JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. Subject matter of this appeal is the order, dated 26th March, 2010, passed by the Commissioner under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Karsog, District Mandi, H.P., (for short, the Commissioner), in Petition No.8/2009, titled Som Kala and others vs. Bula Ram Sharma and another, whereby compensation to the tune of Rs.5,13,086/-, inclusive of interest at the rate of 12%, came to be awarded in favour of the claimants and the insurer was saddled with the liability, (for short, the impugned order). 2. Claimants and the owner/insured have not questioned the impugned order on any count, thus, the same has attained finality so far as it relates to them. The insurer has questioned the impugned award by filing the instant appeal on the ground that the Tribunal has wrongly saddled the insurer with the liability. Brief facts: 3. Legal representatives of deceased driver-employee have filed the petition before the Commissioner under Section 4 & 4(a) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, (for short, the WC Act) for grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.7.00 lacs, on account of death of Hem Raj. It was alleged in the petition that the deceased Hem Raj was employed by respondent No.1 Bula Ram Sharma as driver, who, on the fateful day i.e. on 20th August, 2008, in the course of his employment, was driving the tractor bearing No.HP-30A-9310, which met with an accident. Resultantly, the deceased-employee sustained injuries and succumbed to the same. Thus, the claim petition was filed by the legal representatives of the deceased-employee for grant of compensation under the WC Act. 4. After hearing the parties, the compensation was granted and since the offending tractor was insured, the insurer (present appellant) was directed to satisfy the compensation amount. 5. Feeling aggrieved, the insurer has filed the instant appeal under Section 30 of the WC Act challenging the impugned order passed by the Commissioner. 6. In the grounds of appeal, in paragraph 4, the appellant has averred that following substantial questions of law arise for determination in the instant appeal:- “1. When the owner/insured by engaging driver having no effective driving licence had committed breach of the policy conditions, whether he is entitled to be indemnified of the claim under the policy? 2. 6. In the grounds of appeal, in paragraph 4, the appellant has averred that following substantial questions of law arise for determination in the instant appeal:- “1. When the owner/insured by engaging driver having no effective driving licence had committed breach of the policy conditions, whether he is entitled to be indemnified of the claim under the policy? 2. Whether liability of payment of interest on compensation amount under the Workmen’s Compensation Act arises only when “amount due” towards compensation is determined by the prescribed authority under the Act?” 7. From a bare perusal of the questions enumerated above, it is well apparent that both the questions are factual and cannot be said to be substantial questions of law. However, in order to answer the first question, it would be expedient, at the first instance, to settle the controversy regarding the applicability of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, the MV Act) to the proceedings under the WC Act. 8. It is beaten law of the land that the claim under the WC Act cannot be defeated by invoking the mandate of Sections 147, 148 and 149 contained in Chapter XI of the MV Act for the simple reason that the claim petitions under both the Acts are to be determined as per the procedure contained in the respective Acts. 9. Section 143 contained in Chapter X of the MV Act provides that only the provisions of Chapter X of the MV Act are applicable to the claims preferred under the WC Act. It is apt to reproduce Section 143 of the MV Act hereunder: “143. Applicability of Chapter to certain claims under Act 8 of 1923. - The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply in relation to any claim for compensation in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) resulting from an accident of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) of section 140 and for this purpose, the said provisions shall, with necessary modifications, be deemed to form part of that Act.” 10. Section 143 of the MV Act nowhere mandates that the provisions contained in Chapter XI of the MV Act are applicable to the WC Act, thereby excluding the applicability of Chapter XI to the proceedings under the WC Act. Section 143 of the MV Act nowhere mandates that the provisions contained in Chapter XI of the MV Act are applicable to the WC Act, thereby excluding the applicability of Chapter XI to the proceedings under the WC Act. It is also not provided in the WC Act that the fetters, restrictions, terms and conditions contained in Sections 147, 148 and 149 of the MV Act can be pressed into service in order to resist the petition under the WC Act. 11. My above view is fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Mastan & Anr., 2005 AIR SCW 6305. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 13, 19, 21 and 22 of the said decision hereunder:- “13. Section 143 occurs in Chapter X of the 1988 Act. Section 144 contains a non obstante clause stating that the provisions of the said chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of the said Act or of any other law for the time being in force. Chapter X deals with liability without fault in certain cases. Chapter X, therefore, will have no application in relation to a claim made in terms of chapter XI of the 1988 Act. xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx 19. Section 143 of the 1988 Act limits its applicability to the 1923 Act in a case where the liability arises despite the fact that the accident might have taken place without any fault on the part of the driver of the vehicle or others in control thereof. Under the 1923 Act also, as noticed hereinbefore, a workman is entitled to compensation even if no negligence is proved against the owner or any other person in charge of the vehicle. It is, thus, not possible to extend the applicability of Section 143 of the 1988 Act to include Chapter XI thereof to a claim under the 1923 Act. xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx 21. An insurer, subject to the terms and conditions of contract of insurance, is bound to indemnify the insured under the 1923 Act as also the 1988 Act. But as noticed hereinbefore, keeping in view the nature and purport of the two statutes, the defences which can be raised by the insurer being different, the scope and ambit of appeal are also different. 22. But as noticed hereinbefore, keeping in view the nature and purport of the two statutes, the defences which can be raised by the insurer being different, the scope and ambit of appeal are also different. 22. Under the 1988 Act, the driver of the vehicle is liable but he would not be liable in a case arising under the 1923 Act. If the driver of the vehicle has no licence, the insurer would not be liable to indemnify the insured. In a given situation, the Accident Claims Tribunal, having regard to its rights and liabilities vis-a-vis the third person may direct the insurance company to meet the liabilities of the insurer, permitting it to recover the same from the insured. The 1923 Act does not envisage such a situation. Role of Reference by incorporation has limited application. A limited right to defend a claim petition arising under one statute cannot be held to be applicable in a claim petition arising under a different statute unless there exists express provision therefor. Section 143 of the 1988 Act makes the provisions of the 1923 Act applicable only in a case arising out of no fault liability, as contained in Chapter X of the 1988 Act. The provisions of Section 143, therefore, cannot be said to have any application in relation to a claim petition filed under Chapter XI thereof. A fortiori in a claim arising under Chapter XI, the provisions of the 1923 Act will have no application. A party to a lis, having regard to the different provisions of the two Acts cannot enforce liabilities of the insurer under both the Acts. He has to elect for one.” 12. I, as a Judge of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, in case United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Noora, 2007 ACJ 64 , has taken the similar view. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 10 to 14 of the said decision hereunder:- “10. The aim and purpose of Workman's Compensation Act, 1923 is to ameliorate the sufferings of the workman and to provide a remedy to the workman in order to save the victims of accident/from the destitution, vagrancy and, other social evils. 11. The legislation was enacted to assuage and remedy the poverty. It is profitable to reproduce the passage from the objections and reasons for the legislation published as early in 1922. 11. The legislation was enacted to assuage and remedy the poverty. It is profitable to reproduce the passage from the objections and reasons for the legislation published as early in 1922. "The general principles of Workmen's Compensation command almost universal acceptance, and India is now merely alone amongst civilized countries in being without legislation embodying those principles. For a number of years the more generous employers have been in the habit of giving compensation voluntarily, but this practice is by no means general. The growing complexity of industry in this country, with the increasing use of machinery and consequent danger to Workmen, alongwith the comparative poverty of the Workmen themselves, renders it advisable that they should be protected, as far as possible, from hardship arising from accidents." 12. While going through the Workmen's Compensation Act, what is required to be proved is that the deceased was workman and was employed to do an act in the course of employment and during the course of employment the workman died due to an accident. 13. The provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act no where prescribe that if a driver is employed he should possess valid licence as is required in terms of the mandate of Motor Vehicles Act 1939. This view is fortified by the judgment of Hon'ble High court of Karnatka titled Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hazira Begum and others reported in 1995(1) ACJ page 236, it is profitable to reproduce the para 9 of the judgment herein:- "9. A scan of various decisions of the High court will disclose that where a workman was engaged in the employer's business and who was doing the very thing he was employed to do, then the mere fact that he was not acting strictly by the letter of law will not make the accident any the less 'arising out of and in the course of employment.' It follows, therefore, the owner and insurance company are both liable in such an event.." 14. The compensation is to be paid to the workman in terms of Workmen's Compensation Act. Section 2(1)(n) defines workman. Section-3 mandates that employer is liable and Section-4 quantifies the compensation payable.” 13. Having regard to the above discussion, it is held that the insurer cannot prefer an appeal on the grounds available to him under Section 149(2) of the MV Act. Section 2(1)(n) defines workman. Section-3 mandates that employer is liable and Section-4 quantifies the compensation payable.” 13. Having regard to the above discussion, it is held that the insurer cannot prefer an appeal on the grounds available to him under Section 149(2) of the MV Act. The appeal is to be filed as per the mandate of Section 30 of the WC Act. 14. The learned counsel for the insurer/appellant argued that at the time of accident, the driving licence of the driver was not valid and effective as the same was not renewed. 15. The factum that the driver was having the driving licence and was employed by the owner to drive the offending tractor has been admitted. Thus, the relation of ‘master-servant’ between the owner/insured and the deceased driver is not in dispute. 16. The argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant merits to be rejected for the reason that the driver, who also lost his life in the accident, had applied for the renewal of the licence within 30 days from the expiry of the driving licence. Copy of the driving licence has been proved on record as Ext.R-2/B, which shows that the driving licence was valid upto 26th January, 2008 and the deceased had applied for the renewal thereof on 16th February, 2008 i.e. within one month as per the limit prescribed by Section 15 of the MV Act. The Commissioner has also discussed the said fact while returning findings on issues No.2, 3 and 5. 17. Having said so, it can safely be inferred that the deceased driver had applied for the renewal of the driving licence well within the limit prescribed, but, unfortunately, after applying for renewal, he died in the accident. 18. This Court in FAO No. 475 of 2010 titled as Lalit Kumar vs. Sanjiv Kumar and others, decided on 3rd June, 2016, has held that in case the application is made to the concerned Authority within one month after the expiry of the driving licence and the same is not renewed within the prescribed period for the reason that the application was not complete, it is the duty of the Authority to reject the application and inform the applicant accordingly. It was further held that the delay in renewing the licence, in such circumstances, is not on the part of the driver, but is attributable to the Authority concerned. It was further held that the delay in renewing the licence, in such circumstances, is not on the part of the driver, but is attributable to the Authority concerned. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 14, 15, 19, 21 and 22 of the said decision hereunder:- “14. The driver of the offending truck had applied for renewal of the driving licence on 7th May, 2007, which had expired on 16th April, 2007. 15. Section 15 of the Act deals with the renewal of driving licences, which mandates that a driver is supposed to apply for the renewal of the licence within one month of its expiry. It is apt to reproduce Sub Section (1) of Section 15 of the Act hereunder:- “15. Renewal of driving licences. – (1) Any licensing authority may, on application made to it, renew a driving licence issued under the provisions of this Act with effect from the date of its expiry; Provided that in any case where the application for the renewal of a licence is made more than thirty days after the date of its expiry, the driving licence shall be renewed with effect from the date of its renewal: Provided further that where the application is for the renewal of a licence to drive a transport vehicle or where in any other case the applicant has attained the age of forty years, the same shall be accompanied by a medical certificate in the same form and in the same manner as is referred to in subsection (3) of section 8, and the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 8 shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to every such case as they apply in relation to a learner's licence.” 19. While reaching at the above conclusion, the Tribunal has lost sight of the fact that it is the duty of the Authority concerned to renew the licence within time. In the instant case, the driver applied for renewal on 7th May, 2007, i.e. well within time prescribed under the Act, but the licence was not renewed for the reason that it was sent for verification, as stated by RW-2 Vinod Kumar. In the instant case, the driver applied for renewal on 7th May, 2007, i.e. well within time prescribed under the Act, but the licence was not renewed for the reason that it was sent for verification, as stated by RW-2 Vinod Kumar. In case the application for renewal was not complete and was not accompanied with the requisite fee, it was the duty of the Authority concerned to reject the application and inform the applicant accordingly, which has not been done in the instant case. Thus, the delay in renewing the licence is not on the part of the driver, but is attributable to the Authority concerned. 21. Section 146 of the Act mandates that the owner of a vehicle is under statutory obligation to get the vehicle insured, the aim and object of which is to protect third party interest. 22. Having glance of the above discussion, it is held that the Tribunal has wrongly saddled the owner with the liability. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the owner is allowed and the insurer is saddled with the liability.” 19. The second question of law framed cannot be said to be substantial question of law and also does not arise out of the pleadings in view of the order made by the Commissioner and for the reasons stated hereinabove. 20. Having said so, there is no merit in the appeal filed by the appellant and the same is dismissed. Consequently, the impugned order is upheld. The Registry is directed to release the amount of compensation in favour of the claimants forthwith through their bank accounts, strictly in terms of the impugned award.