ORDER : Sujoy Paul, J. This civil revision filed under section 23-E of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) challenges the legality, propriety and correctness of the order passed by the Prescribed Rent Control Authority (R.C.A.) dated 8-5-2015. 2. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of this matter are that the non applicant filed an application under sections 18 and 20 of the M.P. Parisar Kirayedari Adhiniyam, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as the Adhiniyam) before the Rent Controlling Authority, Satna for eviction of the applicant and for recovery of arrears of rent. This is not in dispute between the parties that a tenancy agreement dated 6-7-2000 was executed between the husband of non applicant and the applicant. Accordingly, a shop was allotted to the applicant for an amount of Rs.2,500/- per month. The applicant is running the shop in the name of Parul Agency from the said rented shop. 3. The applicant filed written statement and controverted the allegations of application filed under section 18 and 20 of the Adhiniyam. The Court below after hearing the parties allowed the application of non-applicant and directed the applicant to vacate the accommodation in question and hand over the possession to non-applicant within one month. It is further directed that arrears of rent be adjusted from the security amount of Rs.1,00,000/-. If anything is remaining after adjustment of arrears of rent, the said amount be paid to the other side. 4. Shri Akhilesh Jain, learned counsel for the applicant assailed the impugned order by contending that the Adhiniyam although got assent of Hon’ble President but as per section 1(3) of the Adhiniyam it has not been published in the official gazette. Hence, the Adhiniyam has not been enforced till date. The application of non-applicant before the R.C.A. was not maintainable because it was filed under the Adhiniyam, which is not enforceable till date. Thus, the Authority below has acted with material irregularity and in excess of jurisdiction. It is further submitted that the Authority below had no jurisdiction to pass the decree for arrears of rent. For the purpose of recovery of arrears of rent, non-applicant should have filed civil suit and the application before R.C.A. was not maintainable. 5. Thus, the Authority below has acted with material irregularity and in excess of jurisdiction. It is further submitted that the Authority below had no jurisdiction to pass the decree for arrears of rent. For the purpose of recovery of arrears of rent, non-applicant should have filed civil suit and the application before R.C.A. was not maintainable. 5. It is further urged by Shri Jain that the accommodation in question was sought to be vacated by showing the alleged bona fide need of non-applicant’s son Nitinraj Nema. It is submitted that non-applicant allegedly adopted Nitinraj Nema but failed to prove custom of adoption. The adoption was against the provisions of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. On this score alone, the order of Court below needs to be interfered with. It is argued that the unregistered adoption deed was also inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the learned R.C.A. should have dismissed the application for eviction. 6. Shri Jain by placing reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court reported in (2008) 15 SCC 538 , Sulochana v. Rajinder Singh, urged that the non applicant’s case is not covered under section 23-J of the Act. It is submitted that the non-applicant cannot be treated to be a ‘landlord’ within the meaning of the said Act. 7. Shri Jain has taken pains to contend that the summons issued by R.C.A. were not in the prescribed form and proceedings based on such summons are liable to be interfered with. 8. Shri Shreyas Dubey, learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned order. He submitted that the non-applicant is a landlord as per Chapter III-A of the Act. He submitted that the Court below has not committed any error of law while allowing the application of non-applicant. In support of his contention, he relied on Pradeep Kumar v. Hajari Lal, (2008) 3 SCC 299 , Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Limited and others, 2011 (3) M.P.L.J. (S.C.) 625 : (2011) 5 SCC 532 , Praveen Kumar v. Raghunath s/o Jagannath Ghorse and another, 2013 (2) M.P.L.J. 237 . No other point is raised by the parties. 9. have heard the parties at length and perused the record. 10. Before dealing with rival contentions, it is apposite to refer certain provisions of the Act. Chapter III-A of the Act deals with the eviction of tenants on the ground of ‘bona fide requirement’. No other point is raised by the parties. 9. have heard the parties at length and perused the record. 10. Before dealing with rival contentions, it is apposite to refer certain provisions of the Act. Chapter III-A of the Act deals with the eviction of tenants on the ground of ‘bona fide requirement’. Section 23-A is a special provision and the said chapter prescribes a summary proceedings. 11. A simple reading of Chapter III-A of the Act and more particularly section 23-A of die Act makes it clear that the eviction can be sought for on the ground of ‘bona fide requirement’. I find force in the arguments of Shri Akhilesh Jain that non payment of rent or recovery of rent cannot be subject-matter of adjudication under Chapter III-A. To this extent the applicant has made out a case. 12. The core issue in relation to eviction is whether the non-applicant is a ‘landlord’ and whether she was able to establish bona fide requirement of accommodation before the Authority below. It is apt to quote section 23-J of the Act which reads as under :— 23-J. Definition of landlord for the purposes of Chapter III-A— For the purposes of this Chapter ‘landlord’ means a landlord who is— (i) a retired servant of any Government including a retired member of Defence Services; or (ii) a retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the Central or State Government; or (iii) a widow or a divorced wife; or (iv) physically handicapped person; or (v) a servant of any Government including a member of defence services who, according to his service conditions, is not entitled to Government accommodation on his posting to a place where he owns a house or is entitled to such accommodation only on payment of a penal rent on his posting to such a place, (emphasis supplied) 13. The reliance was placed by the applicant on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sulochana (supra). In the said case, the Apex Court held that recourse to summary procedure under Chapter III-A of the Act can be taken only by specified landlord within the meaning of section 23-J of the Act, which includes ‘widow or divorced wife’. Only a landlord who comes within the purview of the said definition is entitled to file suit on the ground of bona fide requirement. Only a landlord who comes within the purview of the said definition is entitled to file suit on the ground of bona fide requirement. In Sulochana (supra), the Apex Court opined that the appellant purchased the property in question on 23-3-1996. She was already a widow at that time. In the present case, admittedly the tenancy agreement was entered into between the non-applicant’s husband and present applicant. The husband died later on. The non-applicant herein was not a widow at that time. The widow thereafter filed an application for eviction. This Court in 1998 (1) M.P.L.J. 110 , Kailash Chandra and others v. Dr. Kamla w/o Chintaman Chaudhary held that the law nowhere says that a woman would be entitled to the benefit under section 23-J read with section 23-A if the premises were let out when she was not a widow and the need arose only after she became a widow. The concession is shown to the persons and the cause of action would accrue in favour of such landlord only when they need the premises. The cause of action for eviction would not accrue on the date when the tenancy was created. 14. For the foregoing reasons, I am unable to hold that non-applicant is not a landlord within the meaning of section 23-J of the Act. The judgment of Sulochana (supra) for the reasons stated above cannot be pressed in service in the present case. 15. The applicant contended that Adhiniyam of 2012 has no application, hence the application filed under the said Adhiniyam should have been dismissed by R.C.A. It is seen that R.C.A. opined that the reliance on Adhiniyam, is based on wrong quoting of provision. He otherwise has authority to deal with the question. In my view, it is trite that omission or error in mentioning the correct provision of law by itself would not denude the power of the authority to take it so long as source of power is traceable from enabling provision. He otherwise has authority to deal with the question. In my view, it is trite that omission or error in mentioning the correct provision of law by itself would not denude the power of the authority to take it so long as source of power is traceable from enabling provision. [See AIR 1977 SC 854 , P. R. Naidu v. Govt, of A. P., (1994) 2 SCC 558, State of Karnataka v. Krishnaji Srinivas Kulkami and others, (2001) 2 SCC 482, B.S.E. Brokers Forum, Bombay and others v. Securities and Exchange Board of India and others, (2003) 4 SCC 712, High Court of Gujarat and another v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and others, (2003) 6 SCC 545 , Chandra Singh and others v. State of Rajasthan and another, (2004) 1 SCC 453 Challamane Huchha Gowda v. M. R. Tirumala and another, (2006) 3 SCC 167 , Union of India and another v. S. C. Parasher and (2006) 5 SCC 789 , K. K. Parmar v. H. C. of Gujarat]. Chapter III-A of the Act makes it clear that for the purpose of eviction on the ground of bona fide need, R.C.A. is a competent authority. Hence, I am unable to hold that for the purpose of eviction R.C.A. has acted beyond his authority. The applicant is entitled to succeed only on the aspect of recovery of rent. 16. The Applicant has also raised doubt about adoption of Nitinraj Nema by the non-applicant. In the written statement filed before the R.C.A., the applicant has raised a bald objection. In Para 6, it is averred that the applicant has filed an unproved and misleading adoption deed. The applicant did not raise objection before the Court below relating to non-registration of adoption deed. In view of the aforesaid, R.C.A. was not required to examine the question whether Nitinraj Nema was adopted son or not. If the applicant had any doubt about the same, the burden was on the applicant to put forth his defence in a proper manner. Similarly, it was for the present applicant to show before the R.C.A. that Nitinraj Nema cannot be treated as son of the non-applicant. The applicant has failed to discharge said burden. 17. The last contention of Shri Jain was relating to issuance of improper summons. It is seen that there is no pleading in the present civil revision relating to the said contention. The applicant has failed to discharge said burden. 17. The last contention of Shri Jain was relating to issuance of improper summons. It is seen that there is no pleading in the present civil revision relating to the said contention. The applicant has not raised any ground relating to infirmity in the procedure of issuance of summons or relating to form of the summons. This is trite law that an issue not raised in the petition cannot be permitted to be raised in arguments. [See (2010) 11 SCC 433 , Avinash Gaikwad and others v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2002) 9 SCC 458 , State of Rajasthan and another v. D.D. Sood and another, (2007) 3 M.P.H.T. 309 , Nagda Municipality v. ITC Limited and 2008 (4) M.P.L.J. 536 , Gomti Bai Tamrakar and others v. State of M.P. and others. 18. As analyzed above, the applicant is entitled to succeed partly. The applicant is able to establish that the R.C.A. has committed an error in passing the order relating to rent/arrears of rent. Under section 23-J of the Act, learned R.C.A. was competent to pass orders only in relation to eviction based on ‘bona fide requirement’. The impugned order to the extent relates to rent is liable to be interfered with. 19. Resultantly, the petition is partly allowed. The impugned order to the extent it relates to payment/recovery of rent is set aside. Liberty is reserved to the non-applicant to avail the remedy relating to recovery of rent by filing appropriate proceeding before the Court of competent jurisdiction. Rest of the order which relates to eviction is affirmed. 20. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.