JUDGMENT : SANKAR ACHARYYA, J. This application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short Cr.P.C.), 1973 has been filed by petitioner M/S. ABG Kolkata Container Terminal Pvt. Ltd. against opposite party S.K. Dwivedi, Deputy Director (Safety), Inspectorate Dock Safety, Ministry of Labour, Government of India (hereinafter call as complainant) for quashing of the proceeding of the Case no. 152 of 2013 under Section 14 (2) (b) of the Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Act, 1986 for breach of regulations 85 (6), 111 and 116 (3) read with Regulation 7 (4) (b) of the Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Regulations 1990 pending before the learned Metropolitan magistrate, 19th Court at Calcutta including the order dated 02.12.2013 passed in connection therewith. The petitioner company is one of the two accused persons in Case No. 152 of 2013 brought by opposite party as complainant and that case is pending in the 19th Court of Metropolitan magistrate, Calcutta. Petitioner Company is engaged in business of import and export in the port of Calcutta. In the process of said business the petitioner company undertakes loading/unloading of containerized cargo from ships which is a dock work as per law. On 03.12.2012 in the second shift containers were being loaded on to the ship from shore at 05 NSO with the help of a trailer and reach stacker (RST No. 5) by petitioner company. At about 16:00 hours (4:00 p.m.) a dock worker Swapan Kumar Dubey, porter of Kolkata Port Trust was proceeding through block No. 9 of Container Parking Yard (in short C.P.Y.). Suddenly said RST No. 5 (Supra) of petitioner company hit Shri Dubey moving the RST reverse direction resulting fall of Shri Dubey on the ground and his right leg was run over by rear wheel of the RST. His leg was badly injured and ultimately it was amputed. Alleging such facts the complaint was lodged against petitioner company and its managing Director as accused persons under Section 14 (2) (b) of the Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Act, 1986 on the ground of Violation of Regulations 85 (6), 111 and 116 (3) read with Regulations 7 (4) (b) of the Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Regulations, 1990. Receiving such complaint learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 2nd Court, Calcutta took cognizance of the offence on 02.12.2013 and order was passed for issuing summons upon the accused persons on that date. In the instant application the petitioner has stated in substance that the complaint was lodged by opposite party in mechanical way and cognizance was taken mechanically by learned Metropolitan Magistrate without application of judicial mind. According to petitioner, the accident occurred for vicarious negligence of Kolkata Port Trust and the injured Swapan Kumar Dubey and not for any negligence on the part of petitioner Company or its officers. The regulations 85 (6), 111, 116 (3), 7 (4) (b) were not violated by petitioner company or its officers. In substance, petitioner denies its responsibility for any accident at Container Parking Yard where the actual accident took place. The Kolkata Port Trust did not take safety measures negligently for which the accident occurred and the injured was crossing the prohibited area negligently for which he had to face the unfortunate accident. As such, the injured violated the Regulation 85 (12) of the Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Regulations, 1990. Since the accident did not occur at hatchway the petitioner does not admit its any responsibility in view of Regulation 85 (6) read with Regulation 75 of that Regulation. Kolkata Port Trust violated the Regulation 83 not making demarcation of terminal road and pedestrian traffic as safety measures negligently. Port authority is responsible for training of dock workers in terms of Regulation 111 and 7 (1) of the said Regulations. Petitioner has alleged that in the complaint there is no particular to establish violation of Regulation 116 (3) of the said Regulations. Contending inter alia the petitioner claimed the taking of cognizance by the Metropolitan Magistrate as mechanical act without application of judicial mind and bad in law. Petitioner prays for quashing the proceeding in the Court below. It is almost undisputed that accident occurred on 03.12.2012 at about 4:00 p.m. when petitioner’s RST No. 5 rear wheel ran over the leg of the victim Swapan Kumar Dubey on his way through block no. 9 of CPY within the Kolkata Port. Petitioner prays for quashing the proceeding in the Court below. It is almost undisputed that accident occurred on 03.12.2012 at about 4:00 p.m. when petitioner’s RST No. 5 rear wheel ran over the leg of the victim Swapan Kumar Dubey on his way through block no. 9 of CPY within the Kolkata Port. In this case the petitioner’s side had made lengthy arguments on various angles of legal technicality with reference to different Regulations of Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Regulations, 1990 and meaning of the term ‘hatchway’ to deny its responsibility in the alleged accident. Undisputedly the victim Swapan Kumar Dubey is a ‘dock worker’ within the meaning of Section 2 (d) of the Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Act, 1986. It appears to me that at the initial stage of lodging the complaint before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate determining question was not to decide the case finally after conclusion of trial. Learned Magistrate took cognizance of the alleged offence on the basis of face value of the prima facie case. Issue of process against accused depends upon allegations made against accused. Receiving and on perusal of a complaint of a Public Officer there was no wide scope before the Magistrate to finally determine as to whether the accused is actually guilty of the alleged offence or not. Process is issued only if it is prima facie established that there are materials for proceeding against the accused to consider whether the accused is guilty or not. In the instant case at the stage of taking cognizance it was not open before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate to hold finally that although the petitioner company works within the Port complex with machineries where dock workers work for the port the petitioner company has no responsibility of training up its workers for working in dock area and to abide by the relevant Regulations of Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Regulations, 1990. Prosecution against the accused persons is permissible under Section 15 of the Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Act, 1986 in respect of the allegation of the offence punishable under Section 14 (2) of the Act. Section 15 of the Act reads as follows:- “15. Prosecution against the accused persons is permissible under Section 15 of the Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Act, 1986 in respect of the allegation of the offence punishable under Section 14 (2) of the Act. Section 15 of the Act reads as follows:- “15. Determination of the persons responsible for the offence in certain cases.-If the person committing an offence made punishable by this Act or the regulations or any abetment thereof is a firm or other association of individuals or a company or a local authority, all or any of the partners or members of directors thereof as well as the firm, association of individuals, company or local authority shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence or abetment and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly : Provided that where a firm, association or company has given notices in writing to the Chief Inspector and the Inspector of the port where any dock work is being carried that it has nominated,- (a) In the case of a firm, any of its partners; (b) In the case of an association, any of its members; (c) In the case of a company, any of its directors, who is resident, in each case in any place to which this Act extends and who is in each case either in fact in charge of the management of, or holds the largest number of shares in, such firm, association or company, to assume the responsibility of the person in charge of any dock work for the purposes of this Act, such partner, member or director, as the case may be, shall, so long as he continues to so reside and be in charge or hold the largest number of shares as aforesaid, be deemed to be the person in charge of such dock work for the purposes of this Act unless a notice in writing cancelling his nomination or stating that he has ceased to be a partner, member or director, as the case may be, is received by the Chief Inspector”. In the instant case if the complaint in its entirety establishes by its face value it constitute an offence punishable under Section 14 (2) of that Act against the accused persons and so it cannot be considered as rarest of rare cases for invoking inherent power of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, this case is not considered as a fit case to quash the proceeding as prayed for. This Court follows the principle in this regard as discussed in the case of Haryana and Ors. Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors. reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 which has been cited by learned advocate for the petitioner. Arguments of learned advocate for the opposite party in the same tune of above observations are accepted. At the time of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the decisions in the cases of Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli Rangawalla Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1965 SC 1616 , Suleman Rahiman Mulani and Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1968 SC 829 , Kishan Chand and Anr. Vs. The State of Haryana reported in 1970 (3) SCC 904 and Public Prosecutor Vs. Pitchaiah Moonpanar alias Pitchaich Pillai reported in AIR 1970 Madras 198 in support of his arguments. On going through the said decisions it appears that none of the said cases dealt with any question of quashing a proceeding at the initial stage of the proceeding of Trial Court. That apart, the case discussed in AIR 1965 SC 1616 is quite different in nature from this case. In the instant case Section 15 of the Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Act, 1986 is applicable and provisions of said Section are wide enough to implicate the accused persons including the petitioner company but such provisions were not applicable in the case of Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli Rangawalla (supra). In the case in our hand it is almost admitted that the RST- 5 caused the accident and said RST- 5 is owned by Petitioner Company and it was also in operation under the management of petitioner company at the time of accident. In the case in our hand it is almost admitted that the RST- 5 caused the accident and said RST- 5 is owned by Petitioner Company and it was also in operation under the management of petitioner company at the time of accident. In the case of Suleman Rahiman Mulani (supra) there was no direct nexus between death of the victim and rash and negligent act of accused but here such nexus is prima facie established from the alleged facts and circumstances read with the provisions of Section 15 of the Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Act, 1986. In the case of Kishan Chand and Anr. (supra) the case of Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli Rangawalla (supra) was referred. The ratio of said judgment of Kishan Chand case also does not improve the position of petitioner of this case at this stage. The case of Hon’ble Madras High Court reported in AIR 1970 Madras 198 (supra) has discussed a case of death of several persons due to collapse of a building and in that case negligent act of masons alleged but the masons were not found guilty finally. Nature of alleged offence in that case is not at all similar to this case and thus said decision also does not fortify the claim of the petitioner in this case. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner also cited the decisions in the cases of Pradip Churiwala and Anr. Vs. Dilip Kumar Nemani reported in 2003 C Cr.LR (Cal) 249, Tapas Sarkar Vs. State reported in (2009) 2 C Cr. LR (Cal) 926 and Shyamapada Mandal Vs. The State of West Bengal reported in (2010) 2 C Cr.LR (Cal) 133 in support of his arguments that in the present case learned Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance mechanically. I also agree that taking cognizance in a criminal case is not a mechanical process as observed by a learned Single Judge of this High Court in the case of Pradip Churiwala and Anr. Vs. Dilip Kumar Nemani (Supra). But I find some distinguishing factor relating to the facts of that case with the present case. In the said reported case the order of taking cognizance in question was a rubber stamp while in the instant case such order is handwritten. It seems to me at least the matter of taking cognizance was written by the learned Magistrate himself. But I find some distinguishing factor relating to the facts of that case with the present case. In the said reported case the order of taking cognizance in question was a rubber stamp while in the instant case such order is handwritten. It seems to me at least the matter of taking cognizance was written by the learned Magistrate himself. That apart it is well-established here that learned Magistrate perused the complaint lodged before it. The complaint appears to me as filed within the limitation period of taking cognizance under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. As such, it is obvious that learned Magistrate applied his conscious judicial mind. So, in this case at this stage it cannot be said that learned Magistrate did not exercise his judicial mind. Therefore, in this case, the proceeding pending in the trial Court cannot be quashed as could be done in the reported case of 2003 C Cr.LR (Cal) 249. In my opinion, the case of Tapas Sarkar Vs. State reported in (2009) 2 C Cr. LR (Cal) 926 is totally dissimilar to this case. Said case of Tapas Sarkar (supra) dealt with matters of granting and/or cancellation of bail but such matters are absent in the case in hand. The case of Shyamapada Mandal Vs. The State of West Bengal reported in (2010) 2 C Cr.LR (Cal) 133 has also no similarity with this case. As such, said reported case also does not fortify the petitioner in this case from its taking part in the impugned proceeding pending in the trial Court. Considering all the matters discussed above, I find no substance in the present application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore, this application stands dismissed on contest. However, no order as to costs is passed in this case. Urgent certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied promptly to the parties or their advocates on record observing all legal requisite formalities.