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2016 DIGILAW 1143 (ORI)

Kunja Bihari Badu v. State of Orissa

2016-11-23

SANJU PANDA, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

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JUDGMENT : SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD, J. 1. This writ petition is to quash Annexures-13 and 14, whereby and where under the claim raised by the petitioner for disbursement of differential amount of salary on account of revision of pay scale has been rejected. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he was appointed by the Managing Director of Orissa State Commercial Transport Corporation (O.P. No. 2) vide order dated 08.12.1966, promoted to higher post and while holding the post of Sectional Officer with an additional charge of Accounts Officer on 25.07.1998, the Orissa State Commercial Transport Corporation was declared closed and all its employees were retrenched. The petitioner, as per the terms of appointment under Annexure-1 was drawing D.A., A.D.A. at par with State Government employees. This benefit was extended to the petitioner till 31.01.1982. Although the benefit in revision in pay scale, implemented w.e.f 01.01.1981 and seven dozes Additional D.A., implemented w.e.f. 1.4.1982, 1.6.1982, 1.9.1982, 1.3.1983, 1.5.1983 and 1.7.1983 was allowed in favour of the Government employees, but not allowed to the employees of the Management, the opposite party herein, finding no other alternative, the petitioner’s Union has raised a dispute registered as I.D. Case No. 2 of 1985 wherein the Industrial Tribunal has passed an award holding that the employees of Orissa State Commercial Transport Corporation are entitled to get D.A., A.D.A. and revision of pay scale at par with Government employees from time to time. The award was published and notified in the Official Gazette. The opposite party No. 2 being aggrieved with the award had filed writ petition being O.J.C. No. 455 of 1987, this Court, vide order dated 17.01.1990, dismissed the writ petition and upheld the decision of the Industrial Tribunal with a direction to disburse the amount. The opposite party No. 2 had preferred an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the order of this Court in O.J.C. No. 455 of 1987, the same was also dismissed and as such the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal has been upheld hence binding upon the opposite parties, but the legitimate dues, as per the direction passed by the Industrial Tribunal has not been released. The benefit of revised pay scale, D.A., A.D.A. and I.R. had been allowed by the opposite party No. 2 from prospective dates leaving behind the dues applicable as per the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal. The benefit of revised pay scale, D.A., A.D.A. and I.R. had been allowed by the opposite party No. 2 from prospective dates leaving behind the dues applicable as per the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal. According to the petitioner he is entitled to get balance amount of Rs.1,49,956.46 along with other benefits such as increase of statutory dues. The Orissa State Commercial Transport Corporation was closed w.e.f. 25.07.1998 under the provision of Section 25(O) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as per the decision of the State Government, hence all the employees, including the petitioner, were disengaged from service w.e.f. 25.07.1998. The petitioner along with other 26 retrenched employees were reappointed for a period of six months on contract basis as per the last wages drawn, after completion of the period of six months, the period of appointment of the petitioner had been extended in piecemeal manner with due approval but no extension order was issued after 31.10.2004. The petitioner is entitled to get benefit of D.A., A.D.A., revision in scale of pay as admissible to the State Government employees as per the terms of appointment and for that he had approached this court by preferring writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 11323 of 2005 and a Bench of this Court, while disposing the writ petition vide order dated 06.10.2005 had directed the opposite parties 1 and 2 to consider the claim of the petitioner and take decision as to whether the petitioner is entitled to the claim or not. The opposite party no. 2, in pursuance to the order passed in W.P. (C) No. 11323 of 2005, has passed order on 29.5.2006 and 24.5.2006 as contained in Annexures-13 and 14, whereby and where under the claim of the petitioner has been denied regarding the benefit of revised scale of pay which is under challenge in this writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the other co-employees of the Corporation have filed application U/s.33 C(2) of the I.D. Act, 1947 being numbered as I.D. Case Nos.16 of 2003 and 175 of 2004 and the Industrial Tribunal vide order dated 21.11.2011 has passed an order directing the opposite parties to pay the arrear differential pay, revised pay, D.A., A.D.A., D.P., I.R., unutilized leave salary, notice pay and compensation. The order passed by the Industrial Tribunal in I.D. Case Nos. The order passed by the Industrial Tribunal in I.D. Case Nos. 16 of 2003 and 175 of 2004 had been challenged by the opposite parties in W.P. (C) Nos. 21307, 21308, 7032 and 7033 of 2012 and this Court has passed order on 27th October, 2016 by which the writ petitions have been dismissed. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that after rejection of the claim by virtue of issuance of Annexures-13 and 14, since the Tribunal has passed an award U/s.33 C(2) in I.D. Case Nos. 16 of 2003 and 175 of 2004 which has been affirmed by this court in W.P. (C) Nos. 21307, 21308, 7032 and 7033 of 2012, as such the authorities are required to take a fresh decision in the light of the subsequent development. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties have vehemently opposed the prayer of the petitioner by submitting that Government has already taken decision denying the claim of the petitioner in the light of the order passed by this court in W.P. (C) No. 11323 of 2005 which needs no interference by this court for the reason that the Management of opposite party no. 2 has already been closed w.e.f. 25.07.1998 and as such nothing can be paid to the petitioner after closure of the Corporation. It has been submitted that the proceeding initiated U/s.33 C(2) itself is not maintainable since the provision of Section 33 C(2) is an execution proceeding in which the claim of the workman cannot be adjudicated, but without appreciating this aspect of the matter the Tribunal has passed the Award. 5. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties in detail and perused the materials available on record. We have also perused the order passed by this court in W.P. (C) Nos. 21307, 21308, 7032 and 7033 of 2012. 6. The undisputed fact in this case is that a dispute has been raised by the Union of the workmen working under opposite party no. 2 to answer the reference as to whether the workmen of Orissa State Transport Corporation, Cuttack are entitled to revised scale of pay w.e.f. 01.01.1981, if so, with what details and whether they are entitled to the Additional D.A. from 01.04.1982, 01.06.1982, 01.09.1998, 1.12.1982, 1.3.1983, 1.5.1983 and 1.7.1983 as applicable to the State Government employees. 2 to answer the reference as to whether the workmen of Orissa State Transport Corporation, Cuttack are entitled to revised scale of pay w.e.f. 01.01.1981, if so, with what details and whether they are entitled to the Additional D.A. from 01.04.1982, 01.06.1982, 01.09.1998, 1.12.1982, 1.3.1983, 1.5.1983 and 1.7.1983 as applicable to the State Government employees. The Industrial Tribunal vide Award dated 26th August, 1986 (notified on 16th September, 1986) has answered the reference by holding that the employees of the Corporation are entitled to revised scale of pay as admissible to the State Government employees w.e.f. 01.01.1981, they are also entitled to Additional D.A. as admissible to the State Government employees w.e.f. 01.04.1982, 01.06.1982, 01.09.1998, 1.12.1982, 1.3.1983, 1.5.1983 and 1.7.1983, but taking into consideration the financial crisis claimed by the Management in making payment of the arrear dues arising out of the Award, had directed that the arrear dues of the workmen may be deposited in their respective E.P.F. Accounts. The Management would, however, not be liable to contribute any share towards the E.P.F. deposits. This direction shall not however, apply to the workmen who have since left the Management, and the arrear dues so far as they are concerned shall be paid in cash in four installments. The opposite parties had challenged the award before this court vide O.J.C. No. 455 of 1987 but vide order dated 17.1.1990 the writ petition had been dismissed, against which a Special Leave Petition was filed before the Hon’ble Apex Court being S.L.P. No. 12852 of 1990 which was also dismissed vide order dated 12.12.1990. The Management after being unsuccessful, implemented the award and paid the revised scale of pay and additional D.A. and A.D.A. in terms of the award. The business transaction of the Corporation closed by virtue of order passed under Sub-Section 2 of Section 25(O) of the I.D. Act vide order dated 26.3.1998, the said decision of closure was challenged by the Union before this court under writ jurisdiction in O.J.C. No. 5657 of 1998 which was dismissed vide order dated 15.05.1998, the same was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 9859 of 1998 which was disposed of vide order dated 25.05.1998. While dismissing the Special Leave Petition, the Management was directed not to terminate the services of the employees for a period of two months from the date of passing of that order, as the Union intends to file review application U/s.25(O) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Employee’s Union had filed review application before the appropriate Government challenging the permission for closure w.e.f. 27.5.1998, after hearing the parties, the appropriate Government had rejected the same vide order passed in this regard on 01.07.1998. The Employees’ Union, being aggrieved with the order dated 01.07.1998, moved the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing Writ Petition (Civil) No. 386 of 1998 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has ordered that “stay granted by the Hon’ble Apex Court on 25.05.1998 in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 9859 of 1998 stand extended by 10 days or till hearing of the matter, which ever is earlier. Registry may fix the date accordingly” and thereafter the writ petition was finally withdrawn by the Union with permission to file appropriate petition in the High Court. The Corporation had filed a modification application for modification of the order dated 27.07.1998 taking a ground for modification that the amount from 26.07.1998 to 08.08.1998 is not payable but the Hon’ble Apex Court while passing the order has given liberty to the Union that if the Union feels that the said amount is payable, it is open for it to initiate appropriate proceeding for recovering the same and it is in this pretext the union has filed application U/s.33-C-(2) for issuance of direction upon the Management to disburse the amount as claimed by them for the period from 01.08.1983 to 8.8.1998, i.e. arrear differential pay, revised pay, D.A., A.D.A., D.P., I.R., un-utilized leave salary, notice pay and compensation. The Labour Court after hearing the parties at length has passed order on 21.11.2011 whereby and where under the Labour Court has passed order directing both the opposite parties to pay the arrear differential pay, revised pay, D.A., A.D.A., D.P., I.R., un-utilized leave salary, notice pay and compensation. The Labour Court after hearing the parties at length has passed order on 21.11.2011 whereby and where under the Labour Court has passed order directing both the opposite parties to pay the arrear differential pay, revised pay, D.A., A.D.A., D.P., I.R., un-utilized leave salary, notice pay and compensation. So far as differential gratuity amount is concerned, the Labour Court has observed that this court is not the competent authority to compute the same but since it is already determined and paid some amount towards gratuity to the applicants, as such the differential amount of the same is only calculated towards gratuity of the applicant and accordingly directed to implement the order within a period of two months from the date of award, failing which the amount shall carry interest @ 10% per annum till its realization. The opposite parties being aggrieved with the order passed by the Labour Court U/s.33-C(2) have filed writ petitions on the ground that since the establishment itself has been closed vide order passed in this regard on 26.3.1998 and the same has been extended for a period of two months by virtue of order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in SLP (Civil) No. 9859 of 1998 directing not to terminate the services of the employees of the corporation for a period of two months from today and as such the workmen continued in service till 25.07.1998. The Hon’ble Apex Court has passed order in an application for modification filed by the Corporation on 27.07.1998 whereby and where under the Stay granted by Hon’ble Apex Court on 25th May, 1998 in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 9859 of 1998 has been extended by 10 days or hearing of the matter, whichever is earlier. The Registry of the Hon’ble Apex Court was directed to fix the date accordingly. The order is being quoted herein below for ready reference:- “Stay granted by this Court on 25th May, 1998 in SLP (C) No. 9859 of 1998 would stand extended by 10 days or the hearing of this matter, whichever is earlier. The Registry may fix the date accordingly.” Writ Petition (Civil) No. 386 of 1998 was finally heard and withdrawn by the Union with liberty to approach the High Court vide order dated 03.08.1998. The Registry may fix the date accordingly.” Writ Petition (Civil) No. 386 of 1998 was finally heard and withdrawn by the Union with liberty to approach the High Court vide order dated 03.08.1998. The modification application was filed by the Corporation in W.P. (C) No. 386 of 1998 which was heard by Hon’ble Apex Court on 16.01.1999 wherein the following order was passed: “Learned counsel for the Corporation states that the Corporation is not making payment of salary for the period from 26.7.1998 to 3.8.1998 as according to the legal advice obtained by it, the said amount is not payable. If the Union feels that the said amount is payable, it will be open to it to initiate appropriate proceedings for recovering the same.” In the background of this admitted position there is no dispute about the fact that the State Government has passed an order of closure of the corporation on 26.3.1998 which was extended for a period of two months from the date of passing the order, i.e. from 25.5.1998, meaning thereby the period of closure has been extended till 25.7.1998 restraining the Corporation not to terminate the services of the workmen working under it. The further admitted position is that the interim order extending the date of closure till 25.7.1998 has further been extended vide order dated 27.7.1998 for a period of ten days or till the hearing of the matter, the hearing of the matter had been concluded on 03.08.1998 and as such the effective date of closure would be 03.08.1998. The workmen, in the light of these factual aspects had made claim for disbursement of amount treating them in service up to 03.08.1998, when denied, they had filed application U/s.33 C(2) of the I.D. Act, 1947. The Industrial Tribunal had decided the same by taking into consideration the fact that the Industrial Tribunal has already passed an Award in I.D. Case No. 2 of 1985 holding therein that the employees of the Corporation are entitled to revised scale of pay as admissible to the State Government employees, w.e.f. 01.01.1981, also entitling them for the Additional D.A. as admissible to the State Government employees. The Tribunal has entertained the application filed by the workmen to disburse the amount of arrears against the differential pay, revised pay, D.A., A.D.A., D.P., I.R., unutilized leave salary, notice pay and compensation and accordingly directed to disburse the said amount in favour of the workmen within stipulated time. 7. Learned counsel representing the Corporation has submitted that the order passed U/s.33 C(2) is not sustainable, however, in this writ petition the said order has not been challenged, while submitting this, it has been argued that the proceeding U/s.33 C(2) is merely an execution proceeding and the claim of the workmen cannot be adjudicated in the proceeding U/s.33 C(2) and as such the petitioner cannot be given the benefit of the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal U/s.33 C(2) but however, he has not disputed the fact that the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal U/s.33 C(2) has already been approved by this court in W.P. (C) Nos. 21307, 21308, 7032 and 7033 of 2012. This court thought it proper to answer the point raised by the learned counsel representing the corporation regarding maintainability of the proceeding U/s.33-C(2) since according to him it is merely an execution proceeding. In order to adjudicate this issue, it would be relevant to discuss the provisions as contained in Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which is being reproduced herein below:- “33C. In order to adjudicate this issue, it would be relevant to discuss the provisions as contained in Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which is being reproduced herein below:- “33C. Recovery of money due from an employer.-(1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of [Chapter V-A or Chapter V-B], the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue: Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer: Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government [within a period not exceeding three months:] [Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.] (3) For the purposes of computing the money value of a benefit, the Labour Court may, if it so thinks fit, appoint a Commissioner who shall after taking such evidence as may be necessary, submit a report to the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the Commissioner and other circumstances of the case. (4) The decision of the Labour Court shall be forwarded by it to the appropriate Government and any amount found due by the Labour Court may be recovered in the manner provided for in sub-section (1). (5) Where workmen employed under the same employer are entitled to receive from him any money or any benefit capable of being computed in terms of money, then, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf, a single application for the recovery of the amount due may be made on behalf of or in respect of any number of such workmen.” 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Central Bank of India Ltd. vs. P.S. Rajagopalan, reported in AIR 1964 SC 743 , while dealing with the scope of Section 33C(2) has been pleased to hold that the word ‘benefit’ used in Section 33C(2) is not confined merely to non-monetary benefit which could be converted in terms of money, but that it takes in all kinds of benefits which may be monetary as well as non-monetary if the workman is entitled to the, and in such a case, the workman is given the remedy of moving the appropriate Labour Court with a request that the said benefits be computed or calculated in terms of money. Once such computation of calculat5ion is made under Section 33C(2) the amount so determined has to be recovered as provided for in sub-section (1). In other words, having provided for the determination of the amount due to the workman in cases falling under sub-section (2), the legislature has clearly prescribed that for recovering the said amount, the workman has to revert to his remedy under sub-section (1). 9. Sub-section (3) empowers the Labour Court to appoint a Commissioner for the purpose of computing the money value of the benefit, and it lays down that if so appointed, the Commissioner shall take such evident as may be necessary and submit his report to the Labour Court. The Labour Court is then required to proceed to determine the amount in the light of the report submitted by the Commissioner and other circumstances of the case. This means that proceedings taken under sub-section (2) may be determined by the Labour Court itself or, in a suitable case, may be determined by it after receiving a report submitted by the Commissioner appointed in that behalf. It is clear that if for computing in terms of money the value of the benefit claimed by the workman, an enquiry is required to be held and evidence has to be taken, the Labour Court may do that itself or may delegate that work to a Commissioner appointed by it. 10. It is clear that if for computing in terms of money the value of the benefit claimed by the workman, an enquiry is required to be held and evidence has to be taken, the Labour Court may do that itself or may delegate that work to a Commissioner appointed by it. 10. This is the settled proposition as has been held in the case of Punjab National Bank Ltd. vs. K.L. Kharbanda, reported in (1962) 1 LLJ 234 , the question which is the subject matter before the Hon’ble Apex Court regarding the scope of sub-section (2) as to whether when it can be invoked by a workman who is entitled to receive from the employer the benefit there specified, but the right of the workman to receive the benefit has to be admitted and could not be a matter of dispute between the parties in cases which fall under sub-section (2). While answering this, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Central Bank of India Ltd. vs. P.S. Rajagopalan reported in AIR 1964 SC 743 has been pleased to hold at para-16, which is being reproduced herein below:- “Para 16. In our opinion, on a fair and reasonable construction of sub-section (2) it is clear that if a workman’s right to receive the benefit is disputed, that may have to be determined by the Labour Court. Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money, the Labour Court inevitably has to deal with the question as to whether the workman has a right to receive that benefit. If the said right is not disputed, nothing more needs to be done and the Labour Court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money; but if the said right is disputed, the Labour Court must deal with that question and decide whether the workman has the right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the Labour Court answers this point in favour of the workman that the next question of making the necessary computation can arise. It seems to us that the opening clause of sub-section (2) does not admit of the construction for which the appellant contends unless we add some words in that clause. It seems to us that the opening clause of sub-section (2) does not admit of the construction for which the appellant contends unless we add some words in that clause. The Clause “Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit” does not mean “where such workman is admittedly or admitted to be, entitled to receive such benefit.” The appellant’s construction would necessarily introduce the addition of the words “admittedly, or admitted to be” in that clause, and that clearly is not permissible. Besides, it seems to us that if the appellant’s construction is accepted, it would necessarily mean that it would be at the option of the employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy provided by sub-section (2), because he has merely to raise an objection on the ground that the right claimed by the workman is not admitted to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the workman's application. The claim under S.33 C (2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases. have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub-section (2). As Maxwell has observed "where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution(1). We must accordingly hold that Section 33C (2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers incidentally, it may be relevant to add that it would be somewhat odd that under sub-s. (3), the Labour Court should have been authorised to delegate the work of computing the money value of the benefit to the Commissioner if the determination of the said question was the only task assigned to the Labour Court under sub-s. (2). On the other hand, sub-s. 3 becomes intelligible if it is held that what can be assigned to the Commissioner includes only a part of the assignment of the Labour Court under sub-section (2).” The Hon’ble Apex Court in the said case while discussing the scope of Section 33C(1) and 33C(2) has been pleased to hold at para-19, which is being reproduced herein below:- “Para 19. It is remarkable that similar words of limitation have been used in Section 33C (1) because s. 33 C (1) deals with cases where any money is due under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA. It is thus clear that claims made under Section 33C (1), by itself can be only claims referable to the settlement, award, or the relevant provisions of Chapter VA. These words of limitations are not to be found in Section 33C(2) and to that extent, the scope of Section 33C(2) is undoubtedly wider than that of Section 33C(1). It is true that even in respect of the larger class. of cases which fail under Section 33C(2), after the determination is made by the Labour Court the execution goes back again to Section 33C(1). That is why Section 33C(2) expressely provides that the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in sub-section (1). It is .unnecessary in the present appeals either to state exhaustively or even to indicate broadly what other categories of claims can fall under Section 33C(2). There is no doubt that the three categories of claims mentioned in Section 33C(1) fall under Section 33C(2) and in that sense, Section 33C(2) can itself be deemed to be a kind of. execution proceeding; .but it is possible that Claims not based on settlements, awards or made under the provisions of Chapter V A, may also be competent under Section 33C(2) and that may illustrate its wider scope. We would, however, like to indicate some of the claims which would not fall under Section 33C(2), because they formed the subject matter of the appeals which have been grouped together for our decision along with the appeals with which we are dealing at present. We would, however, like to indicate some of the claims which would not fall under Section 33C(2), because they formed the subject matter of the appeals which have been grouped together for our decision along with the appeals with which we are dealing at present. If an employee is dismissed or demoted and it is his case that the dismissal or demotion is wrongful, it would not be open to him to make a claim for the recovery of his salary or wages under Section 33C(2). His demotion or dismissal may give rise to an industrial dispute which may be appropriately tried, but once it is shown that the employer has dismissed or demoted him, a claim that the dismissal Or demotion is unlawful and. therefore, the employee continues to be the workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits due to him under a preexisting contract, cannot be made under s. 33 C (2). If a settlement has been, duly reached between the employer and his employees and it fails under Section 18(2) or (3) of the Act and is governed by Section (19)2 it would not be open to an employee, notwithstanding the said settlement, to claim the benefit as though the said settlement had come to an end. If the settlement exists and continues to be operative no claim can be made under Section 33C(2) inconsistent with the said settlement. If the settlement is intended to be terminated, proper steps may have to be taken in that behalf and a dispute that may be arise thereafter may to be dealt with according. to the, other procedure prescribed by the Act. Thus, our conclusion is that the scope of Section 33C(2)is wider than Section 33C (1) and cannot be wholly assimilated with it, though for obvious reasons, we do not propose to decide or indicate what additional cases would fall under s. 33G (2) which may not fall under Section 33C(1). In this connection, we may incidentally state that the observations made by this Court in the case of Punjab National Bank Ltd (1), that Section 33C is a provision in the nature of execution should not be interpreted to mean that the scope of Section 33C(2) is exactly the same as Section 33C(1). 11. In this connection, we may incidentally state that the observations made by this Court in the case of Punjab National Bank Ltd (1), that Section 33C is a provision in the nature of execution should not be interpreted to mean that the scope of Section 33C(2) is exactly the same as Section 33C(1). 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court by its Constitution Bench while rendering judgment in the case of Central Bank of India (supra) has adjudicated the issue wherein it has been observed by Maxwell that:- "where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution." Further it is evident from the said judgment that if the right is not disputed, nothing more needs to be done and the Labour Court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money, but if the said right is disputed, the Labour Court must deal with that question and decide whether the workman has the right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the Labour Court answers this point in favour of the workman, then the next question of making the necessary computation can arise. We have examined the order passed U/s.33-C(2) in the light of the proposition laid down by the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Central Bank of India (supra) and found that the Tribunal has led oral as well as documentary evidence. The Tribunal has examined two witnesses together, namely, Raghu Arakhita Sinha and Siba Prasad Sahu as A.W.1 and 2 respectively and proved documents under the cover of Exts.1 to 63, similarly one Sri Antaryami Pradhan, Assistant Law Officer of opposite party No. 2 had been examined as O.P.W.1 on behalf of both the opposite parties and proved documents under the cover of Exts.A to x. The Tribunal after going through the depositions of the witnesses has found that the workman had been able to corroborate their claim and nothing has come against them even in spite of cross-examination having been done at length. The Tribunal has taken note of the Award passed in I.D. Case No. 2 of 1985 which was answered in favour of the workmen, affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court giving parity in revised pay scale at par with the State Government employees. The Tribunal has also taken note of the extract of the proceeding of the 171st meeting of the Board of Directors of the opposite party No. 2, held on 07.02.2004, marked as Ext.23 from which it transpires that the workmen are entitled to their arrear dues as per the Award passed in I.D. Case No. 2 of 1985 and accordingly came to finding holding entitlement of the workmen to get the claim and as such the Tribunal has exercised its jurisdiction within the framework of the statute as well as the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Central Bank of India (supra), as such the argument advanced on behalf of learned counsel representing the opposite parties that the provision of Section 33-C(2) is only an execution proceeding and nothing can be adjudicated is having no force. The other ground has been raised that in case of dispute the right course would be to raise a dispute by raising it before the appropriate Government, according to the opposite parties, the claim of the petitioner has been disputed, as would be evident from the order dated 16.01.1999 passed in W.P. (C) No. 386 of 1998 on a modification application filed by the corporation (O.P. No. 2), from its perusal it is evident that the Hon’ble Apex Court after taking into consideration the fact that the claim of the petitioner has been disputed, has granted liberty to the workmen to initiate appropriate proceeding for recovering the same. In the said order the word ‘recovery’ is of paramount consideration and in compliance of the said order the workmen had filed application U/s.33-C(2) and as such it cannot be said that the Tribunal has entertained the application which is not in consonance with the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court on 27.07.1998 in W.P. (C) No. 386 of 1998. Moreover, we have already passed an Award in W.P. (C) Nos. 21307, 21308, 7032 and 7033 of 2012 approving the order passed U/s.33-C(2) and as such the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal U/s.33-C(2) has already been affirmed by this Court. 12. Moreover, we have already passed an Award in W.P. (C) Nos. 21307, 21308, 7032 and 7033 of 2012 approving the order passed U/s.33-C(2) and as such the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal U/s.33-C(2) has already been affirmed by this Court. 12. So far as the case of the petitioner in the instant case, the admitted position is that the petitioner had not made an application U/s.33-C(2), rather he had filed an application before this Court invoking the writ jurisdiction being W.P. (C) No. 11323 of 2005 and this Court, while disposing of the writ petition, had directed the opposite parties to consider the claim of the petitioner and take decision in accordance with law, the opposite parties have rejected the claim of the petitioner vide order dated 29.5.2006 and 24.5.2006 annexed to the writ petition as Annexures-13 and 14 respectively by showing the reason that due to closure of the Union w.e.f.25.07.1998, the petitioner is not entitled to revised scale of pay, as such the claim is not tenable. 13. Since the claim of other similarly situated workmen regarding the entitlement as is being claimed by the petitioner, has already been decided by the Industrial Tribunal in I.D. Case Nos. 16 of 2003 and 175 of 2004 which has been affirmed by this court vide judgment pronounced in W.P. (C) Nos. 21307, 21308, 7032 and 7033 of 2012 on 27th October, 2016, as such the case of the petitioner is required to be considered afresh by the concerned competent authority to find out as to whether the case of the petitioner is similar to that of other workmen who have filed application U/s.33-C(2) of I.D. Act. 14. In the light of this, the orders as contained in Annexure-13 dated 29.5.2006 and Annexure-14 dated 24.5.2006 are hereby quashed. 15. In the result, the matter is remitted back before the Principal Secretary, Commerce and Transport (Commerce) Department, Bhubaneswar (O.P. No. 1) to take decision afresh in accordance with law within reasonable period, preferably, within four months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Accordingly the writ petition is disposed of with the above observations and directions.