Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 1138 (GUJ)

V. R. Boghani v. Chief General Manager

2016-06-20

J.B.PARDIWALA

body2016
JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. By this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, a retired employee of the Erstwhile State Bank of Saurashtra, has prayed for the following reliefs:- "(A) This Hon'ble High Court may be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 19.10.1993 (Annex. L) issued by the Respondent No. 2 and the impugned order dated 10.7.1993 (Annex. J) issued by the Disciplinary Authority by holding it as arbitrary, discriminatory and against the principles of equity and natural justice and therefore, required to be held illegal and may kindly be quashed and set aside and the respondents may be directed to give all the consequential benefits to the petitioner by considering his suspension period as on duty and the Telex Operator allowance may also be granted by re-transferring him at Begumpura Branch, Surat. (B) Pending admission and final disposal of this petition this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to stay the further operation and implementation of the impugned order dated 10.7.1993 and 19.10.1993. (C) This Hon'ble High Court may be pleased to grant the ad interim relief as prayed in Prayer (B) above. (D) This Hon'ble High Court may be pleased to allow this application with cost. (E) Any other order or direction as may be deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be passed in the interest of justice." 2. The petitioner, while working at the Begumpura Branch at Surat, was placed under suspension by an order dated 9th August 1990. Later on, he was served with a departmental charge-sheet dated 8th September, 1990 with the following charges; "1. That you had sometime in November, 1989, illegally and unlawfully demanded Rs. 25,000/- from Shri B.D. Bhatt, when he was Branch Manager of Bank's Surat (Begampura) Branch, under the pretext that you will arrange for clearing of arrears of work done at the Branch. 2. That you had further pressurized/threatened Shri B.D. Bhatt that unless he provided him Rs. 40,000/- the work at the Branch would not be cleared and it would be further paralysed. 3. That you had during the period from December, 1989 and February, 1990 in a coercible manner accepted illegal gratification of Rs. 2. That you had further pressurized/threatened Shri B.D. Bhatt that unless he provided him Rs. 40,000/- the work at the Branch would not be cleared and it would be further paralysed. 3. That you had during the period from December, 1989 and February, 1990 in a coercible manner accepted illegal gratification of Rs. 8,000/- through Shri B.D. Bhatt from the Bank's customers as detailed below and acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest thereby causing to tarnish the image of the Bank. (i) Rs. 3,000/- from Shri Kishanbhai of M/s. Krishna Textiles in December, 1989. (ii) Rs. 5,000/- from Shri Valjibhai of M/s. Kesari Exports, in the month of February, 1990. You have thus committed acts prejudicial to the interest of the Bank, tarnishing the image of the bank, obtained illegal gratification and rendered yourself liable for acts of misconduct as provided in clause 19.5(J) & 19.5(K) of the Bipartite settlement, if proved." 3. The statement of allegations, on the basis of which charges were framed, is as under; "Shri V.R. Boghani is working as Staff Clerical at Bank's Surat (Begampura) Branch. He is at present local Secretary of the Award Staff Union at the Branch. 2. At the said branch of the Bank, routine work of the branch remained in arrears and it was increasing substantially day by day. Shri B.D. Bhatt, the then Manager of the Branch, then discussed the matter with Shri Boghani to improve the position of housekeeping some where in November, 1989. Shri Boghani, after a series of discussions with Shri B.D. Bhatt, assured him normal position provided the Branch Manager should arranged for Rs. 25,000/- within 10/15 days. As the Branch Manager could not manage for Rs. 25,000/- within the said period of 10/15 days, the arrears of work deliberately kept mounting to pressurized the Branch Manager and Shri Boghani then again raised his demand to provide atleast Rs. 40,000/- to Rs. 50,000/- under pretext of clearance of accumulated work by exercising his influence on the staff member, otherwise the work will not be done and kept in arrears. 3. As the arrears of work was mounting up, Shri Boghani pressurized the then Branch Manager Shri Bhatt to arrange money, which was ultimately arranged by way of collecting from Bank's customers and given to Shri Boghani under pressure, the details of which are as under:- (i) Rs. 3. As the arrears of work was mounting up, Shri Boghani pressurized the then Branch Manager Shri Bhatt to arrange money, which was ultimately arranged by way of collecting from Bank's customers and given to Shri Boghani under pressure, the details of which are as under:- (i) Rs. 3,000/- from Shri Kishanbhai, partner of M/s. Krishna Textiles, in the month of December, 1989. (ii) Rs. 5000/- from Shri Valjibhai, proprietor of M/s. Keshri Exports in the month of February, 1990. 4. Thus, Shri Boghani obtained illegally and unlawfully total amount of Rs. 8,000/- through Shri B.D. Bhatt. Shri Boghani had then again advised Shri B.D. Bhatt that the said amount of Rs. 8,000/- given to him was very small and not up to his expectations. 5. Thus, Shri Boghani illegally and in an coercible manner demanded and obtained money through the Branch Manager by pressurizing him to collect the amount from the customers and pay the same to him for clearing arrears of work and illegally and unlawfully obtained Rs. 8,000/- from Shri Bhatt for the said purpose. He had thus committed the acts prejudicial to the interest of the Bank tarnishing the image and obtained unlawful gains for himself and thereby committed acts of gross misconduct as provided in clause 19.5(J) and 19.5(K) of the Bipartite Settlement, if proved." 4. An inquiry Officer was appointed to conduct the inquiry. 5. The Inquiry Officer filed his report dated 22nd April 1993 stating that the charges against the petitioner were not established. 6. The Disciplinary Authority, by an order dated 10th July 1993, imposed a penalty of withdrawal of Telex Operator Allowances for a period of five years. The order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is as under; "I am in receipt of your letter dated 26/6/93 in reply to our show cause notice No. AZO:STAFF:CON:212 dated 12/6/93. After carefully going through the deposition of prosecution witnesses and exhibits PO Ex 2 and 3 as also entire records of inquiry proceedings and keeping in view, length of your service, I have decided to impose following final punishment on you; "Withdrawal of telex operator allowance for a period of five years." The above punishment will come into force from the date of service of this final punishment order to you. Further it has been decided by me that your suspension period will not be treated as duty period. Further it has been decided by me that your suspension period will not be treated as duty period. I see no reason to change my earlier decision of posting you at our Varaccha Rd., Surat Branch on reinstatement. If you wish to prefer an appeal against above punishment to the Appellate Authority, Please do so within 45 days of service of this final punishment order in terms of clause No. IX. 3(b) of Bipartite Settlement. This letter is sent to you in duplicate. Please acknowledge receipt in second copy which should be returned to me." 7. Being dissatisfied, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Deputy General Manager being the Appellate Authority. The Deputy General Manager, by an order dated 19th October, 1993, dismissed the appeal. The order, dismissing the appeal, reads as under; "With reference to your letter dated 3.9.1999, making an appeal to me against the punishment of withdrawal of telex operator allowance for 5 years imposed by the disciplinary authority consequent upon an inquiry ordered on charges against you contained in charge sheet issued to you vide letter No. RM (A-I)/Staff/GM/CON/36 dated 8.9.1990, I have carefully gone through the contents of your appeal as also the observations of disciplinary authority and his decision to impose the above referred punishment and inquiry officer's report dated 22.4.1993. After going through the whole records, I agree with the findings of the disciplinary authority and punishment imposed by him vide his letter No. AZO/Staff/CON/245 dt: 10.7.1993. As such your appeal is hereby dismissed. The punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority will therefore stand as it is." 8. When this matter was called out, Mr. K.K. Shah, the learned advocate appeared for the petitioner stated that he has retired from the matter long time back. According to him, in the year 2008, Mr. Abhishek Mehta appeared in one of the civil applications and had made a statement that he would be appearing for the petitioner in the main matter. I do not find the appearance of Mr. Mehta. The Board does not show the name of Mr. Mehta. The name of Mr. K.K. Shah still continues and is being shown in the board today. Mr. Shah expressed his inability to assist the Court in the absence of any papers and instructions. None is present even for the Bank. The appearance Mr. M.R. Anand is shown for the respondents. The Board does not show the name of Mr. Mehta. The name of Mr. K.K. Shah still continues and is being shown in the board today. Mr. Shah expressed his inability to assist the Court in the absence of any papers and instructions. None is present even for the Bank. The appearance Mr. M.R. Anand is shown for the respondents. Simultaneously, the appearance of Mr. Deepak Raval is also shown. Mr. Anand is no longer practicing in this High Court, and so far as Mr. Raval is concerned, he has passed away. The Bank has not bothered to look into it. 9. In such circumstances, I was left with no other option but to go through the papers and decide the matter. 10. I find a palpable error in the impugned order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, imposing the penalty of withdrawal of Telex Operator Allowances for a period of five years. The Departmental Inquiry against the petitioner was under the State Bank of Saurasthra Officers Service Recruitment, 1979. The State Bank of Saurashtra got merged with the State Bank of India. I take notice of regulation 68(3)(ii) of the Regulations, which reads as under; "The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiring Authority on any Article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence or record is sufficient for the purpose." 11. As observed above, the Inquiry Officer recorded a clear cut finding that none of the charges were held established. If the Disciplinary Authority thought fit to disagree with the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority, then in such circumstances he was obliged to record his reasons for such disagreement and record his own findings on such charge, if the evidence or record is sufficient for the purpose. In the case in hand, it appears that the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority and proceeded further to impose the penalty of withdrawal of Telex Operator Allowances for a period of five years without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner so far as the report of Inquiring Officer is concerned. 12. In the case in hand, it appears that the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority and proceeded further to impose the penalty of withdrawal of Telex Operator Allowances for a period of five years without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner so far as the report of Inquiring Officer is concerned. 12. Thus, no reasons for disagreement were recorded by the Disciplinary Authority and in the absence of the same, no opportunity was given to the petitioner to show the cause as to why the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority were correct. There is no escape from the fact that the regulation 68(3)(ii) has been infringed in the present case. 13. Let me assume for the moment that there was no such regulation like regulation 68(3)(ii), still not giving an opportunity to a delinquent to meet with the disagreement, would amount to violation of the principles of natural justice. This issue has been very exhaustively explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Yoginath D. Bagde vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., AIR 1999 SC 3734 . The Supreme Court observed in paragraphs-23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34 as under:- "23. It was next contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the Disciplinary Committee, which had disagreed with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and had held that the charges against the appellant were proved, had acted in violation of the 'principles of natural justice' inasmuch as it did not give an opportunity of hearing at the stage when it developed the inclination that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were not acceptable and were liable to be reversed. It was further contended that the findings of the Enquiry Officer, which were based essentially on an appreciation of the evidence recorded by him were considered by the Disciplinary Committee in the absence of the appellant without any notice to him and the Disciplinary Authority on a re-appraisal of the evidence came to the conclusion that the charges against the appellant were established. The Disciplinary Committee thus having taken a decision, proceeded thereafter to issue a notice to the appellant to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service and a recommendation to that effect be not made to the Governor. The Disciplinary Committee thus having taken a decision, proceeded thereafter to issue a notice to the appellant to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service and a recommendation to that effect be not made to the Governor. It was also contended that Disciplinary Committee had already made up its mind and it was only in respect of the proposed punishment that a notice was issued to the appellant. Consequently, the appellant, it is contended, was denied an adequate opportunity of hearing which should have been afforded to him before taking a decision that he was guilty of the charges levelled against him. 24. Before entering into the merits of this question, we may point out that the action against the appellant was taken under the provisions of Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline & Appeal Rules), 1979. Part III of the Rules deals with "penalties and disciplinary authorities". Penalties are mentioned in Rule 5. Dismissal from service is one of the major penalties mentioned in Rule 5(1)(ix). The Disciplinary Authorities are indicated in Rule 6. The Authority which can institute disciplinary proceedings is indicated in Rule 7. 25. Part IV of the Rules deals with procedure for imposing penalties. Rule 8 prescribes the procedure for imposing major penalties. The Inquiring Authority, after completing the inquiry, is required to prepare a report as provided by Clause 25 of Rule 8 which provides as under: "(25) After the conclusion of the inquiry, a report shall be prepared by the inquiring authority. Such report shall contain:- (a) the articles of the charge and the statement of the imputation of misconduct or mis-behavior; (b) the defence of the Government servant in respect of each article of charge; (c) an assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charge; (d) the findings on each article of charge and the reasons therefor; (e) recommendation regarding the quantum of punishment." 26. The Inquiring Authority is thereafter required to forward the report as also all other relevant records, including the report prepared by it under sub-rule (25); the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the Government servant; the oral and documentary evidence produced in the course of the inquiry; written briefs, if any, filed by the Presenting Officer or the Government servant or both during the course of the inquiry and the orders, if any, made by the Disciplinary Authority and the Inquiring Authority in regard to the inquiry, to the Disciplinary Authority. 27. What action would be taken on this report and in what manner will this report be dealt with is indicated in Rule 9. Relevant portions of this Rule are quoted below: "9. Action on the inquiry report.--(1) The disciplinary authority, if it is not itself the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the inquiring authority for further inquiry and report, and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of rule 8 of these rules as far as may be. (2) The disciplinary authority shall if it is not the inquiring authority, consider the record of the inquiry and record its findings on each charge. If it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge, it shall record its reasons for such disagreement. (3) ................................ (2) The disciplinary authority shall if it is not the inquiring authority, consider the record of the inquiry and record its findings on each charge. If it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge, it shall record its reasons for such disagreement. (3) ................................ (4) (i) If the disciplinary authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that any of the major penalties should be imposed on the Government servant, it shall:- (a) furnish to the Government servant, a copy of the report of the inquiry held by it and its findings on each article of charge, or, where the inquiry has been held by an inquiring authority appointed by it, a copy of the report of such authority and a statement of its findings on each article of charge expressly stating whether or not it agrees with the findings of the inquiry authority, together with brief reasons for its disagreement, if any, with the findings of the inquiring authority; and (b) give to the Government servant a notice stating the penalty proposed to be imposed on him and calling upon him to submit within fifteen days of receipt of the notice or such further time not exceeding fifteen days, as may be allowed, such representation as he may wish to make on the proposed penalty on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry held under rule 8 of these rules. (ii) (a) ................................. (b) ................................. (iii) Where it is not necessary to consult the Commission, the disciplinary authority shall consider the representation, if any, made by the Government servant in pursuance of the notice given to him under clause (i)(b) of this sub-rule and determine what penalty, if any, should be imposed on him on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry held under rule 8 and make such order as it may deem fit." 28. In view of the provisions contained in the statutory Rule extracted above, it is open to the Disciplinary Authority either to agree with the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority or disagree with those findings. If it does not agree with the findings of the Inquiring Authority, it may record its own findings. In view of the provisions contained in the statutory Rule extracted above, it is open to the Disciplinary Authority either to agree with the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority or disagree with those findings. If it does not agree with the findings of the Inquiring Authority, it may record its own findings. Where the Inquiring Authority has found the delinquent officer guilty of the charges framed against him and the Disciplinary Authority agrees with those findings, there would arise no difficulty. So also, if the Inquiring Authority has held the charges proved, but the Disciplinary Authority disagrees and records a finding that the charges were not established, there would arise no difficulty. Difficulties have arisen in all those cases in which the Inquiring Authority has recorded a positive finding that the charges were not established and the delinquent officer was recommended to be exonerated, but the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with those findings and recorded its own findings that the charges were established and the delinquent officer was liable to be punished. This difficulty relates to the question of giving an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer at that stage. Such an opportunity may either be provided specifically by the Rules made under Article309 of the Constitution or the Disciplinary Authority may, of its own, provide such an opportunity. Where the Rules are in this regard silent and the Disciplinary Authority also does not give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer and records findings, different from those of the Inquiring Authority that the charges were established, "an opportunity of hearing" may have to be read into the Rule by which the procedure for dealing with the Inquiring Authority's report is provided principally because it would be contrary to the principles of natural justice if a delinquent officer, who has already been held to be 'not guilty' by the Inquiring Authority, is found 'guilty' without being afforded an opportunity of hearing on the basis of the same evidence and material on which a finding of "not guilty" has already been recorded. 29. We have already extracted Rule 9(2) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1979 which enables the Disciplinary Authority to disagree with the findings of the Inquiring Authority on any article of charge. The only requirement is that it shall record its reasoning for such disagreement. 29. We have already extracted Rule 9(2) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1979 which enables the Disciplinary Authority to disagree with the findings of the Inquiring Authority on any article of charge. The only requirement is that it shall record its reasoning for such disagreement. The Rule does not specifically provide that before recording its own findings, the Disciplinary Authority will give an opportunity of hearing to a delinquent officer. But the requirement of "hearing" in consonance with the principles of natural justice even at that stage has to be read into Rule 9(2) and it has to be held that before Disciplinary Authority finally disagrees with the findings of the Inquiring Authority, it would give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer so that he may have the opportunity to indicate that the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority do not suffer from any error and that there was no occasion to take a different view. The Disciplinary Authority, at the same time, has to communicate to the delinquent officer the "TENTATIVE" reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the Inquiring Authority so that the delinquent officer may further indicate that the reasons on the basis of which the Disciplinary Authority proposes to disagree with the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority are not germane and the finding of "not guilty" already recorded by the Inquiring Authority was not liable to be interfered with. 30. Recently, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Punjab National Bank & Ors. vs. Kunj Behari Mishra, (1998) 7 SCC 84 : AIR 1998 SC 2713 , relying upon the earlier decisions of this Court in State of Assam vs. Bimal Kumar Pandit, (1964) 2 SCR 1 : AIR 1963 SC 1612 ; Institute of Chartered Acountants of India vs. L.K. Ratna & Ors. (1986) 4 SCC 537 as also the Constitution Bench decision in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. vs. B. Karunakar & Ors. (1993) 4 SCC 727 and the decision in Ram Kishan vs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 157 , has held that: "It will not stand to reason that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed to be overturned by the disciplinary authority then no opportunity should be granted. The first stage of the enquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The first stage of the enquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the enquiring officer holds the charges to be proved, then that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who can make a representation before the disciplinary authority takes further action which may be prejudicial to the delinquent officer. When, like in the present case, the enquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such conclusions, then that authority which is deciding against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity of being heard for otherwise he would be condemned unheard. In departmental proceedings, what is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary authority." 31. The Court further observed as under: "When the enquiry is conducted by the enquiry officer, his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with the decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the enquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an enquiry, an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the enquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the enquiry officer, they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the enquiry officer's report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation, the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the disciplinary authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed." 32. The Court further held that the contrary view expressed by this Court in State Bank of India vs. S.S. Koshal, 1994 Supp.(2) SCC 468 and State of Rajasthan vs. M.C. Saxena, (1998) 3 SCC 385 was not correct. 33. The Court further held that the contrary view expressed by this Court in State Bank of India vs. S.S. Koshal, 1994 Supp.(2) SCC 468 and State of Rajasthan vs. M.C. Saxena, (1998) 3 SCC 385 was not correct. 33. In view of the above, a delinquent employee has the right of hearing not only during the enquiry proceedings conducted by the Enquiry Officer into the charges levelled against him but also at the stage at which those findings are considered by the Disciplinary Authority and the latter, namely, the Disciplinary Authority forms a tentative opinion that it does not agree with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. If the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are in favour of the delinquent and it has been held that the charges are not proved, it is all the more necessary to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee before reversing those findings. The formation of opinion should be tentative and not final. It is at this stage that the delinquent employee should be given an opportunity of hearing after he is informed of the reasons on the basis of which the Disciplinary Authority has proposed to disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. This is in consonance with the requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution as it provides that a person shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. So long as a final decision is not taken in the matter, the enquiry shall be deemed to be pending. Mere submission of findings to the Disciplinary Authority does not bring about the closure of the enquiry proceedings. The enquiry proceedings would come to an end only when the findings have been considered by the Disciplinary Authority and the charges are either held to be not proved or found to be proved and in that event punishment is inflicted upon the delinquent. That being so, the "right to be heard" would be available to the delinquent up to the final stage. This right being a constitutional right of the employee cannot be taken away by any legislative enactment or Service Rule including Rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution. 34. That being so, the "right to be heard" would be available to the delinquent up to the final stage. This right being a constitutional right of the employee cannot be taken away by any legislative enactment or Service Rule including Rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution. 34. Applying the above principles to the facts of this case, it would be noticed that in the instant case the District Judge (Enquiry Officer) had recorded the findings that the charges were not proved. These findings were submitted to the Disciplinary Committee which disagreed with those findings and issued a notice to the appellant requiring him to show-cause why he should not be dismissed from service. It is true that along with the show-cause notice, the reasons on the basis of which the Disciplinary Committee had disagreed with the findings of the District Judge were communicated to the appellant but the Disciplinary Committee instead of forming a tentative opinion had come to a final conclusion that the charges against the appellant were established. The Disciplinary Committee, in fact, had acted in accordance with the statutory provisions contained in Rule 9(4)(i)(a) & (b). He was called upon to show-cause against the proposed punishment of dismissal as will be evident from the minutes of the Disciplinary Committee dated 21st June, 1993 which provide as under:- "Decision: Discussed. For the reasons recorded in Annexure "A" hereto, the Committee disagrees with the finding of the Enquiry Officer and finds that the charges levelled against the delinquent Judicial Officer have been proved. It was, therefore, tentatively decided to impose upon the Judicial Officer penalty of dismissal from service. Let notice, therefore, issue to the delinquent Judicial Officer calling upon him to show cause why penalty of dismissal from service as prescribed in Rule 5(1)(ix) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 should not be imposed upon him. Show cause notice will be accompanied by a copy of the Report of the Inquiring Authority and the reasons recorded by this Committee." These minutes were recorded after the Disciplinary Committee had considered the Enquiry Report and differed with the findings and recorded its final opinion in para 10 of its reasons as under:- "10. The Disciplinary Committee is of the opinion that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer on both the charges cannot be sustained. The Disciplinary Committee is of the opinion that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer on both the charges cannot be sustained. The Committee, after going through the oral and documentary evidence on record, is of the opinion that both the charges against the delinquent are proved. The delinquent is a Judicial Officer who has failed to maintain the absolute integrity in discharge of his judicial duties." 14. I also take notice of the fact that the impugned order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is a non speaking order. The order passed by the Appellate Authority is also a non speaking order. In a case like one in hand, it is expected of the Disciplinary Authority to assign some reasons and more particularly when the Inquiry Officer has recorded the findings that the charges are not held to be established. 15. As a result of the above discussion, this petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as by the Appellate Authority are hereby quashed and set aside. Ordinarily, in this type of cases, the Court would remit the matter with a view to give an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner by asking the Disciplinary Authority to record its reasons for disagreement. However, its too late in the day to undertake this exercise. This petition is of the year 1994. The Inquiry is of the year 1990. I am sure that now the petitioner must have retired from the service. In such circumstances, I do not deem fit to remit the matter. The impugned orders should go. 16. The concerned authority shall calculate the amount which was withdrawn towards the Telex Operator Allowances for a period of five years and pay the arrears to the petitioner within a period of two months from the date of the receipt of the writ of the order with interest at the rate of 8% per annum. If this amount has any bearing so far as the other retiral benefits are concerned, the same will be looked into and the retiral benefits be accordingly modified. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct service is permitted.