgment and order was passed on 07.02.2015, by the learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge but the date of receipt of the certified copy of the order has not been mentioned in the petition. In the application no particulars have been given for the inordinate delay in filing the appeal. The application also does not say when the matter was examined by the authority at different levels and on which date it was sent for legal opinion and on what date legal opinion was received. The application is a vague one and although it is stated in the petition that some new developments have taken place and it took some time but nothing has been elaborated in this regard. 20.
The application is a vague one and although it is stated in the petition that some new developments have taken place and it took some time but nothing has been elaborated in this regard. 20. Moving of the files from one department to another cannot be a ground for preferring the appeal after such an inordinate delay and it cannot be evinced that the matter was pursued diligently by the authorities. 21. The applicant in my considered view miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reason to condone the delay in filing the connected appeal before this court and having regard to the decision rendered by the Apex Court in various cases and the fact situation of this case I do not find sufficient reason to condone the delay of 382 days in presenting the connected appeal. 22. The Interlocutory Application is consequently dismissed and the connected appeal is also dismissed on the same grounds.